企业核心利益相关者共享控制权的理论基础——从人力资本产权的角度

企业核心利益相关者的基本构成应该是股东、管理者和员工三类利益相关者。企业核心利益相关者共同治理模式的结构特征是股东、管理者和员工三者共同拥有企业的控制权,并分享企业剩余。从人力资本产权的角度来说,人力资本产权所有者拥有企业的控制权,可以调动员工的工作积极性,减少企业激励监督的成本;可以改善企业委托——代理关系中监督不足,信息不对称的问题,降低代理成本;提高企业的治理效率;可以缓解员工权益受损、劳资关系紧张。     

独立董事防范上市公司股东相容性风险的博弈分析

公司治理中不可避免地存在着股东间的矛盾与冲突,隐含了股东利益相容性风险.虽然独立董事制度理论上有助于该类风险的防范,但由于现实中的独立董事是有限理性的经济人,导致其实际发挥作用需要满足一定的条件,如果条件不满足或不充分,将直接影响这一理论功能的发挥.本文从博弈角度分析了独立董事制度在防范股东相容性风险方面应具备的条件,并据此提出了相关的建议措施.     

上市公司大股东与小股东的利益博弈

近年来,公司治理的研究问题从经理人和股东之间的委托代理关系,转移到大股东对小股东的利益侵占分析。本文通过博弈模型对大股东和小股东的利益关系进行了分析,首先选用智猪博弈说明小股东的“搭便车”心理,然后对大小股东的完全信息下的博弈分情况讨论,解释了“用脚投票”的现象,最后根据博弈分析结论提出建议。     

公司治理之国际模式浅析

公司治理(corporategovernance)这一术语在20世纪80年代正式出现在英文文献中。传统的公司治理定义是指保护股东的利益。现代公司所有权与经营权的分离所引致的股东与管理者的冲突,以及由此产生的委托代理关系,是公司治理问题产生的根源。所以,狭义的公司治理被认为是指公司董事会的功能、结构、股东的权利等方面的制度安排。由于各国经济制度、历史传统、市场环境、法律观念及其他条件的不同,公司治理的模式也不尽相同。当前主流的公司治理模式可分为三类:以英美为代表的外部控制主导模式;以德日为代表的内部控制主导模式;以韩国为代表的家…     

经理人财务治理风险与治理机制

现代公司制所有权与经营权分离、中小股东无力监督及“搭便车”行为、债务资金软约束、职工处于劣势,企业利益相关者中拥有信息优势和人力资本特殊性的经理人成了企业实际的“内部控制人”,出现经理人在职消费、过度投资等财务治理风险行为,危害到企业的长远发展.利益相关者特别是股东应在激励与约束经理人方面设计行之有效的治理机制,解决经理人财务治理风险问题.     

公司治理与企业内生风险

本文在整理有关公司治理文献的基础上,指出公司治理与企业内生风险的关系;对企业委托人层面上权力重构做出合理的静态分析,认为委托代理关系的融合是降低企业内生风险的关键;研究还表明,若干时期内,委托代理关系不可能调整到均衡状态,委托人必须预设一个相对弹性的空间,使得内在风险与外在风险可调和。在“共同治理”模式下,风险可以降低。     

公司治理与企业内生风险

本文在整理有关公司治理文献的基础上,指出公司治理与企业内生风险的关系;对企业委托人层面上的权力重构做出合理的静态分析,认为委托代理关系的融合是降低企业内生风险的关键;研究还表明,若干时期内,委托代理关系不可能调整到均衡状态。因此,委托人必须预设一个相对弹性的空间,使得内在风险与外在风险可调和,在“共同治理”模式下,当委托人与代理人拥有的信息随着时间推移互为“内外双层气泡”时,企业内生风险可以降低。     

浅谈公司治理中的委托代理

本文阐述了新形势下委托代理问题重心的转变,剖析了控股股东侵占中小股东利益的方式,并结合工作实践有针对性地就如何解决委托代理问题提出了自己的见解,对进一步规范所有者和经营者的关系,规范公司内部治理结构,促进管理水平的提高,实现股东利益最大化具有重要的指导意义。     

中小证券公司营销策略研究

我国中小券商经纪业务经营模式存在的问题:我国券商经纪业务模式总的来说是一种营业部模式,是在长期的政府政策保护和行业垄断下形成的,主要表现在:粗放式经营,成本高;依靠政策生存,自生能力弱;经营模式基本相同,缺乏经营特色;消极经营模式,风险大;委托交易方式较落后,网上交易不发达。     

股东层治理风险与公司绩效的相关性研究

股东会治理风险是指由于股东层内部结构和股东自己的道德而给公司治理可能造成的风险。股东会治理风险的存在一方面是由于在股东层内部存在股权问题。这些风险与公司绩效的相关性怎样?又是如何影响公司绩效呢?     

中国上市公司小股东保护:一个公司治理的视角

上市公司小股东权益遭受侵害的一个重要原因在于上市公司治理存在制度缺陷。存在于我国上市公司治理制度中不利于小股东保护。有四大缺陷使其通过各种途径小股东遭受侵害。为完善我国小股东保护制度提出五项建议:稳步推进上市公司股票全流通;建立小股东对控股股东的权力制衡机制;加快董事会制度建设;完善上市公司信息披露制度;构建独立高效的证券司法体系,完善法律救济与实施机制。     

The crisis of Japanese retailing at the turn of the millennium: a crisis of corporate governance and finance

The year 2000 saw a sudden rise in failures of prominent Japanese retailers. With problems of corporate finance and governance being pointed out as early as the 1970s, the recent problems as well as the continuous rise of companies up to then have to be explained. This article contends that a major explanatory factor is the weakening of the existing stable relationships between retailers and financial institutions. Banks functioned as lenders, shareholders and providers of management resources. Changes in the banking sector led to changes in the relationship at the end of the 1990s. Problems in corporate governance surfaced that might result in a major reorganization of the Japanese retail scene.     

WTO服务贸易紧急保障措施制度中的“国内产业”范围问题——以我国证券服务业为视角的分析

我国证券服务业对外开放的重点是放宽商业存在形式的市场准入,主要依据是我国加入世界贸易组织的承诺和主动实施的对外开放措施。分析表明,我国存在外商控股服务提供者、非外商控股外商投资服务提供者、外资参股中资服务提供者和纯中资服务提供者等四类证券服务提供者,不存在外商独资服务提供者。为维护我国证券服务业的安全和所有服务行业的整体经济利益,建议以中资股东是否拥有实际控制权为标准,适度从宽地划定证券服务业国内产业的范围。此外,在关于国内产业范围的谈判中,应注意坚持根据实质重于形式确定"实际控制权"的衡量标准。     

‘Profligacy in the encouragement of thrift’: Savings banks in Ireland, 1817–1914

We describe the legal rules underlying corporate governance of banks in Germany during the 1870s as well as the rules of governance fixed in corporate charters collected from a sample of 202 charters for the year 1872. Governance standards were – on average – below the legal default. In particular, voting rights as well as monitoring rights of shareholders were restricted. Most governance provisions did not affect the level of Tobin's Q in 1872, the change of the market-to-book ratio during 1873, and the probability of firm survival until 1880. Yet large banks having adopted a ‘one share–one vote’ provision and large banks having a governmental concession had a higher Tobin's Q, whereas the reverse holds for small banks. Moreover, the probability of firm survival was larger if small shareholders had voting rights or if shareholders could elect the supervisory board.     

Corporate ownership and the theory of the multinational enterprise

This paper makes a contribution to the theory of the multinational enterprise (MNE) and, in particular, to why firms undertake foreign direct investment (FDI) rather than alternative strategies. We argue that FDI and its strategic alternatives involve different patterns of costs and returns over time, and hence different levels of risk and uncertainty. Traditional theories of the MNE conceptualize the firm as a risk-neutral decision-making entity with short-term efficiency objectives, and hence do not take these issues into account. This may be reasonable for firms with passive professional managers and widely-dispersed shareholders, operating in countries with the Anglo-American system of corporate governance. But many firms operate under quite different systems of corporate governance where concentrated shareholdings are commonplace and markets for corporate control are weak or non-existent. In these cases, shareholders exert considerable influence on all aspects of firm strategy including FDI. Furthermore, different groups of shareholders (State, family, institutions) are likely to have different objectives, different attitudes towards risk, and different decision-making time horizons. We thus suggest that the traditional theories of the MNE need to be extended to embrace consideration of corporate ownership (and other governance dimensions).     

Do Shareholders Have Obligations to Stakeholders?

The question of whether, and to what extent, business managers have obligations to stakeholders has been the principal theme in much of recent business ethics literature. The question of whether shareholders have obligations to stakeholders, however, has not been addressed sufficiently. I provide some needed attention to this matter by examining the positions of shareholders in the contemporary world of investing. Their positions are considerably different than that often envisioned by business ethicists and economists where shareholders determine the directions of corporate activities through their voting decisions. Typical contemporary investors rarely control corporate activities. If they own corporate securities directly, generally they own too small an interest to exercise control. And, in most cases, they do not even own corporate securities directly, but, rather, own shares in funds. Because of the positions of shareholders today, it is highly questionable whether most have obligations to stakeholders. This has a significant implication for business managers. Whether or not shareholders have obligations to stakeholders, business managers have a greater obligation to educate shareholders about how corporate activities affect stakeholders. I provide a justification for that obligation and comment on how business managers might begin to fulfill it.     

Enterprise ownership and control in China: Governance with a Chinese twist

Inefficient state-owned enterprises in China were compelled to restructure to remain competitive, which resulted in phenomenal economic growth. While economically successful, China did not initially have any indigenous laws to regulate companies or control this growth, so Chinese lawmakers had to transplant corporate laws from developed Western countries. However, this transplantation process did not occur without problems, and certain domestic attributes had to be supplemented in corporate legislation to correspond with Chinese socialistic objectives and cultural values. This article analyzes the key attributes of Chinese corporate governance and regulations concerning shareholders’ rights and, in the process, highlights provisions that are peculiar and characterized as uniquely Chinese, ultimately raising more questions than answers for shareholders.     

大股东资产注入的产业链整合效应研究

以股权分置改革后已完成大股东资产注入的上市公司为样本,通过统计大股东资产注入前后上市公司与大股东之间关联交易的变化以及资产注入前后上市公司经营业绩的变化来检验大股东资产注入的产业链整合效应,研究发现: 大股东注入的资产大多与上市公司产业相关,相比资产注入前一年,资产注入后一年上市公司与大股东之间的关联交易量以及非公允关联交易量均显著下降,并且上市公司各项经营业绩指标也均比资产注入前一年有所上升,表明大股东资产注入降低了上市公司与大股东之间的关联交易,改善了上市公司经营业绩,具有积极的产业链整合效应。     

Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance: Role of Context in International Settings

This research aims to explore the relationship between corporate governance and CSR: What are the major factors that play a direct role in the establishment of this relationship? How does context and institutional background impact upon the relationship between CSR and Governance? Using in-depth semi-structured interviews from two types of governance systems in three countries over three years, this study has demonstrated that in practice, within different settings, CSR is being used both as a strategy as well as a reaction to different drivers. We call this adaptive governance where governance can be defined as a flexible system of action incorporating strategic and monitoring activities that determines the way a company enacts its responsibilities to its shareholders and stakeholders and which is determined at any given time by the interrelationship of institutional drivers and behavioural norms. Governance systems and their interrelationships with CSR are demonstrated as fluid according to the national and institutional context, economic situation and industry impact. In the eyes of practitioners corporate governance includes both structural and behavioural factors as well as responsibilities and actions towards shareholders and stakeholders. Contextual factors that this research highlights to be important to the incorporation of CSR into governance include the economic environment, national governance system, regulation and soft law, shareholders, national culture, behavioural norms and industry impacts. Hypotheses on the impact of institutional contexts, industry impacts and economic situations on different types of CSR actions are proposed for further research.     

Is there Informational Value in Corporate Giving?

In this article, we propose that giving in cash and non-cash (in-kind) differ in their relation with the giving firm’s future corporate financial performance (CFP) and only cash giving is associated with future CFP. Using a novel dataset from ASSET4 that differentiates corporate giving over a sample period of 2002–2012, we examine three competing hypotheses: (1) agency cost hypothesis that cash giving reflects agency cost and destroys value for shareholders, (2) investment hypothesis that cash giving is an investment by management that aims for better future return, and (3) information hypothesis that cash giving has informational value to shareholders as cash is a critical resource at a firm and giving is a decision by managers who are insiders. We find that indeed, only cash giving is positively associated with future CFP and firm value, measured by Fama–French five-factor abnormal risk-adjusted stock returns, future return on assets, and Tobin’s Q. In addition, we find that the positive association exists only between excess, i.e., unexpected, but not expected cash giving and future CFP. Our empirical findings support the information hypothesis, but neither the agency hypothesis nor the investment hypothesis, and are robust to a number of endogeneity tests, including orthogonalized cash giving, instrumental variable regression using geography-based instruments, and propensity score matching. Furthermore, we show that the positive association between future CFP and unexpected cash giving is only pronounced at firms with good governance and relatively higher sales growth where agency problems are less likely, and at firms with no alternative mechanisms to demonstrate the strength of cash flow. Additionally, we do not find evidence that suggests in-kind giving to possess any informational value.