Barriers to Entry and Competitive Behavior: Evidence from Reforms of Cable Franchising Regulations

Between 2005 and 2008, nineteen of the fifty states of the U.S. reformed the franchising process for cable television, significantly easing entry into local markets. Using a difference‐in‐differences approach that exploits the staggered introduction of reforms, we find that prices for ‘Basic’ service declined systematically by about 5.5 to 6.8 per cent following the reforms, but we find no statistically significant effect on average price for the more popular ‘Expanded Basic’ service. We also find that the reforms led to increased actual entry in reformed states, by about 11.6% relative to non‐reformed states. Our analysis shows that the decline in price for ‘Basic’ service holds for markets that did not experience actual entry, consistent with limit pricing by incumbents. To control for potential state‐level shocks correlated with the reforms, we undertake a sample‐split test that finds larger declines in prices for both ‘Basic’ and ‘Expanded Basic’ services in local markets which faced a greater threat of entry (because they were close to a prominent second entrant). Our results are consistent with limit pricing models that predict incumbents respond to increased threat of entry, and suggest that the reforms facilitated entry and modestly benefited consumers in reformed states.     

Entry into platform‐based markets

This paper examines the relative importance of platform quality, indirect network effects, and consumer expectations on the success of entrants in platform‐based markets. We develop a theoretical model and find that an entrant's success depends on the strength of indirect network effects and on the consumers' discount factor for future applications. We then illustrate the model's applicability by examining Xbox's entry into the video game industry. We find that Xbox had a small quality advantage over the incumbent, PlayStation 2, and the strength of indirect network effects and the consumers' discount factor, while statistically significant, fall in the region where PlayStation 2's position is unsustainable. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Determinants of Entry and Profits in Local Banking Markets

This paper estimates a two equation model of market entry and profits, utilizing data on entry into over 2,000 banking markets over the period 1977--88. The entry equations measure whether entry depends on incumbent firms' profits and other market attributes that reflect the long-term attractiveness of markets for entry. Market profits, assumed to follow a partial-adjustment process, are affected by entry directly and indirectly through market structure. The model also corrects for an unavoidable source of error in market-level profits for the banking industry. The estimates suggest that a competitive process is at work in banking markets that limits the ability of supra-normal profits to persist. Entry is more likely in markets that have high profits, consistent with previous empirical results that market structure adjusts more quickly when profits are supra-normal. Population and population growth are also strong determinants of entry. Entry, in turn, reduces profits in rural markets.     

Second Mover Advantage and Entry Timing

We describe a model of entry timing assuming that a second mover can benefit from observing the experience of a first mover. We focus on how market attractiveness characteristics such as size and cost affect the time until first entry. The effects depend on whether the number of participants is exogenous or endogenous. In the former case, a more attractive market leads to earlier entry. In the latter case, it leads to later entry. Treating the number of firms as an integer, free entry leads to non‐monotone, but testable, effects of market attractiveness on entry timing.     

Mental Models and Successful First‐mover Entry Decisions: Empirical Evidence from Chinese Entrepreneurs

Existing research has identified a variety of mechanisms through which early entrants may be able to develop competitive advantages that favorably influence performance relative to later entrants. At the same time, later entrants can sometimes enjoy cost advantages arising from free riding and the resolution of uncertainty. Despite the impressive array of possible explanations linking entry timing with performance, it is unclear how these explanations align with the cognitive representations that guide managerial decision making. The authors address this gap in the literature by arguing that the resource‐based view of the firm provides potential insight into the way that perceived pioneer advantages and disadvantages influence managerial behavior. The resource‐based view argues that the value of various pioneer advantages will depend on the degree to which those advantages enable pioneers to access and control resources that are costly to copy. Because legal and cultural variables also influence access to resources, the value of specific dimensions of pioneer advantage will vary depending on the macroenvironment within which a firm operates. To test this reasoning, the authors examine the impact of perceived pioneer advantages on the number of first‐mover entry decisions of Chinese service entrepreneurs, who operate in an environment characterized by underdeveloped legal institutions and inadequate legal protections, a fledgling capital market, the limited availability of information about products and industries, and an emphasis on personal connections. The authors hypothesize that these unique characteristics of Chinese markets will affect the perceived importance of sources of pioneer advantage identified in studies of Western (primarily United States) firms. Using data collected from 302 Chinese service entrepreneurs, the authors find strong evidence that the number of pioneer entry decisions made by Chinese entrepreneurs are strongly tied to entrepreneurs’ perceptions that pioneer firms tend to outperform later entrants and have the ability to preempt key assets. In addition, the number of entry decisions is negatively related to perceptions of pioneer cost disadvantages and the level of uncertainty faced by pioneers relative to later entrants. However, consistent with the research hypotheses, perceptions of pioneer leadership and cost advantages do not significantly influence the entry decisions of Chinese service entrepreneurs.     

Successive Oligopolies with Differentiated Firms and Endogeneous Entry

We develop a model of successive oligopolies with endogenous entry, allowing for varying degrees of product differentiation and entry costs in both markets. We show that downstream conditions dominate the overall profitability of the two‐tier structure while upstream conditions mainly affect the distribution of profits. We analyze how two‐part tariffs and resale price maintenance shape the endogenous market structure and study their welfare effects. In contrast to previous literature, we find that welfare under linear prices can be larger than under twopart tariffs although the latter avoids double marginalization. This is because linear prices induce more downstream market entry.     

Response to McGahan and Porter's commentary on ‘Industry,corporate and business‐segment effects and business performance: a non‐parametric approach’

In the comment on Ruefli and Wiggins (2003), a number of points are made supporting the variance component analysis approach to determining the importance of industry, corporate, and business segment factors on business segment performance. This response addresses in more detail the nature of the methodological and statistical assumptions made by variance components analysis or ANOVA and their implications for the ‘puzzling’ results obtained when these techniques are employed. The response then contrasts the variance‐based methodologies with a non‐parametric approach used in Ruefli and Wiggins (2003) that makes fewer and weaker assumptions and yields more robust and more internally consistent results. The response also examines the limitations of employing an autoregressive approach to measuring persistence of abnormal profits and contrasts it with a non‐parametric methodology presented in the article. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Uniform Pricing as a Barrier to Entry

This paper considers an entry game in which an incumbent firm operates in a number of markets and a potential entrant can enter multiple or all of the markets. While price discrimination has usually been thought of as a barrier to entry, in our model it is not and instead, charging a uniform price across the markets can discourage entry. Partial entry occurs when the two firms' products are highly substitutable. In this case, uniform pricing raises the profits of both the incumbent and the entrant but reduces consumer and total welfare relative to price discrimination.     

Prices,Locations and Welfare When an Online Retailer Competes with Heterogeneous Brick‐and‐Mortar Retailers

This study proposes a novel spatial model in which an online retailer competes with heterogeneous brick‐and‐mortar retailers. Consumers are assumed to be non‐uniformly distributed along an urban‐rural line, and online transactions provide savings in transportation costs at the expense of distaste costs. Among other results, we show that the surviving brick‐and‐mortar retailers eventually move toward densely populated (urban) areas after the entry of the online retailer. Consumer welfare, the policy of not taxing online business, and the socially optimal number of retailers are also analyzed.     

CREDIBLE RETALIATORY ENTRY AND STRATEGIC TOE‐HOLDS*

The anticipated profits from entry by an established firm into a new market will depend on how incumbents in that market are expected to respond. One possibility, suggested by cases and the literature, is that an incumbent may respond with ‘retaliatory entry’ into the first entrant's ‘home’ market. The model presented here describes conditions under which this can be a credible threat that deters the first entry. When the conditions are such that it is not credible, the paper shows how firms can provide credibility through the establishment of toe‐hold investments in other markets.     

Creating Growth in New Markets: A Simultaneous Model of Firm Entry and Price*

Sales in a new market generally follow a hockey‐stick pattern: After commercialization, sales are very low for some time before there is a dramatic takeoff in growth. Reported sales takeoffs across products vary widely from a few years to several decades. Prior research identifies new firm entry or price declines as key factors that relate to the timing of a sales takeoff in new markets. However, this literature considers these variables to be exogenous and only finds unilateral effects. In the present article, new firm entry and price declines are modeled as being endogenous. Thus, the simultaneous relationship between price declines and firm entry in the introductory period of new markets when industry sales are negligible is studied. Using a sample of new markets formed in the United States during the last 135 years, strong support for a simultaneous model of price and firm entry is found: Price decreases relate to the competitive pressures associated with firm entry, and, in turn, firm entry is lower in new markets with rapidly falling prices. Furthermore, a key driver of firm entry during the early years of a new market involves the level of patent activity, and a key driver of price decreases is the presence of large firms. In contrast to the recommendations from other research, these results indicate that rapid price declines may further delay sales takeoff in industries by dampening new firm entry. Instead, rapid sales takeoffs in new markets come from encouraging greater innovative activity and the entry of large firms.     

Entry into Swedish Retail and Wholesale Trade Markets

This paper examines, using a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model, what determined entry into the Swedish retail and wholesale trade markets between 1990 and 1996. According to the results, high returns on equity and low sunk costs seemed to attract more entry into retail trade industries, while recent entry and higher total industry sales were associated with more entry into both retail and wholesale trade local markets.     

ENTRY DETERRENCE BY NON‐HORIZONTAL MERGER*

We study when and how pure non‐horizontal mergers, whether cross‐product or vertical, can deter new entry. Organizational mergers implicitly commit firms to more aggressive price competition. Because heightened competition deters entry, mergers can occur in equilibrium even when, absent entry considerations, they do not. We show that, in order to prevent a flood of entrants, mergers arise even when a marginal merger costs incumbent firms more than does a marginal entrant.     

Why Do Firms Enter a New Product Market? A Two‐Dimensional Framework for Market Entry Motivation and Behavior

What are the energetic forces that induce established firms to enter new product markets? While most previous research has explained the economic profits expected from a new product market as firms' distinctive motivation for market entry, some recent studies also emphasize interfirm competition and benchmarking activities as another important factor that motivates firms' new market entry. To explain the established firms' diverse new product market entry behaviors, this study presents a two‐dimensional scheme of entry motivation in terms of the degrees of target market profit focus and competitor focus. The first dimension captures the economic motivation of firms' new market entry that ranges from focusing on the direct expected profits from the target market to considering more strategic/indirect benefit incentives. The second dimension captures the degree of firms' external motivation for entry affected by competitors that ranges from independent entry decisions to fully competitor‐oriented entry decisions. Using multiple‐industry survey data, the current study empirically verifies that these two entry motivation dimensions explain a great portion of actual firms' new product market entry behaviors and that they are independent of each other. Subsequently, this study validates that firms' operational size and their environmental factors like perceived technological uncertainty and competitive intensity upon new market entry affect the degrees of the two dimensions of firms' new product market entry motivation. More specifically, large firms less emphasize target‐market profits than small firms, and when perceived technological uncertainty is high, potential market entrants become less target market profit focused but more competitor focused. Under a highly competitive new market condition, firms focus on both target‐market profits and competitors. Based on the analysis of new market entry motivation dimensions, the current study proposes a new typology of established firms' market entry behaviors. The suggested typology represents the four different types of new product market entrants and examines specific characteristics and entry strategies for each type of potential entrants. This entry‐motivation framework should provide a deeper understanding of the backgrounds of entry behaviors and assist firms in developing appropriate entry strategies and in advantageously responding to rival firms' actions with regard to entry.     

TWO‐SIDED MARKETS WITH PECUNIARY AND PARTICIPATION EXTERNALITIES*

The existing literature on two‐sided markets addresses participation externalities, but it has neglected pecuniary externalities between platforms. In this paper we build a model that incorporates both externalities. In our set‐up, differentiated platforms compete in advertising levels and offer consumers a service free of charge that is financed through advertising. We show that advertising can exhibit the properties of a strategic substitute or complement. Surprisingly, we find that platform profits can increase with market entry and that there are cases in which the level of advertising rises with entry. We also consider endogenous entry and provide a welfare analysis.     

Decomposing Pioneer Survival: Implications for the Order‐of‐Entry Effect

In contrast to previous studies of pioneer survival that directly compare the survival of market pioneers with later entrants, this paper proposes that a market pioneer, as the first entrant, operates under two distinctly different survival processes, one during the initial monopoly period and another during the later competition period. The two processes of market pioneers need to be separately estimated and compared with the survival process of later entrants. This paper demonstrates a method for decomposing the pioneer's survival and empirically shows how researchers can compare the pioneer survival in two periods with that of later entrants and identify period‐specific advantages of pioneering. Our empirical analysis using data collected from two different types of industries—a low‐tech (i.e., newspaper) industry and several high‐tech industries—reveals several interesting new findings that illustrate the advantages of decomposing pioneer survival. For example, this paper shows that when treating first‐mover survival as a single process, one can only find an oversimplified pattern showing that first movers have a survival chance equal to that of second movers in the newspaper industry, but a lower one than the second movers in high‐tech industries. However, when analyzing the first‐mover's survival as a sequence of monopoly and competition processes, new insights emerge. In the newspaper industry, the pioneers can have survival advantages in both the monopoly and the competition periods relative to the second movers, and there is a significant survival advantage for those second entrants who delay market entry until the first entrant exits. In contrast, the overall pioneer survival disadvantage identified in the high‐tech industries when treating the survival as a single process comes from the survival disadvantage in the competition period but not in the monopoly period. Furthermore, our empirical analyses using data from two types of industries reveal completely different patterns with regard to the pioneer survival advantage, which suggests that being first can benefit pioneers in both two‐market periods in low‐tech industries but can be extremely risky for pioneers to gain any survival advantages in both two‐market periods in high‐tech industries because the former markets have relatively low market and technology uncertainties, and organizational change is less important; whereas the latter industries have significantly high market and technology uncertainties, technological advances emerge frequently, and firms are required to adapt themselves quickly to a fast‐changing environment.     

Generic Entry into the Regulated Spanish Pharmaceutical Market

This paper empirically analyses entry by generic firms into the strictly regulated Spanish pharmaceutical market. We estimate a fixed effects negative binomial entry model using a panel of 77 active ingredient markets during the period 1999–2005. The results show that generic entry depends positively on revenues, the age of the market, and the number of previous brand-name competitors, and negatively on the number of generic incumbents. We also find that regulation may drive out competition since, contrary to what policy makers might expect, the system of reference pricing restrains generic entry.     

Spectrum Licensing,Policy Instruments and Market Entry

Competition policy attempts to address the potential for market failure by encouraging competition in service markets. Often, in wireless communication service markets, national regulatory authorities seek to encourage entry via the spectrum assignment process. Instruments used include the assignment mode (auction or beauty contest), setting aside licenses and providing bidding (price and quantity) credits for potential entrants, and making more licenses (spectrum blocks) available than there are incumbent firms (excess licenses). The empirical analysis assesses the effectiveness of these policy instruments on encouraging entry. The econometric results show that the probability of entry is enhanced by using auction assignments and excess licenses. Furthermore, quantity, but not price, concessions encourage entry.     

OUTPUT‐EXPANDING COLLUSION IN THE PRESENCE OF A COMPETITIVE FRINGE*

Following the structure of many commodity markets, we consider a few large firms and a competitive fringe of many small suppliers choosing quantities in an infinite‐horizon setting subject to demand shocks. We show that a collusive agreement among the large firms may not only bring an output contraction but also an output expansion (relative to the non‐collusive output level). The latter occurs during booms and is due to the strategic substitutability of quantities. We also find that the time at which maximal collusion is most difficult to sustain can be either at booms or recessions. The international copper cartel of 1935–39 is used to illustrate some of our results.     

Sunk Cost and Entry

The usual mechanisms by which sunk costs are said to affect entry arethrough raising the expected average cost of an entrant, relative to that ofincumbents. I show that in standard models and in the absence of riskpremia imposed by financial markets on an entrant's cost of capital, sunkcosts may make entry unprofitable because of their effect on the post-entryunit costs of incumbents.