The joint decision to manage earnings through discretionary accruals and asset sales around insider trading: Taiwan evidence

This study assesses the joint decision of multiple earnings–management tools around insider trading. The Taiwanese evidence indicates significantly higher magnitudes of both discretionary accruals and asset sales before insider selling. In addition, to investigate the endogenous relationship between discretionary accruals and asset sales, this study develops a set of simultaneous equations and includes the inverse Mill’s ratio as a regressor to account for firms that choose not to use asset sales. The results indicate a marginal complementary correlation between discretionary accruals and asset sales before insider selling. Further tests find this complementary correlation becomes stronger when accompanying abnormal insider selling. The findings support the view that insiders consider both tools jointly and adjust them as complements to meet their directional earnings management objective.     

Director Ownership and Voluntary Segment Disclosure: Hong Kong Evidence

Weakness of corporate governance and lack of transparency are often considered causes of or contributors to the Asian Financial Crisis. Publicly listed companies in Hong Kong, like other Asian firms, have concentrated director ownership. The study uses voluntary segment disclosure above the benchmark minimum as a proxy for transparency and examines its relationship to the ownership structure and composition of corporate boards in Hong Kong. We find that: (1) high (concentrated) board ownership explains the extent of low voluntary segment disclosure and this negative relationship is stronger when firm performance is very poor; (2) the contribution of non‐executive directors to enhance voluntary segment disclosure is effective for firms with low director ownership but not for concentrated‐ownership firms. These results have implications for policy makers and regulators in the Asia‐Pacific region striving to improve governance and transparency.     

The Effect of Founding Family Influence on Firm Value and Corporate Governance

We examined a sample of 120 Norwegian, founding family controlled and non‐founding family controlled firms, to address two important research questions: (1) is founding family control associated with higher firm value; and (2) are there unique corporate governance conditions under which a founding family controlled firm can be more valuable? We find a positive association between founding family control and firm value for four alternative definitions of founding family control. We find that the association between founding family CEOs and firm value is stronger among younger firms, firms with smaller boards, and firms with a single class of shares. However, the impact of founding family directors on firm value is not affected by corporate governance conditions such as firm age, board independence, and number of share classes. We also find that the relation between founding family ownership and firm value is greater among older firms, firms with larger boards, and particularly when these firms have multiple classes of shares. Our results imply that founding family controlled firms are more valuable and governed differently than firms without such influence. Furthermore, our results also suggest that founding family CEOs can enhance firm performance when family influence does not create shareholder entrenchment or when their cash flow rights are more aligned with their control rights.     

How do the ownership structure and board of directors' features impact earnings management? The Spanish case

This paper examines how the ownership structure and board of directors' features determine the managerial opportunistic behavior exemplified in the management of accounting earnings. This study contributes to the literature by investigating the relationship of firm‐level and country‐level corporate governance systems on the earnings management in the Spanish corporate sector. Results reveal that the varying efficiency of the corporate governance systems is reflected in the way in which accounting discretion is performed. We found evidence that earnings management is reduced as the voting rights of the controlling shareholder increased and that there is an inverse U‐shaped relationship between insiders' ownership and the earnings manipulation. Regarding the board characteristics, we observe that larger, independent boards, those with a larger proportion of female members, and those with an audit committee compounded by a greater proportion of outside independent directors oversee managers more efficiently, constraining their capacity to manage earnings. To the contrary, board duality increases the likelihood of opportunistic manipulation of financial reporting. We found that when the institutional environment improves in the Spanish context, the discretionary power of the corporate sector to overstate the financial statements is reduced. The findings prove the necessity of reinforcing the rules and regulations toward a more transparent disclosure of the financial statements.     

信息披露与内部人股票交易获利策略——以六起内部人股票交易为基础的案例研究

本文以近期A股市场内部人股票交易活跃的六家公司为例,通过考查信息披露与内部人股票交易间的关系,解释内部人股票交易的获利策略。研究发现,在允许内部人交易本公司股票的情况下,信息披露与内部人股票交易关系密切,内部人存在利用私有信息和策略性信息披露两类获利策略。信息权力是内部人股票交易的获利基础,公司业绩是影响内部人股票交易获利策略选择的重要因素,而法律诉讼风险并没有对我国内部人股票交易和信息披露产生明显约束作用。这些发现对完善我国资本市场内部人股票交易行为规范具有一定借鉴意义。     

Majority Shareholder Ownership and Real Earnings Management: Evidence from Korea

This article examines the influence of majority shareholder ownership on real earnings management. It investigates whether there is a conflict between or an alignment of majority and minority shareholders' interests. If majority shareholders' interests are aligned with those of minority shareholders, a greater majority shareholder ownership lowers real earnings management. On the other hand, if they are not aligned, majority shareholders' attempts to exploit minority shareholders will increase real earnings management. This study does not find a systematic relationship between majority shareholder ownership and real earnings management. However, real earnings management significantly decreases in the upward earnings management incentive bracket as majority shareholder ownership increases. This occurs primarily because majority shareholders are more sensitive to upward real earnings management, which has a negative effect on future performance. These results suggest that the larger the ownership of majority shareholders, the more they play a positive role in mitigating real earnings management. This positive role is only effective in the post‐Asian economic crisis period. These results may suggest that the economic crisis in Korea helped majority shareholders more conscious of the long‐term costs of real earnings management. These findings support the convergence‐of‐interests hypothesis, providing evidence by investigating real earnings management instead of accruals‐based earnings management.     

公司治理、信息披露质量与知情交易

通过对公司治理、信息披露质量与知情交易之间关系的检验,发现股权集中导致的协同效应及壕沟效应同时存在,董事会规模及独立性对信息披露质量及知情交易的影响不明显,高管货币薪酬激励手段比股权激励手段更有效。研究表明,在当前我国资本市场不完善、知情交易日益增多的背景下,努力提高信息披露质量、实现股权适度分散以及合理制定高管薪酬契约对减少知情交易、维护资本市场的良好秩序具有重要意义。     

The influence of ownership structure and board independence on the cost of debt in BRIC countries

Agency theory predicts that the default premium on debt is determined by the intensity of agency conflicts since they affect the risk of debtholders. This effect is especially important in emerging countries with high ownership concentration and low protection of minority owners. This paper presents an empirical analysis of the influence of ownership structure and board independence on the cost of debt in BRIC countries over the period 2007–2020. The main finding of the study is the presence of significant country-specific effects of ownership structure on the cost of debt measured with the G-spread on corporate bonds, as well as the absence of effects of board independence. According to our results, concentrated ownership and state ownership increase the cost of debt in Brazil and Russia, while decreasing it in China. We reveal that institutional investors help mitigate the risks of debtholders in China, while insider ownership decreases the default risk in Brazil.     

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF BANKS: A SURVEY

This paper reviews the empirical literature on the corporate governance of banks. We start by highlighting the main differences between banks and nonfinancial firms and focus on three characteristics that make banks special: (i) regulation, (ii) the capital structure of banks, and (iii) the complexity and opacity of their business and structure. Next, we discuss the characteristics of corporate governance in banks and how they differ from the governance of nonfinancial firms. We then review the evidence on three governance mechanisms: (i) boards, (ii) ownership structures, and (iii) executive compensation. Our review suggests that some of the empirical regularities found in the literature on corporate governance of nonfinancial institutions, such as the positive (negative) association between board independence (size) and performance, do not hold for banks. Also, existing work provides no conclusive results regarding the relationship between different governance mechanisms and various measures for banks’ performance. We discuss potential explanations for these mixed results.     

Japanese Corporate Groupings (Keiretsu) and the Informativeness of Earnings

This paper examines the effect of Japanese corporate groupings, keiretsu , on the informativeness of earnings. Keiretsu firms maintain close financial and personal ties through cross-shareholding, credit holding, interlocking corporate directorates, and various business transactions. We propose that the strong interrelations of the keiretsu ownership structure enhance the informativeness of earnings through efficient monitoring of managerial performance. Our empirical results show that keiretsu firms have higher earnings response coefficients than those of non- keiretsu firms, the earnings response coefficient increases as the strength of the keiretsu relationship increases, and discretionary accruals by keiretsu firms are smaller than discretionary accruals of non- keiretsu firms. All of these results suggest that the monitoring ability of the keiretsu improves the informativeness of earnings.     

Insider Trading: Does Being a Neighbor of the Securities and Exchange Commission Matter?

Using a perception‐based crime deterrence approach, we present evidence that corporate insiders located closer to the Securities and Exchange Commission regional offices trade less frequently on their own company's stocks, while they earn higher abnormal returns from such insider transactions. These results are robust to several additional tests. Our further analysis indicates that such differences in trading profitability are mitigated during the periods of a high level of legal jeopardy such as the periods around earnings announcements and mergers and acquisitions. These findings are consistent with the view that Securities and Exchange Commission oversight has an impact on insiders' trading behavior by influencing their perceptions of sanctions risk. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An empirical test of individual and institutional trading patterns in Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan

We examine the pattern of daily stock returns in Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Our results support the information-processing hypothesis: Average returns on Monday are lower than on other days of the week, particularly when the previous trading day’s return is negative. Our results also support the positive-feedback-trading hypothesis: Daily returns exhibit positive autocorrelation, particularly when the previous trading day’s return is positive. Further analysis reveals that institutional investors (Japan), individual investors (Taiwan), or both (Hong Kong) can cause these patterns. Our findings are consistent with the relative importance of institutional and individual investors in each of these markets. We thank three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions.     

Corporate Value, Managerial Stockholdings and Investments of Japanese Firms

We use a simultaneous equation model which treats firm value, investments and management ownership as endogenous to the firm. Our results show a feedback relation between corporate value and management ownership, i.e., corporate value is positively impacted by management ownership, which in turn is positively impacted by corporate value. Corporate value also affects investments made by the firm. We also find that the effect of the main bank on corporate value is positive but only up to a certain point; then, it turns negative. Supporting the argument that keiretsu firms have lower agency cost, we find that firms belonging to a keiretsu have higher valuations during the sample period. Finally, we find that management ownership increases as the ownership of the main bank, ownership of institutional holders and cross‐holdings decreases, suggesting a substitution effect among these monitoring forces. Our results indicate that ignoring the web of these relationships leads to incorrect inferences.     

Auditor Industry Specialization,Political Economy and Earnings Quality: Some Cross‐Country Evidence

Using cross‐country data, we evaluate the impact of investor protection on the association between earnings quality and audits by industry specialists. Our findings show that the positive association between industry specialist auditors and earnings quality as documented in the literature is affected by the political electoral system, which reflects investor protection rights in a country. We document that audits by industry specialists are associated with higher earnings quality in countries with the proportional electoral system, reflecting weak investor protection. Our results also confirm Kwon et al.'s findings that overall there is a positive association between earnings quality and audits by industry specialists in countries with weak legal enforcement. Our findings, however, indicate that Kwon et al.'s results are valid only for countries with weak investor protection reflected by the proportional electoral system and not for countries with strong investor protection reflected by the majoritarian electoral system. These findings thus suggest that higher earnings quality of firms audited by industry specialists across countries can especially be expected when investor protection is low and legal enforcement is also weak. In addition, our research suggests that future cross‐country studies could explicitly consider the role of the political electoral system of a country in evaluating corporate governance, management and accounting issues.     

民营上市公司CEO持股缓解了代理冲突吗？——基于真实活动盈余管理视角的分析

基于真实活动盈余管理视角,研究了我国民营上市公司CEO持股能否在一定程度上缓解代理冲突。研究发现：CEO持股能够抑制民营上市公司真实活动盈余管理,并且随着CEO持股比例的增加,真实活动盈余管理水平下降,说明CEO持股能够在一定程度上缓解投资者与企业管理层的代理冲突,实现协同效应;董事长与CEO两职兼任时,CEO持股对真实活动盈余管理的抑制效应会加强;深入研究发现,真实活动盈余管理对公司未来业绩产生不利影响,尤其是对企业长期业绩,而CEO持股能够降低真实活动盈余管理给公司业绩带来的负面效应。基于真实活动盈余管理,研究支持了我国民营上市公司CEO持股能够体现出一定的协同效应,缓解投资者与企业管理层的代理冲突。     

Board gender diversity and corporate environmental performance: The moderating role of family and dual‐class majority ownership structures

While prior work has investigated the impact of (a) ownership structure and (b) board gender diversity separately on corporate environmental performance, researchers have not studied the potentially important relationship between ownership control and female board diversity in influencing corporate environmental performance jointly. We do so in the context of majority ownership in family‐controlled and dual‐class firms whose motives and influence are theoretically different from that of the firm's minority shareholders. Drawing on resource dependency, socioemotional wealth theory, and secondary agency theory, we hypothesize that majority family owners and dual‐class owners likely choose women directors to help advance their personal preferences for environmental corporate social responsibility. Our empirical tests utilizing 2,755 U.S. firm years over the 2010–2015 show that, as hypothesized, these two majority ownership types interact with board gender diversity to positively influence corporate environmental performance.     

The Effects of Corporate Governance on the Informativeness of Earnings

This study draws upon prior research on corporate governance and examines whether the informativeness of earnings, proxied by the earnings response coefficient varies with the percentage of outside independent directors serving on the board, the absence of CEO duality, and the presence of independent audit (AUDC), compensation (COMC), and nominating (NOMC) committees. The results suggest a positive association between the proportion of outside independent directors serving on firm’s boards and earnings informativeness. However, the results do not suggest an association between non-CEO duality, or independent AUDC, COMC, and NOMC and earnings informativeness.     

An investigation of causality between insider transactions and stock returns

Prior research shows that corporate insiders engage in profitable transactions by trading securities of their own firms. The main purpose of this study is to examine whether insider transactions and stock returns have causality relationships at the firm level for a sample of 2,521 firms during the period 1988 to 1998. We find a large impact of stock returns on subsequent insider transactions at both the aggregate and firm levels. The impact appears to be negative which suggests that insiders buy after stock price decreases and sell after stock price increases. Our findings on the predictive content of insider transactions for subsequent stock returns are primarily consistent with prior literature. We observe a positive but weak relationship between insider transactions and future stock returns.     

The Coupling of Ownership and Control and the Allocation of Financial Resources: Evidence from Hong Kong

Theoretical and empirical research regarding the impact of corporate ownership on the behaviour and performance of firms have typically focused on consequences stemming from the separation of ownership and control. While large scale business enterprise characterized by such a separation is dominant in the US, Japan and the UK, firms in which ownership and control is coupled in the hands of individuals and their families are apparent in many other large developed economies and are dominant in most emerging markets. This paper examines consequences regarding the generation and allocation of financial resources stemming from the coupling of ownership and control among Hong Kong based firms. In doing so, we join insights from the economics literature regarding the incentive and risk bearing consequences of coupled ownership and control with the extant management, sociology and history literatures regarding Chinese family business groups and develop and six hypotheses pertaining to patterns in the allocation of financial resources. Results indicate that coupled ownership and control is positively related with dividend payout levels and financial liquidity while it is negatively related to investments in capital expenditures. Consistent with these results, we also find that coupled ownership and control is positively related to short-term (accounting) profitability.     

股权集中度、董事会结构与盈余管理——来自中国资本市场的经验数据

本文通过封2005年中国沪深A股上市公司的公司治理和财务数据为基础,实证检验了股权集中度、董事会治理与盈余管理水平之间的关系。结果表明,盈余管理与董事长与CEO两职合一显著正相关,与股权集中度、董事会规模（公司法规定的合理范围内人独立董事的比例显着负相关。因此,应当改善股权结构、提高股权集中度,加强董事会的独立性和监督职能,造对于上市公司的盈余管理行为,起到有效抑制的作用。