The Information Content of Corporate Pension Funding Status in Japan

This paper tests if a firm's pension funding ratio (pension assets/PBO) reveals the management's private information about the firm's operation when the firm can exercise discretion in pension funding. The lax enforcement of pension funding rules and the prevalence of management forecasts make Japanese firms an ideal testing ground. We show that, among firms with large business uncertainty, large accruals, or high effective tax rates, the pension funding ratio predicts the firm's management forecast errors significantly beyond conventional control variable and the effects of pension accounting management. However, the stock market does not appear to incorporate this information immediately.     

The Impact of Taxes on Corporate Defined Benefit Plan Asset Allocation

This paper investigates the extent to which taxes affect a corporation's decision to allocate its defined benefit plan's assets between equity and bonds. Prior theoretical research shows that if a corporation integrates its financial policy and pension investment policy, differences in tax rates create an arbitrage opportunity. The firm's tax benefits from the arbitrage should be positively related to the percentage of its pension assets allocated to bonds. Consistent with this prediction, but contrary to prior empirical work, this paper finds firms' tax benefits are positively and significantly associated with the percentage of their pension assets invested in bonds.     

“De‐risking” Corporate Pension Plans: Options for CFOs

Until the stock market bubble burst in 2000–2002, most CFOs viewed their defined benefit pension plans as profit centers and relatively risk‐free sources of income. Since neither pension assets nor liabilities were reported on corporate balance sheets, and expected returns on pension stocks could be substituted for actual returns when reporting net income, the risks associated with DB plans were masked by GAAP accounting and thus assumed to have no bearing on corporate capital structure. But when stock prices and corporate profits fell together, the risks associated with conventional stock‐heavy pension plans showed up first in reduced pension surpluses (or, in many cases, deficits) and then later in higher required cash contributions and lower reported earnings. As a consequence, today's investors (and rating agencies) are viewing pension and other legacy liabilities as corporate debt, and demands for transparency and increased funding have triggered accounting changes and proposed legislative reforms that will further unmask the economics. This article aims to provide both private‐sector and public‐sector CFOs with suggestions for reducing and controlling the cost of providing for the retirement of their employees. Profitable, tax‐paying companies with DB plans should consider (1) funding any unfunded liabilities (if necessary, by issuing debt) and (2) reducing pension equity and interest rate exposures by shifting some (if not all) pension assets into bonds and defeasing the pension liability (achieving a tax arbitrage in the process). And in cases where the expected costs of maintaining DB plans outweigh the benefits, companies should consider freezing or terminating their plans and switching to a defined contribution (DC) or some form of hybrid plan. The authors also propose similar changes for public pension plans, where underfunding and mismatch problems are greater, less transparent, and in some ways less tractable than those of corporate DB plans.     

Corporate capital structure and pension-funding strategy

This article provides an integrated analysis of pension funding and corporate financing strategies in the presence of default risk. The article shows that when the marginal personal income tax rate is constant, the financing decision with respect to pension funding is influenced entirely by tax considerations. When the marginal personal income tax is progressive, the optimal financing of pension funding depends on the cyclical nature of the firm (as characterized by the sign of beta), the riskiness of pension assets, and ERISA regulations concerning the pension-benefit guaranty rate, the marginal pension insurance premium and the firm's legal responsibility for its unfunded pension obligations. It is shown that a necessary condition for partial pension funding is that the marginal insurance premium imposed by PBGC must be less than actuarially fair, and a necessary condition for pension funding to be financed by both debt and equity is that beta must be positive.     

Corporate taxes and defined benefit pension plans

The Tepper–Black arguments for tax-arbitrage opportunities from overfunding pension plans are critically examined and modifications proposed. Tax status, a function of current marginal tax rates and expected future taxable income, is predicted to determine funding policy. Tests of this modified tax benefits view suggest that 1) tax status declines are associated with pension contribution reductions, 2) reductions in contributions are related to previous excess contributions as well as non-pension tax shield increases causing the decline in tax status, and 3) cross-sectionally, tax status is related to fund levels, choice of actuarial variables, and the use of defined benefit plans.     

CREATING VALUE IN PENSION PLANS (OR, GENTLEMEN PREFER BONDS)

Pension funds are typically one-half to two-thirds invested in equities because equities are expected to outperform other financial assets over the long term, and the long-term nature of pension fund liabilities seems well suited to absorbing any short-term return volatility. What's more, U.S. GAAP currently makes it possible to take credit in advance for the higher anticipated earnings on equity investments without acknowledging their inherent risk. But by allowing the higher expected returns from stocks to reduce a company's current pension expenses, the accounting treatment conflicts with some very basic principles of finance (in particular, the idea that investors must earn higher returns on riskier investments just to "break even"), conceals systematic biases in the actuarial analysis, and gives managers considerable latitude to manipulate the bottom line.
The authors suggest a startlingly different approach. They argue that pension assets should be invested entirely in duration-matched debt instruments for two reasons: (1) to capture the full tax benefits of pre-funding their pension obligations and (2) to improve overall corporate risk profiles by converting general stock market risk into firm-specific operating risk, where corporate managers should have a comparative advantage and can generate real value. Investing exclusively in bonds would take better advantage of the tax-exempt status of pension plans and greatly reduce fund management costs, while at the same time helping o shore up fund quality and sharpening corporate executives' focus on their real operating assets.     

What determines the composition of a firm's cash reserves?

We investigate what determines variation in the composition of the financial assets that constitute corporate cash reserves and how this variation relates to other key liquidity management practices. The degree to which a firm invests its cash reserves in less liquid, longer-maturity financial assets that earn a higher yield is explained by financial constraints, the ability to accurately forecast short-term liquidity needs, and the firm's likelihood of defaulting on its debt. During years when a firm's cash reserves are required to fund increases in investment or operating expenses the firm transfers funds from less liquid to more liquid financial assets. A firm's decisions relating to the composition of its cash reserves interacts with other key liquidity management practices, such as relying on credit lines for liquidity, extending trade credit or using it as a source of financing, and holding large amounts of inventories. Our findings provide insights on an important component of corporate liquidity management decisions.     

Pension Funding Regulations and Actuarial Gains and Losses

With pervasive pension funding deficits, Korean firms have been under pressure to improve their funding levels. We examine whether firms have incentives to set obligation‐decreasing pension assumptions when they have large pension deficits (pension obligations in excess of plan assets) and when they make insufficient contributions to external pension funds. We find that firms report larger actuarial gains (or smaller actuarial losses) associated with the remeasurement of pension liabilities when their pension funding ratio (the ratio of the fair value of plan assets to defined benefit obligations) is lower and when contributions to plan assets relative to pension service costs are smaller. Next, upon the introduction of a minimum pension funding guideline, we find that the effect of the funding ratio and contributions to pension funds on actuarial gains and losses is more pronounced for firms whose funding ratios are slightly below the minimum funding ratio than it is for firms whose funding ratios exceed or fall short of the minimum by a large margin. Our results indicate that firms opportunistically exercise discretion regarding corporate pension accounting under International Financial Reporting Standards to comply with pension funding regulations, thereby reducing perceived pension deficits.     

Share prices and pension funding: An empirical test of the joint effect of pension insurance and the pension tax shield

This article examines the joint significance of the tax benefits of pension funding and the value of government sponsored pension insurance in determining the efficacy of corporate pension funding. When the pension tax shield benefits are dominant, additional funding may enhance shareholder wealth. However, additional funding is observed to have negative effects on equity prices when the value of pension insurance is dominant relative to the value of the pension tax shield. When neither the tax or insurance effects are dominant, marginal adjustments in pension funding apparently will not alter corporate share prices.     

Personal Taxation in Firm Market Valuation: Theory and Test*

In this paper, I extend Ohlson's 1995 firm market valuation model to incorporate personal taxes: the taxes on dividends and the taxes on capital gains. Without personal taxes, firm market value can be expressed as the present value of future benefits received by the shareholders (dividends, in this case). With personal taxes, the benefits received by the shareholders should be classified into three categories (due to their different tax treatments): dividends, share repurchases, and new share issues (i.e., contributed capital). The extended model shows the effects of personal taxation on firm market valuation: retained earnings are valued less than contributed stocks, both dividends taxes and capital gains taxes affect retained earnings valuation and firm market value, and firms choose cash distribution methods (paying dividends and repurchasing shares) to increase their retained earnings valuation, therefore increasing their market value. An empirical test using a sample from the Disclosure Select Canada and Financial Post Card data bases for the years 1995‐98 supports these personal tax effects.     

Does Earnings Management Relieve the Negative Effects of Mandatory Pension Contributions?

Mandatory pension contributions (MCs) are negative shocks to a firm's liquidity that can unfavorably impact its cost of capital, financing, and investment plans. We examine whether firms faced with MCs use both noncash (NEM) and cash‐generating earnings management (CEM) to partially offset their negative effects. Firms increase CEM, but not NEM, when they experience MCs. We also find that earnings management associated with MCs does not substantially lower the weighted cost of capital or boost external funding and investment. Our findings suggest that MC firms use CEM as it directly generates cash to fund MCs, while NEM does not.     

Cash-Balance Plan Conversions: Evidence on Excise Taxes and Implicit Contracts

Firms that wish to switch from a traditional defined‐benefit pension plan to a defined‐contribution‐type plan have a choice between converting to a cash‐balance plan or replacing the defined‐benefit plan with a full‐fledged defined‐contribution plan. According to Ippolito and Thompson's (1999; Industrial Relations, 39: 228‐245) excise tax avoidance hypothesis, a number of firms have switched to cash‐balance plans because conversion allows the firm to avoid excise taxes on its excess pension assets. In contrast to existing studies, our evidence supports the excise tax avoidance hypothesis. Cash‐balance plan conversions also have been criticized for imposing pension losses on older employees. The implicit contract theory of pensions predicts that poorly performing firms would be the ones that would impose losses on employees. However, our evidence indicates that firms converting to cash‐balance plans typically are not poor performers.     

Investment and Financing Constraints: Evidence from the Funding of Corporate Pension Plans

I exploit sharply nonlinear funding rules for defined benefit pension plans in order to identify the dependence of corporate investment on internal financial resources in a large sample. Capital expenditures decline with mandatory contributions to DB pension plans, even when controlling for correlations between the pension funding status itself and the firm's unobserved investment opportunities. The effect is particularly evident among firms that face financing constraints based on observable variables such as credit ratings. Investment also displays strong negative correlations with the part of mandatory contributions resulting solely from unexpected asset market movements.     

Pension Policy and the Value of Corporate‐Level Investment

We examine how pension policy affects the value of corporate‐level investment to the firm and its various claimants using Monte Carlo simulation. Shareholders lose the greatest amount of project value to the pension plan when it is undiversified across asset classes. Improved funding levels mandated by the provisions of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 generally reduce those wealth transfers. Thus, mitigation of the overhang effect joins the reduction of financial distress costs as a motivation for holding both stocks and bonds in the pension fund.     

How does the Funding Status of Defined Benefit Pension Plans Affect Investment Decisions of Firms in the United States?

We investigate whether the flexibility in making contributions towards defined benefit pension plans sponsored by firms in the United States allows managers to save cash and increase investments. Firms invest more at higher levels of pension deficit, defined as pension benefit obligations less pension assets, and scaled by total assets. At the median level (90^th percentile) of pension deficit, investments increase by 6.7 cents (9.4 cents) for every dollar increase in cash. As the pension deficit increases, firms deviate more from the predicted level of investment. These findings suggest that the incremental investments are more likely to represent overinvestment by managers. Our results are robust to alternative model specifications and endogeneity concerns that may arise if investments are jointly determined with the funding policy of pension plans and the firm's target cash level. We repeat our main analysis for the United Kingdom and also find for that country that, at a fixed cash level, total investment increases as pension deficit increases.     

What determines corporate pension fund risk-taking strategy?

Corporate sponsors of defined benefit pension plans generally assume low investment risk when they have low funding ratios and high default risk, consistent with the risk management hypothesis. However, for financially distressed sponsors and sponsors that freeze, terminate, or convert defined benefit to defined contribution plans, the risk-shifting incentive (moral hazard) dominates. Pension fund risk-taking is also affected by labor unionization and sponsor incentives to maximize tax benefits, restore financial slack, and justify the accounting choices of pension assumptions. Sponsors shift toward an aggressive risk strategy when their pension plans emerge from underfunding, bankruptcy risk is reduced, or marginal tax rate decreases. Overall, we show that corporate sponsors adopt a dynamic risk-taking strategy in their pension fund investments.     

“On the Merger of Two Companies,” Hans Gerber and Elias S. W. Shiu,July 2006

Abstract

Bankruptcy risk falls to pension plan participants if a plan sponsor fails when a defined benefit (DB) pension plan is underfunded. This article examines the incidence of that risk and how it changes when public policy provides a guarantee fund. Although government-based guarantee funds are in a unique position to provide pension protection, primarily because of the extent to which the risk of sponsor default is systematic in nature, a looming question is the extent to which such guarantees are exposed to moral hazard. The article focuses on that question using data from four Canadian provinces, including one (Ontario) that operates a guarantee fund for pensions. The findings show that plan assets per DB-plan participant increase with the earnings of workers and decrease with higher unemployment, and that level of assets also is moderated by the influence of taxes, with higher plan assets observed when and where tax rates are higher. Plans in Ontario had on average $20,035 less in asset value per participant, and Ontario plans covered by the guarantee fund had an average of $16,497 less per participant than other Canadian DB plans not backed by a guarantee fund. A separate model finds the presence of a guarantee fund to be one of a very small number of variables significant in explaining variability in the plans’ funded ratios. These empirical results are consistent with the existence of moral hazard.     

Taxation and Corporate Pension Policy

This paper focuses on the impact of taxes on optimal corporate pension policy. The analysis is based upon an integration of corporate and individual shareholder considerations. The major conclusions are that a company should fully fund its pension plan and should invest the pension fund totally in bonds.     

Ageing and the tax implied in public pension schemes: simulations for selected OECD countries

A key figure suited to measuring intergenerational imbalances in unfunded public pension schemes is given by the ‘implicit tax rate’ imposed on each generation's lifetime income. The implicit tax arises from the fact that, quite generally, pension benefits fall short of actuarial returns to contributions paid to these systems while actively working. Under current pension policies, implicit tax rates will increase sharply for younger generations in most industrialised countries. In this paper, this is illustrated for the cases of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the UK and the USA. Nevertheless, there are remarkable differences across countries regarding both the level of implicit taxes and their development over successive age cohorts, which can be attributed to differences in ageing processes and in the institutional features of national pension systems. In addition, we can demonstrate how effective different approaches to pension reform are in smoothing the intergenerational profile of implicit tax rates.     

Do a firm's equity returns reflect the risk of its pension plan?

This paper examines the empirical question of whether systematic equity risk of US firms as measured by beta from the capital asset pricing model reflects the risk of their pension plans. There are a number of reasons to suspect that it might not. Chief among them is the opaque set of accounting rules used to report pension assets, liabilities, and expenses. Pension plan assets and liabilities are off-balance sheet and are often viewed as segregated from the rest of the firm, with its own trustees. Pension accounting rules are complicated. Furthermore, the role of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation clouds the real relation between pension plan risk and firm equity risk. The empirical findings in this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that equity risk does reflect the risk of the firm's pension plan despite arcane accounting rules for pensions. This finding is consistent with informational efficiency of the capital markets. It also has implications for corporate finance practice in the determination of the cost of capital for capital budgeting. Standard procedure uses de-leveraged equity return betas to infer the cost of capital for operating assets. But the de-leveraged betas are not adjusted for the risk of the pension assets and liabilities. Failure to make this adjustment typically biases upward estimates of the discount rate for capital budgeting. The magnitude of the bias is shown here to be large for a number of well-known US companies. This bias can result in positive net present value projects being rejected.