The Productivity of Government Spending in Asia: 1983–2000

Leightner [The Changing Effectiveness of Key Policy Tools in Thailand. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies for East Asian Development Network, EAON Working Paper 19(2002)x0219-6417] develops a new analytical technique, named Reiterative Truncated Projected Least Squares (RTPLS), which produces 1/2 the error of OLS when omitted variables interact with the included independent variable. In this paper, RTPLS is applied to annual panel data on government spending and GDP from 1983 to 2000 for 23 developing Asian and Pacific countries. RTPLS produces estimates for the government spending multiplier for these countries and shows how omitted variables have affected these multipliers across countries and over time.JEL Classification: C13, E62, O23     

State competition in higher education: A race to the top,or a race to the bottom?

How does competition affect higher education? This paper explores this question for public and private universities. Theory indicates that competition can push higher education policy in one of two different directions. On the one hand, competition may increase spending. For states, this would occur if states treat higher education as developmental; for private universities this would occur if they view spending as a means to attract students and prestige. On the other hand, competition may decrease spending if states treat higher education spending as redistributive, and competition may decrease spending by private schools if lower spending enhances their ability to attract students with low tuition. To determine which of these perspectives is most valid, we examine higher education policy choices in the 1980s and 1990s. We find that states appear to act as if higher education funding is redistributive while private schools appear to compete more on the basis of tuition than spending. These results demonstrate the important effects competition and governance structure have on higher education.Received: August 2001, Accepted: May 2002, JEL Classification: I2, I22, H72, I3     

The effect of marketing regulations on efficiency: LeChatelier versus coordination effects

Government regulations designed to promote social welfare can have unintended consequences on efficiency. According to the LeChatelier Principle, regulations that effectively limit substitution possibilities among inputs will reduce firm and industry-wide efficiency. In imperfectly competitive markets, however, government constraints on a strategic variable can facilitate coordination. An advertising restriction, for example, would improve efficiency if it enables firms to produce the same level of sales with less advertising spending. We use data envelopment analysis to estimate the effect of marketing regulations on efficiency in the U.S. cigarette industry. Unlike previous studies, we do not assume that marketing and production technologies are separable. Our results demonstrate that coordination effects dominate LeChatelier effects. Cigarette producers have benefited from advertising restrictions, a result consistent with the capture theory of regulation.

Democratic transition and fiscal policy in the Arab world

This paper investigates the relationship between democracy and public debt in the Arab world over the period 2002–2013. The results show strong evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between democracy and public debt. This means that democratization is associated with lower debt only when a certain level of democracy is reached. In an attempt to explain these findings, we assume that the effect of democracy on public debt operates mainly through its impact on government spending and government revenue. Our results show that the inverted U-shaped relationship between democracy and public debt stems from the inverted U-shaped democracy-government spending path and the U-shaped democracy-government revenue pattern. This implies that, at the earlier stages of democratization, democracy is associated with an increase in government spending and a decrease in government revenue, which stimulates public debt. However, beyond a certain level of democracy, further democratization reduces government spending and enhances government revenue, leading to lower levels of public debt. Hence, achieving some level of democracy is a key prerequisite to improve the effectiveness of public spending, enhance tax compliance, and thereby control public debt.     

Looking across borders: A test of spatial policy interdependence using local government efficiency ratings

Spatial patterns in (local) government taxation and spending decisions have received a lot of attention. Still, the focus on taxation or expenditure levels in previous studies may be incomplete. Indeed, (rational) individuals are likely to consider the level of spending on (or taxation for) public goods provision simultaneously with how much public goods they actually receive—thus assessing the ‘price/quantity’ of government policies. Therefore, the present paper argues that incumbents may want their ‘price/quantity’ ratio to be close to that in neighbouring regions. Analysing Flemish local governments' efficiency ratings for the year 2000 (which relate total spending to the quantity of locally provided public goods), we confirm the existence of neighbourhood effects in local government policies.     

Looking across borders: A test of spatial policy interdependence using local government efficiency ratings

Spatial patterns in (local) government taxation and spending decisions have received a lot of attention. Still, the focus on taxation or expenditure levels in previous studies may be incomplete. Indeed, (rational) individuals are likely to consider the level of spending on (or taxation for) public goods provision simultaneously with how much public goods they actually receive—thus assessing the ‘price/quantity’ of government policies. Therefore, the present paper argues that incumbents may want their ‘price/quantity’ ratio to be close to that in neighbouring regions. Analysing Flemish local governments' efficiency ratings for the year 2000 (which relate total spending to the quantity of locally provided public goods), we confirm the existence of neighbourhood effects in local government policies.     

Voluntary contributions and local public goods in a federation

This paper considers nonneutral effects of government spending in a federation of multiple jurisdictions. Both government spending and private donations finance local public goods, redistributive programs, that provide transfers for the poor. In the standard model, government spending has no effect on the public goods, as donors reduce their donations one for one in response to an increase in government spending. In a federation, donors of a jurisdiction donate, through federal charities, to help the poor in the jurisdiction and the poor in other jurisdictions as well. Jurisdictions are thus linked through donations. Such linkage influences donors' behavior beyond the traditional crowding-out effect. As a result, government spending has nonneutral effects on the level of public goods.     

Political Profit: Taxing and Spending in the Hierarchical State

A bstract . The actions of government fall into two types: taxes (the taking of property ) and expenditures (the awarding of gifts ). Politicians profit as long as the value of resources raised from taxation exceeds the cost of expenditures. From their point of view, fiscal efficiency consists in maximizing the support obtained by spending and minimizing the opposition generated by taxing. This is accomplished by spending on well-organized groups and taxing the uninformed public. This results in the "iron law of political redistribution" in which income and wealth are transferred from the latter to the former. In a hierarchical State , it is usually profitable for those at the top to centralize control over taxing and spending, if for no other reason than to make it difficult for politicians at lower levels to compete against them. This gives rise to the "law of hierarchical centralization "—in a hierarchical State, power becomes centralized over time. The greater the power of government, the faster this process takes place. In order to avoid this problem, one could design constitutions which are non-hierarchical in nature, in which each unit of government is completely autonomous from the others, as firms are in a free market.     

Assessing multi-dimensional performance: environmental and economic outcomes

This study examines economic performance, environmental performance, and regulatory activity for plants in three industries: pulp and paper, oil, and steel. Stochastic frontier production function models show significant deviations from production efficiency. Older plants are less efficient in production, but perform no worse on emissions. Plants spending more on pollution abatement tend to do worse on both production efficiency and emissions. Stricter local regulatory pressure is associated with somewhat lower emissions, but has mixed effects on production efficiency. Positive correlations between SUR residuals for emissions and production efficiency suggest unmeasured plant-level characteristics that drive both economic and environmental performance.

Government spending on public infrastructure,prices, production and international trade

This paper examines the impact of a change in government spending on public infrastructure when monopolistic competition prevails in one sector of the economy. The analysis is based on a variation of the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz model where the presence of internal economies in the production of a differentiated intermediate good leads to specialization based external economies in the production of the final good. It is shown that changes in government spending on public infrastructure can influence relative prices, production, the degree of specialization, and pattern of international trade.     

A more generalized planning model of Bangladesh: Some preliminary observations

Conclusion With a simple model which is more generalized than the one used in planning in Bangladesh, it has been demonstrated that government's overall budgetary programmes (revenue expenditure and credit policy) do not conform with sectoral output projections. This lack of conformity might have been responsible for the failure of planning in Bangladesh. For example, either macroeconomic policies (e.g., liberal credit policy) instead of raising output may have generated structural inflation or sectoral development and investment programmes may have fallen apart in the face of a rising price level. Since economic policies are directed at the macro level without due information about individual production sectors, certain government fiscal and monetary policy combinations may have increased demand for some output whose production could not be increased, at least in the short-run, because of structural bottlenecks. As a result, the Keynesian multiplier may have occurred only in nominal terms.On the other hand, planners may have set some investment target to free a given sector from structural bottlenecks, but fiscal and monetary policies were possibly not accommodating to generate required resources. Moreover, since the I-O model does not explain final demands on the basis of economic behaviour but rather treats them as exogenous, it short-circuits the income propagation mechanism. This possibly led to inconsistency between the forecasts of the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance regarding changes in gross domestic product (GDP) due to changes in exogenous variables.Therefore, for the successful harmonization of stabilization policies and development strategies, the analytical framework of both the Ministry of Finance and the Planning Commission need to be bridged. For this a more general social accounting framework, the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) is needed. The SAM provides a complete and consistent picture of the circular flow (both real and monetary) in an economy. Therefore, the Planning Commission and the Bureau of Statistics should attempt to integrate information on financial flows and institutional income distribution with the information on real flows (I-O table) in the economy. This will provide a framework for a more generalized planning model within which impacts of monetary and fiscal policies can be traced to the individual sectors, so that there could be fruitful dialogue between the two Departments of the government.This paper is based on chapters 3 & 4 of the author's Ph.D. thesis, submitted to the University of Manitoba, 1983.This paper is based on chapters 3 & 4 of the author's Ph.D. thesis, submitted to the University of Manitoba, 1983.The author wishes to express his Sincere gratitude to Professor L.R.Klein for encouraging him to take up this project and for useful criticisms later as an external examiner. Thanks are also due to the advisory Committee, Professors C. Nicolaou, R. Lobdell, and P.S. Dhruvarajan. However, for any deficiency and error that remain, the author alone is responsible.     

Asymmetry in the effects of us government spending shocks: evidence and implications

Using quarterly data for the United States, the evidence differentiates the effects of expansionary and contractionary shocks to government spending around an anticipated steady-state trend over time. While interest rates increase in the face of expansionary government spending shocks, there is no evidence of a reduction in the face of contractionary shocks. Consequently, the increased government spending crowds out private investment. Moreover, there is evidence of a reduction in private consumption as agents anticipate a future increase in taxes to finance the increased government spending. As a result, output growth and price inflation are decreasing despite expansionary government spending shocks, on average, over time. In view of this evidence, public finance considerations ought to dominate attempts to stimulate demand using government spending near full-equilibrium capacity utilization in the economy. In contrast, contractionary government spending shocks are not offset by an increase in private spending. Hence, demand contraction is pronounced, slowing output growth and price inflation in the face of a reduction in government spending. The implication is that concerns over the pronounced contractionary effects of a reduction in government spending ought to dominate public finance considerations near full-equilibrium.     

The transition from central planning to a market economy: A computable general equilibrium model

This paper develops a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the transition from a central planned economy to a market economy. The model is an extension of Wellisz and Findlay's (1986) model of the Soviet second economy. By distinguishing alternative assumptions about the disposition of the government budget, two model variants — the activist and non-activist — are analyzed. Equilibria of these model variants are computed for various parameter specifications of the Kantorovich ray, which represents the stringency of central planners' direction of the economy. The paper shows that increasing efficiency of the private sector, while it reduces the size of government subsidies to the state sector, does not necessarily increase the net government budget.     

Policy uncertainty and aggregate fluctuations

This paper estimates the impact on the US economy of four types of uncertainty about (i) government spending, (ii) tax changes, (iii) public debt, and (iv) monetary policy. Uncertainty about government debt has a large and persistent effect on output, consumption, investment, consumer confidence, and business confidence. Uncertainty about tax changes also has detrimental consequences for real activity but the effect of spending and monetary policy uncertainty appears to be small. About 25% of output fluctuations are accounted for by policy uncertainty, with government debt making the largest contribution at longer horizons.     

On measures of technical inefficiency and production uncertainty in stochastic frontier production model with correlated error components

Analysis of the behavior of technical inefficiency with respect to parameters and variables of a stochastic frontier model is a neglected area of research in frontier literature. An attempt in this direction, however, has recently been made. It has been shown that in a “standard” stochastic frontier model that both the firm level technical inefficiency and the production uncertainty are monotonically decreasing with observational error. In this paper we show, considering a stochastic frontier model whose error components are jointly distributed as truncated bivariate normal, that this property holds if and only if the distribution of observational error is negatively skewed. We also derive a necessary and sufficient condition under which both firm level technical inefficiency and production uncertainty are monotonically increasing with noise-inefficiency correlation. We next propose a new measure of the industry level production uncertainty and establish the necessary and sufficient condition for firm level technical inefficiency and production uncertainty to be monotonically increasing with industry level production uncertainty. We also study the limiting probabilistic behavior of these conditions under different parametric configuration of our model. Finally we carry out Monte Carlo simulations to study the sample behavior of the population monotonic property of the firm level technical inefficiency and production uncertainty in our model.

Monetary and fiscal policy under deep habits

Allowing habits to be formed at the level of individual goods – deep habits - can radically alter the fiscal policy transmission mechanism as the counter-cyclicality of mark-ups this implies can result in government spending crowding-in rather than crowding-out private consumption in the short run. We explore the robustness of this mechanism to the existence of price discrimination in the supply of goods to the public and private sectors. We then describe optimal monetary and fiscal policy in our New Keynesian economy subject to the additional externality of deep habits and explore the ability of simple policy rules to mimic fully optimal policy. We find that the presence of deep habits at empirically estimated levels can imply large externalities that significantly affect the conduct of monetary and tax policy. However, despite the rise in government spending multipliers implied by deep habits, government spending is barely used as a stabilisation tool under the optimal policy.     

Does the expansionary government spending crowd out the private consumption?: Cointegration analysis in panel data

That whether expansionary government spending crowds out private consumption is examined by evaluating the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution between them. Using annual data (1981–2000) of 23 OECD countries, a linear deterministic cointegration relation between private consumption, government spending and their relative price is supported. We have two findings: first, the panel estimators plausibly compute the parameter estimates in general. Second, when cross-sectional correlation is considered by using a SUR estimator, the statistical significance of panel cointegration is improved. Thirdly, the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution indicates that government and private consumption are found to be complements, which shows that expansionary government spending does not crowd out private consumption.     

Nonlinear effects of government spending shocks in the USA: Evidence from state‐level data

This paper uses state‐level data to estimate the effect of government spending shocks during expansions and recessions. By employing a mixed‐frequency framework, we are able to include a long span of annual state‐level government spending data in our nonlinear quarterly panel VAR model. We find evidence that for the average state the fiscal multiplier is larger during recessions. However, there is substantial heterogeneity across the cross‐section. The degree of nonlinearity in the effect of spending shocks is larger in states that are subject to a higher degree of financial frictions. In contrast, states with a prevalence of manufacturing, mining and agricultural industries tend to have multipliers that are more similar across business cycle phases.     

Dealing with a liquidity trap when government debt matters: Optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy

How does the need to preserve government debt sustainability affect the optimal monetary and fiscal policy response to a liquidity trap? To provide an answer, we employ a small stochastic New Keynesian model with a zero bound on nominal interest rates and characterize optimal time-consistent stabilization policies. We focus on two policy tools, the short-term nominal interest rate and debt-financed government spending. The optimal policy response to a liquidity trap critically depends on the prevailing debt burden. While the optimal amount of government spending is decreasing in the level of outstanding government debt, future monetary policy is becoming more accommodative, triggering a change in private sector expectations that helps to dampen the fall in output and inflation at the outset of the liquidity trap.