INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVE PRESSURE*

I analyze the effects of competition on process innovation and product introduction and obtain robust results that hold for a range of market structures and competition modes. It is found that increasing the number of firms tends to decrease cost reduction expenditure per firm, whereas increasing the degree of product substitutability, with or without free entry, increases it—provided that the average demand for product varieties does not shrink. Increasing market size increases cost reduction expenditure per firm and has ambiguous effects on the number of varieties offered, while decreasing the cost of entry increases the number of entrants and varieties but reduces cost reduction expenditure per variety. The results are extended to other measures of competitive pressure and to investment in product quality. The framework and results shed light on empirical strategies to assess the impact of competition on innovation.     

Competition network structure and product market entry

This study proposes and tests a theory of the effects of competition network structure on product market entry. Competition networks are defined as the patterns of interdependence between rivals that emerge from direct competition. Studying networks based on competitive interdependence allows us to extend social network theory to new territory and to enhance our understanding of product market entry. We propose that the size, interconnectedness and diversity of competition networks influence subsequent product market entry in a systemic way. We test our hypotheses in a unique dataset drawn from the aircraft modification industry. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why Do Firms Enter a New Product Market? A Two‐Dimensional Framework for Market Entry Motivation and Behavior

What are the energetic forces that induce established firms to enter new product markets? While most previous research has explained the economic profits expected from a new product market as firms' distinctive motivation for market entry, some recent studies also emphasize interfirm competition and benchmarking activities as another important factor that motivates firms' new market entry. To explain the established firms' diverse new product market entry behaviors, this study presents a two‐dimensional scheme of entry motivation in terms of the degrees of target market profit focus and competitor focus. The first dimension captures the economic motivation of firms' new market entry that ranges from focusing on the direct expected profits from the target market to considering more strategic/indirect benefit incentives. The second dimension captures the degree of firms' external motivation for entry affected by competitors that ranges from independent entry decisions to fully competitor‐oriented entry decisions. Using multiple‐industry survey data, the current study empirically verifies that these two entry motivation dimensions explain a great portion of actual firms' new product market entry behaviors and that they are independent of each other. Subsequently, this study validates that firms' operational size and their environmental factors like perceived technological uncertainty and competitive intensity upon new market entry affect the degrees of the two dimensions of firms' new product market entry motivation. More specifically, large firms less emphasize target‐market profits than small firms, and when perceived technological uncertainty is high, potential market entrants become less target market profit focused but more competitor focused. Under a highly competitive new market condition, firms focus on both target‐market profits and competitors. Based on the analysis of new market entry motivation dimensions, the current study proposes a new typology of established firms' market entry behaviors. The suggested typology represents the four different types of new product market entrants and examines specific characteristics and entry strategies for each type of potential entrants. This entry‐motivation framework should provide a deeper understanding of the backgrounds of entry behaviors and assist firms in developing appropriate entry strategies and in advantageously responding to rival firms' actions with regard to entry.     

The impact of industry environment on early market entry decisions by B2B managers in the U.S. and Japan

Managers form simplified mental models to cope with market environment uncertainties and to process information. A critical decision is whether to enter a high-potential market early. Large innovation and development investments involved in this decision increase uncertainty. We examine the importance ascribed by U.S. and Japanese managers to competitive forces when making early market entry decisions. We expect that the competitive forces will have different effects on the likelihood of early market entry in the U.S. versus Japan due to cultural and business environment differences, and we thereby develop several propositions. We develop a decision-making exercise simulating early market entry decisions, and tested our propositions with managers in medium to large business-to-business (B2B) firms from both countries. We assessed impacts of the competitive market forces on entry strategy selection via relative weights, repeated-measures analysis of variance, and frequency analysis. Our findings revealed differences in the mental models of Japanese and U.S. managers. Buyer power had a larger effect on the decision to make an early market entry for Japanese managers, while threat of new firm entry had a larger effect for U.S. managers; these findings were consistent with our propositions. We also found several areas of agreement between U.S. and Japanese managers. We conclude with theoretical implications and recommendations to B2B management.     

DESIGNING A MARKET STRUCTURE WHEN FIRMS COMPETE FOR THE RIGHT TO SERVE THE MARKET*

In many industries, a regulator designs an auction to select ex‐ante the firms that compete ex‐post on the product market. This paper considers the optimal market structure when firms incur sunk costs before entering the market and when the government is not able to regulate firms in the market. We prove that a free entry equilibrium results in an excessive entry when the entry costs are private information. Then, we consider an auction mechanism selecting the firms allowed to serve the market and show that the optimal number of licences results in the socially optimal market structure. When all the potential candidates are actual bidders, the optimal number of firms in the market increases with the number of candidates and decreases with the social cost of public funds. When the market size is small, as the net profit in the market decreases with the number of selected firms, entry is endogenous. As increasing competition in the market reduces competition for the market, the optimal structure is more concentrated than in the previous case.     

Motivation matters: Corporate scope and competition in complementary product markets

Research summary : We argue that a pure capabilities‐based view does not accurately explain the competitive dynamics of increasingly common settings in which firms act as both complementors and competitors. We propose that the Awareness‐Motivation‐Capability framework is more appropriate for these settings. We derive predictions from both a pure capabilities view and the AMC framework, and test those predictions in the U.S. auto leasing market, in which the leasing subsidiaries of car manufacturers directly compete with the same independent lessors who provide complements to the manufacturers. Although our results are consistent with capabilities playing an important role, motivation appears to be a critical factor explaining the competitive dynamics of the market. Managerial summary : Firms that compete with business units owned by larger corporate parents face additional considerations. Such subsidiary competitors can be motivated by broader corporate considerations, shifting their objectives, and consequently, their strategic actions. Expecting subsidiary competitors to pursue business unit profitability can mislead managers toward pricing, product mix, or market entry errors. We present an important example from consumer finance, where independent auto lessors, such as Bank of America (BoA), compete with captive leasing subsidiaries like Ford Motor Credit (FMC). Since FMC is motivated to subsidize and support vehicle sales for its manufacturer parent, a cost advantage is not enough for BoA to dominate the market. Understanding broader corporate motivations of competitors helps managers anticipate competition levels in potential markets, thereby improving decision‐making and performance. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Internal vs. external learning in new product development: effects on speed, costs and competitive advantage

The purpose of this study was to investigate how different technology sourcing strategies throughout the new product development process influenced innovation speed, development costs, and competitive advantage. We studied 75 new product development projects from ten large, U.S.-based companies in several industries. Results indicated that: (1) more external sourcing during the early (i.e., idea generation) stage was related with lower competitive success; (2) more external sourcing during the later (i.e., technological development stage was related with slower innovation speed; and (3) development costs tended to rise with greater reliance on external sources of technology, but this result was not statistically significant.     

ENTRY AND COMPETITION IN LOCAL HOSPITAL MARKETS*

We extend the entry model developed by Bresnahan and Reiss to make use of quantity information, and apply it to data on the U.S. hospital industry. The Bresnahan and Reiss model infers changes in the toughness of competition from entry threshold ratios. Entry threshold ratios, however, identify the product of changes in the toughness of competition and changes in fixed costs. By using quantity data, we are able to identify separately changes in the toughness of competition from changes in fixed costs. This model is generally applicable to industries where there are good data on market structure and quantity, but not on prices, as for example in the quinquennial U.S. Economic Census. In the hospital markets we examine, entry leads to a quick convergence to competitive conduct. Entry reduces variable profits and increases quantity. Most of the effects of entry come from having a second and a third firm enter the market.     

Does the fourth entrant make any difference?: Entry and competition in the early U.S. broadband market

We study the importance of sunk costs in determining entry conditions and inferences about firm conduct in an adapted Bresnahan and Reiss (1991, 1994) framework. In our framework, entrants incur sunk costs to enter, while incumbents disregard these costs in deciding on continuation or exit. We apply this framework to study entry and competition in the local U.S. broadband markets from 1999 to 2003. Ignoring sunk costs generates unreasonable variation in firms' competitive conduct over time. This variation disappears when entry costs are allowed. Once the market has one to three incumbent firms, the fourth entrant has little effect on competitive conduct.     

Pseudo-Generic Products and Barriers to Entry in Pharmaceutical Markets

This paper examines incentives for brand-name pharmaceutical producers to market pseudo-generic versions of their own branded products upon the expiry of patent protection.Using a two-stage game model, we determine that under plausible demand and cost conditions, brand-name incumbents can find it profitable to produce pseudo-generics as a means of blocking rivals' entry even when independent firms producing true generics face low entry costs.The model shows that social welfare can be higher when firms use pseudo-generics instead of capacity for entry deterrence as long as substitutability between brand-name and generic products is sufficiently high.     

Exploring Mediating and Moderating Influences on the Links among Cycle Time,Proficiency in Entry Timing,and New Product Profitability*

Development cycle time is the elapsed time from the beginning of idea generation to the moment that the new product is ready for market introduction. Market‐entry timing is contingent upon the new product's cycle time. Only when the product is completed can a firm decide whether and when to enter the market to exploit the new product's window of opportunity. To determine the right moment of entry a firm needs to correctly balance the risks of premature entry and the missed opportunity of late entry. Proficient market‐entry timing is therefore defined as the firm's ability to get the market‐entry timing right (i.e., neither too early nor too late). The literature has produced divergent evidence with regard to the effects of development cycle time and proficiency in market‐entry timing on new product profitability. To explain these disparities this study (1) explores the mediating roles of development costs and sales volume in the relationships among development cycle time, proficiency in market‐entry timing, and new product profitability, respectively; and it (2) explores the moderating influence of product newness on the relationship between development cycle time and development costs and that of new product advantage on the link between proficiency in market‐entry timing and sales volume. The results from a survey‐based study of 72 manufacturers of industrial products in the Netherlands suggest that development costs mediate the relationship between development cycle time and new product profitability and that sales volume mediates the link between proficiency in market‐entry timing and new product profitability. In addition, the findings indicate that new product advantage strengthens the positive relationship between proficiency in market‐entry timing and sales volume. The results provide no evidence for a moderating effect of product newness. These results have important implications because to maximize new product profitability managers need to distinguish between costs and demand side effects of development cycle time and market‐entry timing on new product profitability. Keeping this distinction in mind should help them to better determine the relative profit impact of investments in cycle time reduction or improved entry timing. Moreover, the findings suggest that highly advantaged products that enter the market at the right time may have a highly attenuated sales volume. It also implies that new products with lower advantage may have very little leeway in hitting the “sweet spot” in market. The message is that “doing the right thing” (i.e., to develop a highly advantaged new product) may be at least as important as correctly balancing the risks of premature entry and the missed opportunity of late entry.     

EXCLUSIVE QUALITY*

In the case of vertically differentiated products, Bertrand competition at the retail level does not prevent an incumbent upstream firm from using exclusivity contracts to deter the entry of a high‐quality rival. Indeed, because of differentiation, the incumbent's inferior product is not eliminated upon entry. Due to the resulting competitive pressure, a retailer who considers rejecting the exclusivity contract expects to earn much less than the incumbent's monopoly rents. Thus, in equilibrium, the incumbent can always offer high enough an upfront payment to induce all retailers to sign the contract and achieve exclusion. This is true under linear pricing for intermediate levels of entry costs, and with two‐part tariffs even in the absence of entry costs.     

Is a Big Entrant a Threat to Incumbents? The Role of Demand Substitutability in Competition Among the Big and the Small

We establish a model of market competition between large and small firms and investigate the way in which demand substitutability affects how the entry of big firms impacts incumbents. We focus on the relative strength of two opposing effects of entry on large incumbent firms’ demand: the direct substitution effect among large firms (negative) and the indirect feedback effect through the change in small firms’ aggregated behavior (positive). If the substitutability between large and small firms is sufficiently high, the indirect effect dominates the direct effect and large incumbents’ equilibrium prices and profits increase. We show that welfare effects are ambiguous, which calls for careful assessment when regulating large firms’ entry.     

Product Innovativeness and Entry Strategy: Impact on Cycle Time and Break-even Time

New product development time, or cycle time, has become a critical competitive variable, particularly for small high-tech manufacturing firms. The business press is filled with examples about large firms that have successfully reduced cycle time. This article investigates the relative impact of product innovation and entry strategy on cycle time and initial market performance of small firms. Using a sample of seventy-three small manufacturing firms, Abdul Ali, Robert Krapfel, Jr., and Douglas LaBahn find that faster product development is associated with shorter break-even time. Their results also indicate that these firms are achieving shorter cycle time not by sacrificing product quality, but by keeping the technical content of the product simple. Past research has not taken into account this relationship, and this may be one of the reasons why researchers have often suggested conflicting impact of entry strategy on market performance.     

Optimal pricing and advertising strategy for introducing a new business product with threat of competitive entry

The problem of optimal joint pricing and advertising decision making for a new product facing potential competitive entry has received inadequate attention. We propose a model that attempts to find the optimal price-advertising frontier in the face of potential competitive entry that maximizes total discounted profits for pre- and post-entry periods. We find that a firm would charge the price that equates price elasticity to marginal revenue product of advertising (as predicted by [Dorfman, R. and Steiner, P.O. (1954), Optimal Advertising and Optimal Quality, American Economic Review, 44(5), 826-836.]) only when the potential effects of pricing and advertising on its market share are not considered. Under optimal conditions, aware that market share is subject to erosion, the firm charges a somewhat lower price than the profit maximizing price, and sets an advertisement expense that is somewhat higher than the profit-maximizing advertising level as predicted by Cournot's monopolistic setting. We illustrate the applicability of our model using business product examples taken from several industries including operating systems, software, pharmaceutical, and telephone switching. Directions for future research with implications for B2B managers (for example, the possible effects of preannouncement to forestall competitive entry) are discussed.     

Efficient versus Responsive Supply Chain Choice: An Empirical Examination of Influential Factors

Contemporary strategies in operations management suggest that successful firms align supply chain assets with product demand characteristics in order to exploit the profit potential of product lines fully. However, observation suggests that supply chain assets often are longer lived than product line decisions. This suggests that alignment between supply chain assets and demand characteristics is most likely to occur at the time of initial market entry. This article examines the association between product demand characteristics and the initial investment in a supply chain at the time of market entry. We characterize supply chains as responsive or efficient. A responsive supply chain is distinguished by short production lead‐times, low set‐up costs, and small batch sizes that allow the responsive firm to adapt quickly to market demand, but often at a higher unit cost. An efficient supply chain is distinguished by longer production lead‐times, high set‐up costs, and larger batch sizes that allow the efficient firm to produce at a low unit cost, but often at the expense of market responsiveness. We hypothesize that a firm's choice of responsive supply chain will be associated with lower industry growth rates, higher contribution margins, higher product variety, and higher demand or technological uncertainty. We further hypothesize that interactions among these variables either can reinforce or can temper the main effects. We report that lower industry growth rates are associated with responsive market entry, but this effect is offset if growth occurs during periods of high variety and high demand uncertainty. We report that higher contribution margins are associated with responsive market entry and that this effect is more pronounced when occurring with periods of high variety. Finally, we report that responsive market entry also is correlated positively with higher technological demand uncertainty. These results are found using data from the North American mountain bike industry.     

Vertical Product Differentiation, Entry-Deterrence Strategies, and Entry Qualities

We analyze the potential entry of a new product into a vertically differentiated market. Here the entry-deterrence strategies of the incumbent firm rely on “limit qualities.” The model assumes quality-dependent marginal production costs and considers sequential quality choices by an incumbent and an entrant. Entry-quality decisions and the entry-deterrence strategies are related to the fixed cost necessary for entry and to the degree of consumers’ taste for quality. We detail the conditions under which the incumbent increases its quality level to deter entry. Quality-dependent marginal production costs in the model entail the possibility of inferior-quality entry as well. Welfare is not necessarily improved when entry is encouraged rather than deterred.     

Product innovation with vertical differentiation: Is a monopolist's incentive weaker?

This paper compares the incentives for product innovation across different market structures when the new product is vertically differentiated and of lower quality, a common case empirically. We show that innovation incentive rankings across market structures can differ substantially when the new product is of lower rather than higher quality. In particular, the incentive to add the new product can be greater for a monopolist over the old product than for a firm that would face any degree of competition from the old product. This incentive ranking cannot occur when, instead, the new product is of higher quality as has been analyzed in previous work. Moreover, in that case, the incentive ranking is the same whether the market is covered or not covered, whereas in our setting the ranking can differ. With the market covered, our setting provides another environment where the monopolist can have the greatest incentive to innovate, as previously shown when the new product is horizontally differentiated. Together, both settings show that Arrow's famous result—a secure monopolist gains less from a nondrastic process innovation than would a competitive firm—does not always extend to nondrastic product innovations. However, in all the cases analyzed here, consumer welfare (though not total welfare) is always lower under monopoly, even when only the monopolist would add the new product.     

Entry timing and innovation strategy in feature phones

Research summary : This inductive study examines how firms make decisions about the timing of innovations, focusing on the mobile handset industry during the feature‐phone era. Through qualitative and quantitative data, we reveal how individual technology‐entry decisions are influenced by a portfolio‐level timing preference, and how this preference informs other aspects of innovation strategy, too. Early movers address greater, more uncertain revenue opportunities with broader, less selective innovation portfolios. Conversely, late movers target lower, more certain revenue opportunities with narrower, more selective portfolios. While timing per se seems unrelated to performance, a timing‐strategy alignment is. Future research on the equifinal configurations we propose—broad/nonselective for early movers and narrow/selective for late movers—could thus help resolve the debate about the link between timing and performance. Managerial summary : We study how firms make decisions about the entry of new product features, in this case mobile phone technologies. During development firms weigh the scale and likelihood of features' commercial success. Some firms display a preference for earlier entry, which offers temporary monopoly rewards if uncertainty resolves favorably, while others tend to opt for later entry, which offers greater certainty but lower rewards due to competitive preemption. The innovation portfolios of these companies thus pursue differently structured opportunities, bringing about different strategic approaches. Since early movers aim for big hits to compensate for a higher failure rate, they launch a broader set of features and exert little selective pressure on the development portfolio. By contrast, late movers' lower payoffs reduce their tolerance for failure, making them launch fewer features and emphasize selectiveness; i.e., they invest in learning from the resolution of uncertainty so as to choose features more discriminately. When we examine innovation performance, timing has no significant effect but matching timing with feature breadth does. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The impact of SME internationalization on innovation: The mediating role of market and entrepreneurial orientation

In today's highly competitive global environment, even small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) need to make product and process innovations in order to outperform the competition and satisfy global customers. Investigating the success factors of innovation performance has become critical for the survival and competitiveness of SMEs. The aim of this study is to explore the impact of the degree of internationalization (DoI) on innovation performance through the mediating factors of market and entrepreneurial orientation in the context of emerging-market SMEs. We tested our model and hypotheses with 235 SMEs in the United Arab Emirates, which is an emerging market. The results obtained from partial least squares estimates indicate that the degree of internationalization positively affects innovation performance and, more importantly, that this relationship is indirect and fully mediated by market and entrepreneurial orientation for SMEs. These results shed light on the mechanism of the effect of DoI on innovation performance in the emerging-market SME context.