加强农村“三资”管理的思考

农村集体资金、资产、资源（以下简称“三资”），涉及农民群众的根本利益，是发展农村集体经济的重要基础。近年来，随着农村集体经济的发展壮大，集体经济收入、资产总量不断增加，集体资产管理问题已成为农村群众关心的热点问题和社会各界关注的焦点问题。本文就当前农村三资管理存在的问题进行了思考，以此促进农村经济健康发展，维护农村社会稳定。     

农村社区经济合同如何管理

农村社区经济合同作为反映集体资产、资源经营状况的协议文本,是社区的重要档案资料之一,在明确村集体与承包者权利义务、保障集体和群众合法权益等方面发挥着重要作用.随着市场经济的发展,农村社区集体经济规模不断壮大,越来越多的经济活动通过经济合同的形式进行.建立健全农村集体经济组织合同档案管理制度,规范农村集体经济组织合同行为,是规范农村集体经济活动的基础性工作,是充分保证村民的知情权、参与权、决策权、监督权的有效途径,也是协调国家、集体、个人三者利益,壮大农村集体经济、维护农村社会稳定的重要举措.     

长江三角洲村域集体经济转型发展研究

该文从界定村域集体经济的内涵入手,回顾了我国村域集体经济的历史变迁及转型发展的重要性;重点研究了长三角村域集体经济的管理体制改革、经营方式转型、资产流向及发展趋势,并对村域集体经济的收入能力进行了区域比较。认为:我国村域集体资源、资产和资金是村社农民共同创造、代际传承、辛勤积累和沉淀下来的,凝聚着几代农民的贡献,只能由村民自治组织和村组集体经济组织管理和经营;村域集体经济还是农村未来发展和农民共同富裕的重要物质基础,当前农村社区居民生产、生活服务,尤其是公共品供给特别需要村域集体经济实力的支撑。     

农村集体经济混合经营实现形式：作用机理、主要障碍与政策体系

混合经营是农村集体经济的一种新实现形式，即在传统集体经营基础上导入家庭经营、合作经营、企业经营等其他经营形态，这种方式能通过产权激励、要素配置、践行集体经营公平价值等方面，收获资源协同效应，有效促进农村集体经济发展。不过，由于家庭经营、合作经营、集体经营、企业经营等在产权特征、组织成员、决策机制、分配方式、规则认同、个体与组织关系、价值取向等方面存在较大差异，混合经营可能会引发集体利益被侵占、农民利益受损的风险。此外，农村集体经济组织特别法人破产难实现、农村集体产权流转交易范围受限、集体所有权弱化和集体经济发展资源不足、农村集体“三资”监督管理不健全，制约了农村集体经济混合经营发展。要辩证看待农村集体经济混合经营的优势和不足，既要积极推进混合经营，也要建立适宜的治理机制和政策体系，以此应对相关风险和问题障碍，促进农村集体经济健康持续发展，释放集体经济强村富民效应。     

经济发达地区农村公共资源管理机制探析

党的十七届三中全会明确提出要“健全农村集体资金、资产、资源管理制度,切实保障农民权益,维护广大农民根本利益”,为我们进一步推进新农村建设指明了方向。农村集体“三资”是村里最为重要的公共资源,关系着村集体经济的发展和乡村治理的有效性。近年来,绍兴在成功推行“夏履程序”、“八郑规程”等村级民主治理机制基础上,重点深化完善农村集体“三资”管理制度,取得了阶段性成效。     

浅谈新型农村建设中加强农村集体三资管理的思考对策

党在十八届五中全会"十三五规划建议"中提出大力推进农业现代化,随着农村城镇化进程推进农村集体经济不断壮大,农村集体经济组织所拥有的资金、资产和资源,简称农村集体"三资"管理成为农村集体经济管理工作的重要组成部分,也是农村地区的重点和难点问题.本文主要针对农村集体"三资"管理的现状进行分析,结合街道工作的实际,提出在新农村建设中加强农村集体"三资"管理的对策,为加强基层组织建设,推进农村集体经济的制度度化、规范化合提出意见.     

农村集体资产管理的薄弱环节与应对方案研究

随着社会经济的不断发展,人们生活水平逐渐上升,但是想要实现共同富裕,不仅需要提高城镇经济水平,也要增加广大农民生活收入.因此,应该提高农村集体资产管理水平,为集体经济健康发展提供保障.本文将阐述目前农村集体资产管理的薄弱环节,并针对此类问题,提出一系列提高农村集体资产管理水平的方式,以及重视基础管理、加强管理意识等其他...     

农村集体经济组织固定资产管理中存在的问题及建议

在农村固定资产管理中,一些村固定资产管理不够重视,存在资产处置不民主不规范,资产账簿不健全,管理不严格;业务处理不及时,不规范,资产不公开等问题,以上问题容易导致集体资产流失,滋生腐败现象,影响农村的稳定与和谐社会建设.为此,找准固定资产管理中的问题并提出改进措施,是搞好村级固定资产管理的关键.     

以“三资”规范化管理促进云南农村集体经济发展——基于云南省A市辖区的主要做法及成效

农村集体经济组织的资金、资产、资源(简称“三资”),它归属于农村集体成员共同所有.全面推进村集体“三资”规范化管理,历来就是党中央、国务院重视“三农”工作的政策措施之一.云南省A市辖区采取统筹安排、精心培训、全面部署、完善制度等有效措施,在村集体“三资”规范化管理方面做出了有益探索.     

加强集体资产管理 促进农村经济发展

农村集体资产是农村各级党政组织带领广大农民长期艰苦奋斗的丰硕成果,是实现九五计划和跨世纪战略目标的强大物质技术基础。加强集体资产管理,最大限度地发挥集体资产效能,是当前农村工作一项刻不容缓的任务。 改革开放以来,我市农村集体经济迅速发展,经济总量不断增大。1996年,农村集体经济总收入1458亿元,占农村经济总收入的90％;集体拥有固定资产总额422亿元,乡镇村集体经营性资产总额524亿元,还有大量的土地、公共设施等资源性资产     

Downward accountability in response to collective actions

Will autocratic governments implement policies to satisfy the people's demands in order to prevent large scale social unrest? This article explores this question through quantitative analysis of the political economy of public goods provision in Chinese provinces. Data were collected on the number of labour disputes to measure collective actions. My sample includes provincial leaders whose incentives to deliver public goods can either be explained as a result of upward accountability towards the Centre or downward accountability towards the citizens. The confounding factor of upward accountability is ruled out by using two‐step estimation, and the reverse causality between public goods provision and collective actions is controlled by using instrumental variables. This result suggests that provincial leaders will implement policies more in favour of the citizens in response to intensified labour disputes.     

Heterogeneity, returns to scale, and collective action

Abstract .  I analyze the effects of resource inequality and valuation heterogeneity on the provision of public goods with increasing or decreasing returns to scale in production. The existing literature typically takes the agents' characteristics as given and known to the researcher. In contrast, this paper compares collective action provision across groups of agents with resources and valuations for the public good drawn from different known joint distributions. Specifically, I characterize the expected equilibrium public good level as function of various distributional properties and moments. A resource-valuation distribution that first-order stochastically dominates another distribution always results in higher expected public good provision level, independent of the production technology. With decreasing returns to scale in the public good production, higher resource inequality results in higher expected provision. With increasing returns the same result holds when the mean resource level is relatively low, but expected provision decreases in inequality when the mean resource level is high. A parallel result holds for agents' valuations.     

Herding with collective preferences

This paper studies a simple model of observational learning where agents care not only about the information of others but also about their actions. We show that despite complex strategic considerations that arise from forward-looking incentives, herd behavior can arise in equilibrium. The model encompasses applications such as sequential elections, public good contributions, and leadership charitable giving.     

Management of common property resources: Limits to voluntary collective action

This paper finds that the voluntary collective action may be an alternative to market and government in the management of common property resources. In developing countries, the people's capabilities to harness the preserved commons and the fairness in the appropriation of benefits from them are the limits on the voluntary collective action. It shows that collective action is possible if an outside agency plays the role of a catalyst in mitigating these limits. It also shows that there can be mutually beneficial sharing arrangements between government and village communities for the management of local forest resources. The standard result that common and state property resources turn into open access resources as population grows also holds good for the natural resources jointly managed by government and people.     

Cooperation in collective action*

The ability to cooperate in collective action problems – such as those relating to the use of common property resources or the provision of local public goods – is a key determinant of economic performance. In this paper we discuss two aspects of collective action problems in developing countries. First, which institutions discourage opportunistic behaviour and promote cooperation? Second, what are the characteristics of the individuals involved that determine the degree to which they cooperate? We first review the evidence from field studies, laboratory experiments, and cross community studies. We then present new results from an individual level panel dataset of rural workers.     

Breaking up the collective farms

The de‐collectivization of Vietnamese agriculture was a crucial step in the country's transition to a market economy. The assignment of land‐use rights had to be decentralized and local cadres ostensibly had the power to capture this process. We assess the realized land allocation against explicit counter‐factuals. Depending on the region, we find that 95–99 percent of maximum aggregate consumption was realized by a land allocation that generated lower inequality overall, with the poorest absolutely better off. We attribute this outcome to initial conditions at the time of reform and actions by the centre to curtail the power of local elites.     

Wealth inequality and collective action

We study the effect of inequality in the distribution of endowments of private inputs (e.g., land, wealth) that are complementary in production with collective inputs (e.g., contribution to public goods such as irrigation and extraction from common-property resources) on efficiency in a class of collective action problems. We focus on characterizing the joint surplus maximizing level of inequality, making due distinction between contributors and non-contributors, in a framework that allows us to consider a wide variety of collective action problems ranging from pure public goods to impure public goods to commons. We show that while efficiency increases with greater equality within the groups of contributors and non-contributors, so long the externalities (positive or negative) are significant, there is an optimal degree of inequality between these groups.     

Prize sharing in collective contests

The characteristics of endogenously determined sharing rules and the group-size paradox are studied in a model of group contest with the following features: (i) The prize has mixed private–public good characteristics. (ii) Groups can differ in marginal cost of effort and their membership size. (iii) In each group the members decide how much effort to put without observing the sharing rules of the other groups. It is shown that endogenous determination of group sharing rules completely eliminates the group-size paradox, i.e. a larger group always attains a higher winning probability than a smaller group, unless the prize is purely private. In addition, an interesting pattern of equilibrium group sharing rules is revealed: The group attaining the lower winning probability is the one choosing the rule giving higher incentives to the members.