The long run performance of UK firms making multiple rights issues

This study examines the long run performance of firms offering multiple rights issues in the UK and differentiates between one-time and multiple issuers. By analysing a sample of 1146 rights issues offered by 788 London Stock Exchange listed industrial companies between 1988 and 2008, this study reports that firms making multiple rights issues do not experience significant long run underperformance following the third or subsequent issues. However, the one-time rights issuers do experience underperformance during the sample period. The findings of this study thus imply that those firms which are making multiple rights issues are of better quality and investors could avoid loses by investing in firms which had made more than one rights issue in the past. The results also suggest that researchers which are intending to examine the long run post-event performance of firms should control the incidence of similar events that had happened in previous years.     

Long-horizon abnormal performance following rights issues and placings: Additional evidence from the U.K. market

We revisit the long-horizon abnormal performance of U.K. firms following rights issues and placings over the period 1989-1997. We make the following contributions relative to prior research. First, we use, as far as we are aware, a more comprehensive data set of rights issues and placings than hitherto studied for the U.K. market. We thus exploit the fact that issuing new equity predominantly through rights issues is a feature of the U.K. equity market that differs from the U.S. and other markets, where public offers dominate seasoned equity issues. Second, we study both the pre- and post-offer long-horizon performance, complementing previous research that focuses only on announcement-day wealth effects. Third, we apply various metrics and revisit the evidence of long-horizon post-offer underperformance reported in previous research. We find, however, little evidence of long-horizon post-offer underperformance for U.K. firms following issues of equity through rights issues or by placings.     

The Importance of the Sequence in UK Rights Issues

Abstract:  This study examines the market reaction to UK rights issues announcements and also investigates the position of these issues in the sequence in which the firms make multiple rights issues. The sample consists of 569 rights issues made by 243 industrial and financial firms over the period 1988–1998. The results suggest that the UK market responds negatively to earlier issues in the sequence made by multiple rights issuers. This negative reaction diminishes and becomes insignificant at or after the third issue. In addition, the study shows that the favourable response to later rights issues in the sequence is due to the diminishment in the level of information asymmetry around such issues.     

Seasoned equity offerings and the short- and long-run performance of initial public offerings in the UK

In contrast to the US practice, rights issues is the predominant method of raising additional equity capital in the London market. the UK evidence for the period 1980-1991 provides no support to the hypothesis that IPO firms deliberately underprice to signal their quality and facilitate subsequent seasoned equity offerings. the level of initial returns is related neither to the size of the issue nor to the price response at the announcement of a rights issue. the results demonstrate, however, that firms with higher first day returns are quicker in returning to the market for additional equity capital. There is also strong evidence to suggest that the announcement of a seasoned equity offering follows a period of significant rises in the stock prices of reissuing firms. Such gains are, however, dissipated quickly in the 18 months after the announcement of the seasoned equity offering. the level of underperformance is particularly pronounced for firms that raised relatively small subsequent amounts of capital in relation to funds raised at the initial offering. Thus, the paper documents a pattern of post-issue behaviour which is fundamentally similar for both unseasoned and seasoned equity offerings.     

Rights Offerings and Expropriation by Controlling Shareholders

We investigate rights issues and open offers in Hong Kong. We observe that the greater the severity of firms’ management‐agency problems, the more unfavourably shareholders tend to react, leading to more negative cumulative abnormal returns or rights forfeiture. Controlling shareholders do not forfeit rights, and may increase their percentage ownership at deep price discounts by underwriting rights offerings. Our results suggest that, although certain rights offerings can be described as value‐enhancing, many other rights offerings closely resemble the expropriation activities of controlling shareholders.     

Shareholder wealth effects of rights issues: Evidence from the New Zealand capital market

This study examines security price reaction to the announcement of rights issues by New Zealand firms between 1976 and 1994. Over this period, price reaction to rights issue announcements in New Zealand was significantly negative. The price reaction to the announcement was more negative for underwritten compared to non-underwritten rights issues. The evidence suggests non-underwritten rights issues have higher expected participation in the issue by existing shareholders. The results are broadly consistent with the adverse selection cost arguments of Eckbo and Masulis [Eckbo, B.E., Masulis, R.W., 1992. Adverse selection and the rights offer paradox. Journal of Financial Economics 32, 293–332] and help further explain the rights offer paradox whereby firms in a small capital market, like New Zealand, continue to rely on rights issues to raise new equity. Price reaction to the rights issue announcement was also more negative the larger the relative issue size. This result supports both the adverse selection cost and information asymmetry arguments of Krasker [Krasker, W.S., 1986. Stock price movements in response to stock issues under asymmetric information. Journal of Finance 41, 93–105] and the signaling framework hypothesis of Miller and Rock [Miller, M.H., Rock, K., 1985. Dividend policy under asymmetric information, Journal of Finance 40, 1031–1051].     

Initial Public Offerings on the Unlisted Securities Market: The Impact of Professional Advisers

This paper tests two hypotheses developed in the context of information asymmetry between companies making initial public offerings (IPO) on the Unlisted Securities Market and potential investors. It is argued that the status of the sponsor and audit firm are interpreted by potential investors as signals of an IPO's quality. The results indicate that for IPOs made during 1986–87 the level of discount and the status of the associated auditing firm are significantly related. Higher quality auditing firms are associated with lower levels of discount. A similar relationship for IPOs made during the period 1988–89 is not detected. The paper suggests that there were significant changes in the IPO market between these two periods. No relationship in either period is detected between the level of discount and the status of the sponsor.     

Corporate Mergers and Shareholder Wealth Effects: 1977-1986

The paper investigates the distribution of returns to shareholders of UK companies involved in acquisitions during the period 1977-1986. Three control models were used in the analysis: the market model with parameters identified through OLS regression, a model based on adjusted betas, and finally an index-relative model. Abnormal returns were identified around both bid announcement and outcome dates for bidders and targets in completed and abandoned bids. Examination was also made of the distribution of wealth changes for bidders and targets separately and for both in combination. The results demonstrate that, although there is no net wealth decrease to shareholders in total as a result of takeover activity, shareholders of bidder firms do suffer wealth decreases. By contrast, shareholders in target firms obtained significant, positive wealth increases in both completed and abandoned bids.     

Does market misvaluation help explain share market long‐run underperformance following a seasoned equity issue?

We examine the relation between pre‐seasoned equity offering (SEO) announcement date misvaluation and long‐run post‐SEO performance for a large sample of Australian SEOs made between 1993 and 2001. Our study is motivated by inconsistent findings across countries with respect to the SEO long‐run underperformance anomaly first documented in the USA, inconclusive findings with respect to the hypothesis that managers exploit market misvaluation when timing equity issues, and a recent Australian Stock Exchange proposal to loosen SEO regulation. We find SEO firms underperform common share market benchmarks for up to 5 years after the announcement. Using a residual income valuation method, we show that this underperformance is related to pre‐announcement date misvaluation. An unexpected result is that underperformance and misvaluation are more severe for private placements than rights issues. Institutional factors unique to the Australian setting, particularly the large number of smaller loss‐making firms among private placement issuers, appear to explain the poorer performance of placement firms. Our results are robust to various measurement methods and assumptions, and demonstrate the importance of researching SEO performance in alternative institutional settings.     

Price reaction to rights issues in the Indian capital market

This study examines securities price reaction to announcements of rights issues by listed Indian firms during the period 1997–2005. We document a positive but statistically insignificant price reaction to such announcements. The price reaction is significantly more negative for firms with a family group affiliation compared to firms with no family group affiliation. The notable differential price reaction between firms with and without a family group affiliation can be explained by the “tunneling hypothesis.” For firms affiliated with a family group, we surmise that investors perceive that the proceeds of the rights issue may be misused for the benefit of the controlling shareholder. We also find that higher levels of individual shareholding in the firm are associated with a more positive price reaction to the announcement.     

Property Investment and Property Development Firm Performance Around Initial Public Offerings and Rights Offerings: U.K. Evidence

In contrast to the well-documented underperformance of equity issuers, property investment firms undertaking initial public offerings and rights issues have performed indistinguishably from similar nonissuing firms. Property development companies that issued equity over the same period performed significantly worse than nonissuing firms. The major difference between property development and property investment firms is that property investment firms hold portfolios of real estate assets and thus have more certain prices. The lower pricing uncertainty of property investment firms results in normal long-run performance. Tests of the cognitive bias hypothesis provide only weak support of this explanation, while size and book-market effects are unable to account for the performance of property investment and development companies. The findings of underperformance for rights issues suggest that timing equity issues to take advantage of new shareholders may not be linked to the existence of cognitive bias. An important finding for the international growth in securitized real estate markets is that no evidence is found suggesting equity issues of securitized real estate firms should be avoided.     

Who benefits from bond tender offers in Europe?

This paper investigates the wealth effects of European cash tender offers for bonds during the period from 1996 to 2005. European bond offers are made to refinance (35% of cases), to reduce debt (40%) or triggered by an ownership change (25%). We investigate the wealth effects to both bondholders and shareholders. Cash tender offers for bonds turn out to be value creating for firms; with bondholders taking most of the gains on a relative basis. We find no evidence of wealth transfers from shareholders to bondholders: bondholders are paid an average tender premium of 3.9% but shareholders do not experience a significant wealth loss. Shareholders even benefit from making refinancing bond tender offers after a drop in interest rates. The wealth effects to both bondholders and shareholders increase in the remaining time to maturity. This suggests that tendering the bonds, rather than waiting for them to mature, is a win-win situation for both types of security holders.     

What do equity issuances signal? A study of equity issuances in the UK before and during the financial crisis

The financial crisis provides an ideal setting to study how quality signalling by firms, and information asymmetries, might explain the stock price reactions around seasoned equity offerings. The heightened information asymmetry levels during the GFC should have increased the importance of issuance quality and information asymmetries in explaining announcement returns. However, we document new and, in some cases, surprising findings, using a sample of 700 UK seasoned equity offerings between 2003 and 2012: (1) Contrary to expectations, announcement returns during the crisis were driven less by signalling and asymmetric information effects and more by macroeconomic conditions and general uncertainty. (2) In constrained capital markets, firms that were able to move more quickly to raise significant amounts of capital, made the capital-raising environment more challenging for firms that followed, such that the latter had to incur additional costs. (3) Contrary to the traditional view that the low book-to-market ratios may proxy for overvaluation and thus lower announcement returns, we found a negative relationship during the crisis period. The latter is consistent with the view that book-to-market ratios may also proxy for a distressed firm effect which may have dominated the conventional ‘market timing’ effect during the GFC. (4) Announcement returns were strongly positive for many firms at the peak of the crisis, possibly because the market was relieved to see that equity issues might potentially save firms from insolvency; an equity issuance could, in such circumstances, be a positive signal, even though equity issues are conventionally seen as negative signals. Overall, our paper documents fresh and surprising results about equity capital-raising during the GFC, and also offers insights for corporate finance that are of interest beyond the current crisis.     

Excess control,agency costs and the probability of going private in France

The current study investigates the determinants of going private (GP) in France. It contrasts a sample of 161 firms that went private between 1997 and 2009 with a propensity-score-matched sample of firms that remained public during the same period. The results indicate that, unlike for firms that remain public, the largest controlling shareholders (LCSs) of GP firms control their firms using an incommensurately small fraction of ultimate cash flow rights. This is consistent with the view that agency problems between large and minority shareholders make public firms less attractive to investors, which reduces the benefits of staying public and encourages the LCSs to take their firms private or accept takeover offers. Additional results show that GP firms have more undervalued stock prices and higher free cash flows than non-GP firms. Expected interest tax shields, low growth opportunities, and pre-GP takeover interest do not seem to affect the probability of GP.     

Are Dividends Disappearing or Shrinking? Evidence from the Istanbul Stock Exchange

This paper examines the dividend payment decision of publicly owned firms listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) from 1991 through 2006. There is a decline in the percentage of net dividend payers, accompanied by a decline in the aggregate level of net real dividends paid. Contrary to the situation in developed markets, earnings and dividends concentration have declined over the sample period. The first mandatory dividend payment regulation pushed some firms to collect the distributed dividends back through rights issues and this resulted in low net dividend payments. One of the striking findings of this paper reveals that a majority of ISE firms prefer dividend omissions rather than dividend reductions. Once a firm keeps paying dividends, it puts much effort into increasing dividend payments rather than reducing them. Further, dividend payment and reduction decisions are affected by the current earnings of the firm and financial crisis significantly explains both the dividend payment and dividend reduction decisions.     

Internal Funds Allocation and the Ownership Structure: Evidence from Korean Business Groups

We examine the relationship between the controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights and the funds transfer in the internal capital market within Korean business groups (chaebols) during the period from 1998 to 2001. We find that the funds allocation in the firms where controlling shareholders have high cash flow rights is better aligned with the investment opportunities and therefore, more efficient than in the firms where they have low cash flow rights. This effect is stronger when they have controlling powers large enough to expropriate minority shareholders. However, during the financial crisis period, funds simply move toward the firms where controlling shareholders have high cash flow rights. The results evidence the tunneling behavior in the internal capital market within a chaebol that the ownership structure distorts the allocation of internal funds in such a way as to benefit the controlling shareholders.JEL Classification: G31, G30     

Investors’ perception of corporate governance: a spillover effect of Taiwan corporate scandals

The discovery of a series of corporate scandals in Taiwan between 16 June and 15 September 2004 offers a unique opportunity to investigate the perceptions of investors on the value of corporate governance, whilst avoiding any interactions with other exogenous factors such as the lower expected returns on all firms’ investment opportunities during the East Asian or Global financial crises. The main line of reasoning in this study is that at times when news of scandals flows into the market, the perceptions of certain type of investors will lead to a change in their trading habits for non-scandal portfolios. With a comprehensive analysis of order and trade data for all investors identified by investor code, it is found that a substantial proportion of investors ceased trading altogether during the scandal period. This response was particularly discernible among small and medium individuals, despite the fact that the firms in these portfolios were not associated with the scandals. We further examine the ordering behavior of those investors who still traded in the market. It shows that small individual investors began to enter the market more passively, regardless of whether the firms’ ownership structure. And they consistently underperformed in both ownership-structure portfolios. However, foreign institutions and large individuals place more aggressive orders for stocks in firms with strong cash-flow rights leverage and perform particularly well in those portfolios.