Risk aversion and asymmetry in procurement auctions: Identification,estimation and application to construction procurements

This article studies a model of asymmetric risk averse bidding within the independent private value paradigm. The inherent asymmetry in cost and risk aversion imposes an original restriction on the observed bid data, an exact equality which leads to the model semiparametric identification and estimation. The unobserved arguments of this equality need to be simulated in order to estimate the bidders’ Constant Relative Risk Aversion or Constant Absolute Risk Aversion parameters and their heterogeneous cost distributions. In the Los Angeles City Hall construction contracts offered between 1994 and 2003, the model and methodology help reveal that financial asymmetries affect the firms’ cost distribution, while experience influences their degree of risk aversion.     

Semiparametric efficient estimation of dynamic panel data models

This paper extends the semiparametric efficient treatment of panel data models pursued by Park and Simar [Park, B.U., Simar, L., 1994. Efficient semiparametric estimation in stochastic frontier models. Journal of the American Statistical Association 89, 929–936] and Park et al. [Park, B.U., Sickles, R.C., Simar, L., 1998. Stochastic frontiers: a semiparametric approach. Journal of Econometrics 84, 273–301; Park, B.U., Sickles, R.C., Simar, L., 2003. Semiparametric efficient estimation of AR(1) panel data models. Journal of Econometrics 117, 279–309] to a dynamic panel setting. We develop a semiparametric efficient estimator under minimal assumptions when the panel model contains a lagged dependent variable. We apply this new estimator to analyze the structure of demand between city pairs for selected U.S. airlines during the period 1979 I–1992 IV.     

Efficient estimation in dynamic conditional quantile models

In this paper we consider the problem of semiparametric efficient estimation in conditional quantile models with time series data. We construct an M-estimator which achieves the semiparametric efficiency bound recently derived by Komunjer and Vuong (forthcoming). Our efficient M-estimator is obtained by minimizing an objective function which depends on a nonparametric estimator of the conditional distribution of the variable of interest rather than its density. The estimator is new and not yet seen in the literature. We illustrate its performance through a Monte Carlo experiment.     

Defensive sniping and efficiency in simultaneous hard-close proxy auctions

A well-known myopic bidding strategy fails to support an equilibrium of simultaneous ascending proxy auctions for heterogeneous items when a hard-close rule is in place. This is because, in common with the single-auction case, last minute bidding (sniping) is a best response to naive behaviour. However, a modification to the myopic strategy in which all bidders submit an additional bid in the closing stages of the auction–a practice I call ‘defensive sniping’–is shown to yield an efficient, belief-free equilibrium of such environments. This equilibrium is essentially unique within the class of belief-free, efficient equilibria.     

Corruption and auctions

We investigate how corruption affects the outcome of a first-price auction (bidding behavior, efficiency and the seller’s expected revenue). The auctioneer approaches the winner to offer the possibility of a reduction in his bid in exchange for a bribe. The bribe can be a percentage of the difference between the winning and the second-highest bid or a fixed amount. We show that there exists a symmetric bidding strategy equilibrium that is monotone, i.e., higher valuation buyers bid higher. Corruption does not affect efficiency but both the auctioneer’s expected bribe and the seller’s expected revenue depend on the format of the bribe payments. We also find the optimal bribe scheme.     

浅谈我国招投标形成废标的原因及其应对措施

招投标过程中导致废标的因素很多,如投标人以他人名义投标、串通投标、以行贿手段谋取中标或以其他弄虚作假方式投标、投标人的恶性竞标、招标人本身的因素等。对这些因素进行分析有利于减少或避免废标的产生。本文通过对废标的原因剖析,对其所产生的后果进行应对并提出防范措施,使招投标工作能顺利进行。     

铁路投标施工组织设计的编制质量研究

投标施工组织设计在投标报价中的地位越来越被铁路施工企业所重视,施工企业在日趋激烈的招投标的竞争中,求生存,求发展,就必须注重投标施工组织设计的编制,提高投标人员的整体素质,使投标报价更趋合理,达到既能中标又能赢利的目的。本文探讨了在工程投标中,投标施工组织设计的特点、对投标报价的影响及目前所存在问题,提出了提高投标施工组织设计编制质量的具体建议。     

建设项目招标投标阶段的造价管理

文章介绍了建设项目招标投标的概念及特征,分析了建设项目招标投标阶段工程造价管理的现状,阐述了建设项目招标投标的性质、意义及原则,探讨加强建设项目招标投标阶段造价管理应采取的措施。     

合成标底评标法在工程招标中的应用

阐述我国目前的几种评标方法,简要说明其优缺点,从现阶段的招标方法延伸出较为科学的合成标底评标法,并用案例说明合成标底评标法在招标工作中的应用。     

多单位网上拍卖中的托投标分析

在独立私有价值的多单位网上英式拍卖中，诚实的竞标者能够采用对抗性的竞标策略来降低卖者参与托投标的激励，然而即使考虑了诚实竞标者对于托投标的策略性响应，托投标对于卖者而言依然是有利可图的。更为有效地阻止托投标的措施可能包括吸引更多的潜在竞标者，并限制在单次拍卖中销售的物品数量。同时考虑了卖者对于这种对抗性竞标策略的策略响应，求解了卖者的最优托投标，结论表明无论最优的托投标是唯一的还是多重的，卖者的最优策略是在开始使用低的托投标，在观察到之前的竞标信息之后通过动态调整将托投标设定到最优水平。     

Optimal decisions in foreign exchange bidding markets

I characterize optimal bidding decisions in bidding markets where each agent does not perceive she can significantly affect the market outcome. Using a foreign exchange bidding framework to provide a micro-foundation for the shape of a bidder's payoff function, I show that (1) in a discriminatory auction a bidder bids for a price that equals the value of the marginal product of her bid quantity, and (2) in a competitive auction a bidder bids for a price that equals the value of the average product of her bid quantity. An example illustrates the comparative properties of these solutions.     

建设项目招标投标阶段的造价管理

文章介绍了建设项目招标投标的概念及特征，分析了建设项目招标投标阶段工程造价管理的现状，阐述了建设项目招标投标的性质、意义及原则，探讨加强建设项目招标投标阶段造价管理应采取的措施。     

公路工程报价编制与投标策略

在公路工程项目投标过程中,为了顺利中标,投标报价起着关键性作用。本文通过阐述投标报价的编制,同时提出相应的投标策略,以及常用的调价手法等,进而为竞标企业参与招标提供参考依据。     

Asymmetry in first‐price auctions with affiliated private values

Collusion and heterogeneity across firms may introduce asymmetry in bidding games. A major difficulty in asymmetric auctions is that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies are solutions of an intractable system of differential equations. We propose a simple method for estimating asymmetric first‐price auctions with affiliated private values. Considering two types of bidders, we show that these differential equations can be rewritten using the observed bid distribution. We establish the identification of the model, characterize its theoretical restrictions, and propose a two‐step non‐parametric estimation procedure for estimating the private value distributions. An empirical analysis of joint bidding in OCS auctions is provided. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

谈信息化工程招标投标现状

招标投标是市场经济体制下广泛采用的完成工程交易的主要方式,通过公开招标和邀请招标等不同的招标方式,选择报价低、技术强、信誉好的承包商,有效遏制不正当竞争行为,有利于创造公平竞争的市场环境。当前,我国工程招标投标市场中还存在许多问题,不正当的竞争导致各种豆腐渣工程频现。如何保障双方利益,携手合作、实现共赢是当前急需解决的问题。     

政府采购网上招标初探

随着招投标业务的不断深入开展和电子信息技术的不断成熟,电子系统和软件逐渐在招投标相关领域得到应用,网上招标成为传统招标方式的一次革新。文章根据某药品网上招标项目的运作过程,分析政府采购网上招标的作用和意义。     

如何科学合理编制工程投标报价

投标报价是关系到工程能否中标的关键。此文从投标准备工作、投标报价编制、工程成本分析、合理确定投标报价等几个方面论述了如何科学、合理的编制工程投标报价。     

关于建筑工程施工投标报价的策略试析

由于我国建筑行业的竞争日益激烈,对于企业而言要想中标则需要对投标报价策略进行优化。尤其是需要加强投标工程成本的计算,另外还要根据建筑企业内部的施工管理、财务管理、成本核算等多种变化因素进行综合调整,只有这样才能够实现科学的投标报价,为企业的发展带来稳定的经济效益。本文简单论述了建筑工程的投标报价的意义,分析了投标报价的类型并提出相关投标报价策略,希望对建筑行业的良性发展有所帮助。     

Fear of losing in a clock auction

We examine bidding behavior in a clock auction in which price is set by the lowest-accepted bid and provisional winners are reported each round (the LABpw auction). This format was used in the India 3G spectrum auction. In the standard theory, the auction performs poorly. In particular it yields lower revenues and is less efficient than the more standard clock auction with exit bids and highest-rejected-bid pricing (the HRB auction). However, the LABpw auction performs well in the lab, achieving higher revenues than the HRB auction. We show how fear of losing provides one motivation for the overbidding that causes higher revenues in the LABpw auction.     

Managerial incentives and corporate control auctions

An analysis of the sequence of bidding in corporate control contests involving white knights reveals a category of white knights termed as ‘delayed bid’ white knights who make their bid after two consecutive hostile bids. The ‘immediate bid’ white knights make their bid in relative haste after the first hostile bid. Overpayments by white knights are much larger for the ‘immediate bid’ white knights. An analysis of the respective compensation packages shows that the managers of the ‘immediate bid’ white knights have a lower proportion of their income linked to stock value (relative to their annual cash income) compared to ‘delayed bid’ white knights and hostile bidders.