如何打破国际商务谈判的僵局

在国际商务谈判中经常会遇到这样一种情况 :谈判双方似乎已经退到不能再退让的地步 ,谈判已无法进行下去了 ,即人们通常所说的谈判僵局。在谈判进行的过程中 ,僵局无论何时都有可能发生 ,任何主题都有可能形成分歧与对立。出现僵局不等于谈判破裂 ,但它严重影响谈判的进程 ,如不能很好地解决 ,就可能导致谈判的破裂。应该说 ,在国际商务谈判中 ,来自不同国度的谈判双方既然能坐在一起 ,就说明双方都是经过认真准备且怀有合作诚意的。双方从各自所寻求的利益出发 ,都希望能够打破僵局 ,求大同存小异以达到谈判的预期目的。随着我国对外开放和…     

竞争还是合作?——红黑博弈揭示的商务谈判思维

红黑博弈展示了单方利益与双方共同利益的抗衡,商务谈判中如何处理共同利益与己方利益的关系,处处体现红黑博弈的思想。将谈判对方看作是争夺利益的对手还是带来共同利益的合作者,导致谈判者采取两种截然不同的态度和导向,其谈判结果也必然不同。通过分析红黑博弈模型的机理,揭示商务谈判各方微妙的心理和动机,以及对谈判结果的影响,进而阐释商务谈判合作共赢的现代理念。     

国际商务谈判中利益冲突的预防

随着我国经济的迅猛发展，尤其是加入WTO后，我国各企业和单位所面临的国际商务谈判越来越多。商务谈判中因为双方都希望获得利益的最大化，常常面临利益的冲突。本文认为，了解各国商人谈判的特点、做好充分的谈判准备可以在一定程度上预防这些冲突的激化，谈判策略的恰当运用也可以在一定程度上避免冲突。     

商务谈判中的非道德行为

西方学者认为，商务谈判是一种决策的过程，是当事双方或多方决定如何分配资源和责任的过程。同时，谈判也是一种人际交往行为，它是双方或多方都希望通过谈判的争辩、讨论、协商来寻求各自的利益，达成一致的协议。Rubin和Brown(1975)早就认为谈判的双方在某项利益或多项利益上存在冲突，谈判的双方都期望通过谈判来交换资源，进而满足自己的需要，     

"黑箱-灰箱-白箱"策略在商务谈判中的应用

商务谈判是指商务往来双方在经济立场、见解或利益等方面存在差异时,通过洽谈协商而实现某种程度上协调一致的过程。2005年,英国谈判专家珍尼·霍奇森(Jane Hodgson)倡导的“黑箱—灰箱—白箱”策略从系统论的角度出发,强调成功的商务谈判控制取决于正确识别商务谈判不同系统模型的运作模式和灵活运用相应的谈判谋略和技巧。该策略全面系统地阐述了如何克服畏惧心理破解商务谈判中的“黑箱”,以及如何巧借“白箱”扩大谈判成果。同时,针对商务谈判实践中最为常见的“灰箱”,提出了运用模糊数学的方法淡化“灰箱”的“灰度”,建立商务谈判的…     

商务谈判"双赢"成因浅析

谈判是具有利害关系的双方或多方,为谋求一致而进行协商洽谈,从而把可能的商业机会确定下来。在谈判中,双方为各自利益而进行攻心斗智,是不可避免的,但是要取得双方满意的结果,双方就要积极有效地协商,充分的协商才能使问题解决得深入和全面,才能获得双赢。本文从以下几个方面对商务谈判的双赢成因进行了探讨。     

解析商务谈判之"双赢"途径

"双赢"谈判理念是把谈判当作一个合作的过程,视谈判对手如伙伴,与对方共同寻找满足双方利益的方案,真正实现共好双赢.从发展趋势来看,"双赢"谈判无疑有巨大的发展空间.但是,在实际工作中,尤其在处理商务谈判中的利益关系时,却存在着过分重视立场,对关系、利益重视不够、对潜在利益挖掘不充分等诸多问题.文章就商务谈判在把握利益时容易处理失当的几种关系进行了论述,从中探讨出实现"双赢"的谈判思路.     

解析商务谈判之"双赢"途径

"双赢"谈判理念是把谈判当作一个合作的过程,视谈判对手如伙伴,与对方共同寻找满足双方利益的方案,真正实现共好双赢.从发展趋势来看,"双赢"谈判无疑有巨大的发展空间.但是,在实际工作中,尤其在处理商务谈判中的利益关系时,却存在着过分重视立场,时关系、利益重视不够、对潜在利益挖掘不充分等诸多问题.文章就商务谈判在把握利益时容易处理失当的几种关系进行了论述,从中探讨出实现"双赢"的谈判思路.     

解析商务谈判之“双赢”途径

“双赢”谈判理念是把谈判当作一个合作的过程,视谈判对手如伙伴,与对方共同寻找满足双方利益的方案,真正实现共好双赢。从发展趋势来看,“双赢”谈判无疑有巨大的发展空间。但是,在实际工作中,尤其在处理商务谈判中的利益关系时,却存在着过分重视立场,对关系、利益重视不够、对潜在利益挖掘不充分等诸多问题。文章就商务谈判在把握利益时容易处理失当的几种关系进行了论述,从中探讨出实现“双赢”的谈判思路。     

商务谈判在实践中的应用

在商务谈判中双方为了各自的利益常常面临冲突.通过谈判可以防止冲突的激化,谈判策略的恰当运用可以在一定程度上避免冲突.当冲突出现时,通过谈判可以创造双赢的解决方案,化解利益冲突问题.     

The timing of contracting with externalities

This paper endogenizes the timing of bilateral contracting between one principal and multiple agents in the presence of externalities. Contracting simultaneously with all agents is optimal for the principal if externalities become weaker the more an agent trades. If instead externalities become stronger, sequential negotiations might benefit the principal as they lower the agents’ outside options. Under some linearity conditions, the principal's preferences with respect to different timings of contracting are opposed to their efficiency ranking.     

How close is Asia already to being a trade bloc?

FTA bilateral and regional negotiations in Asia have developed quickly in the past decade moving Asia ever closer to an economic union. This paper uses a fifteen-country global general equilibrium model with trade costs to numerically calculate Debreu distance measures between the present situation and potential full Asia integration in the form of a trade bloc. Our results reveal that these large Asia economies can be close to full integration if they act timely in agreements through negotiation. All Asia countries will gain from Asia trade bloc arrangements except when the Asia FTA can only eliminate tariffs. These countries’ gain will increase as bilateral non-tariff elimination deepens. Larger countries will gain more than small countries. Asia FTA, Asia Union and RCEP will benefit member countries more than ASEAN+3. Global free trade will benefit all countries the most.     

分工演进对贸易政策的影响分析——基于交易成本的考虑

贸易政策同贸易理论是紧密联系在一起的.引入交易成本来分析分工演进对贸易政策的影响,不考虑交易成本条件下,贸易自由对于分工演进的国家是有利的;考虑交易成本条件下,随着分工演进,国家之间更加倾向于贸易谈判,最终结果为贸易自由化.但是由于各国交易效率不同,交易效率高的国家在贸易中获得的利益更多,而交易效率低的就会实行更多贸易保护.因此,我国需要降低交易成本,加强分工演进的速度,处理好国际之间的贸易摩擦.     

Penalty Rates and Enterprise Bargaining

Industrial relations procedures in both Australia and New Zealand are changing from a system based on centralised arbitration towards enterprise level negotiation. This article considers how this change will affect overtime and other penalty rate payments. In particular, we show how, despite the existence of a legislative ‘safety net’, enterprise level negotiations can lead to the widespread removal of penalty rates, possibly to the detriment of both employees and employers. Such changes will, however, enhance competition and benefit consumers.     

Issue Linking in Trade Negotiations: Ricardo Revisited or No Pain No Gain*

There has been much discussion about what issues should be included in international “trade” negotiations. Different countries, firms, and activist groups have quite different views regarding which items should (or should not) be negotiated together. Proposals run the gamut from no linking to linking trade with investment, the environment, labor, and human rights codes. This paper provides a formal framework for analyzing this question. It employs a two‐country, two‐issue bargaining model and contrasts outcomes when issues are negotiated separately and when they are linked in some form. A key concept is “comparative interest,” analogous to Ricardian comparative advantage. We provide general results and note, in particular, where a country can benefit by agreeing to include an agenda item for which, when viewed by itself, the country does not receive a positive payoff. We also provide an application of our analysis to negotiations on trade liberalization and environmental protection.     

基于FTA中地理标志的中国策略

地理标志是FTA中较为敏感的谈判领域之一，在TRIPS中已有的地理标志多边保护规则空白点也较多。由于多哈回合谈判艰难曲折，很多国家便将目光投向FTA，各国努力通过形式多样的FTA实现自己的利益，在此过程中也给地理标志保护问题带来新的挑战。我国应审慎处理FTA谈判中的地理标志问题，积极完善相关法律和机制，以适应FTA带来的地理标志复杂变化。     

Trade liberalization in environmental goods

Trade negotiations have started to pay attention to liberalization in environmental goods (EGs), whose production may require dirty intermediate goods. We construct a two-country trade model to explore the effects of trade liberalization in EGs on the local pollution, the global environment and welfare in the presence of such an environmental conundrum. We find that countries do not necessarily benefit from trade liberalization in EGs in the absence of an environmental policy. With the assistance of an upstream pollution tax, trade liberalization in EGs improves each country's welfare. This result holds independent of whether the upstream market is competitive or not, or whether we have upstream trade across countries. For asymmetric countries, trade liberalization in EGs improves the world welfare and the welfare for the country if it has a smaller demand for EGs; or experiences less damage from the production of dirty inputs; or values environment improvement more.     

Secrecy and fairness in plea bargaining with multiple defendants

I consider a model of plea bargaining with multiple codefendants. I mainly compare the equilibrium outcomes under joint negotiations whereby both defendants can observe both plea offers and under separate (secret) negotiations whereby they can observe only their own respective offer. Contrary to the widespread perceptions, the prosecutor is made worse off under secret negotiations or at best as well off as under joint negotiations. I also discuss the implication of equilibrium offers on fairness.      

RAISING WAGES TO DETER ENTRY INTO UNIONIZED MARKETS*

This paper investigates entry under a unionized oligopoly when entry and wage negotiations are sequential. We find the incumbent has incentives to raise the wage, which strengthens the bargaining position of the union relative to the entrant at subsequent negotiations and thus discourages entry. We show that entry is more likely to be deterred (accommodated) if the union is wage (employment) oriented and that raising unemployment compensation during recession not only reduces the burden of the unemployed but also induces new entry, creating more employment opportunities. However, during a business boom, reducing unemployment compensation is a better policy.     

Contracts payments for ecosystem services: the case of bio-pospecting

We examine the economics of royalties in bioprospecting contracts between a pharmaceutical and genetic resource supplier (local), with an eye to understanding the relative advantages of indexing royalty payments to gross revenue or net revenue. We show a risk-averse firm facing only production or only cost risks will index royalties to net revenue. When facing both types of risk, the choice of royalty type depends on the relative magnitudes of the production and cost risk. In each case, the risk-averse firm chooses the royalty type that shifts as much risk as possible to the local. When the local is risk neutral, the pharmaceutical's and local's preferences are compatible. If the local is risk averse and there is only one type of risk, it will prefer a gross revenue royalty, and shift as much risk as possible to the firm: here the local and firm preferences are compatible only if the firm is risk-neutral, Lastly, we show if the firm sets the terms of the contract, and both agents are risk averse, the firm will not likely volunteer to implement the socially optimal royalty arrangement as it prefers to shift as much risk to the local, who now also prefers a more certain return. This last outcome is at the heart of the benefit sharing discussion and suggests if risk sharing and equity are a concern in benefit sharing, then the choice of royalty type can be an important part of negotiations between pharmaceuticals and locals for the phytochemical from nature for new drug discovery.