Costs and benefits of unilateral euroization in central eastern Europe

Countries unable or unwilling to join a monetary union can replicate most membership effects unilaterally through either a currency board or the formal replacement of domestic currency by that of the Union. Potential benefits include lower transaction costs, lower interest rates, and lower exposure to speculative attacks. Costs include initial reserves, inadequate response to asymmetric shocks, loss of seigniorage, no lender of last resort. Expected costs and benefits have probably been exaggerated. Net effects depend primarily on the degree of monetary, real, and institutional convergence. Positive net advantages will accrue to countries that are either already converging, or wish to use a single currency to speed up convergence — especially if small. There is no legal or economic justification for EU aversion to unilateral euroization in accession candidate countries. JEL classification: F33, F36, E58, P33.     

The Economic Case for Monetary Union in the European Union

Differential requirements for seigniorage provide a weak case for retaining monetary independence. As regards adjustment to asymmetric shocks, nominal exchange rate flexibility is at best a limited blessing and at worst a limited curse. Absence of significant fiscal redistribution mechanisms among EU members is not an obstacle to monetary union. Neither is limited international labour mobility. Convergence of real economic performance is irrelevant for monetary union. A common currency is the logical implication of unrestricted capital mobility. The Maastricht criteria need not hinder monetary union provided the political will exists to adopt a flexible interpretation of the fiscal criteria.     

FLOATING WITH A LARGE LIFE JACKET: MONETARY AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES IN CROATIA UNDER DOLLARIZATION

Even after more than a decade of low inflation, Croatia remains highly dollarized. Commercial banks avoid currency mismatch by indexing loans to the exchange rate. Although this eliminates direct currency risk, it creates credit risk, because any larger depreciation might induce borrower defaults. Monetary and exchange rate policies focus on exchange rate smoothing to safeguard financial stability. Dollarization has prevented the use of monetary policy to stabilize output. Given Croatia's likely entry into the EU and adoption of the Euro, dedollarization seems unfeasible. Rather than attempting to reverse dollarization, the central bank has taken measures to make the banking system more robust to shocks. (JEL E52, E58, F31, G21, P24 )     

Institutional changes and shifting ideas: a constitutional analysis of the Euro

This paper uses the logical tools of Constitutional Economics to analyze the creation of the Euro, considering the entire process as the outcome of a conflict between different rules or, if you will, between different monetary systems, moving from the system of flexible exchange rates to a system of fixed exchange rates and ultimately to the single currency. The conflict between monetary systems has been acted out according to the single states’ collective preference functions, with both full employment and price stability figuring among the weights of said preference functions. The “solution” of the single currency was conceived when the body of information available to the policymakers was “simplified” by the new classical macro-economy taking a hegemonic role.     

Oil and the Euro area economy

We examine the macroeconomic effects of different types of oil shocks and the oil transmission mechanism in the Euro area. A comparison is made with the US and across individual member countries. First, we find that the underlying source of the oil price shift is crucial to determine the repercussions on the economy and the appropriate monetary policy reaction. Second, the transmission mechanism is considerably different compared to the US. In particular, inflationary effects in the US are mainly driven by a strong direct pass-through of rising energy prices and indirect effects of higher production costs. In contrast, Euro area inflation reacts sluggishly and is much more driven by second-round effects of increasing wages. The monetary policy reaction of the ECB to oil shocks is also strikingly different compared to the FED. The inflation objective, relative to the output stabilization objective, appears more important for Euro area monetary authorities than for the FED. Third, there are substantial asymmetries across member countries. These differences are due to different labour market dynamics which are further aggravated by a common monetary policy stance which does not fit all.
--- Gert Peersman and Ine Van Robays     

The Euro: An Italian perspective

The adoption of Euro as a common currency of twelve European countries has meant a considerable change in the Italian exchange rate policy. In the past, before Italy entered the EMS and again in 1992-96 when Italy temporarily left the EMS, the Italian monetary authorities enacted a policy of managed exchange rates, aiming at keeping the dollar rate stable, while letting the Italian lira depreciate vis-à-vis the German mark. By so doing, the danger of imported inflation was reduced (the dollar area was then a major import area) and at the same time the Italian exports to Europe were made easier. In the presence of a regime of fixed exchange rates in the European area, Italian industry is trying to make its exports more competitive by means of a reduction in costs. This means moving segments of production to small or middle-size firms, located in Italy as well as in developing countries. A further help is coming from the gradual but consistent depreciation of the Euro against the US dollar. The relevance of the dollar area in Italian exports has been correspondingly increasing.     

The euro for the Balkans?

This paper makes the case for full euroization of the Balkans. It argues that the full adoption of the new currency, including the use of euro notes and coins, would bring important benefits for the countries in south east Europe. The key benefit of euroization would be the opportunity it would provide to radically reform and open the financial system, thus changing the equilibrium of the domestic political economy (by eliminating political influence over credit allocation). It also argues that the loss of seigniorage would be minor, but that there is no reason why the rich EU should benefit from this. Compensation for the loss of seigniorage would be technically easy to implement. Finally, the paper presents a small model that demonstrates how a devaluation might actually impair the debt‐servicing capacity of the government. This implies that the exchange rate cannot easily absorb shocks to the interest rate to be paid on external debt, or to the availability of capital for emerging markets in general. A deterioration in the availability of external capital might thus trigger extremely large exchange rate adjustments, which in turn can disrupt the domestic financial system. This should be an important consideration for such a highly indebted region. JEL classification: F33, F32.     

Monetary Policy Rules for Managing Aid Surges in Africa

This paper examines the properties of alternative monetary policy rules in response to large aid surges in low-income countries characterized by incomplete capital market integration and currency substitution. Using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, it is shown that simple monetary rules that stabilize the path of expected future seigniorage for a given aid flow have attractive properties relative to a range of conventional alternatives, including those involving heavy reliance on bond sterilization or a commitment to a pure exchange rate float. These simple rules, which are shown to be robust across a range of fiscal responses to aid inflows, appear to be consistent with actual responses to recent aid surges in a range of post-stabilization countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.     

欧债危机成因与前景的制度分析

希腊等欧元区国家的主权债务危机可以说是欧洲区域一体化建设中的独特现象,其折射的是欧元区所存在的一个结构性问题：奉行单一货币政策和各国分散的财政政策,集中暴露出了欧洲货币一体化与欧洲福利资本主义的不相容、以及统一货币运行所要求的财政紧缩与欧元成员国经济增长和福利制度之间的矛盾与冲突;欧元不会就此瓦解,但欧债问题的最终解决困难重重;欧元的未来取决于自由与市场的回归欧洲,取决于欧盟的制度完善与欧式福利资本主义改革的成功与否。     

Psychological costs of currency transition: evidence from the euro adoption

This paper assesses the perceived individual psychological costs of adhering to the Euro. We use the difference-in-differences approach (DD), comparing individual levels of satisfaction with the economy in Slovakia immediately before and after the introduction of the Euro, with similar individuals in neighboring Czech Republic, which did not adopt the Euro. Both countries were economically and politically integrated for decades, and display similar macroeconomic behavior before and after the currency change in Slovakia. What we assess is not the actual, economic, costs stemming from the Euro adoption, but the change in utility as perceived by the individuals. There is evidence of substantial psychological costs associated with currency transition, especially for the old, the unemployed, the poorly educated and households with children. Our results are robust to the use of alternative control groups and to estimation procedures using the DD matching approach. The significant perceived costs uncovered in this paper suggest policy-makers should not ignore them when considering a sweeping economic change such as the adoption of a new currency.     

The New Member States and the Process towards EMU

The authors apply two complementary empirical criteria to eight new member states (NMSs) of the European Union to assess how ready they are to adopt the euro. As a first step, they recover demand and supply shocks and calculate the social losses implied by the two relevant exchange rate regimes: flexible rates and currency board. As a second step, the authors calculate the real exchange rates variability that these countries are currently experiencing and compare it to that of three Mediterranean countries during a similar period before they joined the EMU. The combination of the results of both tests shows that Estonia and Slovenia are the only countries that seem ready to adopt the euro within the shortest period of time foreseen by the Maastricht criteria; that is, after the two mandatory years in the ERM2. The rest of the countries will probably still need some exchange rate flexibility to absorb external shocks in the coming years.     

The Monetary Dimensions of Colonialism: Why did Imperial Powers Create Currency Blocks?

In the last few years, northern policymakers are increasingly interested in creating regional currency blocs which link their respective monetary systems more closely to those of nearby poorer 'southern' countries. To what extent does this new interest signal a kind of monetary 'neo-colonialism'? As a starting point for answering this question, I examine the motives that drove imperial powers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to launch monetary reforms in their colonies which created giant currency blocs centred around each of their respective home currencies. I argue that colonial monetary reforms were driven by diversity of goals that related to: (1) international transaction costs; (2) domestic transaction costs within the colonies; (3) macroeconomic influence; (4) seigniorage; and (5) political identities. I conclude that there are similarities - although they should not be overstated - between some of these motivations and those driving the new interest in giant currency blocs today.     

Bi‐currency versus Single‐currency Targeting: Lessons from the Russian Experience

This paper examines how the 2005 shift in Russian exchange rate policy from US dollar (USD) single‐currency to USD–EUR (euro) bi‐currency targeting has impacted domestic interest rates. The finding show that this policy shift has disconnected Russian interest rates from US dollar‐denominated interest rates, while instead linking them to a synthetic interest rate composed of USD and EUR rates at the same proportion as that of these two currencies in the currency basket against which the ruble's exchange rate is set. The Russian experience shows that while the adoption of bi‐currency targeting may help ensure that domestic interest rates are less dependent on the monetary cycle of a single country, these rates are instead likely to reflect financial developments in all countries whose currencies are included in the currency basket. This insight is likely to be relevant for other countries that pursue basket‐targeting policies.     

Monetary integration strategies and perspectives of new EU countries

The poor record of economic convergence between the euro area and those countries that joined the European Union (EU) in May 2004 raises serious doubts about the possibility for the latter countries to adopt the European single currency in the not too distant future. In fact, many new EU countries would have to make considerable efforts in order to fulfil all EMU criteria by the end of the present decade. These efforts could lead to output and growth losses in these countries, which would run counter to their catching‐up process with respect to the rest of the EU. To avoid a number of shortcomings elicited by the obligation to respect the convergence criteria in the short term, and also to avoid the financial instability risks implied by participation in the ERM II, this paper suggests an alternative plan for integrating the new EU countries monetarily. The plan consists in creating a European settlement agent in charge of the final payment of the new EU countries’ international transactions. These transactions would be settled using an international monetary standard whose creation would eliminate instability on the foreign exchange market by its being the yardstick that the current international monetary system lacks.     

Monetary union in Latin America: an assessment in the context of optimum currency area

The article applies the optimum currency area (OCA) theory to Latin America to assess the potential of a monetary union in Latin America and in its major existing regional trade agreements (RTAs). According to OCA criteria we find that Latin America is far from being an optimum currency area, as its countries’ exposure to asymmetric shocks is high and their capacities to adjust in response to macroeconomic disturbances are limited. Using a panel of 20 Latin American countries from 1990 to 2014, we apply the dynamic OLS estimation techniques to estimate the costs and benefits of a potential monetary union in Latin America and in its various RTAs. to estimate the costs and benefits of a potential monetary union in Latin America and in its various RTAs. We find that the costs are high, because Latin America’s economies are vulnerable to severe macroeconomic disturbances and its RTAs differ significantly in their response to negative demand shocks. Most of the monetary efficiency gains are shown to be the result of a common restrictive monetary policy which would result in higher FDI inflows and, to a more limited extent, increased GDP, both overall and per capita. Although Central American countries are shown to be most suitable for further monetary integration, we conclude that Latin American countries should head first towards greater economic and political integration.     

Assessing independent monetary policy in small, open and euroized countries: evidence from Western Balkan

This article approaches to the optimum currency area from the empirical side by investigating the costs of adoption of a single currency for small, open and euroized Western Balkan countries (WBC). Using several econometric techniques, this study attempts to answer three questions relevant for monetary integration of the WBC and similar transition countries: What are the constraints on an independent monetary policy? What is the need for operating an independent monetary policy? and What is the ability to conduct an independent monetary policy? The constraints on independent monetary policy in most of the WBC at this stage are relatively serious because of high levels of openness and euroization. They limit the ability of the central bank, which is oriented to price stability, to use the nominal exchange rate for achieving other goals (for example, output stabilization). Regarding the second question, the results from structural VAR framework suggest a low synchronization for supply and demand shocks between the WBC and the euro area, indicating potentially high costs of losing independent monetary policy. Furthermore, the results from Kalman filter technique inform that the shock convergence process is slow or absent in the WBC vis-à-vis the euro area. Regarding the last question, the results from cointegration and VAR analysis suggest that the ability to conduct an independent monetary policy, assessed by analyzing the interest rate channel as the most prominent transmission channel in the euro area, is relatively weak in the WBC.     

Business Cycle Synchronization in EU: A Time‐Varying Approach

This article investigates the time‐varying correlation between the EU12‐wide business cycle and the initial EU12 member‐countries based on Scalar‐BEKK and multivariate Riskmetrics model frameworks for the period 1980–2012. The paper provides evidence that changes in the business cycle synchronization correspond to major economic events that have taken place at a European level. In the main, business cycle synchronization until 2007 had moved in a direction positive for the operation of a single currency, suggesting that the common monetary policy was less costly in terms of lost flexibility at the national level. However, as a result of the Great Recession of 2007 and the subsequent Eurozone Crisis, a number of periphery countries, most notably Greece, have experienced desynchronization of their business cycles with the EU12‐wide cycle. Nevertheless, for most countries, any questions regarding the optimality and sustainability of the common currency area in Europe should not be attributed to a lack of cyclical synchronization.     

Downward nominal wage rigidity in Europe: an analysis of European micro data from the ECHP 1994–2001

This paper substantially extends the available evidence on downward nominal wage rigidity in the European Union (EU) and the Euro Area. We develop an econometric multi-country model based on Kahn’s (Am Econ Rev 87(5):993–1008, 1997) histogram-location approach and apply it to employee micro data from the European Community Household Panel for 12 of the EU’s member states. Our estimates for the degree of downward nominal wage rigidity on the national as well as the EU-wide level point to substantial downward nominal wage rigidity within the EU. A detailed comparison with other cross-national studies reveals an emerging consensus about which countries can be characterized as high or low rigidity countries, although the status of some countries remains unclear. The variation in national degrees of downward nominal wage rigidity cannot convincingly be explained by institutional variables.      

Exchange Rate Movements and Unemployment in the EU Accession Countries—A Panel Analysis

According to the traditional “optimum currency area” approach, not much will be lost from a very hard peg to a currency union if there has been little reason for variations in the exchange rate. This paper takes a different approach, and highlights the fact that high exchange rate volatility may as well signal high costs for labor markets. The impact of exchange rate volatility on labor markets in the CEECs is put to the test, finding that volatility vis‐à‐vis the euro significantly increases unemployment. Hence, the elimination of exchange rate volatility could be considered as a substitute for a removal of employment protection legislation. However, labor market reform could be argued to be an equally worthy strategy, backed up by central bank independence and the adoption of an anti‐inflation monetary policy rule.     

European economic integration and (a)symmetry of macroeconomic fluctuations

This paper empirically investigates output and consumption asymmetries in the Eurozone and enlarged EU over the period 1992–2007, and their consequences for monetary policy. Our results reveal that in the Eurozone output asymmetry has remained practically unaltered; however, there is some indication of greater consumption smoothing. The UK, Denmark and Sweden are no less asymmetric than the average Eurozone member state and could probably enter the EMU without significant macroeconomic costs. New EU member states are diverse but display higher output and, in particular, consumption asymmetries. This warrants some caution against too quick expansion of the EMU.