Organizational Socialization and Psychological Contract: the Vulnerability of Temporary Newcomers. A Case Study from an Italian <Emphasis Type="Italic">Call Center</Emphasis>

This study aims to analyze the link between the construction of an effective psychological contract with the organization and the success of the socialization process. To this purpose 241 employees of a Call Center organization have been contacted. A questionnaire composed by measures of Organizational Socialization (Haueter et al. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 63, 20–39, 2003), Psychological Contract (Rousseau 1995), Job Satisfaction (Wanous et al. Journal of Applied Psychology, 82, 247–252, 1997) and Organizational Committment (Allen and Meyer 1990) was administered. Results have underlined that organizational socialization may influence the development of the psychological contract thus determining job satisfaction and organizational commitment. This research has been developed in an interdisciplinary perspective, taking into account the peculiarity of the Italian legal framework. In this regard, the analysis has been focused on how the E.U. flexicurity strategy has been implemented in Italy, according to the recent reform of labour market regulation (2012–13) and on the specific regulations introduced for call centres.     

Almost sure central limit theorem for the products of <Emphasis Type="Italic">U</Emphasis>-statistics

Let (X _n ) be a sequence of i.i.d random variables and U _n a U-statistic corresponding to a symmetric kernel function h, where h ₁(x ₁) = Eh(x ₁, X ₂, X ₃, . . . , X _m ), μ = E(h(X ₁, X ₂, . . . , X _m )) and ? ₁ = Var(h ₁(X ₁)). Denote \({\gamma=\sqrt{\varsigma_{1}}/\mu}\), the coefficient of variation. Assume that P(h(X ₁, X ₂, . . . , X _m ) > 0) = 1, ? ₁ > 0 and E|h(X ₁, X ₂, . . . , X _m )|³ < ∞. We give herein the conditions under which

$\lim_{N\rightarrow\infty}\frac{1}{\log N}\sum_{n=1}^{N}\frac{1}{n}g\left(\left(\prod_{k=m}^{n}\frac{U_{k}}{\mu}\right)^{\frac{1}{m\gamma\sqrt{n}}}\right) =\int\limits_{-\infty}^{\infty}g(x)dF(x)\quad {\rm a.s.}$

for a certain family of unbounded measurable functions g, where F(·) is the distribution function of the random variable \({\exp(\sqrt{2} \xi)}\) and ξ is a standard normal random variable.

     

Individual entrepreneurship,collective entrepreneurship and innovation in small business: an empirical study

The study reported in this article examines simultaneously the impact of individual entrepreneurship and collective entrepreneurship on innovation in small business. It intends to address the weakness in previous entrepreneurship research that either only focuses on the individual entrepreneur's role in innovation (Miller 1983 Management Science, 29:770-791), or only stresses the importance of collective entrepreneurship (Reich 1987 Harvard Business Review, 65 (3), 22-83; Stewart 1989). The results of structural equation modeling analysis of data from more than 200 small businesses show that both individual entrepreneur(s) and the collective contribute to innovation in small business. Analysis results also reveal the complex relationships between the two types of entrepreneurship in terms of their impact on innovation in small business. Factors that contribute to collective entrepreneurship were found to contribute to individual entrepreneurship, while factors that are often associated with individual entrepreneurship were found to have negative impact on collective entrepreneurship. Communication among members of the small business, which was found to directly contribute to collective entrepreneurship, was found to contribute to individual entrepreneur's knowledge of emerging markets, products, and technologies. In contrast, centralized decision making, which was found to have direct negative impact on innovation, was found to have negative impact on collaboration and communication. Implications of the study are discussed.     

Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate

A production process involves a principal and two privately informed agents. Production requires coordinated decision making. It might be carried in a centralized organization or through delegated contracting in a hierarchical structure. We compare the performance of different organizational structures when renegotiation of initial contracts is possible. We show that delegated contracting always dominates centralization if the downstream contract between the agents is observable. Contracting (resp. control) should be delegated to the agent with the least (resp. most) important information. If downstream contracts are not observable, we obtain a tradeoff between centralization and delegation.     

A Cramér-type large deviation theorem for sums of functions of higher order non-overlapping spacings

Let U ₁, U ₂, . . . , U _n–1 be an ordered sample from a Uniform [0,1] distribution. The non-overlapping uniform spacings of order s are defined as \({G_{i}^{(s)} =U_{is} -U_{(i-1)s}, i=1,2,\ldots,N^\prime, G_{N^\prime+1}^{(s)} =1-U_{N^\prime s}}\) with notation U ₀ = 0, U _n = 1, where \({N^\prime=\left\lfloor n/s\right\rfloor}\) is the integer part of n/s. Let \({ N=\left\lceil n/s\right\rceil}\) be the smallest integer greater than or equal to n/s, f _m (u), m = 1, 2, . . . , N, be a sequence of real-valued Borel-measurable functions. In this article a Cramér type large deviation theorem for the statistic \({f_{1,n} (nG_{1}^{(s)})+\cdots+f_{N,n} (nG_{N}^{(s)} )}\) is proved.     

Dispersive ordering of fail-safe systems with heterogeneous exponential components

Let X ₁, . . . , X _n be independent exponential random variables with respective hazard rates λ₁, . . . , λ _n , and Y ₁, . . . , Y _n be independent and identically distributed random variables from an exponential distribution with hazard rate λ. Then, we prove that X _2:n , the second order statistic from X ₁, . . . , X _n , is larger than Y _2:n , the second order statistic from Y ₁, . . . , Y _n , in terms of the dispersive order if and only if

$\lambda\geq \sqrt{\frac{1}{{n\choose 2}}\sum_{1\leq i < j\leq n}\lambda_i\lambda_j}.$

We also show that X _2:n is smaller than Y _2:n in terms of the dispersive order if and only if

$ \lambda\le\frac{\sum^{n}_{i=1} \lambda_i-{\rm max}_{1\leq i\leq n} \lambda_i}{n-1}. $

Moreover, we extend the above two results to the proportional hazard rates model. These two results established here form nice extensions of the corresponding results on hazard rate, likelihood ratio, and MRL orderings established recently by Pǎltǎnea (J Stat Plan Inference 138:1993–1997, 2008), Zhao et al. (J Multivar Anal 100:952–962, 2009), and Zhao and Balakrishnan (J Stat Plan Inference 139:3027–3037, 2009), respectively.

     

R-optimal designs for multi-factor models with heteroscedastic errors

In this paper, we consider the R-optimal design problem for multi-factor regression models with heteroscedastic errors. It is shown that a R-optimal design for the heteroscedastic Kronecker product model is given by the product of the R-optimal designs for the marginal one-factor models. However, R-optimal designs for the additive models can be constructed from R-optimal designs for the one-factor models only if sufficient conditions are satisfied. Several examples are presented to illustrate and check optimal designs based on R-optimality criterion.     

A new measure of association between random variables

We propose a new measure of association between two continuous random variables X and Y based on the covariance between X and the log-odds rate associated to Y. The proposed index of correlation lies in the range [\(-1\), 1]. We show that the extremes of the range, i.e., \(-1\) and 1, are attainable by the Fr\(\acute{\mathrm{e}}\)chet bivariate minimal and maximal distributions, respectively. It is also shown that if X and Y have bivariate normal distribution, the resulting measure of correlation equals the Pearson correlation coefficient \(\rho \). Some interpretations and relationships to other variability measures are presented. Among others, it is shown that for non-negative random variables the proposed association measure can be represented in terms of the mean residual and mean inactivity functions. Some illustrative examples are also provided.     

Bayesian estimation based on ranked set sample from Morgenstern type bivariate exponential distribution when ranking is imperfect

In this paper we consider Bayes estimation based on ranked set sample when ranking is imperfect, in which units are ranked based on measurements made on an easily and exactly measurable auxiliary variable X which is correlated with the study variable Y. Bayes estimators under squared error loss function and LINEX loss function for the mean of the study variate Y, when (X, Y) follows a Morgenstern type bivariate exponential distribution, are obtained based on both usual ranked set sample and extreme ranked set sample. Estimation procedures developed in this paper are illustrated using simulation studies and a real data.     

Unbiased estimates for a lognormal regression problem and a nonparametric alternative

Given a normal sample with means \({{\bf x}_{1}^{\prime} {\bf \varphi}, \ldots, {\bf x}_{n}^{\prime} {\bf \varphi}}\) and variance v, minimum variance unbiased estimates are given for the moments of L, where log L is normal with mean \({{\bf x}^{\prime} {\bf \varphi}}\) and variance v. These estimates converge to wrong values if the normality assumption is false. In the latter case estimates based on any M-estimate of \({{\bf \varphi}}\) are available of bias \({O\left(n^{-1}\right)}\) and \({O\left(n^{-2}\right)}\). More generally, these are given for any smooth function of \({\left({\bf \varphi}, F\right)}\), where F is the unknown distribution of the residuals. The regression functions need not be linear.     

Asymptotic inference for a one-dimensional simultaneous autoregressive model

A nonstationary simultaneous autoregressive model \({X^{(n)}_k=\alpha \Big(X^{(n)}_{k-1}+X^{(n)}_{k+1}\Big)+\varepsilon_k, k=1, 2, \ldots , n-1}\), is investigated, where \({X^{(n)}_0}\) and \({X^{(n)}_n}\) are given random variables. It is shown that in the unstable case α = 1/2 the least squares estimator of the autoregressive parameter converges to a functional of a standard Wiener process with a rate of convergence n ², while in the stable situation |α| < 1/2 the estimator is biased but asymptotically normal with a rate n ^1/2.     

The airport problem with capacity constraints

The original airport problem is concerned with the cost sharing of an airstrip among airplanes assuming that one airstrip is sufficient to serve all airplanes. In this paper, we generalize the original airport problem by imposing capacity constraints to consider the situation when one airstrip cannot serve all airplanes and investigate how to share the cost among airplanes. We introduce the sequential equal contributions rule for our problem and show that it coincides with the Shapley value of the corresponding airport game when the worth of a coalition is defined to be the minimum cost of serving all members of the coalition. The sequential equal contributions rule requires each airplane to contribute equally to the cost of a given section of any airstrip as long as the length of the section is less than or equal to its desired length even though the airplane cannot use the airstrip. Each airplane’s contribution is the sum of terms, one for each section of the airstrip whose length is less than or equal to its desired length. We also present an axiomatic characterization of the rule by imposing the axioms of efficiency, the equal share lower bound, smaller-cost monotonicity, and population fairness.     

New axioms for immediate acceptance

Following Kojima and Ünver (Econ Theory 55(3):515–544, 2014) and Afacan (Math Soc Sci 66(2):176–179, 2013), this paper provides two characterizations of the Boston school choice mechanism determined by the student-proposing immediate acceptance algorithm. A mechanism is the Boston mechanism if and only if it satisfies one of the following two groups of axioms: favoring higher ranks and weak fairness; favoring higher ranks, rank monotonicity, and rank rationality.     

The concept of weak exchangeability and its applications

A finite sequence of binary random variables is called a weak exchangeable sequence of order m if the sequence consists of m random vectors such that the elements within each random vector are exchangeable in the usual sense and the different random vectors are dependent. The exact and asymptotic joint distributions of the m-dimensional random vector whose elements include the number of successes in each exchangeable sequence are derived. Potential applications of the concept of weak exchangeability are discussed with illustrative examples.     

Asymptotic non-deficiency of the Bayes sequential estimation in a family of transformed Chi-square distributions

Bayes sequential estimation in a family of transformed Chi-square distributions using a linex loss function and a cost c > 0 for each observation is considered in this paper. It is shown that an asymptotic pointwise optimal rule (A.P.O.) is asymptotically non-deficient, i.e., the difference between the Bayes risk of the A.P.O. rule and the Bayes risk of the optimal procedure is of smaller order of magnitude than c, the cost of single observation, as c → 0.     

Multivariate saddlepoint tests on the mean direction of the von Mises–Fisher distribution

This article provides P values for two new tests on the mean direction of the von Mises–Fisher distribution. The test statistics are obtained from the exponent of the saddlepoint approximation to the density of M-estimators, as suggested by Robinson et al. (Ann Stat 31:1154–1169, 2003). These test statistics are chi-square distributed with asymptotically small relative errors. Despite the high dimensionality of the problem, the proposed P values are accurate and simple to compute. The numerical precision of the P values of the new tests is illustrated by some simulation studies.     

Throwing good money after bad

An “investment bubble” is a period of “excessive, and predictably unprofitable, investment” (DeMarzo et al. in J Financ Econ 85:737–754, 2007). Such bubbles most often accompany the arrival of some new technology, such as the tech stock boom and bust of the late 1990s and early 2000s. We provide a rational explanation for investment bubbles based on the dynamics of learning in highly uncertain environments. Objective information about the earnings potential of a new technology gives rise to a set of priors or a belief function. A generalised form of Bayes’ rule is used to update this set of priors using earnings data from the new economy. In each period, agents—who are heterogeneous in their tolerance for ambiguity—make optimal occupational choices, with wages in the new economy set to clear the labour market. A preponderance of bad news about the new technology may nevertheless give rise to increasing firm formation around this technology, at least initially. To a frequentist outside observer, the pattern of adoption appears as an investment bubble.     

Versatile networks in combining qualitative and quantitative data

Following a series of special volumes on the DISC conferences in the past, this themed issue focuses on versatile network forms particularly in combining qualitative and quantitative data. This special issue also celebrates the second publication born out of the DISC conferences under the Quality and Quantity.     

The changing role of network ties and critical capabilities in an international new venture’s early development

The importance of networks for firm internationalization has been pointed out for several decades. Especially for small and new firms, networks have been found to be an important tool to gain access to resources and to overcome liabilities of newness, smallness and foreignness. Yet, there is a lack of understanding regarding which types of capabilities are developed through networking and how and when networks are used. The aim of this article is to explore how and when different networking activities develop critical capabilities during different phases of an international new venture’s early development. The article is based on a longitudinal, in-depth case study of a Swedish international new venture from the medical-technology industry. We find that the development process is greatly affected by how the individual key actors leverage their network ties to develop critical capabilities – they use existing network ties and different indirect ties during the pre-founding, start-up and establishment of production phases. During the commercialization and sales growth phases, however, many new network ties are developed. The heterogeneity of the individual actors’ backgrounds plays an important role during the different developmental phases. We conclude by advancing a number of propositions in relation to how critical capabilities are developed through networking during different developmental phases.