Trust and reciprocity: extensions and robustness of triadic design

Our paper reconsiders the triadic design proposed by Cox (Games and Economic Behavior 46:260–281, 2004) to identify trust and reciprocity in investment games. Specifically, we extend the design in two directions. First, we collect information on investors’ choices by using both the direct-response (as does Cox) and strategy methods. Using the latter, we are able to condition reciprocity on initial inequality, which is endogenous when investigating reciprocity. We demonstrate that the triadic design provides evidence for reciprocity once that initial inequality is considered. Second, we elicit expectations and test their coherence with the triadic outcomes. By examining the relationship between trust actions and expected gains, we analyze whether investors’ expectations are consistent with their behavior. Finally, we test for the existence of an emotional bias, i.e., whether expectation mismatches induce trustees to change actual choices from the planned ones.     

Perceived trade-off between education and sports career: evidence from professional football

To explore the attitudes towards risky career choices of young people in highly competitive environments, we surveyed almost 1000 football players in the youth academies of German professional clubs (Bundesliga), who must generally decide early in their careers whether or not to risk quitting school to focus solely on a professional football career. Based on the survey responses, we empirically analysed which factors influence these youths’ tendencies to choose a high-risk career option over a lower risk one. Our results seem to indicate that such risk taking in competitive environments can be explained by potential benefits expected from this decision, as well as judgments about the likelihood of achieving the desired career. Risk attitudes towards career choices vary by differences in individuals’ estimates of the potential benefits and in particular, in their own assessments of the likelihood of success, which is an important driver of risk acceptance. We also found that opportunity cost considerations influence risk acceptance: the better the low-risk option, the less willing the individual to give it up for a high-risk alternative. In addition, both national origin and level of cultural integration play a role in attitudes towards risky career choices, with reductions in the latter increasing the risk premium of quitting school.     

Expected utility theory and prospect theory: one wedding and a decent funeral

Choice behavior is typically evaluated by assuming that the data is generated by one latent decision-making process or another. What if there are two (or more) latent decision-making processes generating the observed choices? Some choices might then be better characterized as being generated by one process, and other choices by the other process. A finite mixture model can be used to estimate the parameters of each decision process while simultaneously estimating the probability that each process applies to the sample. We consider the canonical case of lottery choices in a laboratory experiment and assume that the data is generated by expected utility theory and prospect theory decision rules. We jointly estimate the parameters of each theory as well as the fraction of choices characterized by each. The methodology provides the wedding invitation, and the data consummates the ceremony followed by a decent funeral for the representative agent model that assumes only one type of decision process. The evidence suggests support for each theory, and goes further to identify under what demographic domains one can expect to see one theory perform better than the other. We therefore propose a reconciliation of the debate over two of the dominant theories of choice under risk, at least for the tasks and samples we consider. The methodology is broadly applicable to a range of debates over competing theories generated by experimental and non-experimental data.     

Are choice experiments reliable? Evidence from the lab

This study investigates whether a popular stated preference method, the choice experiment (CE), reliably measures individuals’ values for a good. We address this question using an induced value experiment. Our results indicate that CEs fail to elicit payoff maximizing choices. We find little evidence that increasing the salience of the choices or adding monetary incentives increase the proportion of payoff maximizing choices. This questions the increasing use of CE to value non-market goods for policy making.     

Admission standards,student effort,and the creation of skilled jobs

We consider the implications of expanding enrollment through lower standards in a model with human capital externalities and a market failure. Workers and firms make uncoordinated investment choices prior to random matching. Investment choices depend on the expected productivity of the counterpart in production. The setting generates a potential human capital externality as a more skilled labor force induces more skilled job openings. Exploiting the externality is complicated by a market failure which may cause some workers to earn a degree but not put forth the effort required to become highly skilled. We show that beyond a threshold, increased enrollment through low standards can be poor policy. Policies which increase returns to agents and firms in best matches can improve outcomes.     

A model of boundedly rational “neuro” agents

We consider a model in which each agent in a population chooses one of two options. Each agent does not know what the available options are and can choose an option only after observing another agent who has already chosen that option. In addition, the agents’ preferences over the two options are correlated. An agent can either imitate an observed agent or wait until he meets two agents who made different choices, in which case he can compare their choices and choose accordingly. A novel feature of the model is that agents observe not only the choices made by others, but also some information about the process that led them to those choices. We study two cases: In the first, an agent notes whether the observed agent imitated others or whether he actually compared the available alternatives. In the second, an agent notes whether the observed agent’s decision was hasty or not. It is shown that in equilibrium the probability of making a mistake is higher in the second case and that the existence of these nonstandard “neuro” observations systematically biases the equilibrium distribution of choices.     

Technology roadmapping in review: A tool for making sustainable new product development decisions

Typically, firms decide whether or not to develop a new product based on their resources, capabilities and the return on investment that the product is estimated to generate. We propose that firms adopt a broader heuristic for making new product development choices. Our heuristic approach requires moving beyond traditional finance-based thinking, and suggests that firms concentrate on technological trajectories by combining technology roadmapping, information technology (IT) and supply chain management to make more sustainable new product development decisions. Using the proposed holistic heuristic methods, versus relying on traditional finance-based decision-making tools (e.g., emphasizing net present value or internal rate of return projections), enables firms to plan beyond the short-term and immediate set of technologies at hand. Our proposed heuristic approach enables firms to forecast technologies and markets, and hence, new product priorities in the longer term. Investments in new products should, as a result, generate returns over a longer period than traditionally expected, giving firms more sustainable investments. New products are costly and need to have a durable presence in the market. Transaction costs and resources will be saved, as firms make new product development decisions less frequently.     

Trade mechanism selection in markets with frictions

We endogenize the trade mechanism in a search economy with many homogeneous sellers and many heterogeneous buyers of unobservable type. We study how heterogeneity and the traders' continuation values—which are endogenous—influence the sellers' choice of trade mechanism. Sellers trade off the probability of an immediate sale against the surplus expected from it, choosing whether to trade with everyone and how quickly. In equilibrium sellers may simply target one buyer type via non-negotiable offers (price posting), or may price discriminate (haggling). We also study when haggling generates trading delays. A price setting externality arises because of a strategic complementarity in the sellers' pricing choices.     

Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?—An experimental analysis

We experimentally investigate whether individuals can reliably detect cooperators (the nice(r) people) in an anonymous decision environment involving “connected games.” Participants can condition their choices in an asymmetric prisoners’ dilemma and a trust game on past individual (their partner’s donation share to a self-selected charity) and social (whether their partner belongs to a group with high or low average donations) information. Thus, the two measures of niceness are the individual donation share in the donation task, and the cooperativeness of one’s choice in the two games. We find that high donors achieve a higher-than-average expected payoff by cooperating predominantly with other high donors. Group affiliation proved to be irrelevant. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C91, C72, D3     

Does FDI in manufacturing cause FDI in business services? Evidence from French firm‐level data

Abstract .  This paper uses a large French firm-level data set to evaluate the determinants of location choices in services. In a first step, estimates for four broad services sectors are compared with the estimates for the manufacturing sector. Using a discrete choice model, we find that this framework does fairly well in explaining location choices in services and that the parameter estimates for services are close to the ones for manufacturing. We then investigate whether the similarity in estimated parameters is due to a complementarity between location choices in manufacturing and in services, in the sense that manufacturing location choices may cause the location of services. A particularly appropriate services sector, for this purpose is the business services sector, for which input-output linkages with the manufacturing sector are particularly strong. It is found that the downstream demand of French manufacturing firms has a positive effect on the location choice probabilities of French business services firms. This effect is robust.     

The impact of inheritances on the retirement behavior of older Europeans

The aim of this paper is to study how wealth affects retirement behavior. I use data from the 2004–2012 Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, covering 10 European countries. Inheritances are used as an exogenous change in wealth to estimate the causal effect of wealth/inheritance receipt on retirement. I apply binary choice models for a sample of persons working in 2004/05 to estimate the effect of inheritance receipt during 2005–2011 on the probability of retirement in 2011/12. By comparing data on expected retirement age at the beginning of the sample period with actual retirement age I am able to control for unobserved factors that might be correlated with wealth and affect retirement decisions. The main findings are: (1) Inheritance receipt is quite common for individuals nearing retirement age (50+). About 20 % of the sample aged 50 and older in 2011/12 live in households that received at least one inheritance between 2005 and 2011. (2) Inheritance receipt significantly increases the probability of retirement and the effect increases with the size of the inheritance. (3) In contrast to what life-cycle theory suggests I do not find any evidence that expected and unexpected inheritances affect adjustments of planned retirement age differently. These results are important for assessing the effect of policies that induce changes in wealth, such as pension reforms, tax reforms or reforms of Social Security, on retirement behavior.     

Optimal Taxation of Bequests in a Model with Initial Wealth*

We formulate an optimal‐taxation model where parents leave bequests to their descendants for altruistic reasons. In contrast to the standard model, individuals differ not only in earning abilities, but also in initial (inherited) wealth. In this model, a redistributive motive for an inheritance tax – which is equivalent to a uniform tax on all expenditures – arises, given that initial wealth increases with earning abilities. The introduction of the inheritance tax either increases intertemporal social welfare or has an ambiguous effect, depending on whether the external effect related to altruism is accounted for in the social objective.     

Simultaneous versus sequential all-pay auctions: an experimental study

While both simultaneous and sequential contests are mechanisms used in practice such as crowdsourcing, job interviews and sports contests, few studies have directly compared their performance. By modeling contests as incomplete information all-pay auctions with linear costs, we analytically and experimentally show that the expected maximum effort is higher in simultaneous contests, in which contestants choose their effort levels independently and simultaneously, than in sequential contests, in which late entrants make their effort choices after observing all prior participants’ choices. Our experimental results also show that efficiency is higher in simultaneous contests than in sequential ones. Sequential contests’ efficiency drops significantly as the number of contestants increases. We also discover that when participants’ ability follows a power distribution, high ability players facing multiple opponents in simultaneous contests tend to under-exert effort, compared to theoretical predictions. We explain this observation using a simple model of overconfidence.     

Hypothetical Bias Reconsidered: Payment and Provision Uncertainties in a Threshold Provision Mechanism

We extend research on the consequentiality of stated preference choices to a threshold provision mechanism for public goods. We develop a simple theoretical model of option price to analyze how option price varies with payment and provision uncertainty. We explore whether threshold provision contributions are similarly influenced by payment and provision uncertainty using an induced value contribution experiment. Results suggest that: (1) the probability of payment has a negative effect on contributions; (2) the probability of provision has a positive effect on contributions. We offer subjective beliefs regarding payment and provision as a plausible systematic explanation for hypothetical bias.     

Strategic sophistication of individuals and teams. Experimental evidence

Many important decisions require strategic sophistication. We examine experimentally whether teams act more strategically than individuals. We let individuals and teams make choices in simple games, and also elicit first- and second-order beliefs. We find that teams play the Nash equilibrium strategy significantly more often, and their choices are more often a best response to stated first order beliefs. Distributional preferences make equilibrium play less likely. Using a mixture model, the estimated probability to play strategically is 62% for teams, but only 40% for individuals. A model of noisy introspection reveals that teams differ from individuals in higher order beliefs.     

Purely procedural preferences - Beyond procedural equity and reciprocity

We conduct experiments in which parties face a pair of two-player pie-splitting procedures. Parties submit their strategy in each, their beliefs about their opponent's choices, and are also asked whether they prefer one procedure over the other. The procedures – a yes-no game, an ultimatum game, and a dictator game – are designed such that by all existing economic preference models, whether distributive or procedural, parties should be indifferent between them. In particular, the procedures should yield the same outcomes, the same expected outcomes and carry the same information on parties' intentions. At the same time, the procedures differ in the way they distribute decision and information rights across players, and also in their complexity and efficiency. Experimentally, parties do indeed still reveal preferences over the procedures at hand. To explore why this happens, we elicit individuals' simplicity and efficiency ratings of the procedures, and also the degree by which individuals invoke the equality of basic rights and liberties in their moral judgement – an ethical criterion not yet captured by any preference model. The preferences we find link to this data. We explore formalizations for such preferences.     

Deterrence and knowledge of the law: The case of drunk driving

While it is necessary that researchers make choices in order to estimate inequality, the reasons for the measurement choices and their impact on inequality estimates have not been widely assessed. This paper uses Canadian data from the 1980s to analyse whether inequality estimates are sensitive to common measurement choices. Seemingly minor technical choices about the treatment of outlying observations, such as the use of top-income coded data, exclusion of very high and low observations, and differences among data sets in the capture of very high observations affect estimates of inequality. Further, the impact of the treatment of outlying observations on inequality estimates are at least as large as the impact of measurement choices of a conceptual nature, such as the income definition and population selection. The sensitivity of inequality estimates to measurement choices, which often remain invisible, affect inferences about the relative degree of inequality at a given point in time among countries and changes over time.     

Taxation of firms with unknown mobility

We analyze optimal business tax policy when some firms are able to escape taxation by moving abroad. In contrast to the existing literature, we assume that the true number of mobile firms is ex ante unknown. While the government may learn from the firms' location responses to past tax rate changes, firms may anticipate this and adjust their choices accordingly. We find that incomplete information on mobility substantially affects the properties and the implications of equilibrium policy choices. First, the government may find it optimal to set a tax rate that triggers partial firm migration but full revelation of the true number of mobile firms. Second, we show that, if the firms' outside option is attractive (i.e., relocation cost and foreign tax rates are low), expected tax rates and expected firm migration are higher if the degree of mobility is unknown. Third, there is a positive value of learning, i.e., commitment on future tax rates cannot increase the government's expected revenue. However, if the government can commit to a rule‐based learning mechanism, i.e., credibly tie its future tax policy to present policy outcomes, it may obtain a Pareto improvement.     

Correlated Nash equilibrium

We modify the epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium only to accommodate Gilboa and Schmeidler's [I. Gilboa, D. Schmeidler, Maxmin expected utility with nonunique prior, J. Math. Econ. 18 (1989) 141-153] maxmin expected utility preferences, and identify the equilibrium concept in n-player strategic games that characterizes the modified epistemic conditions. The epistemic characterization supports the equilibrium concept as a minimal generalization of Nash equilibrium, in the sense that it deviates from Nash equilibrium only in terms of players' attitude towards ambiguity. Consequently, comparing it with Nash equilibrium constitutes a ceteris paribus study of the effects of ambiguity on how a game is played. For example, with ambiguity, (beliefs about) action choices are in general correlated.