Rumors and pre-announcement trading: why sell target stocks before acquisition announcements?

We track trading activity in the days preceding acquisition announcements for target firms and find that abnormally high trading volume precedes significant price movement. Using additional intraday data, we find increased active-selling in target stocks before acquisition announcements that offsets increased active-buying. This is unexpected because sellers often lose money when an acquisition is announced. After ruling out alternative explanations, we find evidence that sellers are rational investors who trade on the market??s perceived overreaction to takeover rumors. While sellers lose money when a rumor precedes an actual announcement, in most cases rumors fail to materialize into public announcements. We provide evidence that the significant pre-announcement volume we document reflects the market??s processing of highly uncertain information in takeover rumors.     

Rumors in the sky: Corporate rumors and stock price synchronicity

Using hand-collected rumor clarification announcements from Chinese listed firms to identify corporate rumors, we find that rumored firms have lower stock price synchronicity (R²) than do firms without rumors. Channel analyses reveal that rumors reduce stock price synchronicity through elevating investor sentiment rather than stimulating informed trading. Additionally, the negative association between corporate rumors and stock price synchronicity is more evident among firms with more individual investors and higher information opacity. Moreover, corporate rumors are associated with higher analyst forecast errors and forecast dispersion. Overall, our evidence suggests that corporate rumors reduce stock price synchronicity by increasing investor irrationality.     

Liquidity: Considerations of a Portfolio Manager

This paper examines liquidity and how it affects the behavior of portfolio managers, who account for a significant portion of trading in many assets. We define an asset to be perfectly liquid if a portfolio manager can trade the quantity she desires when she desires at a price not worse than the uninformed expected value. A portfolio manager is limited by both what she needs to attain and the ease with which she can attain it, making her sensitive to three dimensions of liquidity: price, timing, and quantity. Deviations from perfect liquidity in any of these dimensions impose shadow costs on the portfolio manager. By focusing on the trade-off between sacrificing on price and quantity instead of the canonical price-time trade-off, the model yields several novel empirical implications. Understanding a portfolio manager's liquidity considerations provides important insights into the liquidity of many assets and asset classes.     

Follow the leader: fund managers trading in signal‐strength sequence*

When fund managers trade sequentially in the same direction, the information confirmation hypothesis predicts the long‐term profitability of the leader trade to be increasing in the number of subsequent trades. The information cascade hypothesis predicts a non‐positive relationship. Using active equity funds’ daily trading data, we document a transition from information confirmation to information cascades as the number of followers increase. We find that highly disguised multiple‐broker packages exhibit higher market impact, higher long‐term returns and are associated with fewer followers. Our study also documents that lead fund managers face portfolio risk constraints in trading on private information.     

Starts and refutations of the Covid-19 rumors: Evidence from the reaction of the stock market

By manually collecting data on Internet-based rumors concerning COVID-19, we investigate the market reactions to the spread of such rumors and the government’s refutation of them. We find that frightening (reassuring) rumors have a negative (positive) impact on investors. The refutation of frightening rumors triggers a positive market response, whereas the refutation of reassuring rumors does not cause a significant market reaction. Further analysis shows that there is a stock price drift when frightening rumors are refuted by governments. Our conclusions remain robust after considering endogeneity. Our findings support the notion that epidemic-related rumors affect investors’ decisions, which add to literatures of the market responses of companies in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and provide incremental evidence for the “the spiral of silence” theory.     

Trades and Quotes: A Bivariate Point Process

This article formulates a bivariate point process to jointlyanalyze trade and quote arrivals. In microstructure models,trades may reveal private information that is then incorporatedinto new price quotes. This article examines the speed of thisinformation flow and the circumstances that govern it. A jointlikelihood function for trade and quote arrivals is specifiedin a way that recognizes that an intervening trade sometimescensors the time between a trade and the subsequent quote. Modelsof trades and quotes are estimated for eight stocks using Tradeand Quote database (TAQ) data. The essential finding for thearrival of price quotes is that information flow variables,such as high trade arrival rates, large volume per trade, andwide bid–ask spreads, all predict more rapid price revisions.This means prices respond more quickly to trades when informationis flowing so that the price impacts of trades and ultimatelythe volatility of prices are high in such circumstances.     

Stock Price Reactions to Securities Recommended in Business Week's “Inside Wall Street”

The price behavior of stocks of firms that were favorably mentioned in the “Inside Wall Street” column in Business Week are studied. These firms have been the subject of rumors or have been recommended by analysts or brokerage houses and, therefore, their mention in Business Week constitutes dissemination of secondary information. Positive, significant excess returns are observed the day prior to the publication date, the publication date, and the two days after publication. Positive, significant excess returns are observed for long-term holding periods prior to the publication date, while negative, significant excess returns are observed for the post-publication holding periods. The observations appear to be consistent with the price performance of firms that might have been subject of either rumors or recent recom-mendations by analysts or brokerage houses. The results suggest that secondary information is of value only to low transaction cost, short-term traders. Investors who buy for the longer term based on secondary information generally receive below market rates of return.     

INTRADAY STEALTH TRADING: WHICH TRADES MOVE PRICES DURING PERIODS OF HIGH VOLUME?

Research documents a U-shaped intraday pattern of returns. We examine which trade sizes drive the U-shaped pattern and find that intraday price changes from larger trades exhibit a U-shaped pattern whereas price changes from smaller trades show a reverse U-shaped pattern. We argue that price changes from smaller trades are higher during the middle of the day because informed investors break up their trades to disguise their information when intraday volume is low. Price changes from larger trades are likely higher at the beginning and end of the day because high volume allows informed investors to increase their trade size without revealing their information to the market.     

Information-Based Trading and Price Improvement

Abstract:  In this study we test the information hypothesis of price improvement. Our results show that price improvement is negatively related to both the probability of information-based trading and the price impact of trades. We interpret these results as evidence that liquidity providers selectively offer price improvements according to the information content of trades. We also show that liquidity providers offer greater (and more frequent) price improvements when they are at the NBBO, and for stocks with wider spreads, fewer trades, or smaller trade sizes relative to the quoted depth. Buyer-initiated trades receive smaller (larger) price improvements than seller-initiated trades on the NYSE (NASDAQ).     

Price Volatility and Investor Behavior in an Overlapping Generations Model with Information Asymmetry

This paper studies an overlapping generations model with multiple securities and heterogeneously informed agents. The model produces multiple equilibria, including highly volatile equilibria that can exhibit strong or weak correlations between asset returns—even when asset supplies and future dividends are uncorrelated across assets. Less informed agents rationally behave like trend‐followers, while better informed agents follow contrarian strategies. Trading volume has a hump‐shaped relation with information precision and is positively correlated with absolute price changes. Finally, accurate information increases the volatility and correlation of stock returns in the highly volatile, strongly correlated equilibrium.     

Institutional trading in firms rumored to be takeover targets

In this paper we examine institutional trading in proximity to takeover rumors by combining the ANcerno dataset of transaction-level institutional trades with a unique sample of takeover rumor ‘scoops’. We find that institutions are net buyers in firms which subsequently become subject to takeover speculation and that institutional trading predicts which rumored firms will eventually receive takeover bids. Segregating funds according to their propensity to trade, we show that those less likely to purchase rumored targets by chance over the pre-rumor period are more likely to identify firms which will receive bid proposals and that they trade more profitably over both the pre- and post-rumor periods. We test for the presence of informed trading in a variety of ways and conclude that institutional investors appear to trade on material private information which identifies the firms soon to be the target of takeover speculation.     

Short-Sale Restrictions and Price Clustering: Evidence from SEC Rule 201

We provide a novel test of information-based theories of price clustering by examining trade, order, and the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) quote price clustering during periods when information is removed from the market. We use a natural experiment of short-sale restrictions resulting from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 201 to more effectively determine the impact of information on price clustering. We find evidence of increased price clustering for trades, orders, and NBBO prices during short-sale restrictions. Overall, our findings indicate that short-sale restrictions harm the price discovery process and lead to a reduction in market efficiency.     

Are all odd-lots the same? Odd-lot transactions by order submission and trader type

We study odd-lot trading and determine if an odd-lot trade results from odd-lot orders or if odd-lots are a result of orders broken into multiple trades. We confirm that odd-lot transactions contribute to price discovery. Our finding that odd-lot transactions contain substantial information is not being driven by orders that are originally larger than 100 shares and subsequently divided into odd-lot transactions. We further find that odd-lot transactions resulting from odd-lot orders add more to price discovery than odd-lot transactions resulting from orders for 100 or more shares. Additionally, we find that more price contribution occurs when non-high frequency traders trade in an odd-lot transaction.     

Price dispersion, information and learning

We consider an economy where trade is decentralized and agents have incomplete information with respect to the value of money. Agents’ learning evolves from private experiences and we explore how the formation of prices interacts with learning. We show that multiple equilibria arise, and equilibria with price dispersion entail more learning than equilibria with one price. Price dispersion increases communication about private histories, which in turn increases the overall amount of information in the economy. We also compare ex ante welfare under price dispersion and one price. Our results show that, despite the existence of some meetings where no trade takes place, ex ante welfare under price dispersion may be higher than under one price.     

Are corporate managers savvy about their stock price? Evidence from insider trading after earnings announcements

We find that insiders trade as if they exploit market underreaction to earnings news, buying (selling) after good (bad) earnings announcements when the price reaction to the announcement is low (high). We also find that insider trades attributable to public information about earnings and the price reaction generate abnormal returns. By demonstrating that managers spot market underreaction to earnings news, our results imply that managers are savvy about their company’s stock price.     

eInformation: A Clinical Study of Investor Discussion and Sentiment

We examine the information flow for four stocks over seven months to trace the relationship between on-line discussion, news activity, and stock price movements. On-line discussions support numerous unsubstantiated rumors, substantial on-point exchanges, and quick dissemination of imminent and recently released information. Applying language-processing routines to message board postings and news, we create sentiment and disagreement measures or "eInformation." We analyze the determinants of sentiment and disagreement, and trace links between news, eInformation, and stock returns. This intensive clinical study of on-line discussions suggests mechanisms individual investors and groups can use to analyze and digest company information.     

TRADE SIZE AND PRICE CLUSTERING: THE CASE OF SHORT SALES AND THE SUSPENSION OF PRICE TESTS

In this article, we compare trade size and price clustering of short sales with regular trades. We find that short sales cluster less on round sizes and round prices than do nonshort trades. When price tests are suspended, both trade size and price clustering markedly increase for short sales although the difference between shorts and nonshorts remains significant during the postsuspension period. These results are consistent with the idea that because of execution uncertainty caused by price tests, short sellers are less concerned with cognitive processing costs, negotiations costs, and the costs associated with revealing information through trade sizes.     

The Determinants of Execution Costs in Short‐Term Money Markets

Prior research attributes the observed negative relation between execution costs and trade size in opaque markets to two factors—information asymmetry and broker‐client relationships. We provide evidence that a trader's ex ante transaction price information and the relationship traders have with their brokers are both significant determinants of a trader's execution costs in an opaque market; however, traders who establish strong relationships with their brokers will achieve a greater reduction in execution costs than traders with ex ante transaction price information. We also find evidence that trade size has little explanatory power after controlling for a trader's ex ante transaction price information and broker‐client relationships.     

Adverse selection costs,trading activity and price discovery in the NYSE: An empirical analysis

This paper studies the role that trading activity plays in the price discovery process of a NYSE-listed stock. We measure the expected information content of each trade by estimating its permanent price impact. It depends on observable trade features and market conditions. We also estimate the time required for quotes to incorporate all the information content of a particular trade. Our results show that price discovery is faster after risky trades and also at the extreme intervals of the session. The quote adjustment to trade-related shocks is progressive and this causes risk persistency and unusual short-term market conditions.     

Information provision in financial markets

We set up a rational expectations model in which investors trade a risky asset based on a private signal they receive about the quality of the asset, and a public signal that represents a noisy aggregation of the private signals of all investors. Our model allows us to examine what happens to market performance (market depth, price efficiency, volume of trade, and expected welfare) when regulators can induce improved information provision in one of two ways. Regulations can be designed that either provide investors with more accurate information by improving the quality of prior information, or that enhance the transparency of the market by improving the quality of the public signal. In our rational expectations equilibrium, improving the quality of the public signal can be interpreted as a way of providing information about the anticipations and trading motives of all market participants. We find that both alternatives improve market depth. However, in the limit, we show that improving the precision of prior information is a more efficient way to do so. More accurate prior information decreases asymmetric information problems and consequently reduces the informativeness of prices, while a more accurate public signal increases price informativeness. The volume of trade is independent of the quality of prior information and is increasing in the quality of the public signal. Finally, expected welfare can sometimes fall as prior information or the public signal become more precise.