Cost effects of mergers and deregulation in the U.S. Rail industry

We attempt to disentangle the effects of deregulation on rail costs from those directly attributable to mergers and acquisitions, employing a translog variable cost function, based on an unbalanced panel data set of annual observations for major U.S. Class I railroads from 1974 to 1986. We find that both deregulation and mergers contributed significantly to cost savings. However, of the accumulated cost savings achieved by the six major firms involved in mergers postderegulation, we estimate that by 1986 about 91% of the reduction in accumulated costs is due to deregulation, and about 9% is directly due to mergers and acquisitions (which in turn were facilitated by regulatory reforms).     

The effect of mergers on firms’ costs: evidence from the HMO industry

We examine the effect of mergers on firms’ costs, using a national data set that contains information on both pre- and post-merger costs for firms in the Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) industry. By utilizing data on all HMOs that operated in the United States from 1985 to 1997, we observe enough mergers to obtain estimates of both short-run and relatively permanent merger effects. On average, we do not find evidence that mergers allowed HMOs to realize greater economies of scale or that mergers improved efficiency by shifting the cost function. On the other hand, mergers between HMOs that produce Medicare and other products are likely to create dis-economies of scope that increase costs.     

To merge or not to merge: That is the question

In this paper we analyze the implementation of socially optimal mergers when the regulator is not informed about all parameters that determine social and private gains from potential mergers. We show that implementation requires a certain degree of agreement between social and private incentives. The most important example where this congruence is present is when the uncertainty refers to cost savings, because in this case society and firms want costs savings to be as high as possible. Then, it is possible to induce firms to truthfully reveal the costs savings induced by the merger.Received: 7 June 2001, Accepted: 14 June 2004, JEL Classification: D78, L13, L41This paper was presented at the First CODE meeting held in Barcelona, June 1997 and in seminars at the universities of Alicante, Caen, Carlos III, Bilbao, Complutense (Madrid) and Málaga. We would like to thank P. Amor ós, D. Cardona-Coll, P. Hammond, A. Lozano, C. Martinez, V. Merlin, D. Moreno, B. Moreno, D. Mookherjee, J. Naeve, P. Pereira, R. Renault, A. Snoy and F. Vega-Redondo for their useful comments. The authors are solely responsible for any remaining errors. They acknowledge financial support from CICYT BEC2002-02194, PB97-0120, BEC2001-0535 and the IVIE.     

Market value,market share,and mergers: Evidence from a panel of U.S. firms

Improving shareholder value has often been cited as a merger determinant. Because mergers create larger firms and less competition, they may increase shareholder value through higher market share and stock‐market value. We investigate merger impacts on firms' stock‐market value and market share. We construct panel data from 4 different data sources on public merging and non‐merging U.S. manufacturing firms for 1980–2003. Instrumental variables and factors such as R&D, patents, and citations control for endogeneity. We find that mergers are positively correlated with stock‐market value and market share.     

Mergers with Product Market Risk

This paper studies the causes and the consequences of horizontal mergers among risk-averse firms. The amount of diversification depends on the allocation of shares among the merging firms, with a direct risk-sharing effect and an indirect strategic effect. If firms compete in quantities, consolidation makes firms more aggressive. Mergers involving few firms are then profitable with a relatively low level of risk aversion. With strong enough risk aversion, mergers reduce prices and improve social welfare. If firms instead compete in prices, consumers do not benefit from mergers in markets with demand uncertainty, but can easily benefit with cost uncertainty.     

The Effect of Leasing versus Buying on Entry Deterrence

Models of entry deterrence typically require that incumbents possess a cost advantage as a prerequisite for deterring entry. Potential entrants possess a cost advantage over incumbents, however, if input costs fall over time. This paper models the behavior of an incumbent and a potential entrant when the input cost falls over time and the firms have the option of buying or leasing the input. The model shows that if the future cost savings from new technology exceed the marginal transaction costs of leasing the current equipment, then leasing increases the incumbent's ability to deter entry. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The impact of access to consumer data on the competitive effects of horizontal mergers and exclusive dealing

We examine the influence of firms’ ability to employ individualized pricing on the welfare consequences of horizontal mergers. In a two‐to‐one merger, the merger reduces consumer surplus more when firms can price discriminate based on individual preferences compared to when they cannot. However, the opposite holds true in a three‐to‐two merger, in which the reduction in consumer surplus is substantially lower with individualized pricing than with uniform pricing. Further, the merger requires an even smaller marginal cost reduction to justify when an upstream data provider can make exclusive offers for its data to downstream firms. We also show that exclusive contracts for consumer data pose significant antitrust concerns independent of merger considerations. Implications for vertical integration and data mergers are drawn.     

Beyond profitability: effects of acquisitions on technical efficiency in the Italian pasta industry

Unlike traditional studies on the impact of ownership changes—which use either profitability measures or stock prices—this paper investigates the impact of acquisitions on acquired firms' technical efficiency. Using a panel of Italian firms in the pasta industry for the 1981–1997 period, I estimate a stochastic production frontier with exogenous factors affecting efficiency in a translog specification with non‐neutral technical progress. The main result is that acquired firms experience, within the 6 years period following the acquisition, an increase in technical efficiency of the order of 10%. This result is statistically significant and proves to be robust with respect to the inclusion of size and calendar year effects as explanatory variables of firms' inefficiency. These findings contribute to the debate on the welfare gains of ownership changes by providing evidence that mergers and acquisitions lead to cost savings, due to the reduction of acquired firms' X‐inefficiency. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mergers,strategic investments and antitrust policy

Established firms can diversify into new markets in two distinct modes: through internal development or through conglomerate merger. Building on a dynamic three-stage bargaining model with variable threats, this paper shows that a lenient antitrust position toward horizontal mergers can induce established firms that would otherwise not have entered to enter via conglomerate merger. The vigor of antitrust enforcement toward horizontal mergers also affects the conglomerate acquisition price but it does not influence the choice of entry mode. Finally, the paper brings to light a heretofore neglected avenue through which conglomerate mergers can increase welfare.     

Corporate governance and the returns to acquiring firms' shareholders: an international comparison

We examine the effects of mergers on the returns to acquiring companies' shareholders for a large sample of companies from both Anglo‐Saxon and non‐Anglo‐Saxon countries over the 1980s and 1990s. With the important exception of Japan, we find similar patterns of returns across both types of countries. For a sample of 9733 acquiring companies the mean percentage gain over a short window of 21 days is 0.6%. This picture changes dramatically as the market has more time to evaluate the mergers and/or the acquiring firms. After three years, acquirers' shareholders in the United States and continental Europe lost on average 19% of their market value compared to a portfolio of non‐merging firms in their size deciles and their two‐digit industry, in Canada, Australia and New Zealand roughly 16%, and in the four Scandinavian countries almost 15%. Further analysis indicates that some mergers are consistent with the hypothesis that mergers generate synergies, but that a majority of mergers in Continental Europe are explained by the managerial discretion and/or hubris hypothesis. Our findings also suggest that corporate governance institutions in the United States and the other Anglo‐Saxon countries lead to better investment performance than in continental Europe, when one confines one's attention to mergers. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The causes of mergers: tests based on the gains to acquiring firms' shareholders and the size of premia

Despite the large number of event studies of mergers that have been undertaken, considerable disagreement still exists over whether mergers increase the value of the merging firms, and if so why. Most event studies measure the average returns to the acquired and acquiring companies' shareholders separately, and based on these averages conclude either that mergers increase wealth, or that they reduce it. From this the authors go on to claim support either for a hypothesis about how mergers increase efficiency, or for one that claims they do not. This paper develops a methodology that uses the distribution of gains and losses across the two samples of firms, and their relationship to one another to test four hypotheses about why mergers occur: (1) the market‐for‐corporate‐control hypothesis, (2) the synergy hypothesis, (3) the managerial discretion hypothesis, and (4) the hubris hypothesis. The hypotheses are tested with data for 168 mergers between large companies from 1978 through 1990. Considerable support is found for the managerial discretion and hubris hypotheses, and some support is found for the market‐for‐corporate‐control hypothesis. Little or no support is found for the hypothesis that mergers create synergies and that shareholders of both the acquiring and acquired firms share gains from these synergies. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Premium,merger fees and the choice of investment banks: A simultaneous analysis

We analyze 635 US M&A transactions from 1985 to 2004. In contrast with prior research, we distinguish between the target and acquirer fees, and examine their independent effects on the level of the merger premium. The study provides evidence of a positive (negative) association between target (acquirer) fees and the level of the premium. It indicates that the reputation of investment banks affects the level of merger fees, but does not affect the level of the premium. The findings confirm the conflict of interests between target and acquirer firms where the investment banks’ efforts are positively related to shareholders’ interest. The study also finds that when acquirers pay higher fees than target firms, they pay lower premiums. The findings also imply that for the small proportion of mergers (13%) resulting in relatively large value gains for buying firms, an acquirer might be willing to pay large advisory fees even though this may result in a higher premium.     

Optimal Timing of Foreign Direct Investment Under Uncertainty

Foreign-trade zone (FTZ) use by international marketers vrovides them with the mlential to gain cost savings and increak operating efficiencies. However, no empirical research has yet been conducted to examine whether operating cost efficiency is better for international marketers using FTZs (FTZ firms) than those not using FTZs (non-FTZ firms). The operating cost efficiency of FTZ and non-FIZ firms is examined through a comparison of their cost structures. Using translog production functions, the surprising results in this paper suggest that FTZ firms tend to be less efficient than non-FTZ firms. Some possible explanations for this result are advanced, and public policy implications are discussed.     

会计师事务所合并、审计市场结构与审计定价

以2006年至2009年初发生的8起"强强联合"会计师事务所合并案为研究对象,分析合并发生前后审计市场结构与审计定价的变化后发现:随着会计师事务所合并案的增多,市场结构呈现出市场集中度增加以及大所之间竞争更为均衡的特点,国内本土所的市场力量在逐渐增强,但与国际"四大"之间还存在着十分明显的差距。从单变量检验来看,合并后会计师事务所对同一客户的审计收费较合并前显著增加,但在控制其他影响审计定价的因素后,合并因素对审计定价虽仍有正向作用,但是在统计上并不显著。     

Bertrand competition with capacity constraints: mergers among parking lots

To analyze the effects of mergers among firms facing capacity constraints, we develop a numerical model of price-setting behavior among multi-product firms differentiated by location and capacity. We perform a number of computational experiments designed to inform merger policy, with specific reference to the Central Parking–Allright merger of 1999. The experiments show that capacity constraints on merging firms attenuate merger effects by much more than capacity constraints on non-merging firms amplify them. The experiments also highlight the dependence of merger welfare effects on parking demand. In preparation for further industry consolidation, we propose estimators of parking demand to more precisely estimate the costs and benefits of future mergers.     

The Impact of the Big 8 Mergers on Market Power: Evidence from the Hong Kong Market

This study examines the impact of the Big 8 mergers on market power in an audit market where the merging firms have little presence. Audit fee changes for each merger participating firm are identified and fee changes for several post‐merger years are examined. The pre‐merger differential market power between the merging and non‐merging long‐established Big 8 firms (Price Waterhouse and KPMG Peat Marwick) in Hong Kong provides a unique opportunity to examine whether the mergers could help the merging firms to increase their market power. The results are consistent with the hypotheses that the audit fees of the merging firms were significantly lower than that of the non‐merging, long‐established Big 8 firms before the mergers, but the audit fees of the merged firms increased significantly to a level comparable with that of the latter group after the mergers. In addition, the market share of the merged firms increased significantly after the mergers. However, no association is found between market concentration and market power. Overall, the results show that the Big 8 mergers have helped the merged firms increase their market power and market share in the Hong Kong audit market where they had little presence.     

The effect of non-rural hospital mergers and acquisitions: An examination of cost and price outcomes

This paper examines the direct impact of urban horizontal hospital consolidations on hospital efficiency and prices. Specifically, we measure the extent of cost savings resulting from these consolidations and the extent to which these gains are passed on to consumers. A fixed effects model is tested with data consisting of 4160 unique hospitals, 125 of which were involved in mergers and 1040 in system acquisitions, for over a 10-year time period. We find that hospital consolidation may generate efficiency in some circumstances and some of these gains may be passed on to consumers, but the results are very sensitive to hospital ownership and governance and the structure of the market following the consolidation.     

Write-offs and Profitability in Private Firms: Disentangling the Impact of Tax-Minimisation Incentives

Private firms are likely to use the financial reporting process more for other objectives, such as tax savings, than for communicating performance. However, observing firms choosing accounting policies for tax-minimisation purposes is not straightforward due to (i) tax and non-tax costs of reporting lower income (ii) accounting policies that result in lower reported income and no tax savings but generate non-tax benefits (iii) preparers' multiple incentives and (iv) econometric issues. We observe a large sample of 20,505 private firms writing off assets in two separate regimes, one that generates tax savings and one that does not. Firms significantly decrease, but continue to use, write-offs after the adverse change in tax treatment of write-offs. The exogenous tax change should not affect other reporting incentives. This allows us to disentangle the tax-minimisation incentive from other (un-observable) incentives, including debt contracting, dividends and employee relations that contribute to the observed anomalous positive relationship between write-offs and profitability. We show that for private firms (i) obtaining tax savings is important overall (ii) non-tax costs and benefits are probably also important and (iii) earnings informativeness for future cash flows increases after the adverse tax legislation change.     

Can the Timing of Negotiations Impact the Consequences of Mergers?

This paper uses a theoretical model to examine whether variation in the timing of negotiations between buyers and sellers can alter the effects of mergers between sellers. The model shows that mergers between horizontally overlapping firms lead to price increases regardless of how negotiations take place. In contrast, mergers between firms in different markets can only lead to higher compensation for the combined firm when negotiations occur sequentially. However, any price effects from out‐of‐market mergers stem from a mechanical redistribution of existing market power and not from a loss in competition. Published 2014. This article is a U.S. Government work and is in the public domain in the USA.     

Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration

This paper analyzes the effect of competition among downstream firms on an upstream firm's payoff and on its incentive to integrate vertically when firms in both segments negotiate optimal contracts. We argue that as downstream competition becomes more intense, the upstream firm obtains a larger share of a smaller downstream industry profit. The upstream firm may encourage downstream competition (even excessively) in response to high downstream bargaining power. The option of vertical integration may be a barrier to entry downstream and may trigger strategic horizontal spinoffs or mergers. We extend the analysis to upstream competition.