Market structure, pigouvian taxation, and welfare

Using a short-run partial equilibrium model of social welfare, this paper examines the social welfare implications of changing Pigouvian taxes under three markets: perfect competition, monopoly, and Cournot oligopoly. The result for perfect competition supports the earlier finding that Pigouvian taxation increases social welfare [Buchanan, 1969]. However, in contrast to the previous result that Pigouvian taxes lower welfare under monopoly, the authors show that if the noncompetitive distortion is small, these taxes might still be useful in correcting monopoly-generated externalities and in improving social welfare. Cournot firms react to the tax depending upon their individual perceptions of the gain in post-tax marginal revenue. Policy implications of the study's results are discussed.     

Shareholder Income Taxes and the Relation between Earnings and Returns*

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether and how shareholder‐level taxes affect earnings response coefficients (ERCs). Our tests indicate that when the tax rate on dividends increases, ERCs decrease for firms with high levels of dividend yield and whose marginal investor is likely to be an individual. For firms with high levels of share repurchase yield and whose marginal investor is likely to be an individual, an increase in dividend tax rate has no discernible effect on ERCs. These results are consistent with the notion that the tax penalty on dividends, relative to capital gains, reduces the earnings‐return relation.     

A choice‐theoretic analysis of a corporate tax holiday versus a subsidy

This paper attempts to compare the effect of a corporate tax holiday with that of a subsidy on the behaviour of the individual firm. Assuming the subsidy equals the amount of tax paid by a firm operating under the subsidy system, we find that the firm's net profit will be greater under the tax holiday than under the subsidy regime. Similarly, if the subsidy exceeds the tax by an amount that would equalize the profits made by the (“marginal”) firm under the two regimes, then it is found that firms with higher than “average” unit costs would opt for the subsidy system; conversely, firms with a low cost structure would maximize profits by selecting the tax holiday. Finally, a multiperiod analysis of the particular choice facing prospective manufacturers in Ciskei, shows that the firm would normally choose the subsidy system except if the current tax exceeded the subsidy at the output level representing maximum profit under the tax holiday.     

On Income Transfers and Equivalence Scales

This article focusses on the relations between equivalence scales and income transfers linked to household characteristics, also called demogrants. Since transfer payments have to be financed, the relation is analyzed in the framework of an optimal tax model. The – in a second-best sense – optimal demogrants and optimal marginal tax rate are characterised by their first-order conditions. Some general properties of the demogrant structure are derived and discussed. Finally, an adopted version of Stern's model for the numerical calculation of optimal taxes is used to obtain more explicit indications about how different factors affect the structure of demogrants and the marginal tax rate.     

Subsidizing Non-Polluting Goods vs. Taxing Polluting Goods for Pollution Reduction

Pigovian taxes on polluters are politically unpopular, but subsidies for non-polluting sources are politically attractive. This paper presents a linear demand and supply model and numerical example to explore the trade-offs between taxing polluting sources of a good versus subsidizing non-polluting sources of the same good. While the model (along with the associated numerical example) shows the optimality of Pigovian taxes, it also shows how much welfare is reduced if subsidies for nonpolluters are employed instead. Further, it shows the optimal tax, given any level of subsidy and the optimal subsidy, given any level of tax.     

基础设施建设支出、结构性减税与最优政策选择

财政政策的最优政策选择问题对于国家宏观调控政策的出台具有指导意义。既往的研究忽略了利用动态一般均衡的方法探求具有双重外部性的基础设施建设支出与结构性减税支出的政策选择问题。本文利用引入基础设施建设支出和结构性减税的新凯恩斯DSGE模型,测算比较基建支出和结构性减税的政策福利效应。研究表明：具有双重外部性的基础设施建设支出不仅可以通过提高生产效率的方式促进产出,还可以通过挤入居民消费的方式加强政策福利效应。经过测算,短期的基建支出乘数大于结构性减税的政策乘数。同时,基建支出长期平均产出乘数小于结构性减税的平均产出乘数。与结构性减税政策相比,增加基建支出对于财政资金有限的政府是短期内更加有效的产出刺激政策,但在长期中,结构性减税政策不仅具有较高的政策效应,还可以从消费、劳动、投资等角度实现结构性政策目标。进一步研究发现,地区经济发展水平的不同会导致各地区的最优政策选择存在差异性：发达地区可以通过结构性税收政策解决结构性问题的同时实现长期经济增长;而欠发达地区则更应该注重运用基础设施建设为主的支出政策以促进经济增长;但随着人口逐渐从欠发达地区流出,提高欠发达地区的基建支出是否是可行之策,还需要考虑区域协调发展等诸多因素。     

Estimating the Corrective Tax for Goods whose Consumption Affects the Consumer’s Health

Taxing goods whose consumption has an adverse impact on the consumer’s health appears to be gaining support. But the social benefit from taxes on these goods is debatable. This paper considers what the corrective tax on such a good is and applies this theory to one good whose health effects are well established. More specifically, we produce a formula for computing the corrective tax on a good whose consumption may adversely affect the health of the consumer, and then use this formula to calculate the corrective tax for one such good, cigarettes.     

Tax Incidence in Vietnam*

This paper examines the incidence of taxation in Vietnam, using data from the Living Standards Survey of 1997–1998 and an input–output matrix for 1997. The tax system in 1998 was slightly progressive, taking the equivalent of 7.8percent of spending for households in the lowest, and 10.3percent from households in the highest expenditure quintile. The replacement of the turnover tax by a value‐added tax in January 1999 made the system marginally more progressive, and the falling importance of taxes on trade has had a negligible effect on the overall incidence of the tax system. The tax system is progressive overall because business income taxes fall mainly on better‐off households; and low‐income households rely heavily on home consumption, which is untaxed. Against this, agricultural taxes and fees are highly regressive. The recent phasing out of the agricultural land use tax is making the tax system more progressive; however, efforts since 2004 to limit price increases for motor fuels have effectively provided a relatively greater subsidy to rich than to poor households.     

Transfer Pricing: Strategies,Practices, and Tax Minimization

Using a survey of tax executives from multinational corporations, we document that some firms set their transfer pricing strategy to minimize tax payments, but more firms focus on tax compliance. We estimate that a firm focusing on minimizing taxes has a GAAP effective tax rate that is 6.6 percentage points lower and generates about $43 million more in tax savings, on average, than a firm focusing on tax compliance. Available COMPUSTAT data on sample firms confirm our survey‐based inferences. We also find that transfer pricing‐related tax savings are greater when higher foreign income, tax haven use, and R&D activities are combined with a tax minimization strategy. Finally, compliance‐focused firms report lower FIN 48 tax reserves than tax‐minimizing firms, consistent with the former group using less uncertain transfer pricing arrangements. Collectively, our study provides direct evidence that multinational firms have differing internal priorities for transfer pricing, and that these differences are strongly related to the taxes reported by these firms.     

International spillover effects of consumption taxation

This paper investigates the international spillover effects of a revenue-neutral increase in consumption taxes coupled with a reduction in wage taxes in a two-country open economy. Many economists feel that the consumption tax would be an improvement over the income tax. This paper provides counterexamples to the conventional wisdom. We show that conversion to a consumption tax may reduce capital accumulation and may transmit a negative externality to the rest of the countries in the world economy under certain conditions: endogenous labor supply and bequests.     

吃喝腐败、税收寻租与企业成长——来自中国企业的经验证据

税收的弹性空间使低成长率的企业能够借助吃喝腐败进行税收寻租以促进其成长,这破坏了公平的市场竞争环境,导致了资源误置。本文运用2005年世界银行对中国企业的调查数据,分析吃喝腐败和税负对企业成长的影响。分位数回归结果发现,重税负阻碍企业成长,吃喝腐败有助于缓解企业税负对其成长的不利因素。但这种润滑剂作用主要体现于低成长的企业,使其能在权力庇佑下继续生存,对高成长的企业这种作用并不明显。在运用工具变量解决税收的内生性问题和一系列的稳健性检验后,以上结论仍然成立。进一步根据企业规模和制度质量进行的分样本研究发现,吃喝腐败缓解企业税负以促进其成长的润滑剂作用在中小企业和制度质量低的地区表现得更为突出。因此,结构性减税与建立公平的市场竞争环境是释放企业成长空间的关键。     

The complicit role of local government authorities in corporate bribery: Evidence from a tax collection reform in China

In January 2002, China decided to centralize corporate income tax collection, shifting the collection authority from the local tax bureaus (LTBs) to the state tax bureaus (STBs), for all firms established after December 31, 2001. We exploit this exogenous shock to identify a new cause for corporate bribery, namely, the complicit role of local government authorities. We find that firms whose income taxes are still collected by LTBs after the reform bribe more than similar firms whose taxes are collected by STBs. Such effects are more pronounced for firms located in provinces where government intervention is more prevalent and where judicial system is less independent. Moreover, we find that firms whose taxes are collected by LTBs enjoy lower tax burdens and receive greater tax-related subsidies, especially when they bribe more. Overall, our results highlight the reciprocation between local government authorities and firms in determining corporate bribery.     

Corporate Taxes and Financing Methods for Taxable Acquisitions*

We examine the influence of corporate taxes on U.S. firms' financing methods for taxable acquisitions of 100 percent of a target corporation's stock. We conduct tests of acquirer firms' use of debt or internal funds as the funding source for these acquisitions over the period 1987‐97. Our results provide the first empirical evidence that U.S. firms' use of debt to fund acquisitions significantly declines as foreign tax credit limitations reduce the marginal tax benefits received from borrowing. This finding is consistent with earlier speculation that U.S. foreign tax credit provisions could materially affect the capital costs of U.S. companies in debt‐financed acquisitions. We also find that these firms are generally high‐tax‐rate corporations whose financing choices are not significantly influenced by whether they acquire target‐firm tax loss carryovers. Our findings contribute to the accounting literature on the influence of taxes on the structure and financing of corporate acquisitions.     

Tax and leverage: Evidence from China

This study exploits two institutional features of China to test the causal link between tax and capital structure. First, the central government exclusively determines the corporate tax rate in China, which results in changes in corporate income tax rates across different Chinese public firms over the period of 2000–2011. Such mandatory tax shifts provide a quasi-natural experimental setting for our difference-in-differences analysis investigating the impact of tax on leverage. We find evidence supporting the dynamic trade-off theory, namely that firms are unresponsive to tax cuts but increase long-term leverage when taxes rise (particularly those in low statutory tax regimes). Second, governmental intervention in capital allocation is common in China such that political connections are usually regarded as an asset for firms in accessing bank loans. Using anti-corruption events as shocks to the value of political connections over the sample period, our research is the first study to show that political connections become a liability that enables banks to recall loans from affected firms during the anti-corruption campaign periods. This change overturns the typical tax-leverage relationship observed, as we find anti-corruption affected firms reduce long-term leverage when taxes are cut and they become insensitive to tax increases. Our results reveal the importance of political ties in explaining how firms adjust their capital structure to tax changes, which is extremely relevant to policy makers and regulators when monitoring bank loan markets.     

Trapped Cash and the Profitability of Foreign Acquisitions

Current U.S. reporting and tax laws create an incentive for some U.S. firms to avoid the repatriation of foreign earnings, as the U.S. government charges additional corporate taxes on these transfers. Prior research suggests that the combined effect of these incentives leads some U.S. multinational corporations to hold a significant amount of cash overseas. In this study, we investigate the effect of cash trapped overseas on U.S. multinational corporations' foreign acquisitions. Consistent with expectations, we observe firms with high levels of trapped cash make less profitable acquisitions of foreign target firms using cash consideration (lower announcement window returns, lower buy and hold returns, decreased ROA). The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA) reduced this effect by allowing firms to repatriate foreign earnings held as cash abroad at a much lower tax cost. Our study has implications for current proposals to change the tax laws related to foreign earnings.     

Intra- and Inter-industry Externalities from Foreign Direct Investment in the Mexican Manufacturing Sector: New Evidence from Mexican Regions

This paper presents new empirical evidence on externalities from Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in several Mexican regions in the early 1990s. The main findings are threefold. First, the presence of FDI creates negative externalities within industries and positive externalities between industries through backward linkages. Second, FDI-externalities are stimulated by large technological differences between FDI and Mexican firms and by geographic concentration of industries. Third, we identify a substantial level of regional heterogeneity of the externality impact of FDI, in line with the notion that FDI may have contributed to processes of changing regional prosperity under trade liberalization. The findings also imply that maquiladora firms in the border states are generating positive externalities.     

International spillover effects of sectoral tax differentiation in unionized economies

Sectoral tax differentiation has in recent years appeared onthe agenda in European policy discussions concerning unemployment.The member countries of the European Union are allowed to reducethe value added tax rates on goods and services that are particularlylabour intensive and price elastic. This paper provides a theoreticalanalysis of the international repercussions of such policies.We develop a two-country and two-sector model with monopolisticcompetition in the goods market and wage bargaining in the labourmarket. Policy externalities operate through the endogenouslydetermined terms of trade. We examine how national and supranationalcommodity tax policies affect sectoral and total employmentand characterize optimal commodity taxes with and without internationalpolicy cooperation. Some rough estimates of the welfare gainsfrom policy coordination are also presented, using a calibratedversion of the model.     

Financial Accounting Effects of Tax Aggressiveness: Contracting and Measurement

This study examines a setting in which a tax‐reporting decision is delegated to a firm's tax manager. Using financial accounting measures of tax expense to evaluate the tax manager allows the firm to efficiently attain the level of tax avoidance it prefers, despite the fact that the consequences of the tax‐reporting decision will occur in the future. The study also examines how well two accounting measures of tax aggressiveness — cash taxes paid and the unrecognized tax benefit — distinguish between conservative and aggressive firms.     

Rebalancing in China: A taxation approach

The rebalancing of the Chinese economy is analyzed through a heterogeneous taxation of various types of firms. Based on a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model, the paper applies tax reforms to raise consumption, reduce some firms' overinvestment (overcapacities) and maintain a high level of welfare.To rebalance consumption and investment, taxation may allow reallocating a part of the labor force to firms that are not overinvesting (via business taxes and social security contributions). Moreover, the correction of distortions in production factor costs (capital and labor) is necessary during certain reforms applied in the model; that is, on the one hand, higher credit costs for firms that face soft budget constraints (via financial transactions taxes) and, on the other hand, a catch-up of foreign firms' wages by domestic firms (via social security contributions).These tax reforms bring welfare benefits to households and stabilize the welfare reaction to productivity shocks. Another interesting result is that in this framework, the rebalancing of the domestic demand in China does not require the readjustment of the external financial position. Indeed, the aggregate savings rate remains high and the supply of domestic assets is reduced.Finally, another model proposes a heterogeneous taxation of consumption across home and foreign goods to enhance consumption.     

CAPITAL FLOWS AND EXPORT EXTERNALITIES: AN EAST ASIAN CURE FOR THE DUTCH DISEASE?*

The analysis so far suggests several conclusions regarding policy under externalities in tradables production. It shows that conventional profit-maximizing solutions lead to too much investment, too much “up front” consumption, high period 1 real exchange rates, and underproduction of tradables. In this setting, it is possible that an improvement in an economy's access to foreign capital will lead to welfare losses. These distortions are most efficiently corrected by a tradables output subsidy, equal to the externality. This subsidy should be increased if the economy's access to foreign capital markets improves. In the absence of such subsidies, however, incentives to reduce investment and postpone consumption may be appropriate second-best policies. These policies, in effect, drive a wedge between rates of return on investment and foreign interest rates. Therefore the optimal policy will also require controls on foreign capital seeking to take advantage of higher interest rates at home than abroad.