Paying Customers to Switch

This paper studies the business practice of offering discounts to new customers in markets with switching costs. In a two-period homogeneous-good duopoly model, it is shown that the equilibrium amount of discounts increases continuously in the expected switching costs of a typical consumer. In equilibrium, firms offer the same prices and discounts in a mature market even if they have different market shares, and the demands faced by these firms in a new market become more elastic. Firms are worse off engaging in the discriminatory pricing, while consumers need not necessarily benefit from it. There is costly equilibrium switching of consumers, which creates a dead-weight loss to the society.     

Corporate social responsibility,durable‐goods and firm profitability

Utilizing a two‐period durable‐goods framework, we show that in uncommitted sales markets a firm may earn higher profits as it increases its level of corporate social responsibility (CSR). We find that this occurs even though CSR has no direct impact other than increasing the durable‐goods firm's manufacturing costs. We show that in sales markets, CSR may allow the firm to credibly commit itself to lower production in the future. This, in turn, can enhance their profits even though the CSR activities are costly and provide no direct demand or marketing benefit in our model. This is important because it provides another, hereto unexplored, strategic rationale for the willingness of profit‐maximizing firms to undertake costly CSR activities. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Switching Regime Approach to Measuring the Effects of Technological Change in Ocean Shipping

this study examines the dramatic change in production technology of the U.S. ocean liner shipping industry over the period 1971 through 1982 using panel data on 15 subsidized U.S.-flag liner firms. To estimate the changes in the production function due to the new technology, the switching regime method of Goldfeld and Quandt is applied to a translog variable profit function. Three regimes based on the proportion of the new technology reflected in a firm's fleet are identified. The constant returns to scale fleet size more than doubles across the three regimes.     

Bargains Followed by Bargains: When Switching Costs Make Markets More Competitive

In markets where consumers have switching costs and firms cannot price‐discriminate, firms have two conflicting strategies. A firm can either offer a low price to attract new consumers and build future market share or a firm can offer a high price to exploit the partial lock‐in of their existing consumers. This paper develops a theory of competition when overlapping generations of consumers have switching costs and firms produce differentiated products. Competition takes place over an infinite horizon with any number of firms. This paper shows that the relationship between the level of switching costs, firms' discount rate, and the number of firms determines whether firms offer low or high prices. Similar to previous duopoly studies, switching costs are likely to facilitate lower (higher) equilibrium prices when switching costs are small (large) or when a firm's discount rate is large (small). Unlike previous studies, this paper demonstrates that the number of firms also determines whether switching costs are pro‐ or anticompetitive, and with a sufficiently large (small) number of firms switching costs are pro‐ (anti‐) competitive.     

转换成本、网络规模与信用卡产业竞争策略比较

近年来，我国信用卡产业呈现出市场集中度逐年下降的趋势。信用卡市场的竞争融合了网络效应、兼容性及转换成本等因素，而在兼容性一定的环境下，不同银行的竞争策略往往不同。本文通过防降价均衡模型估计出2010—2012年我国九家上市银行的信用卡转换成本，并对网络规模扩张、转换成本定位以及竞争成效等进行分组比较。结果表明，股份制商业银行利用较低的转换成本吸引新客户，实现了更高的业务规模增长率；四大国有商业银行则利用高转换成本锁定其已有客户，并以高速扩张网络规模来竞争新客户，使其同股份制商业银行的业务规模增长率差异逐年下降。这说明网络产业中不同市场地位的厂商可将转换成本定位与网络规模扩张作为差异化策略，以此实现竞争优势。     

Firm governance and duopoly: in weakness may lie strength

The paper proposes a model of firm governance when two firms compete in a duopoly. The paper assumes that a motivational asymmetry exists between owners and managers: owners wish to obtain maximum profits, managers wish to maximize sales. Managers perceive that salary, social status or future job prospects are more closely associated with firm size (i.e. sales) than with firm profits. The paper takes an agency view of the firm where owners only indirectly influence the behaviour of firms through the level of control they exert over managers. The paper demonstrates that a weakly governed firm, acting as a sales maximizer, can gain a competitive advantage over a strongly governed firm, acting as a profit maximizer. The paper examines the extent of this advantage under cost leadership and differentiation strategies. The paper also demonstrates that the objectives of profit maximization and maximization of competitive advantage are not necessarily congruent. The paper graphically represents the profit functions of the two firms illustrating the Nash equilibrium under Cournot and Stackelberg conditions. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Environmental Compliance and Firm Performance: Evidence from China*

This article evaluates the impact of environmental compliance on firms’ innovation and financial performance using a panel dataset of Chinese firms for the period of 2000–5. Our results show certification of the ISO14000 has a significantly positive impact on firms’ profitability. This finding is robust when we take into account possible endogeneity of certification, effects of export and types of customers, and possible precertification time trends. In addition, we find that certified firms have larger per‐worker sales volumes and market shares in the country, which suggests an alternative mechanism for the Porter hypothesis in the context of a developing economy.     

Global Engagement and Returns Volatility

This paper finds that a greater reliance on foreign market sales increases the volatility of firms’ stock returns, using high‐frequency data for publicly listed Japanese manufacturing firms over the period 2000–10. The two margins of global engagement we consider, namely, exports and sales via foreign affiliates (horizontal foreign direct investment), have both a positive and economically significant effect on firm‐level volatility. We find, however, that increasing the intensity of sales through foreign affiliates has a stronger effect on volatility than a similar change in export intensity. We also uncover evidence consistent with the notion that firms’ need to use external finance to cover the substantial costs involved in reaching foreign consumers can be an important channel through which firms’ participation in international markets increases their exposure to economic uncertainty.     

The effectiveness of entrepreneurial firm’s knowledge acquisition from a business incubator

This cross-cultural research project, involving the United States and Finland, explored how the entrepreneurial firm’s acquisition of business processes’ knowledge from interaction with incubator management positively impacts on new product development, increased technical competence, enhanced reputation and lower costs of sales to customers. In a sample of 52 firms, the study’s methodology depended on single response, self-reported data. The findings suggest that the sole knowledge benefits gained by the firm, from the incubator relationship, is a perception of enhanced reputation. Also, incubator managers should focus more on assisting new technology based firms with growing the venture in the marketplace. Funding for this project was provided by The National Science Foundation, and The National Technology Agency of Finland.     

Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two‐Period Cournot Oligopoly

Two‐period Cournot competition between n identical firms producing at constant marginal cost and able to store before selling has pure strategy Nash‐perfect equilibria, in which some firms store to exert endogenously a leadership over rivals. The number of firms storing balances market share gains, obtained by accumulating early the output, with losses in margin resulting from increased sales and higher operation costs. This number and the industry inventories are nonmonotonic in n. Concentration (HHI) and aggregate sales increase due to the strategic use of inventories.     

Differentiation-Induced Switching Costs and Poaching

We show that the presence of sufficiently significant switching costs, which are increasing in the degree of product differentiation, generates an equilibrium configuration with maximal differentiation within the framework of a Hotelling model with linear transportation costs. The equilibrium with maximal differentiation offers a formalization of the idea that competing firms have noncooperative incentives to establish maximal switching cost barriers. The equilibrium incentives for commitments to high switching costs can be explained with poaching profits, which are increasing in the switching costs. Ex ante competition for market shares in period 1 is unable to eliminate these poaching profits .     

Loyalty Rewards Facilitate Tacit Collusion

Using a dynamic overlapping‐generations model, we show that loyalty rewards robustly facilitate tacit collusion. We compare the sustainability of tacit collusion when uniform prices are used, when loyal customers are rewarded without using commitment, and when loyalty rewards are implemented by committing to offering customers either lower fixed repeat‐purchase prices or fixed repeat‐purchase discounts. We find that, relative to uniform prices, rewarding loyalty without using commitment on the equilibrium path makes tacit collusion easier to sustain, because a deviating firm is unable to steal one period of industry profit before losing all future profits. When loyalty rewards are offered by firms committing to repeat‐purchase prices, collusion is even easier to sustain, because a deviating firm cannot renege on its discounted price for repeat‐purchase customers. When firms commit to repeat‐purchase discounts, they also commit to lowering the price for their repeat‐purchase customers if they undercut the regular price, rendering tacit collusion to be even more readily sustainable. Our results hold whether products are homogeneous or horizontally differentiated as in a Hotelling model.     

Managerial Delegation Contracts under Centralized Unionization

This paper studies how alternative managerial delegation contracts in a duopoly product market interact with wage decisions taken by a central (industry‐wide) union in the labor market. Interestingly, results prove to be more varied with respect to findings by the managerial delegation literature with exogenous production costs. Most notably, it is pointed out that, in equilibrium, both firm profitability and welfare outcomes can be superior under both sales delegation and relative profit delegation, depending on various factors such as the degree of product differentiation and the competition regime. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

考虑顾客惰性时的供应链定价与存货决策研究

本文研究了存在顾客惰性时的零售商的最优定价与存货决策问题。假定产品的销售分为正常销售阶段和清仓处理阶段,顾客在确定最优购买时机时会战略性地比较提前购买和延迟购买时获得的期望效用,同时顾客也可能存在延迟购买的消费惰性。利用理性预期均衡分析,分析了存在顾客惰性时零售商的最优定价与存货数量,并且比较了战略顾客行为下和顾客惰性下的零售商的最优定价和存货数量的关系。研究表明,顾客惰性的存在减少了零售商的期望利润,降低了零售商的最优销售价格,同时也降低了零售商的最优存货数量。     

Competitive Strategies in an International Context: Impact of Multi-Cultural Dimensions

ABSTRACT

This study extended research on organization characteristics associated with successful technology-based competitive strategies in U.S. firms to Brussels-based firms in order to specifically investigate the multicultural aspects of competitive strategies in an international context. Organization characteristics associated with success in U.S. firms also were associated with success in Brussels firms. However, the pattern of performance criteria varied. Brussels firms with responsive and innovative organizational systems exhibited higher sales growth, higher creation and maintenance of employment, higher reduction of employee turnover and higher overall success. In contrast, firms characterized by traditional and hierarchical management philosophies exhibited lower profit growth, lower profit margins and lower returns to shareholders.     

Is econometrics useful for private policy making? A case study of replacement policy at an auto rental company

The goal of this paper is to illustrate the potential usefulness of econometrics as a tool to assist private policy makers. We provide a case study and detailed econometric analysis of the automobile replacement policy adopted by a large car rental company. Unlike public policy making–where the benefits from using econometric models and “science-based” approaches to policy making are hard to quantify because the outcomes of interest are typically subjective quantities such as “social welfare”–in the case of firms there is an objective, easily quantifiable criterion for judging whether policy A is better than policy B: profits. We introduce and estimate an econometric model of the rental histories of individual cars in the company’s fleet. Via stochastic simulations, we show that the model provides a good approximation to the company’s actual operations. In particular, the econometric model is able to reproduce the extraordinarily high rates of return that the company obtains on its rental cars, with average internal rates of return between purchase and sale of approximately 50%. However, the econometric model can simulate outcomes under a range of counterfactual vehicle replacement policies. We use the econometric model to simulate the profitability of an alternative replacement policy under pessimistic assumptions about the rate maintenance costs would increase and rental rates would have to be decreased if the company were to keep its rental cars longer than it does under the status quo. Depending on the vehicle type, we find that the company’s expected discounted profits would be between 6% to over 140% higher under the suggested alternative operating strategy where vehicles are kept longer and rental rates of older vehicles are discounted to induce customers to rent them. The company found this analysis to be sufficiently convincing that it undertook an experiment to verify the predictions of the econometric model.     

Detecting falsified financial statements: a comparative study using multicriteria analysis and multivariate statistical techniques

Falsifying financial statements involves the manipulation of financial accounts by overstating assets, sales and profit, or understating liabilities, expenses or losses. This paper explores the effectiveness of an innovative classification methodology in detecting firms that issue falsified financial statements (FFS) and the identification of the factors associated to FFS. The methodology is based on the concepts of multicriteria decision aid (MCDA) and the application of the UTADIS classification method (UTilités Additives DIScriminantes). A sample of 76 Greek firms (38 with FFS and 38 non-FFS) described over ten financial ratios is used for detecting factors associated with FFS. A jackknife procedure approach is employed for model validation and comparison with multivariate statistical techniques, namely discriminant and logit analysis. The results indicate that the proposed MCDA methodology outperforms traditional statistical techniques which are widely used for FFS detection purposes. Furthermore, the results indicate that the investigation of financial information can be helpful towards the identification of FFS and highlight the importance of financial ratios such as the total debt to total assets ratio, the inventories to sales ratio, the net profit to sales ratio and the sales to total assets ratio.     

Capital investment and determinants of financial constraints in Estonia

Unlike previous empirical work concerning investment behavior and the determinants of liquidity constraints, we use a switching regression framework when sample separation is unknown and endogenous and firms are assumed to operate either in the financially constrained or in the financially unconstrained regime. By using new panel data for Estonian companies during 1993–2002 we find that: (i) investment behavior is characterized by two distinct regimes; (ii) the likelihood of being financially constrained is higher in firms that are recently privatized, small and where ownership is concentrated in the hands of insiders and the state; (iii) the actual probabilities of operating in the financially constrained regime are quite high and essentially stable during the whole period under consideration; (iv) ownership structure affects investment beyond its indirect effects through financial constraints.     

Determinants and Consequences of a Voluntary Turn Away from IFRS to Local GAAP: Evidence from Switzerland

Abstract

We examine determinants and consequences of a turn away from International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to local generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), thereby exploiting a unique feature of the Swiss setting in which listed firms are allowed to switch from IFRS to Swiss GAAP, all else being equal. We posit that net benefits of IFRS are less for small firms with higher insider ownership. In addition, we predict that the net benefits of IFRS are not constant over time because of changes in IFRS and/or changes in firm-specific circumstances. To the extent that the switching firms’ costs of IFRS reporting outweigh its benefits, we do not predict adverse capital-market effects after a switch. Consistent with predictions, we find that (a) small firms with higher insider ownership and fewer foreign investor holdings are more likely to switch, (b) increasing reporting costs as well as changes in firm-specific circumstances affect switching propensity, (c) switching firms substantially reduce their disclosures after they switch, and (d) switching firms neither experience a decrease in liquidity nor negative announcement returns. Overall, our findings are important for standard setters and securities regulators in shaping (future) reporting requirements for listed firms.     

R&D in a strategic delegation game

This paper studies how a separation of ownership and management affects firms' R&D and production decisions in Cournot quantity competition. It is found that when R&D spillovers are small, owners strategically direct their managers away from profit maximization towards sales. Consequently, managerial firms invest more in R&D and have higher output and lower prices compared to their entrepreneurial counterparts. On the other hand, when spillovers are large, owners ‘penalize’ managers for sales. In this case, managerial firms have lower R&D, lower output and higher prices. Nonetheless, managerial firms have lower profits than their entrepreneurial counterparts regardless of spillovers. This paper also examines the welfare effects of a separation of ownership and management. It is found that in terms of first-best social welfare, managerial firms are more (less) efficient than their entrepreneurial counterparts with low (high) spillovers. However, in terms of second-best social welfare, managerial firms are less efficient with all spillovers. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.