Performance Implications of Ties to the Government and SOEs: A Political Embeddedness Perspective

In many countries governments not only regulate business activities, but also become involved in the corporate governance of individual firms through ownership and board ties. While existing studies usually focus either on benefits of political connections or on costs of government influence, a political embeddedness perspective helps us consider both advantages and constraints associated with ties to the government. In particular, firms with direct ties to the government will experience significant costs associated with government officials' involvement in the corporate governance process. In contrast, firms with ties to state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) are connected to the government indirectly and thus, while getting access to state‐owned resources, avoid costs associated with the government's interventions. This study compares the performance consequences of board and ownership ties to the government with the consequences of board and ownership ties to SOEs. I find that ties to SOEs are associated with higher profitability, while no significant differences are discovered for firms with direct ties to the government.     

Government Engagement,Environmental Policy,and Environmental Performance: Evidence from the Most Polluting Chinese Listed Firms

This study empirically examines the implementation of environmental policies and how government engagement impacts on a firm's environmental performance based on a sample of Chinese listed firms in the eight most polluting industries over a 10‐year period. The findings of the study demonstrate that government engagement, measured as ownership structure, is positively correlated with environmental performance, measured by environmental capital expenditure, for state‐owned firms, but no significant relation is found for non‐state‐owned firms. In addition, non‐state‐owned firms are more likely to perform better in terms of environmental investment after the 2006 enactment of a new policy explicitly linking environmental issues with political incentives to regional governments. This study also reports that corporate environmental performance impairs firm value for state‐owned firms but has no impact on firm value for non‐state‐owned firms, suggesting that investors negatively respond to environmental investments made by state‐owned firms as a result of government engagement/political pressure. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

Bank monitoring,managerial ownership and Tobin's Q: an empirical analysis for India

The paper examines how banking relationships and managerial ownership relate to firm valuation. It is argued that both the number of banking relationships (which serves as an external monitoring function) and managerial ownership (which serves as an internal monitoring function) affect firm value, while internal monitoring by managers and external monitoring by banks were viewed as substitutes or complements. After controlling for the effect of exogenous variables, the results reveal the existence of a complementary monitoring effect between banks and the managerial group. On the other hand, the results indicate that increased external monitoring by banks will simultaneously raise the incentive on the part of managers to engage in internal monitoring. Also, firm valuation is found to be a significant determinant of managerial ownership. A disaggregated analysis of firms according to size and leverage suggests the existence of a complementary monitoring effect between banks and managers, except for small‐sized firms. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corporate Governance,Investment, and Firm Valuation in Asian Emerging Markets

We investigate the effects of corporate governance and family ownership on firm valuation through investment efficiency in Asian emerging markets. Using 3 years of time series data from the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia corporate governance score for 10 Asian emerging markets, we find that good corporate governance leads to better or more efficient investment decisions and eventually to higher firm value. We also find that investors reward firms for improvement in corporate governance. The findings do not hold for Asian firms with a family or concentrated ownership structure. The results are not driven by changes in accounting standards in these markets.     

Corporate sustainability strategies in institutional adversity: Antecedent,outcome, and contingency effects

This study examines (i) how top-level managerial institutional ties drive corporate sustainability strategies of emerging market firms operating under conditions of institutional adversity; (ii) the impact of corporate sustainability strategies on market performance; and (iii) the moderating role of financial resource slack on the relationships between corporate sustainability strategies and market performance. The study builds from institutional development logic and the structure–conduct–performance paradigm. Primary data are collected from 300 firms operating in a major sub-Saharan African market. Findings show that top-level managerial institutional linkages with regulatory national governmental officials, local community leaders, and top managers at other firms drive corporate proactive and responsive sustainability strategies, which in turn influence market performance. In addition, the findings reveal that financial resource slack strengthens the path between corporate proactive sustainability strategies and market performance, but not the path between corporate responsive sustainability strategies and market performance. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

The Influence of Managerial Ownership on Bank Market Value,Performance, and Risk: Evidence from Banks Listed on the Stoxx Global Index

We follow agency theory to assess the influence of managerial ownership on the market value, performance, and risk of 123 listed banks in 23 countries included in the STOXX Global Index in 2007 and 2010. After controlling for bank characteristics, regulatory restrictions, and macroeconomic conditions, our findings show a positive relation between managerial ownership and both market value (Tobin's Q) and performance (ROA and ROE). Moreover, we find a negative relation between managerial ownership and risk (EDF, NPL/L, and Z‐SCORE). Bank market value and performance is a non‐linear, inverse U‐shaped function of managerial ownership. The negative relation between managerial ownership and bank risk is also non‐linear and U‐shaped. Our results remain robust to reverse causality. In their effort to immunize the global financial system from systemic risks, central banks and practitioners should find our results relevant for regulation purposes.     

Ownership structure and corporate liquidity policy

This study analyzes the relationship between corporate liquidity (i.e. the fraction of assets invested in cash and marketable securities) and managerial ownership in the firm's stock. We postulate a negative relationship between excess liquidity and managerial stock ownership as the managers' interests shift from protecting the value of their human capital to maximizing the value of their stockholdings. This managerial behavior is constrained by the disciplining forces of the firm's product market structure and the market for corporate control. While the tests fail to reveal any significant impact of managerial stock ownership, they show that firm liquidity is positively related to the firm's ability to earn economic rents.     

Human Capital and CEO Compensation during Institutional Transitions

Firms appoint CEOs with different types of human capital in order to manage resource dependencies. How CEOs are compensated thus can be conceptualized as a valuation process of how boards view the value of CEOs' human capital. Two types of human capital – international experience and political ties – have emerged as potential drivers of CEO compensation during institutional transitions. But how they impact CEO compensation has remained unclear. We develop a resource dependence‐based, contingency framework to focus on the external and internal factors that enable or constrain human capital to impact CEO compensation. Because of the tremendous regional diversity within China, externally, we focus on the level of marketization of the region in which firms are headquartered. Internally, we pay attention to two corporate governance mechanisms: politically connected outside directors and compensation committee. Data from 10,329 firm‐year observations at 94 per cent of listed firms in China largely support our framework. Overall, our study contributes to resource dependence research by extending this research to the context of institutional transitions with a focus on how human capital impacts CEO compensation.     

Firm performance and board composition: Some new evidence

We investigate the effect of board composition on overall corporate performance while controlling for managerial ownership and other key variables. We recognize that both managerial ownership and board composition may be endogenous to performance, but our work differs from previous in two important respects. First, we measure performance using the market value to book value ratio of common stock equity rather than the more commonly used Tobin's q. Second, recognizing that overall estimates from the IV approach depend greatly on the choice of instruments, we perform sensitivity analysis by using a variety of instruments to proxy for board composition and managerial ownership. Both our OLS and IV estimates indicate a significant curvilinear relation between board composition and performance. However, we find that moderate differences in first-stage regressions, resulting in small changes to first-stage R²s, lead to widely differing overall results. Our results suggest that findings of studies using IV and similar techniques (e.g. two- and three-stage least squares) must be interpreted cautiously.     

Enhancing firm performance through internal market orientation and employee organizational commitment

Considering the importance of retaining key staff and managing the negative impact of high labor turnover on firm performance, this study investigates the notion of internal market orientation (IMO) as an employee management tool for helping companies retain employees and leverage performance via their organizational commitment. Drawing on data from three different managerial respondents in 275 companies based in China, the findings demonstrate the precedential effect of IMO on corporate performance through employees’ organizational commitment and retention. Interdepartmental relationship and interdepartmental communication, together with ownership types are identified as potential moderating variables, which may vary IMO’s effectiveness in the framework. This study provides scholars and practitioners with empirical evidence of IMO’s contribution to different industries and markets. Building on a western perspective, this study extends the literature in an emerging market context and specifically has implications for managing Chinese employees.     

Ownership Types and Strategic Groups in an Emerging Economy*

ABSTRACT Existing strategic group studies have rarely examined ownership type as a variable to classify firms in an industry. Using Chinese firms of different ownership types, we suggest that ownership type can be a parsimonious and important variable that managers use to cognitively classify firms into different strategic groups. While ownership itself is an objective variable, we contend that different ownership types lead to different managerial outlook and mentality due to a number of macro and micro foundations giving rise to various managerial cognitions. Employing the Miles and Snow typology, we find that state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately‐owned enterprises (POEs) tend to adopt defender and prospector strategies, respectively, while collectively‐owned enterprises (COEs) and foreign‐invested enterprises (FIEs) exhibit an analyser orientation that falls between defenders and prospectors on the strategy continuum. Three statistical tests suggest that ownership types can be used to successfully predict strategic group memberships in China's emerging economy.     

Is evil rewarded with evil? The market penalty effect of corporate environmentally irresponsible events

The negative response of the capital market to environmentally irresponsible events is an important governance mechanism that motivates enterprises to assume environmental responsibility. Based on the theory of effective markets and organizational legitimacy, this paper takes corporate environmentally irresponsible events in Chinese environmentally sensitive industries during the period of 2014–2018 as a research sample, and our work uses the event study methodology to explore the penalty effect of the capital market from a mathematical empirical and case empirical dimension. Furthermore, this research discusses the spillover effect of corporate environmentally irresponsible events in the capital markets. The empirical results show that once an irresponsible event is exposed, it causes a significant negative cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in the short term, and the difference between the industry and the ownership type leads to a significant difference in the duration and impact of the penalty effect. More interestingly, the capital market's penalty for corporate environmentally irresponsible events may have a notable industry spillover effect, but there are differences between the penalty effect and the spillover effect in different markets. This paper confirms that the penalty mechanism of the capital market related to an environmentally irresponsible event can effectively restrain the behaviour of the company involved and the industry to which it belongs, and it may also provide a new way for the government to build an eco‐environmental protection system of multisubject “co‐governance” and bring the punitive “forced” mechanism of the capital market to bear on corporate environmentally responsible behaviour.     

Does Ownership Matter? Evidence from the Zaibatsu Dissolution Program

In 1985, Demsetz and Lehn argued both that the optimal corporate ownership structure was firm-specific, and that market competition would drive firms toward that optimum. Because ownership was endogenous to expected performance, any regression of profitability on ownership patterns would yield insignificant results. To test this hypothesis, we use the zaibatsu dissolution program from late-1940s Japan as a natural experiment: an exogenous shock to the equilibrium ownership structure. Through that program, the US-run occupation removed the more prominent shareholders from many of the most successful Japanese companies. By focusing on the way firms and investors responded to the mandated selloff, we accomplish two goals: (a) we avoid the endogeneity problem that has plagued much of the other research on the subject, and (b) we clarify the equilibrating dynamics by which competitive markets move firms toward their optimal ownership structure. With a sample of 637 Japanese firms for 1953 and 710 for 1958, we confirm the equilibrating mechanism behind the Demsetz-Lehn hypothesis: between 1953 and 1958, the ex-zaibatsu firms did retructure their ownership patterns. As of 1953, the unlisted ex-zaibatsu and new firms still had not been able to negotiate the transactions necessary to approach their profit-maximizing ownership structures. Even the listed firms had not fully undone the effect of the occupation-induced changes on managerial practices. By 1958 the firms had done this, and the earlier correlation between profitability and ownership disappeared. By then, firm profitability showed no correlation with ownership, whether under linear, quadratic, or piecewise specifications. We further find no evidence that ex-zaibatsu firms sought to strengthen their ties to banks over 1953–1958.     

Shareholder Heterogeneity and Conflicting Goals: Strategic Investments in the Japanese Electronics Industry

This article investigates the effects of the changing institutional environment on strategic orientations of Japanese electronics firms during the 1990s. We examine the effects of three different types of shareholders on strategic directions of their invested firms. The first one, foreign portfolio investors, characterizes the emerging influence that pressed for change in corporate strategies. The two domestic shareholders, corporate investors and financial institutions, represent the conventional forces for continuity. Between the two domestic forces, though, while corporate investors attempted to maintain status quo, financial institutions have shifted towards market‐oriented behaviour of investment. Specifically, we explore: (1) the influence of each type of shareholder on a firm's diversification strategy and capital commitment; and (2) the moderating effects of firm performance on the relationships between ownership structure and strategic choices. The results suggest that foreign investors prefer the focused product portfolio and conservative capital commitment. They also prefer the reduction of capital investment when the financial performance of their invested firms is poor. Domestic financial institutions are now similarly sensitive to the performance of their invested firms when those firms make strategic investments. By contrast, domestic corporate shareholders remain indifferent to performance, while they aim to maintain relational business ties with invested firms.     

Corporate Value, Managerial Stockholdings and Investments of Japanese Firms

We use a simultaneous equation model which treats firm value, investments and management ownership as endogenous to the firm. Our results show a feedback relation between corporate value and management ownership, i.e., corporate value is positively impacted by management ownership, which in turn is positively impacted by corporate value. Corporate value also affects investments made by the firm. We also find that the effect of the main bank on corporate value is positive but only up to a certain point; then, it turns negative. Supporting the argument that keiretsu firms have lower agency cost, we find that firms belonging to a keiretsu have higher valuations during the sample period. Finally, we find that management ownership increases as the ownership of the main bank, ownership of institutional holders and cross‐holdings decreases, suggesting a substitution effect among these monitoring forces. Our results indicate that ignoring the web of these relationships leads to incorrect inferences.     

Managerial Ownership and Earnings Management: Theory and Empirical Evidence from Japan

This paper examines the relationship between managerial ownership and opportunistic managerial behavior relating to earnings management. Economics theory identifies two apparently conflicting effects of managerial ownership on managers' incentives: the incentive alignment effect and the management entrenchment effect. We construct a theoretical model demonstrating the two effects. This model suggests that as managerial ownership increases, earnings management decreases for both high and low levels of managerial ownership, while it increases for intermediate levels of managerial ownership if the sensitivity of the probability of managerial dismissal to the corporate performance is high enough and/or the manager's private benefit derived from managerial position is high enough. In a sample of Japanese firms, we find a significant nonmonotonic relationship between managerial ownership and discretionary accruals, consistent with our model.     

Where Corporate Governance and Financial Analysts Affect Valuation

We examine whether corporate governance and financial analysts affect accounting-based valuation models for B and H shares traded by foreign investors in China and Hong Kong, respectively. We expect that better corporate governance and more effective analyst activity mitigate potential adverse effects on accounting valuation models generated by country-specific problems in accounting, auditing, and legal systems. We find that valuation models perform better for companies with a greater analyst following, smaller forecast errors, relatively high public ownership and a strong board structure. Valuation models and accounting numbers have only limited explanatory power and valuation role for companies with weak governance and less effective analyst performance. The findings are robust across various market value, return, unexpected return, and other accounting valuation models. The results are consistent with less informed foreign investor clienteles searching for signals of more effective analyst activity and better corporate governance mechanisms.     

Disclosure, Corporate Governance and Foreign Share Ownership on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange

We investigate the association of foreign share ownership with firm‐level disclosure and corporate governance structures in Zimbabwe, a developing country in Southern Africa. Our motivation for the study derives from the literature, which suggests that foreign investors: (1) generally have a preference for companies in which they are well informed and where their investments are more likely to be protected, and (2) avoid companies in developing countries because of weak corporate governance structures and low disclosure. Using data drawn from companies listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, we examine the effect of disclosure and corporate governance on foreign share ownership. We find that disclosure, proportion of non‐executive directors, institutional share ownership and audit committee independence are all positively and significantly associated with foreign share ownership. Our results also demonstrate that market capitalization, return on equity and liquidity ratios are significantly associated with foreign share ownership. These results are consistent with the notion that foreign investors have a preference for companies with effective corporate governance structures, companies with less information asymmetry, as well as companies with healthy cash positions. The results have implications for policy‐makers in developing countries in their endeavour to improve liquidity on stock markets through the participation of foreign investors. The results are also useful to managers in developing countries who are keen to increase the market value of their company, thereby reducing their cost of capital.     

Valuation and Forecasting Roles of Dividends of Indonesian Listed Firms

We study the role of dividends in valuation and in forecasting future earnings in a low‐protection environment with highly concentrated ownership that is expected to yield low earnings quality. Using a sample of 372 distinct Indonesian firms listed on the IDX during the period 1995 to 2012 we show that dividends are reliably positively priced by the capital market, violating thus the dividend displacement theorem. This result persists even after controlling for some typical factors that affect firm value (capital structure, risk) and the effect of factors not separately identified, but priced by the Indonesian capital market (other information). Dividends replace accounting earnings entirely in valuation. Dividends are positively correlated to future earnings over and above current accounting earnings and other accounting and market variables. Both findings show that dividends play a central role on the Indonesian capital market. Finally, we show evidence consistent with the view that earnings management of Indonesian firms after 2002 is contractually efficient rather than opportunistic.     

The Value Relevance of Accounting under Political Uncertainty: Evidence Related to Quebec's Independence Movement

The Canadian province of Quebec is a region of an advanced industrialized nation characterized by a strong independence movement and, therefore, provides an interesting context in which to test the effect of political uncertainty on the relationship between market values and accounting values. In this study we compare market‐to‐book value associations of a sample of firms headquartered in Quebec with those of a sample of Canadian firms headquartered outside Quebec, over the period 1988–2002. Our comparisons suggest that, on average, the value of Quebec‐based firms is significantly less than other Canadian firms when valuation is based on multiples of book value and earnings. In addition, we find that the “Quebec discount” decreased significantly in the period immediately following the 1995 provincial sovereignty referendum wherein Quebeckers voted (narrowly) against Quebec sovereignty. We conclude that the relative undervaluation of Quebec firms is related, at least in part, to political uncertainty associated with the Quebec independence movement.