Supply function equilibria with capacity constraints and pivotal suppliers

The concept of a supply function equilibrium (SFE) has been widely used to model generators' bidding behavior and market power issues in wholesale electricity markets. Observers of electricity markets have noted how generation capacity constraints may contribute to market power of generation firms. If a generation firm's rivals are capacity constrained then the firm may be pivotal; that is, the firm could substantially raise the market price by unilaterally withholding output. However the SFE literature has not fully considered the impact of capacity constraints and pivotal firms on equilibrium predictions. We characterize the set of symmetric supply function equilibria for uniform-price auctions when firms are capacity constrained and show that this set is increasing as capacity per firm rises. We provide conditions under which asymmetric equilibria exist and characterize these equilibria. In addition, we compare results for uniform-price auctions to those for discriminatory auctions, and we compare our SFE predictions to equilibrium predictions of models in which bidders are constrained to bid on discrete units of output.     

Viewpoint: “Customized competitiveness” strategies for horticultural exporters – Central America focus with lessons from and for other regions

This paper presents the idea of “customized competitiveness” as a strategy necessary for overall competitiveness in particular in globalized horticulture markets and in the “second round” of globalization that started in the mid/late 1990s. Customized competitiveness is additional and complementary to basic “structural competitiveness” that is the focus of competitiveness debates today and for the past decade. The paper illustrates the need for this new strategy, using the example of Central America, highlighting the severe challenges (similar to those facing other developing regions) it faces in the second round of globalization of horticulture markets, magnified by market liberalization culminating recently in implementation of CAFTA. The paper then illustrates “solutions” by providing examples of cutting-edge programs in various developing countries of de facto “customized competitiveness” in the form of public–private partnerships and the provision of public and semi-public goods, to help their exporters access and succeed in the new markets. We conclude with policy implications for Central America and other developing regions.     

Markov Perfect Equilibrium in the US digital camera market

This paper examines the model launch and withdrawal decisions of the major digital camera makers for the period 1996–1999. These manufacturers produce differentiated products and some have the experience of participating in a similar market—the film camera market. This paper investigates to what extent the following four factors affect firms' decisions to launch a new model of digital camera: the effects of competition with “within-brand” models; the effects of competition with “cross-brand” models; the level of experience in the film camera market; and market conditions. The empirical findings suggest that good market conditions can accommodate more products, which has a positive effect on product launches. On the other hand, existing cross-brand models have a negative effect on product launches, while within-brand models and experience in similar markets have an ambiguous effect on product launches.     

Strommarktdesign: Zur Ausgestaltung der Auktionsregeln an der EEX

This paper studies the design of power exchanges in liberalized electricty markets. We analyze several pricing rules for day ahead trading and show that a uniform price mechanism has quite desirable properties as compared to its alternatives. We then discuss how the particular cost structure of electricity generation can be accounted for by appropriate bid formats. We moreover analyze the effects of bid caps and price floors in electricity auctions on market performance, as well as several other aspects of electricity market design. In particular, we discuss linkage of independently operating markets for electricity, reserve energy and transmission capacities, coupling of national power exchanges, and the effects of transparency on the outcome of electricity markets.     

INEFFICIENCIES AND MARKET POWER IN FINANCIAL ARBITRAGE: A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRICITY MARKETS*

For two years prior to the collapse of California's restructured electricity market, power traded in both a forward and a spot market for delivery at the same times and locations. Nonetheless, prices in the two markets often differed in significant and predictable ways. This apparent inefficiency persisted, we argue, because most firms believed that trading on inter‐market price differences would yield regulatory penalties. For the few firms that did make such trades, it was not profit‐maximizing to eliminate the price differences entirely. Skyrocketing prices in 2000 changed the major buyers' (utilities') incentives and exacerbated the price differentials between the markets.     

Food safety and product liability

This paper focuses on the U.S. product liability system for food poisoning cases and makes six key points. First, current legal incentives to produce safer food are weak, though slightly stronger in outbreak situations and in markets where foodborne illness can be more easily traced to individual firms. Far less than 0.01% of cases are litigated and even fewer are paid compensation. Second, even if potential plaintiffs can overcome the high information and transaction costs necessary to file lawsuits, monetary compensation provides only weak incentives to pursue litigation. Firms paid compensation in 56% of the 294 cases examined in this study and the median compensation was only $2,000 before legal fees. Third, indirect incentives for firms may be important and deserve more research. For example, firms may be influenced by costly settlements and decisions against other firms in the same industry. Fourth, confidential settlements, health insurance, and product liability insurance distort legal incentives to produce safer food. Fifth, the ambiguity about whether microbial contamination is “natural” or an “adulterant” hinders the legal system from effectively dealing with food safety issues. Sixth, a brief comparison of the incentives from U.S. and English legal systems suggests that more research is needed to understand the strengths, weaknesses, and relative impact of each country's legal system on the incentives to produce safer food.     

An econometric analysis of the European Commission's merger decisions

Using a sample of 96 mergers notified to the European Commission and logit regression techniques, we analyse the Commission's decision process. We find that the probability of a phase-2 investigation and of a prohibition of the merger increases with the parties' market shares. The probabilities increase also when the Commission finds high entry barriers or that the post-merger market structure is conducive to collusion. We do not find significant effects of “political” variables, such as the nationality of the merging firms.     

Designing an electronic auction market for complex ‘smart parts’ logistics: Options based on LeBaron's computational stock market

Modern technologies, such as RFID, offer never-before seen learning abilities to parts moving in supply chains. Logistics systems may be understood as complex adaptive logistics systems (CALS). They also may be conceived as electronic auction markets as ‘smart parts’ bid for the best routing and pricing from transportation firms. To ensure the world-wide functionality and efficiency of CALS transportation markets, we suggest the utility of an agent-based computational market design based on Blake LeBaron's stock-market model. Given that parts may be more or less smart, markets more or less complex, and self-organizing CALS systems probabilistically subject to the bullwhip effect, we suggest nine different computational CALS market-design options, offering more adaptivity to unexpected environmental contingencies.     

Single Bidders and Tacit Collusion in Highway Procurement Auctions

Collusion in auctions can take different forms, such as refraining from bidding. Certain aspects of highway procurement auctions facilitate collusive outcomes. We collect data on asphalt paving auctions conducted in Kentucky from 2005-2007. We determine the potential service area of each asphalt plant and potential bidders for each paving project. We analyze firms’ bid participation decisions, including variables affecting costs as well as competitive and strategic effects. In many geographic markets where firms face only a few identifiable rivals, county boundaries serve as a coordinating mechanism for softening competition, significantly influencing firms’ decisions whether and how much to bid.     

Opportunity Cost Pass‐Through from Fossil Fuel Market Prices to Procurement Costs of the U.S. Power Producers

This paper investigates the transmission of fossil fuel commodity spot market price changes to procurement costs of U.S. power producers. We measure and compare the speed and magnitude with which spot prices predict procurement costs using restricted access fuel price data. Natural gas spot prices are quickly reflected in procurement costs. Coal spot prices offer very little predictive power to coal procurement costs. Although not causal, the empirical results also show differences across regulatory status. These findings may have implications for the electricity market deregulation literature that creates marginal cost curves as a competitive benchmark.     

Foreign IPO capital market choice: Understanding the institutional fit of corporate governance

While product market choices have been central to strategy formulation for firms in the past, the integration of financial markets makes the choice of capital markets an equally important strategic decision. We advance a comparative institutional perspective to explain capital market choice by firms making an IPO in a foreign market. We find that internal governance characteristics (founder‐CEO, executive incentives, and board independence) and external network characteristics (prestigious underwriters, degree of venture capitalist syndication, and board interlocks) are significant predictors of foreign capital market choice by foreign IPO firms. Our results suggest foreign IPO firms select a host market where the firms' governance characteristics and third party affiliations fit the host market's institutional environment. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mixed Oligopoly and Market Power Mitigation: Evidence from the Colombian Wholesale Electricity Market*

Using information on price bids in wholesale electricity pools and empirical techniques described in the literature on electricity markets, this study identifies the market power mitigation effect of public firms in the Colombian market. The results suggest that while private firms exercise less market power than is predicted by a profit-maximization model, there are marked differences between private and public firms in their exercise of unilateral market power. These findings support the hypothesis of the market power mitigation effect of public firms.     

Welfare losses under Cournot competition

In a market for a homogeneous good where firms are identical, compete in quantities and produce with constant returns, the percentage of welfare losses (PWL) is small with as few as five competitors for a class of demand functions which includes linear and isoelastic cases. We study markets with positive fixed costs and asymmetric firms. We provide exact formulae of PWL and robust constructions of markets were PWL is close to one in these two cases. We show that the market structure that maximizes PWL is either monopoly or dominant firm, depending on demand. Finally we prove that PWL is minimized when all firms are identical, a clear indication that the assumption of identical firms biases the estimation of PWL downwards.     

The moderating influence of firm market power on the transaction cost economics model: An empirical test in a forward channel integration context

Transaction cost economics (TCE) has guided a variety of research on governance in the strategic management literature. An important question arises, however, as to whether the TCE framework is equally appropriate for all types of firms in all business settings. In this paper, we argue that TCE is not and suggest that firms with high market power may be able to lower transaction costs under high asset specificity and uncertainty in nonintegrated distribution channels, avoiding the need to utilize highly integrated channels as a result. We test our hypotheses with data collected from 40 manufacturers of electronic and telecommunications products in 109 product‐markets in the United States. The results support our hypothesis that transaction cost factors are better at explaining forward channel integration for firms with low market power than for firms with high market power. Our results indicate that the basic TCE framework must be supplemented by the market power construct to adequately explain forward channel integration decisions. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Electricity Contract Market in England and Wales

In England and Wales, wholesale electricity is sold in a spot market partly covered by long-term contracts which hedge the spot price. Two dominant conventional generators can raise spot prices well above marginal costs, and this is profitable in the absence of contracts. If fully hedged, however, the generators lose their incentive to raise prices above marginal costs. Competition in the contract market could lead the generators to sell contracts for much of their output. Since privatisation the generators have indeed covered most of their sales in the contract market.     

The value of knowledge spillovers in the U.S. semiconductor industry

This paper aims at quantifying the economic value of knowledge spillovers by exploring information contained in patent citations. We estimate a market valuation equation of the U.S. semiconductor firms during the 1980s and 1990s, and find an average value of $0.6 to 1.2 million “R&D-equivalent” dollars for knowledge spillovers embodied in one patent citation. For an average semiconductor firm, such an estimate implies that the total value of knowledge spillovers the firm received during the sample period can be as high as half of its actual total R&D expenditures in the same period. This provides a direct measure of the economic value of social returns or externalities of relevant technological innovations. We also find that the value of knowledge spillovers declines as the size of firm's patent portfolio increases, and that self citations are more valuable than external citations, indicating a significant amount of tacit knowledge or know-how spillovers that occur within the firm.     

Cournot competition in wholesale electricity markets: The Nordic power exchange,Nord Pool

Horizontal shifts in bid curves observed in wholesale electricity markets are consistent with Cournot competition. Quantity competition reduces the informational requirements associated with evaluating market performance because the price-cost margins of all producers then depend on the same inverse residual demand curve instead of one for each firm. We apply the model to the day-ahead market of the Nordic power exchange, Nord Pool, for the years 2011-13. We reject the null hypothesis of perfect competition in all specifications. Results suggest that the average price-cost margin across the sample period was around four percent.     

Location choices under strategic interactions

We explore a fundamental aspect of firms' location choices largely overlooked in the literature: strategic interaction. We formalize the notion that strategic interaction renders collocation less appealing by fostering competition, which erodes firms' profits. Strategic interaction also impacts location choices across time. Specifically, because firms learn by doing in markets, location choices are shaped by two novel effects: entrenchment benefits from entering early in a market and improving capabilities relative to rivals, and opportunity costs from postponing entry to other markets where rivals enter and learn. When learning is local, firms collocate more: rivals are preempted from improving relative capabilities in higher‐value markets. However, when learning is global, firms collocate less: they can transfer capabilities from lower‐value to higher‐value markets, blocking rivals from achieving entrenchment benefits. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cannibalization and option value effects of secondary markets: Evidence from the US concert industry

We examine how reducing search frictions in secondary markets affects the value appropriated by firms in primary markets. We characterize two effects on primary‐market firms caused by intermediaries entering secondary markets: the “cannibalization” and “option value” effects. Separation between primary and secondary markets can drive which of the two effects dominates. Firms selling valuable and scarce products are more likely to have separate primary and secondary markets, and will therefore appropriate more value when secondary markets thicken. Firms selling products that are not valuable and scarce will be hurt. Further, we hypothesize that firms have incentives to engineer scarcity by limiting supply when secondary markets thicken to separate primary and secondary markets. We find support for these hypotheses in the U.S. concert ticket industry. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

ON THE VALUE OF A LARGE CUSTOMER BASE IN MARKETS WITH SWITCHING COSTS*

It is usually acknowledged that firms benefit from a large customer base in markets with switching costs. However, Klemperer [1995] argues that this may not be true if an increase in the size of a firm's customer base induces fierce price competition, making the firm worse off. This paper shows that such an outcome can be obtained under standard assumptions, such as homogeneous goods and uniformly distributed switching costs. In the model, firms have very limited incentives to fight for market shares, and the notion that switching costs make markets less competitive is stronger than previously shown.