Incorporating Policymaker Costs and Political Competition into Rent-Seeking Games

We incorporate policymaker costs of supplying rents and variable intensities of competition among rent seekers into the standard rent-seeking game. By incorporating these aspects, the game has greater verisimilitude to the lobbying process. The first aspect captures the fact that in rent-seeking contests there is a positive probability that neither firm will obtain the rent. The second aspect captures the fact that firms seeking different rents still must compete for policymakers' resources. We find that lobbying expenditures, rent-seeking profits, and rent dissipation depend on the intensity of competition and the value of the rent relative to policymaker costs. For example, if the value of the rent is sufficiently high relative to policymakers' costs, an increase in the intensity of political competition will increase lobbying expenditures; otherwise, expenditures fall as competitive intensity increases. In addition, the model establishes pure-strategy equilibria with underdissipation where only mixed-strategy equilibria exist in the standard model.     

Weitzman’s rule with market distortions

Weitzman (1976) provides a foundation for net national product (NNP) of a competitive economy as the annuity equivalent of the present discounted value of maximized consumption. This paper considers how Weitzman’s rule should be modified if the competitive equilibrium is affected by the presence of market distortions. The paper first examines the model with external effects of capital in which there are spillovers of knowledge. The paper also studies the model with policy interventions where the policy maker seeks the second best allocation. The central concern of the paper is to elucidate the factors that generate a divergence between net national product and the welfare equivalence of maximized consumption. In discussing each model, the paper presents a typical example that has been widely discussed in the literature.     

Expectation-driven fluctuations and welfare loss under free trade in two-country models

This paper investigates the interlinkage in the business cycles based on expectation-driven fluctuations of large-country economies in a free-trade equilibrium. We consider a two-country, two-good, two-factor general equilibrium model with sector-specific externalities. We show that some country's expectation-driven fluctuations can spread throughout the world once trade opens even if the other country has determinacy under autarky. We thus prove that under free trade, globalization and market integration can have destabilizing effects on a country's competitive equilibrium. Finally, we characterize a configuration in which opening to international trade improves the stationary welfare at the world level but deteriorates the stationary welfare of the country that imports investment goods and exports consumption goods. We conclude that in opposition to the standard belief, international trade might not be beneficial to all trading partners in the long run.     

Capital market distortion,firm entry and wage inequality

Distortions in the capital market are notable in developing economies like China. By building up a dual production structure with oligopolistic competition in urban manufacturing, this paper investigates the distributional and welfare effects of capital market distortions. We find that in the short run, an increase in the capital market distortion in favor of urban firms can lower both the skilled and unskilled wages. However, in the long run, the preferential policy on reducing capital cost to the urban sector attracts new entry of firms, which can worsen the skilled-unskilled wage inequality in the economy. This firm-entry effect of the capital market distortion on wage inequality is empirically confirmed for China.     

Impacts of the Doha Round on Brazilian,Chinese and Indian agribusiness

The central themes to be addressed during the Doha Round of the world trade negotiations are the reduction of the agricultural production and export subsidies and improved market access for agricultural and non-agricultural goods. The G-20 group wields enough power to press negotiations at the Doha Round toward lower agricultural trade barriers and production and export subsidies. The objective of this study is to determine the impacts of the Doha Round on the economies of Brazil, China, and India. The Global Trade Analysis Project's (GTAP) general equilibrium model and database (version 7) are used. The Doha Round scenarios simulated in this paper consider the WTO agricultural production and export subsidy reduction requirement, and the application of the Harbinson approach, and Swiss formula to reduce import tariffs. Brazil and China present the highest GDP growth rate varying from 0.4 % to 1.4%. India shows a negative GDP growth rate in all scenarios, except in that which replicates the Uruguay Round. The welfare gains are positive, but small, for Brazil, China and India. The GDP loss observed in the economies of the EU25 and the US may make it difficult to reach a trade agreement at the Doha Round.     

The Effects of Temporary Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilizations when Money Serves a Productive Role

This paper investigates the effects on production, consumption, and welfare that result from a temporary exchange-rate-based (ERB) stabilization plan. The analysis is based on a dynamic optimizing model of a small open economy where real money is assumed to be a factor that is used in the production of goods. The assumption of money serving a productive role makes the model capable of generating a boom-bust cycle in output, as is often experienced during ERB stabilization plans. It is shown that if the stabilization plan is expected not to be too short and/or the costs associated with the breakdown of the plan are not too high, a temporary decrease in the rate of exchange rate devaluation will increase economic welfare. It is also found that if some of the increase in output in the initial phase of the stabilization plan is saved for periods after the plan has broken down, there is a greater chance that the ERB plan will increase economic welfare. On the other hand, if the plan is not sufficiently credible at the outset, or there is not enough intertemporal transference of output, the stabilization plan is likely to be harmful to economic welfare.

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Protection versus Free Trade: Lobbying Competition between Domestic and Foreign Firms

This article considers how political interaction between policymakers and domestic and foreign firms endogenously determines tariff rates. We show that because of lobbying competition between foreign and domestic firms, even a less competitive foreign firm can successfully elicit a tariff reduction under reasonable conditions. Moreover, lobbying competition may also increase the level of aggregate domestic welfare when the market powers of the competing firms are sufficiently alike.     

Market integration and imperfect competition in labor and product markets

We analyze the consequences of product market integration in a simple two-country, two-sector, general-equilibrium model with imperfect competition due to economies of scale. In contrast to the existing literature we take explicit account of the labor-market structures in the integrating economies. It turns out that the specific labor-market structures are very important for how integration affects total production and product market structure in a particular economy. However, integration always gives rise to a welfare gain in both economies.I have benefitted from comments by an anonymous referee, a coeditor of this journal, and by participants in a workshop arranged by CIE in April 1992, at the University of Aarhus, and by participants at the EEA conference in Dublin 1992.     

How China's accession to the WTO affects global welfare?

Conventional wisdom suggests that, if a large nation reduces tariffs, the Rest of the World (RoW) as a whole should immediately experience gains from trade. However, little simulation evidence has been provided to evaluate the welfare effects of China's tariff reduction upon its WTO accession on each of its trade partners. This paper addresses the above issue under both the perfectly competitive model and the monopolistic competition framework à la Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Melitz (2003). Armed by the method of Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2007, 2008) to quantify the individual countries' responses to the “China (trade liberalization) shock” at equilibrium, we could check the extent to which global welfare benefit from the import tariff reduction after China's entry into the WTO. The quantitative results show that, both China and the RoW benefit from Chinese participation into the WTO, with estimated welfare gains falling in a range of [1.4697%, 3.8743%] and [0.0743%, 0.1015%], respectively. That is to say, about 58.24% of total benefits extracted from China's accession into the WTO worldwide flow to countries other than China under perfect competition; while under monopolistic competition, the whole world enjoys a 0.1571% welfare increases if firms' entry is restricted, of which 42.64% are injected into the RoW, an equivalent amount of 23.3903 billion US dollars. Since allowing for firms' entry and exit would lead to adjustments in both aggregate price indices and government tariff revenues, welfare gains of the world significantly increase (0.2474%), but these adjustments would slightly distort the welfare changes for other countries in the sense that only 36.50%, which is equivalent to 32.1008 billion US dollars, overflow to the RoW. As a result, some countries gain more, while some less.     

The impact of e-commerce: It always benefits consumers, but may reduce social welfare

This paper investigates the impact of e-commerce on social welfare using a linear city model. Our model incorporates the diversity of consumers such that some can purchase the good via the Internet while others cannot. Our main result is as follows. The appearance of e-commerce enhances retail competition and always increases consumer surplus. However, total surplus does not necessarily improve. This is because the equilibrium market division between conventional stores and e-commerce is not socially optimal and efficiency loss of distribution accrues if the population of Internet shoppers is small and/or the cost of e-commerce is high. Our theoretical results indicate that the small e-commerce market share in the Japanese and US economies may result in welfare loss.     

State‐Owned Enterprises,Competition, and Disclosure

We develop a mixed‐duopoly model in which a private firm competes against a state‐owned enterprise (SOE) who cares about social welfare and is privately informed about market demand. When the SOE's social concerns are sufficiently important and when the market competitiveness is sufficiently low, the SOE commits to fully disclose its private information. Otherwise, the SOE commits to withhold its private information. When the disclosure equilibrium prevails, the private firm can be more profitable competing against an SOE than against another private firm. In this mixed‐duopoly setting, the equilibrium social welfare is maximized when the SOE puts a positive weight on both social welfare and its own profit. Our analysis has further implications for both mandatory disclosure and market entry.     

高端装备制造品出口复杂度及其影响因素研究--基于新兴经济体与发达经济体的比较分析

本文对新兴经济体和发达经济体高端装备制造品出口复杂度及其影响因素进行比较研究。从出口复杂度现状来看,当前发达经济体高端装备制造品出口复杂度较高,新兴经济体与其存在差距;不同行业的竞争态势存在差别,智能制造装备行业差距最大,其他行业差距较小。出口复杂度影响因素分析结果表明,发达经济体高端装备制造品出口复杂度主要受人均资本、贸易开放度和政府治理效力的正向推动,而新兴经济体受自然资源租金、科技研发和贸易开放度变量的正向影响更显著,行业间的差别使得相关影响因素的差异作用更明显。中国及主要新兴经济体应借鉴发达经济体的先进经验,从重点产业发展、基础要素投入、科研投入与人力资本协调、开放合作关系巩固等方面着手,提升产业竞争优势。     

Third-Degree Price Discrimination: Apology Not Necessary

Applied work in price discrimination often treats demand curves among multiple market segments as algebraically additive. Yet the welfare effects of multi-market (third degree) price discrimination depend on how the demand segments are added. Treating demands as geometrically additive yields the well known result that discrimination absent an increase in production diminishes Marshallian surplus. But if demands are treated as algebraically additive then discrimination increases welfare over uniform pricing. Quantity is identical in the three cases, so the effect is not due to market opening. Nor is the effect due to scale economies since marginal cost is assumed constant. Profit is always greater under discrimination, so the effect is due to distributional changes in consumer surplus. The model is restricted to linear demands and constant marginal cost but can be generalized for future work and policy analysis.     

处于产品成熟期的中小企业竞争策略研究

竞争策略是企业总体发展战略的一部分,是企业保持竞争优势和谋求利益的重要手段。把企业与外部环境联系起来并在该产业中建立竞争优势是制定竞争策略的根本。本文在产品生命周期和企业竞争战略理论的基础上,根据顾客价值空间维度,结合产品成熟期中小企业的竞争特征,着重从产品效用和价格两方面着手,探究基于效用和基于价格的基本竞争策略。结果表明成熟期的中小企业在运用基于效用维度基本竞争策略提高产品效用价值的同时,应采用基于价格维度的基本竞争策略降低产品售价。     

Regional monetary integration in the presence of two large countries: What modality makes sense for East Asia?

This paper analyzes the modalities of East Asian monetary integration by taking note of the relevance of two large economies, one outside the region (the United States) and one inside (Japan), for monetary policy making. Within the framework of a three-country model, it derives the social welfare of two regional economies and uses numerical calibration to show how it crucially depends on the specific modality of monetary integration. By using parameters obtained from the actual macroeconomic data for 1981–1996, we find that the smaller regional economy (Korea) always benefits from monetary integration, while the large regional economy (Japan) benefits from monetary integration only when it is asymmetric (such as a peg to a common basket or yenization), so that it can continue to enjoy some monetary autonomy. Symmetric integration, while not a viable option for East Asia in the short run, may become feasible in the long run if economic integration deepens sufficiently to produce convergence in economic structure and synchronization of business cycles.     

COMPETITIVE ISSUES IN THE TAIWANESE BANKING INDUSTRY: MERGERS AND UNIVERSAL BANKS

This paper investigates scale economies and scope economies in the Taiwanese banking system, looking beyond the market‐power (MP) and efficient‐structure (ES) hypotheses. Given the existence of overall economies of scale and the positive value of expansion path sub‐additivity, we conclude that there might be large increases in profits following mergers. Moreover, since the profit‐structure relationship after financial reform is determined by the relative‐market‐power hypothesis, this consolidation trend will not necessarily decrease the social benefit for Taiwanese consumers. With regard to scope economies and product‐specific economies of scale, we are unable to recommend whether Taiwanese banks should develop as specialized banks or diversified banks in the future. Finally, we find that risk indicators play an important role in explaining the observed variation in bank profitability, and present evidence that default risk and leverage risk have negative effects on the profits of banking, although the effect of portfolio risk is uncertain.     

Unemployment with trade and firm heterogeneity

By specifying the setting of the footloose capital model with firm heterogeneity, this paper examines the effects of trade liberalization on unemployment through two different mechanisms: firstly, we embed search frictions into the labor market; and secondly, we consider fair wages as the source of unemployment. In the model with search frictions, we find that both the expected wage and employment rate could be higher for a small country with better search technology. In the fair wage setting, the results show that an increase in trade freeness increases the unemployment rate of the large (small) country when the trade freeness is sufficiently high (low). Finally, we try to compare the welfare levels under different scenarios and discover that unemployment may lead to a deterioration in the welfare gains from trade.     

Market Power of Domestic Marketers and its Influence on the Consequences of the Korea–US and Korea–Australia FTAs on the Beef Market

Domestic, US and Australian beef, which are differentiated by country of origin, are sold in Korea. In this differentiated product market, tariff reductions through Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are expected to strengthen the competitiveness of imported beef and, therefore, to mitigate the effects arising from the market power of domestic marketers. The present study develops a simulation model that evaluates this mitigating effect by explicitly reflecting the market structure that domestic beef marketers constitute. The simulation results indicate that the farm-retail marketing margin would decrease by 10.59% or 6.79% due to the Korea–US and Korea–Australia FTAs, respectively, if domestic beef marketers formed a cartel or an oligopoly market (i.e. the degree of market power is 0.5), while the marketing margin under a competitive market scenario is simulated to have no change. The value of beef production would decrease by 1009 million dollars if the marketers form a cartel and hence exercise monopoly power. The FTAs are simulated to reduce the value of beef production by 564 million dollars under the competitive market scenario.     

Bank competition and monetary policy

There is an apparent theoretical discrepancy between the effects of monetary policy shocks on economies with differently competitive banking sectors. We employ cross-country data to investigate this hypothesis with two different approaches. First, using aggregate data we analyze the correlation between two indices: (i) a cumulative impulse response function providing an index of the effect of monetary policy shocks; and (ii) Panzar and Rosse's H-statistic as an index of the state of bank competition. Second, using disaggregated data we regress bank lending on the interaction of bank competition and monetary policy shocks. The first approach does not provide any evidence of a relationship between monetary policy shocks and bank competition. However, the second approach suggests that competition in the banking industry leads to smaller monetary policy effects on bank lending.