The size and growth of banks: evidence from four European countries

This paper tests for mimicry in local tax setting, by using a panel data set of the English non-metropolitan districts in the 1980s — when property tax rate variability across districts was highest. The results confirm the presence of large and significant spatial interactions among districts. Even after allowing for district-specific and time effects, a district appears to be significantly affected by its neighbours' policies. A 10% increase in the local property tax rate of a district's neighbours leads to an increase of 4–5% in its own property tax rate. On the other hand, the absence of correlation in tax rates between lower tier (district) authorities and upper tier (county) authorities suggests that the spatial pattern in district tax rates is not simply driven by spatially auto-correlated shocks.     

INCOME INEQUALITY,MEDIA FRAGMENTATION,AND INCREASED POLITICAL POLARIZATION

The increasing polarization of congressional voting has been linked to legislators' inability to reach consensus on many pressing economic issues. We examine two potential factors driving polarization: greater income inequality and the increasingly fragmented state of American media. Using cointegration techniques, we find evidence indicating that media fragmentation has played a more important role than inequality. Periods of rising media fragmentation are followed by increased polarization. If recent patterns of media structure and income inequality persist, a polarized policymaking environment will likely continue to impede efforts to address major challenges, such as the long‐run fiscal imbalances facing the United States. (JEL D72, D31)     

Electoral Systems, Legislative Process, and Income Taxation

We characterize the equilibrium income tax schedules and the optimality conditions under two types of political institutions, a two-party plurality system with a single district, and one with multiple districts where tax policies are determined through a legislature. It is shown that the exogenous social welfare functions in the optimal taxation literature can be endogenously determined by explicitly modeling the political institutions, which put different welfare weights on different subsets of the population. This paper also extends the Coughlin probabilistic voting model and the Baron–Ferejohn legislative bargaining model to a function space.     

ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IMMIGRATION AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTION*

In this article, we analyze an economy in which agents vote over immigration policy and redistributive tax policy. We show that natives' preferences over immigration are influenced by the prospect that immigrants will be voting over future tax policy. We also show that changes in the degree of international capital mobility, the distribution of initial capital among natives, the wealth or poverty of the immigrant pool, and the future voting rights and entitlements of immigrants can have dramatic effects on equilibrium immigration and tax policies. Finally, we provide some empirical support for the model's predictions.     

The geometry of voting power: Weighted voting and hyper-ellipsoids

Suppose legislators represent districts of varying population, and their assembly's voting rule is intended to implement the principle of one person, one vote. How should legislators' voting weights appropriately reflect these population differences? An analysis requires an understanding of the relationship between voting weight and some measure of the influence that each legislator has over collective decisions. We provide three new characterizations of weighted voting that embody this relationship. Each is based on the intuition that winning coalitions should be close to one another. The locally minimal and tightly packed characterizations use a weighted Hamming metric. Ellipsoidal separability employs the Euclidean metric: a separating hyper-ellipsoid contains all winning coalitions, and omits losing ones. The ellipsoid's proportions, and the Hamming weights, reflect the ratio of voting weight to influence, measured as Penrose–Banzhaf voting power. In particular, the spherically separable rules are those for which voting powers can serve as voting weights.     

REGIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT DISPARITIES: AN EVALUATION OF POLICY MEASURES*

This paper analyses the efficacy of regional and federal government policies in reducing inter‐regional unemployment disparities. We use as our framework a two‐region general equilibrium model with a given freely‐mobile supply of labour. We assume inter‐regional migration to occur in response to inter‐regional utility differentials. Each region has households, firms and a regional government. In addition to regional governments, there is a federal government. The firms in a region use a single factor, labour, to produce a single good which we assume to be different to that produced in the other region. It is supplied to households and to the regional government in the form of payroll taxes. Households consume some, trade some with households in the other region and give some up to the federal government as income tax. Firms and households bargain over wages and firms then choose employment to maximise profits. The resulting equilibrium will generally not be a full‐employment one. We simulate a linearised numerical version of the model. We examine seven alternative policies, six carried out by a regional government and one by the federal government. In the first group there are traditional tax/expenditure polices as well as policies which might be seen as attacking the natural rate of unemployment: changes in unemployment benefits, changes in union power, changes in the labour force and changes in labour productivity. The federal government policy is a regionally‐differentiated fiscal policy. Contrary to expectations, many policies which have traditionally been recommended to alleviate unemployment are found, in fact, to exacerbate the unemployment problem.     

ON BUYING LEGISLATURES*

This paper analyzes a simple spatial voting model that includes lobbyists who are able to buy votes on bills to change the status quo. The key results are: (i) if lobbyists can discriminate across legislators when buying votes, then they will pay the largest bribes to legislators who are slightly opposed to the proposed change, rather than to legislators who strongly support or strongly oppose the change; (ii) equilibrium policies exist, and with quadratic preferences these equilibria always lie between the average of the lobbyists' ideal points and the median of the legislators' ideal points; and (iii) “moderate” lobbyists, whose positions on a policy issue are close to the median of the legislators' ideal points, will prefer the issue to be salient, while more extreme lobbyists will generally prefer the issue to be obscure.     

GROWTH AND VARIABILITY OF SCHOOL DISTRICT INCOME TAX REVENUES: IS TAX BASE DIVERSIFICATION A GOOD IDEA FOR SCHOOL FINANCING?

School districts in Ohio have the option of diversifying their revenue base by adopting income taxes. Using a panel of Ohio school districts that adopted a local income tax from 1990 to 2008, we find that revenues are procyclical and fluctuate only mildly. The estimated short‐ and long‐run income elasticity of school district income tax revenues is 1.05 and 1.04, respectively. We also find that the school district tax base fully adjusts to its long‐run equilibrium within 2 years. Finally, we show that school district income tax adoption does not provide more stability to total school district tax revenues in the short or the long run. (JEL H71, H75)     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. FOREIGN AID: AMERICAN LEGISLATORS AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF AID

Are there systematic political economy factors that shape preferences for foreign aid, a key component of American foreign policy? We analyze votes in the House of Representatives from 1979 to 2003 that would increase or decrease foreign aid by considering the political, economic, and ideological characteristics of legislators and their districts. To understand who supports and opposes foreign aid, we utilize theories of foreign economic policy preferences. By examining different types of aid policy, we show that domestic politics and especially the distributional consequences of economic aid can matter. The economic characteristics of a district and its left–right ideological predispositions influence support for aid in a systematic fashion over the nearly 25‐year period. Stolper–Samuelson models along with political ideology can help explain legislators' preferences toward aid.     

Voting over selfishly optimal tax schedules: Can Pigouvian tax redistribute income?

This paper studies pairwise majority voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules proposed by a continuum of individuals who differ in privately observable skills and make consumption comparisons, which creates a negative positional externality. It shows that the tax schedule preferred by the median skill type will win the voting contest. Given a reference consumption defined as the average consumption in the population, all skills face the same Pigouvian tax rate in the utilitarian optimum, whereas in selfish optima high skills face a Pigouvian tax rate larger than that facing low skills, generating a novel income redistributive effect. Under a constant elasticity of labor supply, two more results are obtained. First, for Pareto, Champernowne, Weibull, and lognormal skill distributions, the selfishly optimal tax schedule facing high (low) skills tends to be more progressive when the bottom‐skill's (top‐skill's) status concern intensifies. Second, it identifies the conditions under which, in the voting equilibrium, high skills face higher marginal tax rates while low skills face lower ones than what they face in the utilitarian optimum.     

Minority representation, election method, and policy influence

Recently a number of legal scholars have advocated jurisdiction-wide cumulative voting as a mechanism to promote minority representation. Among other benefits, they claim minority representatives will have greater policy influence if they are elected in at-large contests rather than from single-member districts. We test this proposition by estimating the deter-minants of minority hiring practices. We find increases in the proportion of black representatives on a city council are positively correlated with the percentage of black police recruits. However, holding constant black representation, the impact of black councilors on municipal hiring is enhanced when councilors are elected at-large rather than by district.     

Output‐based rebating of carbon taxes in a neighbour's backyard: Competitiveness,leakage and welfare

We investigate how, in an open economy, carbon taxes combined with output‐based rebating (OBR) perform in interaction with the carbon policies of a large neighbouring trading partner. Analytical results suggest that, whether the purpose of the OBR policy is to compensate firms for carbon tax burdens or to maximize welfare (accounting for global emission reductions), the OBR rate should be positive in policy‐relevant cases. Numerical simulations for Canada, with the US as the neighbouring trading partner, indicate that the impact of US policies on the OBR rate will depend crucially on the purpose of the Canadian OBR policies. If, for a given US carbon policy, Canada's aim is to restore the competitiveness of domestic emission‐intensive and trade‐exposed (EITE) firms to the same level as before the introduction of its own carbon taxation, we find that the necessary domestic OBR rates will be insensitive to the foreign carbon policies. However, if not only the Canadian carbon tax but also an equally high US tax is introduced, compensatory Canadian OBR rates will be up to 50% lower, depending on the sector and on US OBR policy. If the policy objective is to increase economy‐wide allocative efficiency (welfare) of Canadian policies by accounting for carbon leakage, the US policies will have only a minor downward pressure on desirable OBR rates in Canada. Practical choices of OBR rates hardly affect overall domestic economic performance; thus, output‐based rebating qualifies as an instrument for compensating EITE industries without a large sacrifice in terms of economy‐wide allocative efficiency.     

The Political Economy of the IRS

This paper tests a multiple principal–agent model of the Internal Revenue Service. Using data for 33 IRS districts over six tax years, 1992–1997, we report evidence that the fraction of individual income tax returns audited is significantly lower in districts that are important to the president electorally and that have representation on key congressional committees. These findings suggest that the IRS is not a rogue government agency, but rather is an effective bureaucratic agent of its political sponsors. "Reforming" the IRS by subjecting it to an independent oversight board appointed by the president would therefore seem to be redundant.     

Do income tax breaks for the elderly affect economic growth?

Income tax breaks for elderly taxpayers are sizable, widespread, and potentially affect growth through migration and other behaviors. We provide the first investigation into the growth effects of differential tax policy by age, taking a multi-pronged empirical approach to US state-level data since 1977. Some analyses include panel error-correction models combined with variation in state-level policies over time. Alternative analyses use how changes in federal tax law manifest at the state-level. Results suggest that taxes on lower income taxpayers, of any age, decrease growth the most, while taxing the high income elderly—those targeted recently—has little effect.     

Lifetime versus Annual Tax‐and‐Transfer Progressivity: Sweden, 1968–2009

In this paper, we analyze the evolution of tax‐and‐transfer progressivity in Sweden over both annual and lifetime horizons. Using a rich micro panel covering the period 1968–2009, we calculate tax rates over a cohort's entire working life cycle. Our main finding is that taxes are considerably less progressive over the lifetime than in any single year. Social insurance transfers to transitory low‐income earners account for most of this result. We offer a number of robustness checks of the measurement of lifetime incomes and progressivity, but none of them changes our overall findings.     

Mobility of Top Incomes in Germany

I analyze German top income mobility using micro‐level panel data of personal income tax returns which are highly representative for top income taxpayers for the years 2001–06. Top income mobility is assessed in three dimensions: (i) persistence in top income fractiles and its stability over time, (ii) measures of individual mobility that are not dependent on the fractile size: the degree of mobility between equally sized groups and mobility in ranks, and (iii) mobility's impact on top income shares. Persistence in top income fractiles is comparatively high and fairly stable across the analyzed period. Top income recipients are less prone to downward mobility and see less variation in annual ranks than less rich tax units. Mobility's impact on income concentration is moderate. The top percentile's share is reduced by roughly 5 percent over six years.     

Do Natural Resources Depress Income Per Capita?

Most evidence for the resource curse comes from cross‐country growth regressions suffers from bias originating from the high and ever‐evolving volatility in commodity prices. These issues are addressed by providing new cross‐country empirical evidence for the effect of resources in income per capita. Natural resource dependence (resource exports) has a significant negative effect on income per capita, especially in countries with bad rule of law or bad policies, but these results weaken substantially once we allow for endogeneity. However, the more exogenous measure of resource abundance (stock of natural capital) has a significant negative effect on income per capita even after controlling for geography, rule of law and de facto or de jure trade openness. Furthermore, this effect is more severe for countries that have little de jure trade openness. These results are robust to using alternative measures of institutional quality (expropriation and corruption instead of rule of law).     

Resource‐driven victory

The vast popularity of distributive policies in many resource‐rich countries coincided with the oil and gas price hike of 2004. However, following the sharp decline of price in the late 2014, this popularity started waning and the tendency toward more productive policies gained traction. Using a theoretical model, this paper studies the optimal composition of public spending and demonstrates that, for a sufficiently low amount of any exogenous revenue, for example, resource revenue, investing revenue in productive public good is preferable. The representative agent prefers more distributive policies as resource revenue increases. A key determinant of the optimal composition of public spending is the inherited level of productivity. Countries with too low or too high productivity both find distributive policies more appealing even for a small amount of resource revenue. Yet, they have an essential difference. Resource revenue eradicates individuals' incentive to work in countries with low initial productivity while individuals always prefer to work in highly productive countries.     

IMPACT OF TAX, TRANSFER, AND EXPENDITURE POLICIES OF GOVERNMENT ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME IN CANADA

This is a study of the first order incidence of government taxation and expenditure policies on the incomes of families and unattached individuals in Canada in 1970. The specific purposes of the study are twofold. The first is to estimate for calendar year 1970 the first order incidence of governments'actual tax, transfer, and expenditure policies on spending units. The second objective is to simulate the changes in this incidence that would have occurred in 1970 if the new federal personal income tax, unemployment insurance, old age sccurity and family allowance programs had been in operation during that year. The methodology is similar to that used by W. Irwin Gillespie in his pioneering 1964 study for the Royal Commission on Taxation.
It is concluded that the 1970 incidence of the combined tax and transfer programs of all levels of government is broadly redistributive, with net incidence of federal government programs being considerably more redistributive than that of provincial and local governments. In general, the public sector provides large net benefits to families and individuals with incomes of less than $4,000, declining net benefits to families earning from $4,000 to $11,000 and levies small but increasing levels of net tax on families and individuals with incomes in excess of $11,000. This general conclusion is relatively insensitive to the precise assumptions made about the shifting of taxes and the distribution of expenditures on pure public goods. From simulation experiments, recent reforms of the federal income tax, unemployment insurance, old age security and family allowance systems were estimated to increase the amount of redistribution from the rich to the poor.     

Corruption and local democratization in Indonesia: The role of Islamic parties

Indonesia has a tradition of corruption among local officials who harass and collect bribes from firms. This paper examines whether corruption is affected by local democratization and by the party composition of local assemblies. Democratization occurred in 1999 and decentralization in 2001. We have firm-level data for 2001 and 2004. The 2001 data benchmark corruption at the time of decentralization. We find that corruption declines between 2001 and 2004 overall, but much less so in districts with more secular party as opposed to Islamic party representatives in district assemblies. For a larger sample of districts, correspondingly, we find that corruption in 2004 is more in districts which voted more in favor of secular party representatives in the first elections in 1999. We argue that the effects seem to be causal, over above any effects of changing religiosity and economic circumstances across districts.