The Effects of Securitization on Consumer Mortgage Costs

We examine the effects of securitization on two dimensions of consumer mortgage costs: coupon rates and loan origination fees. We find no evidence that securitization reduces the coupon rates on fixed- or adjustable-rate mortgages. Instead, securitization appears to lower mortgage loan origination fees, resulting in substantial savings for consumers. Securitization activity includes passthrough creation and collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO) creation. We test for differences between the effects of passthrough and CMO creation on primary mortgage costs. Surprisingly, these activities appear to have indistinguishable effects on loan rates and origination fees, suggesting that a large derivatives market for mortgage loans is not creating value for consumers.     

The Effect of Conforming Loan Status on Mortgage Yield Spreads: A Loan Level Analysis

The magnitude of the effect of government-sponsored enterprise purchases on primary mortgage market rates has been a difficult research question with differing data and competing methodologies producing varying results. Here we present a new approach using loan level data and controlling for credit risk differentials between conforming and nonconforming loans. Our method also addresses econometric problems of endogeneity and sample selection bias. We find that conforming loans have yield spreads about 5.5% lower compared to other loans on a risk-adjusted basis. This is lower than previous estimates appearing in the literature.     

Housing Finance in the 1980's

Strains evident in the housing finance system on the eve of the 80's suggest significant difficulties in meeting the housing demands of the decade ahead. The annual increase in residential mortgages outstanding had climbed to historic levels, relative to GNP, without raising residential construction spending above its ordinary share of GNP. This very weak housing bang for the mortgage buck is traceable, ultimately, to the soaring volume of sales in the used home market, relative to those in the new home market. With significant inflation rates continuing through the 1980's, mortgage lenders will be under great pressure from demands to refinance the existing housing stock, even if the rate of ownership turnover does not persist at the levels of the late 70's. And, as the dollar demands mount, for new and used housing purchases, lenders may find repayment flows from earlier loans continuing to provide a historically small fraction of the funds they need in supplying these demands.     

Owner-occupancy fraud and mortgage performance

We identify occupancy fraud—borrowers who misrepresent their occupancy status as owner-occupants rather than investors—in residential mortgage originations. Unlike previous work, we show that fraud was prevalent in originations not just during the housing bubble but also persists through more recent times. We also demonstrate that fraud is broad-based and appears in government-sponsored enterprise and bank portfolio loans, not just in private securitization; these fraudulent borrowers make up one third of the effective investor population. Occupancy frauds obtain credit at lower interest rates, suggesting a motivation for undertaking fraud. These fraudulent borrowers perform substantially worse than similar declared investors, defaulting at a 75% higher rate. We also provide evidence consistent with fraudulent borrowers’ defaults being more “strategic,” suggesting that this population poses a risk in the face of declining house prices.     

Potential Beneficiaries from Reverse Mortgage Products for Elderly Homeowners: An Analysis of American Housing Survey Data

A variety of reverse mortgage loan programs have been available to elderly households for over a decade. The number of unrestricted reverse mortgage loans issued by the private sector has been quite small. About 12,000 loans have been issued through mid-1992. Some researchers take this to mean that the size of the potential market for reverse mortgages is also quite small. Other researchers claim that current low levels of activity reflect supply and demand problems, but that the potential market is in fact quite large. This paper uses American Housing Survey (AHS) data to estimate the potential size of the market for unrestricted reverse mortgages. The 1989 national AHS shows that there are over twelve million elderly homeowners (age 62 and over) who own their homes free and clear. Depending on their income, age and the level of home equity, the group of households most likely to benefit from reverse annuity mortgages is considerably smaller. As one approach to defining a lower bound of the estimate of potential beneficiaries from reverse mortgages, we count the number of homeowners in a prime group consisting of the older elderly, aged 70 or above, with an annual income of $30,000 or less, with home equity between $100,000 and $200,000, who have lived in their homes for over ten years. We estimate that there are about 800,000 elderly households in this prime group. For such households, reverse mortgage payments could represent a substantial percentage increase in income; other definitions of target groups can also be explored using the tables provided. The paper uses the 1985 through 1988 AHS Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) surveys to identify areas that have a large number of elderly homeowners in the prime target group, and in which these homeowners represent a large fraction of the elderly homeowner population. These locations are likely targets for introduction of reverse mortgage products because any campaign can be targeted towards a high concentration of likely eligible beneficiaries.     

Determinants of Credit Spreads in Commercial Mortgages

This article examines the cross-sectional and time-series determinants of commercial mortgage credit spreads as well as the terms of the mortgages. Consistent with theory, our empirical evidence indicates that mortgages on property types that tend to be riskier and have greater investment flexibility exhibit higher spreads. The relationship between the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and spreads is relatively weak, which is probably due to the endogeneity of the LTV choice. However, the average LTV ratio per lender has a strong positive relation with credit spreads, which is consistent with the idea that lenders specialize in mortgages with either high or low levels of risk, and that high LTV mortgages require substantially higher spreads. Finally, we observe that spreads widen and mortgage terms become stricter after periods of poor performance of the real estate markets and after periods of greater default rates of outstanding real estate loans.     

Government Policies,Residential Mortgage Defaults and the Boom and Bust Cycle of Housing Prices

We develop a micro‐based macromodel for residential home prices in an economy where defaults on residential mortgages negatively affect housing prices. Our model enables us to study the impact of subprime defaults on prime borrowers and the impact of various government policies on the housing market boom and bust cycle. In this regard, our key conclusions are that (i) there is a contagion effect from subprime defaults to prime defaults due to the negative impact of subprime defaults and (ii) monetary policy is the most effective tool for decreasing mortgage defaults and increasing aggregate home prices in contrast to alternative government fiscal policies designed to loosen mortgage credit.     

Semivariance of Property Value Estimates as a Determinant of Default Risk

Standard practice in the residential mortgage underwriting industry is to estimate collateral values via independent appraisals conducted by third parties. This paper empirically examines the role of property value ( i.e. , appraisal) uncertainty as a determinant of default on residential mortgage loans. Based upon an analysis of 1,428 residential loans drawn from the portfolio of a national mortgage lender, we find evidence that semivariance in property value uncertainty is related to default risk. Specifically, subject properties that are valued above the sales price of recently sold "similar and proximate" properties show evidence of greater default risk. Interestingly, a variance (range) measure of property value uncertainty is not significantly related to default risk.     

Real Estate Investment Trusts, Small Stocks and Bid-ask Spreads

This study examines the liquidity of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), as measured by their bid-ask spread. We find that REIT spreads have increased over the period 1986–1990, are inversely related to market capitalization, and are similar in magnitude to spreads on other stocks of comparable size. Analysis of variance tests indicate that REIT spreads are similar across equity, mortgage and hybrid asset types. Multivariate regression results indicate that market capitalization is the primary determinant of REIT bid-ask spreads, and spreads are larger for National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) REITs than for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) REITs. The regression results also indicate that spreads are lower for equity REITs than for mortgage or hybrid REITs, and are inversely related to the fraction of the REIT's shares held by institutional investors. The similarity between REIT spreads and those of other common stocks holds in both bull and bear real estate markets and suggests that, from a liquidity perspective, REITs are similar to other common stocks.     

The Conditional Probability of Foreclosure: An Empirical Analysis of Conventional Mortgage Loan Defaults

This paper analyzes the factors affecting the conditional probability that defaulted residential mortgage loans will foreclose. We analyze a large national sample of conventional loans, which have been in default at least once during the 1988 to 1994 period. For such loans, lenders and borrowers either individually or jointly make choices which lead to the following outcomes: (1) resumption of payments, (2) termination by prepayment, or (3) foreclosure. Our estimates of a logit model indicate that termination option values and local area economic and housing market conditions affect default resolution probabilities. Perhaps more importantly, simulations using the logit model indicate that the efficiency of the default resolution process may be substantially improved by legal and regulatory reforms.     

The Termination of Subprime Hybrid and Fixed‐Rate Mortgages

Adjustable‐rate and hybrid loans have been a larger component of subprime mortgage lending in the mortgage market than prime lending. The typical adjustable‐rate loan in subprime is a hybrid of fixed and adjustable characteristics in which the first 2 years are fixed and the remaining 28 years adjustable. Hybrid loans terminate at elevated probabilities even before the first adjustment date. Hybrid loan terminations are sensitive to interest rates and teaser rates (payment shocks). Default probabilities increase dramatically when payment shocks are mixed with low or no equity in the home. This is the mixture of events that helped to trigger the 2007/2008 subprime mortgage crisis.     

Do Riskier Borrowers Borrow More?

Conventional wisdom in the mortgage industry holds that loan-to-value (LTV) ratios are positively correlated with mortgage default rates. However, not all empirical studies of mortgage loan performance support this view. This paper offers a theoretical signaling model of why the correlation between LTV ratios and default risk is contingent upon the default costs of the borrower. Specifically, the model proposes that when default costs are high there exists a separating equilibrium in which risky borrowers will self-select into lower LTV loans to reduce the probability of facing a costly default, while safe borrowers will self-select into higher LTV loans as a signal of their enhanced creditworthiness. This adverse selection process gives rise to the possibility of higher default probabilities for lower LTV loans. Conversely, when default costs are low the conventional result, in which risky borrowers select higher LTV loans than safe borrowers, is obtained. Empirical results, based on a sample of 859 single-family residential mortgage loans drawn from the portfolio of a national mortgage lender, are consistent with the separating equilibria predicted by the model.     

An Investigation of the Major Influences of Residential Liquidity: A Multivariate Approach

The liquidity of the single-family home has been potentially compromised by prevailing conventional mortgage market conditions in the 1980s. The primary objectives of this study are to investigate the degree of liquidity of a given residence, defined to incorporate both the "recovery-of-value" and "timeliness" dimensions, and the major influences upon such liquidity. The multivariate techniques of canonical correlation and multiple discriminant analysis are employed to identify those property characteristics and/or prevailing mortgage market conditions that most appreciably influence the liquidity of a residential listing.     

Subprime governance: Agency costs in vertically integrated banks and the 2008 mortgage crisis

Research summary: This study uses the 2008 mortgage crisis to demonstrate how the relationship between vertical integration and performance crucially depends on corporate governance. Prior research has argued that the vertical integration of mortgage origination and securitization aligned divisional incentives and improved lending quality. We show that vertical integration improved loan performance only in those firms with strong corporate governance and that this performance‐integration relationship strongly decreases and actually reverses as governance quality decreases. We interpret these findings as suggesting that the additional control afforded by vertical integration can, in the hands of poorly monitored managers, offset gains from aligned divisional incentives. These findings support the view that corporate governance influences the strategic outcomes of a firm, in our case, by influencing the effectiveness of boundary decisions. Managerial summary: One of the unanswered questions of the 2008 mortgage crisis is why some firms produced toxic mortgages and others did not. Many have argued that vertically integrated banks—banks that both originated and securitized mortgages—had incentives to monitor themselves and thereby avoid overaggressive lending and outright fraud. Yet many of the worst lenders, such as Washington Mutual and New Century Financial, were in fact integrated. This study shows that the behavior of these firms critically depended on their corporate governance. We find that poorly monitored executives used their additional control over the integrated businesses to issue low quality loans that supported short‐term growth. Our results suggest that governance is a crucial prerequisite for financial services, particularly for firms whose managers control multiple, interrelated businesses. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Residential Mortgage Markets: Current Developments and Future Prospects

Historical developments as well as current innovations have generated significant changes in the structure and operation of the residential mortgage market. General economic stability, a low inflation rate, growth of savings and loan associations, and strong consumer demand marked the fifteen-year period immediately following World War II. In contrast, the decade of the sixties was characterized by increased competition in the mortgage market, a series of credit crunches, and increased governmental activity. In reaction to these and related developments, current innovations affecting the mortgage market focus on design of new mortgage instruments, improvements in market efficiency, and reform of financial institutions. If history is a guide, it suggests that the residential mortgage market responds flexibly to adverse conditions.     

Residential Mortgage Credit Derivatives

As the fallout from subprime losses clearly demonstrates, the credit risk in residential mortgages is large and economically significant. To manage this risk, this article proposes the creation of derivative instruments based on the credit losses of a reference mortgage pool. We argue that these derivatives would enable banks to retain whole loans while also enjoying the capital benefits of hedging the credit risk in their mortgage portfolios. In comparisons of hedging effectiveness, the analysis shows that instruments based on credit losses outperform contracts based on house price appreciation.     

The Performance of Commercial Mortgages

This study examines the return characteristics of a large, well-diversified commercial mortgage portfolio. Mortgage-specific cash-flow histories are constructed for 2,480 loans originated over the period 1974 through 1990, and a contingent-claims approach to pricing risky debt is used to estimate inter-temporal market values. Quarterly holding-period returns are compared across selected mortgage groups and to alternate asset classes. Our findings suggest that both mortgage returns and volatility of return are comparable to those of other forms of fixed-income assets over the study period. Implied property price volatility is found to average 17%, a result significantly higher than reported in earlier studies. While mortgage returns are found to vary by property type and region of origin, cross correlation of returns is found to be high, illustrating the systematic effect of interest rates on the performance of commercial mortgages over the period 1974 through 1990. However, an increase in credit risk in the latter years of the study suggests that diversification may be a worthwhile objective for holders of these assets. We do not find evidence to suggest that abnormal returns were earned on commercial mortgage portfolios over the study period.     

Mortgage Brokers,Origination Fees,Price Transparency and Competition

This article examines the dynamics between mortgage broker competition, origination fees and price transparency. A reverse first‐price sealed‐bid auction model is used to motivate broker pricing behavior. Confirming the model predictions, our empirical analysis shows that increased mortgage brokerage competition at the Metropolitan Statistical Area level leads to lower fees. The findings are robust to different measures of fees as well as different measures of competition. We also provide evidence that broker competition reduces mortgage origination fees on retail (nonbrokered) loans as well. In addition, our results indicate that pricing complexity is an important determinant of fees, and increased broker competition is associated with a higher probability of a loan being priced with transparency. Our results suggest that mortgage brokers increase competition and lower fees in the mortgage market.     

Mortgage Default and Prepayment Risks among Moderate‐ and Low‐Income Households

Using a unique sample of community reinvestment loans, we study the propensity of very low‐income households to terminate a mortgage and compare it to the outcomes for low‐income and moderate‐income households. The results indicate that, even within moderate‐ and low‐income segments, lower or very low income is associated with higher default and lower prepayment probabilities. In addition, depending on how low the borrower's income is, classic determinants of loan termination such as credit scores, the amount of equity in the home and local labor market conditions can have different impacts on default and prepayment probabilities.     

Reverse Mortgages: Contracting and Crossover Risk

A pricing model is developed for a reverse mortgage contract where the borrower receives payments either as a lump sum or in an annuity while the loan balance accumulates as a claim against the house. No underwriting criteria on income are applied. One risk of default is that the borrower will remain in the house after the negatively amortizing loan balance exceeds the value of the house. An explicit pricing model of the reverse mortgage permits the evaluation of this default "crossover" option. Alternative methods involving life insurance contracts and securitization are compared as secondary market channels.