基于信息不对称的预算松弛文献综述

本文在文献回顾的基础上,对信息不对称与预算松弛相互关系问题展开理论评述。然而随着现阶段对预算松弛行为认识的深入,理论界开始从不同的视角对这一问题加以研究,但信息不对称仍然是一个很重要的实验控制因素,信息不对称因素仍将会是未来研究预算松弛需要重点关注的实验控制环境之一。     

信息不对称对预算谈判的影响

本文探讨了二个问题:(1)当预算过程是以设置谈判的过程进行时,信息不对称对预算松弛的影响;(2)信息不对称对预算谈判过程的影响;当最初的差别是由于信息不对称的时候,这个结果则表明在最初的谈判位置微小的差别并不表明有更大的可能性同意.更进一步地说,信息不对称影响谈判达成可能性和预算松弛的关系.最后,与纯经济学视角不一致的是,在谈判失败后上级强加一个预算会导致下级失去动力     

关于预算松弛问题的若干思考

预算管理作为一种有效的管理机制，在西方发达国家的运用已日趋成熟。在我国，越来越多的企业在运用预算管理来提高企业的绩效及实现企业的发展战略。但无论国内还是国外，一直有一个让实务界及理论界颇感棘手的问题，那就是预算松弛(budgetary slack)。本文试图对预算松弛问题作一粗浅的探讨，以期能抛砖引玉。     

信息不对称下的科研机构预算管理

<正>一、科研机构预算管理现状科研机构在我国经济发展中发挥着重要作用,预算管理在推动科研机构科学决策、提高管理效率方面有着积极的意义。预算管理在科研机构实行已有较长时间,大部分科研机构已经建立了日常费用预算体系,部分科研机构正在建立项目预算制度,目前,科研机构预算管理的主要特征有以下几个方面:     

由预算松弛问题看预算目标的制定

一、预算松弛现象预算松驰是指下级通过故意低估收入或高估成本进行虚报预算,使收入或成本预算与真实的收入或成本之间出现不合理的差异。1.预算松弛的不利影响由于预算执行者对预算管理没有     

集团管控中的预算松弛问题研究--基于博弈论视角

国内外的研究都表明预算松弛是普遍存在的,而预算松弛会影响预算功能的发挥。对于集团管控来讲,不管何种功能定位的预算管理都可能存在预算松弛。基于代理理论,本文分析了预算委员会与子公司经理人间的利益冲突,并且构建了一个非合作的博弈模型,详细研究了二者在预算制定中的博弈过程,分析了影响预算松弛发生的因素。最后,提出了在集团预算管理中治理预算松弛的对策。     

预算松弛影响因素的研究综述

通过对2001—2012年间国内学者关于企业中预算松弛的文献做的总结梳理发现：预算松弛的影响因素有很多,如：市场环境、竞争程度、股权结构、组织文化、信息不对称、预算参与、预算强调、预算公平、报酬激励方案和员工的个人特征等。发现国内现有研究文献重规范轻实证．预算松弛的研究成果不是很多,部分结论的证明力不够．缺乏有分量的文献,于是本文在此基础上提出些许可供进一步研究的内容、方向和方法。     

信息不对称对保险中介机构的影响

在保险业中,作为双方当事人的保险人和投保人均存在信息不对称问题。……     

高等学校预算管理中的预算松弛问题研究

预算管理作为高等学校内部管理的重要组成部分,越来越受到人们的重视.然而预算管理在高等学校普遍认同并加以实施的过程中,其效果并非尽如人意,还存在许多问题.预算松弛问题就是高等学校预算管理中的一个主要问题,它是高等学校预算管理中的一种常见现象.预算松弛的存在对高等学校的预算管理既有积极的一面,也有负面的影响,预算松弛积极作...     

Periodic Information Asymmetry and Intraday Market Behaviour: An Empirical Analysis

The model of Foster-Viswanathan (1990, FV) predicts that informationheterogeneity among market participants generates patterns involume, trading costs and volatility. In the Italian Treasurybond market, periodic information asymmetry is related to thearrival of block orders from international investors, whichcluster soon after the opening of the market and, respectively,of the US market. Our evidence is that volume is lower and tradingcosts are higher after the two openings, consistent with FV.We find only weak evidence that volatility behaves as impliedby the model. JEL Classification: D82; G14     

信息不对称对做市商报价影响力的实证研究

认清信息不对称理论如何在做市商制度中发挥效用，会帮助人们更深刻地理解做市商制度的运行机理。本文以纽约证券交易所的股票交易活动为研究对象，用实证研究的方法，证明了由于证券市场普遍存在“信息不对称”，做市商会根据交易间隔期本身所包含的信息内容改变其做市商报价。     

Antecedents of Budget Participation: Leadership Style,Information Asymmetry,and Evaluative Use of Budget

This study explores the causes or antecedents of budget participation to understand more fully the role of participation in the workplace. The study focuses on the reasons why superiors encourage the budget participation of their subordinates and draws upon several theoretical perspectives including leadership theory, agency theory and organizational justice. To examine the issues, a survey was administered to managers and supervisors in several companies. Results of path analysis suggest that superiors encourage subordinate participation when the superior's leadership style is considerate. This implies that budget participation may mediate the relation between leadership style and work outcomes. Results also suggest that superiors encourage participation when budget goals are used in the performance evaluation of subordinates, in which case, the study argues, the superiors encourage participation because of concerns about organizational justice. This finding implies that budget participation may mediate the relation between the evaluative use of budget and those work outcomes that prior research has linked to organizational justice. The proposed relation between information asymmetry and budget participation is not supported.     

Information Asymmetry and Earnings Management: Some Evidence

This paper conducts an empirical investigation of the relationship between information asymmetry and earnings management predicted by Dye (1988) and Trueman and Titman (1988). When information asymmetry is high, stakeholders do not have sufficient resources, incentives, or access to relevant information to monitor manager's actions, which gives rise to the practice of earnings management (Schipper, 1989; Warfield et al., 1995). Empirical results suggest a systematic relationship between the magnitude of information asymmetry and the level of earnings management in two different settings.     

Information Asymmetry and Organizational Structure: Evidence from REITs

We test for the differences in information asymmetry across two organizational forms (external and internal) in the REIT industry. We find significant differences with external REITs being significantly more transparent relative to internal REITs, and these differences are reflected in the loan contract terms and loan syndicate structure of loans made to these two types of REITs. We find that the relatively more transparent externally advised REITs are offered more favourable loan contracts in terms of lower loan rates and lower likelihood of collateral requirement. Further, loans to external REITs have syndicates that are larger in size and the lead lender retains a smaller portion of the loan, reflecting lower information asymmetry.     

Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans

I empirically explore the syndicated loan market, with an emphasis on how information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers influences syndicate structure and on which lenders become syndicate members. Consistent with moral hazard in monitoring, the lead bank retains a larger share of the loan and forms a more concentrated syndicate when the borrower requires more intense monitoring and due diligence. When information asymmetry between the borrower and lenders is potentially severe, participant lenders are closer to the borrower, both geographically and in terms of previous lending relationships. Lead bank and borrower reputation mitigates, but does not eliminate information asymmetry problems.     

Information Asymmetry and Valuation Effects of Debt Financing

This study demonstrates that under conditions of information asymmetry, shareholders earn positive returns around the shelf registration date of straight debt. The results provide evidence to support Miller and Rock's conclusion that new expected financing by firms can result in positive returns to shareholders and Blazenko's contention that positive returns around the announcement date of straight debt issuance may be found by studying firms with asymmetric information. Firms with reported research and development expenses are assumed to have a higher level of asymmetric information and a greater chance of requiring new outside financing. Research and development expense intensity and abnormal earnings in future periods are found to be significant in a cross-sectional regression explaining abnormal returns for days surrounding the announcement period.     

浅析信息不对称对保险经营的影响

信息经济是21世纪经济的主要特征,保险市场的一个固有的特征是信息不对称,如果没有其他机制来克服信息不对称问题,逆向选择将造成保险经营成本的不断上升,而道德风险的存在,又限制了风险的可保性。本文通过对保险经营中逆向选择和道德风险的成因分析,提出了一些简单的解决方法。