On Antitrust Enforcement and the Deterrence of Collusive Behaviour

This paper examines an antitrust enforcement policy of using significant price changes in an industry as a sorting mechanism for the allocation of resources devoted to policing collusion. That is, in either responding to complaints or initiating investigations on their own, I examine the issue of whether an antitrust enforcement policy of inferring possible collusion from significant prices changes is effective in deterring collusion given that antitrust officials have no direct knowledge of the costs of individual firms. Using the imperfect information repeated game of Green and Porter (1984), I show that this investigation strategy if coupled with uniform costs being borne by firms, can reduce the expected profits from the collusive agreement: however, unless the punishment is large enough, it will be ineffective in reducing the frequency of collusion. More importantly, it can have the undesirable effect of reducing the output agreed to by firms, if firms choose quantities, or raise collusive prices if firms are choosing price. Moreover, if the enforcement policy is anticipated by firms, the punishment mechanism adopted to support collusion will be altered to offset the policy.     

A comparative analysis of layoff announcements and stock price reactions in the United States and Japan

Downsizing and layoffs are an important mechanism for U.S. firms to cope with their strategic and economic environment. In contrast, the Japanese tradition of lifetime employment limits the ability of firms to employ layoffs as a strategic measure, relegating its use to conditions of financial distress. This paper provides the first comparison of layoffs in Japan and the United States and examines stock price reactions to layoff announcements in each country from 1990 to 1994. Agency theory and Aoki's cooperative game theory are employed to discuss differences in the governance structures of U.S. and Japanese firms and their implication for stock price reactions. Results show that layoff announcements trigger negative returns for both U.S. and Japanese firms. Specifically, layoff announcements of U.S. firms are associated with a negative 1.78 percent abnormal return, while layoff announcements for Japanese firms are associated with a negative 0.56 percent abnormal return. To better understand the impact of layoffs, this study examines the relationships between stock price reactions and various layoff characteristics (such as whether the layoff is proactive or reactive or whether the layoff is the first in the industry). Implications of the findings are discussed. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The leniency rule revisited: Experiments on cartel formation with open communication

The experimental literature on antitrust enforcement provides robust evidence that communication plays an important role for the formation and stability of cartels. We extend these studies through a design that distinguishes between innocuous communication and communication about a cartel, sanctioning only the latter. To this aim, we introduce a participant in the role of the competition authority, who is properly incentivized to judge the communication content and price setting behavior of the firms. Using this novel design, we revisit the question whether a leniency rule successfully destabilizes cartels. In contrast to existing experimental studies, we find that a leniency rule does not affect cartelization. We discuss potential explanations for this contrasting result.     

Exports and antitrust: Complements or substitutes?

Conflicting arguments have recently been voiced concerning the impact of antitrust statutes on the export performance of U.S. industries. On the one hand, opponents of vigorous enforcement have argued that antitrust constraints prevent firms from achieving efficiencies, thereby hampering competitiveness on world markets. On the other hand, proponents of antitrust have argued that vigorous enforcement tempers monopolistic pricing, thereby improving export performance. This paper presents an empirical test of these competing arguments. Our results indicate that Sherman Act Section 1 (price-fixing) enforcement has a positive effect on export shares, while Clayton Act Section 7 (merger) enforcement appears to have a negative effect.     

Multi-Market Collusion with Demand Linkages and Antitrust Enforcement

This paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand-related markets. We show that cartel prosecution can have a knock-on effect: bringing down a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel stability and leads to the break-up of the cartel in the adjacent market. Cartel prosecution can also have a waterbed effect: disrupting a cartel increases cartel stability in the adjacent market and induces cartel formation in previously competitive markets. We discuss the impact of dynamic cartel formation on consumer surplus, explore antitrust spillovers, the optimal scope of antitrust interventions and cartel formation with local firms.     

Patterns of abnormal returns and the competitive effects of horizontal mergers

This paper examines the abnormal stock returns of rivals of firms undertaking horizontal mergers that were challenged by the FTC over the period 1981–1987. At the time of merger announcements, the rivals earn positive abnormal return on average; at the time of the antitrust complaints, the rivals earn normal returns. Past studies have argued that this specific pattern of abnormal returns necessarily indicates that mergers could not have reduced competition. This paper finds that this pattern of abnormal returns is a result of the different effects of antitrust complaints on smaller and larger rivals. The evidence suggests that the mergers may have created efficiencies, but the pattern of abnormal returns is not inconsistent with mergers that may also have resulted in higher product prices.     

Oligopoly intermediation,relative rivalry and market conduct

We consider two firms that compete against each other jointly in upstream and downstream markets under two pricing games: Purchasing to stock (PTS), in which firms select input prices prior to setting consumer prices; and purchasing to order (PTO), in which firms sell forward contracts to consumers prior to selecting input prices. The antitrust implications of the model depend on the relative degree of oligopoly rivalry in the upstream and downstream markets. Firms strategically precommit to setting prices in the less rivalrous market, which serves to soften competition in the more rivalrous market, resulting in anticompetitive effects. Bertrand prices emerge in equilibrium when the markets are equally rivalrous, while Cournot outcomes arise with upstream monopsony or downstream monopoly markets. The slope of firm reaction functions depends on relative rivalry, a feature we use to derive testable hypotheses for antitrust analysis of a wide variety of industry practices.     

Effects of antitrust prosecution on retail fuel prices

In February 2015, Spain’s Competition Authority imposed € 32.4 million in fines on five of the country’s largest oil operators as sanctions for price collusion. This paper examines the effect of that antitrust action on retail fuel prices. Our analysis uses a novel data set with detailed information on more than 8000 gas stations throughout Spain. Prices were collected every day from 18 August 2014 to 15 June 2015 (almost 2 million price observations). First we estimate a reduced-form fuel price equation that accounts for wholesale costs and brand affiliation. Then we use a model of gas stations and time fixed effects while adopting a difference-in-differences approach to assessing the fines’ effect on retail fuel prices. Our results indicate that, after publication of the fine, sanctioned firms raise prices slightly, and the additional revenues far exceeded the amount of the fine. We also find substantial heterogeneity, depending on the size of the fine, in the magnitude of this price response. Hence the fine’s burden might well have been borne mainly by consumers, whose welfare was thereby reduced. Our study should be of interest to antitrust authorities as we show that sanctions may not be effective enough in deter price fixing practices, especially when sanctions are weak and the profits from colluding are sufficiently high.     

The Determinants of State-Level Antitrust Activity

While there has been a considerable literature exploring the determinants of antitrust enforcement in the United States, these studies have been based either on aggregate federal enforcement data over time (exploring cyclical influences) or cross-industry studies, usually for a single year or aggregated over several years. What has never been investigated is the pattern of state-level antitrust litigation. This is somewhat surprising, as this has been a major activity of many state attorneys general. In this paper, we explain state antitrust activity across states, examining a number of the economic and political determinants that have been proposed in the literature.     

Mergers — What the “Grimm” data tell us

The aggregate level of U.S. merger activity may be influenced by expectations concerning future economic growth (as proxied by stock prices), current economic conditions, and/or interest rates. This paper applies regression analysis to the W. T. Grimm annual merger data from 1963–1986 to determine which of these determinants are significant. It also examines whether the government's antitrust stance influences merger activity. The results indicate that current economic conditions are a significant determinant, while interest rates and the government's antitrust stance appear to have no effect on mergers. The result concerning stock prices was inconclusive and will require more analysis.The author would like to thank an anonymous referee for many helpful comments. As always, the author accepts sole responsibility for any errors or omissions.     

The cyclical behavior of the Department of Justice’s antitrust enforcement activity

We study the cyclical behavior of antitrust enforcement as measured by the number of cases initiated by the US Department of Justice. The key result is that antitrust case activity is countercyclical. This finding is robust across alternate indicators of economic activity which include stock prices, corporate profits and business cycles, and across different types of cases. The finding of countercyclical case activity does not appear to lend support to interest-group theories that predict greater regulatory protection towards producers during economic contractions. One interpretation of our result would be that antitrust violations tend to increase during economic downturns, leading to an increase in the number of cases initiated, the broad implication being that the Antitrust Division primarily acts as an antitrust law enforcement agency. Our results show that politics, as measured by the party of the President and the Republican versus Democrat composition of the House and Senate, does not have a clear impact on case activity. Finally, the number of cases initiated are significantly affected by the extent of funding.     

Market Efficiency and Return Statistics: Evidence from Real Estate and Stock Markets Using a Present-Value Approach

This paper develops a methodology to identify asset price response to news in the framework of the Campbell–Shiller log-linear present-value equation. We further show that a slow price adjustment in real estate markets not only induces a high serial autocorrelation in excess returns, but also dampens the return volatility and the correlation with excess returns in other asset markets. Using Hong Kong real estate and stock market data, we find that the quarterly real estate price assimilates only about half the effect of market news, whereas the quarterly stock price incorporates the news fully. Our analysis identifies a cumulative price adjustment that recovers lost information in real estate returns due to market inefficiency and thereby restores the real estate return volatility and the correlation between real estate and stock markets.     

Government-Assisted Oligopoly Coordination? A Concrete Case

In 1993 the Danish antitrust authority decided to gather and publish firm-specific transactions prices for two grades of ready-mixed concrete in three regions of Denmark. Following initial publication, average prices of reported grades increased by 15–20 percent within one year. We investigate whether this was due to a business upturn and/or capacity constraints, but argue that these seem to have little explanatory power. We conclude that a better explanation is that publication of prices allowed firms to reduce the intensity of oligopoly price competition and, hence, led to increased prices contrary to the aim of the authority.     

The impact of earnings expectations on corporate downsizing

Research Summary: We propose that due to financial market pressures, managers are forward‐looking in their search and decision processes and focus on meeting performance targets set by the financial community. Using panel data on S&P 100 companies, we find that pressure felt by management to meet the analyst consensus earnings estimate influences the extent of corporate downsizing. Moreover, our results show that high levels of institutional investor stock ownership and CEO power attenuate managers’ sensitivity to financial market pressures, while high levels of analyst coverage increase their sensitivity. Managerial Summary: In this study we examine how financial market pressures influence managers’ downsizing decisions. We argue that investment analysts’ earnings estimates represent important performance targets to which managers aspire. If firms fail to meet analysts’ expectations, the stock price will suffer. This study shows that managers utilize corporate downsizing to address the potential shortfall between a firm's future performance and the analyst consensus earnings estimate. In addition, we find that managers’ concerns over meeting analysts’ earnings estimates are influenced by various contextual factors such as institutional investor stock ownership, CEO power, and high levels of analyst coverage.     

The recency of technological inputs and financial performance

Inventions differ in terms of the age of the knowledge base they build upon. We examine what effects differences in the recency of knowledge inputs have on financial performance. Using threshold regression analysis, we isolate three regimes that exhibit different associations between recency and stock return. We find that for firms whose new patents use inputs in the mid‐range of the technological recency distribution, the relationship is positive; higher recency leads to higher stock return. However, for firms whose new patents make use of either nascent or very mature technological inputs, the effects are negative; higher recency leads to lower stock return. These findings indicate that it is not firms utilizing the most recent technological inputs that experience the highest returns to their inventive activity. Indeed, firms operating at the technological input frontier have market returns significantly below the mean. Rather, it is firms whose new patents utilize medial‐aged technological inputs (i.e., firms using inputs slightly behind the technology frontier) that tend to experience the highest returns. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Proof of nonparticipation in a price fixing conspiracy

When a group of firms colludes on price, the industry price will rise even when there are some firms that do not participate in the conspiracy. If the government or private parties file antitrust suits, the noncolluders face the problem of establishing their innocence since their prices rise along with those of the colluders. We propose a simple output test. Under various models of oligopoly pricing—Bertrand, Cournot, and Stackelberg—we show that the colluders restrict their output while the noncolluders take advantage of the higher price by expanding their outputs. Thus, distinguishing between colluders and noncolluders involves simply observing the output behavior of the industry members.The authors appreciate the support of the Public Policy Research Center at the University of Florida. We regret that B&R Associates is purely imaginary as is the industry.     

POST-CARTEL PRICING DURING LITIGATION

Standard methods in the U.S. for calculating antitrust damages in price-fixing cases are shown to create a strategic incentive for firms to price above the non-collusive price after the cartel has been dissolved. This results in an overestimate of the but for price and an underestimate of the level of damages. The extent of this upward bias in the but for price is greater, the longer the cartel was in place and the more concentrated the industry.     

Online RPM and MFN Under Antitrust Law and Economics

The legal framing of a firm’s pricing strategy can determine whether it constitutes online resale price maintenance (RPM) or online most favored nation (MFN). Together, cases that involve online RPM and MFN can be viewed as a natural experiment of how antitrust economics and law may adapt to an online world. Thus far, legal theories that have been inconsistent with economic theories have dictated enforcement across jurisdictions, which has led to confusion that thwarts potentially efficient business practices. This paper distinguishes issues of online RPM from traditional RPM and online RPM from online MFN. We apply the economics learning to RPM and analyze the antitrust cases of online RPM and MFN to date in the United States, Europe, and Australia. Finally, we offer policy recommendations that reduce the confusion in current legal doctrine.     

Price uncertainty and output concentration

This paper conducts an empirical investigation to assess the impact of price uncertainty on industry output concentration. Results show that greater price uncertainty leads to greater output concentration; the result is robust to controls for technological factors, barriers to entry effects and other industry controls. The empirical results are consistent with theory which shows that depending on firms attitudes towards risk, output concentration is likely to be endogenous to price uncertainty. Our empirical finding suggests that examining the magnitude of uncertainty could be a useful additional criteria in antitrust policymaking.     

Cheap talk? Strategy presentations as a form of chief executive officer impression management

Research summary: We develop and test a set of hypotheses on investors' reactions to a specific form of impression management, public presentations of overall strategy by Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). Contrary to expectations from a “cheap talk” perspective, we suggest that such strategy presentations convey valuable information to investors, especially in conditions of heightened information asymmetry associated with varying types of new CEOs. Broad empirical support for our theoretical arguments is shown in a sample of strategy presentations carried out by NYSE and NASDAQ listed organizations over 10 years. Our research contributes to literature on new CEOs and impression management. We draw out implications both for management and for further research. Managerial summary: We examine the impact of public presentations on company strategy by Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) on company stock prices. Adjusting for market movements in general, on average stock prices rose by 1.6 percent following these strategy presentations. Strategy presentations received larger reactions the more the CEO was unfamiliar to investors. Thus, stock price gains for new CEOs in general were 5.3 percent; for external, within‐industry new CEOs, they were 9.3 percent; and for external, outside‐of‐industry new CEOs, they were 12.4 percent. Given that only 40 percent of new CEOs present on strategy in their first 200 days post‐appointment, we suggest that new CEOs pay more attention to this potential means of communicating, especially if they are unfamiliar to investors. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.