不确定需求、垂直协调与电力市场结构

本文考虑一个在发电和零售环节均为完全竞争的电力市场。电力以事先确定的线性价格销售给用户,而电力总需求不确定。模型表明,如果企业的发电量与边际发电成本之间的协方差为正,即两个随机变量之间有正的线性关联度,那么在短期均衡中,垂直分离导致较高的电力价格和发电企业利润。在长期均衡中,垂直分离导致发电企业的过度进入,形成较高的电价和较低的社会福利水平。本文的结论对我国正在进行的电力体制改革有一定参考意义。     

Electricity in Quebec before Nationalization, 1919 to 1939

History books tend to depict the early days of the electrical industry as one of monopoly where consumers were being gouged. The province of Quebec in Canada was no exception. With the use of wide-ranging data over time, we observe a different portrait: electrical firms in Quebec increased production faster than elsewhere while prices fell consistently. The main reason for this divergence between facts and history books is most likely the choice of comparing Quebec’s private industry with Ontario’s nationalized industry, which priced electricity at the average cost.     

论我国电力管理体制改革

虽然电力行业属于垄断行业,其自然垄断业务有持垄断的合理性,但我国目前由于缺乏独立的规制机构,缺乏对发电企业和电网公司垄断行为的有效规制,导致过度垄断,抑制了有效竞争,扭曲了资源配置,损失了效率和福利.我们应当尽快建立独立的规制机构,将电网公司的电能交易业务与提供基础性服务业务分开,引入多元的电能交易主体,改变成本加成定价方法,建立激励性的定价制度.     

互联网平台垄断与低质量陷阱

坚定不移地走高质量发展道路，已经成为各领域发展的共识。然而，随着互联网平台经济的飞速发展，线上市场中的低质量问题也变得愈加突出，相比线下市场，线上市场同类产品不合格率、不达标率、投诉量更高。文章认为平台垄断是低质量陷阱产生的主要原因，超级互联网平台的价格垄断、流量垄断和渠道垄断行为，一方面形成了对低成本实体经济需求的"扩张效应"，即低价垄断迫使实体企业降低产品质量成本；另一方面形成了对高质量产品的"挤出效应"，即流量垄断带来的高额流量费用，迫使实体企业将大部分资金用于线上市场产品营销，挤出了质量创新投入和渠道垄断形成的巨大规模效应，迫使实体企业将低质低价产品打造成为爆款，保障线上市场销量优势。为此，政府部门需要加大对互联网平台恶性价格竞争的监管和处罚力度，督促互联网平台降低实体企业经营成本，强化互联网平台对实体企业的质量赋能作用。     

Regional Comparisons,Spatial Aggregation,and Asymmetry of Price Pass-Through in U.S. Gasoline Markets

Spot to retail price pass-through behavior of the U.S. gasoline market was investigated at the national and regional levels, using weekly wholesale and retail motor gasoline prices from January 2000 to the present. Asymmetric pass-through was found across all regions, with faster pass-through when prices are rising. Pass-through patterns, in terms of speed and time for completion, were found to vary from region to region. Spatial aggregation was investigated at the national level and the East Coast with the aggregated cumulative pass-through being greater than the volume-weighted regional pass-through when spot prices increase. These results are useful to the petroleum industry, consumers, and policy makers by providing a basis to estimate the retail price effects that result from a change in spot price.     

竞争性电力市场态势与走向:由四个新兴市场国家生发

竞争性电力市场既是完整的现代市场体系,又是一整套现代化的经济管制制度。电力市场化改革的目标是使得电力像一般商品一样在市场竞争中形成价格,电力系统的技术特性与商品交易的经济特性紧密结合,能够解释电价市场形成的深层次机理。低碳经济时代迫近,我国政府应按照选准市场模式、夯实市场体系、破除垄断利益、理顺竞争与监管关系的思路进一步推进电力市场化改革。     

我国第三方物流企业战略联盟研究

随着我国加入WTO后对服务业的开放,国外第三方物流企业的大量涌入,对于我国物流企业形成了巨大的冲击,激烈竞争的格局已经形成。建立战略联盟成为了我国第三方物流企业适应市场竞争,促进企业发展的必然选择。建立第三方物流企业战略联盟需要注意以下问题：树立明确的联盟目标;慎重选择合作伙伴;处理好联盟各方的企业文化差异;加强风险防范和提高联盟管理水平。     

The energy crisis and energy reform in Russia: Competition instead of reliability

Energy supply reliability problems are looked at in view of a mega breakdown in the energy grid of Central Russia, which occurred on May 25, 2005, and the energy reform underway in Russia. The splitting of RAO Unified Energy Systems of Russia (UES) into multiple independent companies, as stipulated by the current energy reform, lowers the reliability of energy supply and increases the risk of systemic energy breakdowns, as we noted in [1]. The roles of monopoly, oligopoly, monopolistic competition, and government regulation in the electric power industry are analyzed. The American economist and 2001 Nobel Prizewinner Joseph E. Stiglitz demonstrated the need for government intervention for market regulation, because there is no perfect competition in a real-life market economy, and the market under asymmetric information conditions does bring the economy to an equilibrium state, maximizing public wellbeing. The implications of establishing six whole-sale generating companies from thermoelectric power stations for the growth of electricity tariffs and possible bankruptcy of some companies are also estimated.     

基于协整理论的美国电力期货市场实证研究

本文基于VAR的协整理论,对美国PJM电力期货市场作了模型实证研究。因果关系检验显示下月合约价格是现货价格单向的Granger原因。协整检验结果显示电力期货价格和现货价格存在长期稳定均衡的关系,期货市场具有价格发现的功能,与现货市场相比价格发现功能较弱。方差分解结果显示,期货价格受自身的影响很大,受现货价格的影响很小;而现货价格受自身影响很大,随着滞后期的增加,受自身的影响逐渐减弱,受期货市场的影响逐步增大,期货市场在价格决定中起主导作用;脉冲响应函数同样显示现货对期货的影响较小,期货对现货的影响相对较大。     

垄断竞争格局——经济开发我国油气资源

在石油工业高度全球化的今天,中国作为世贸组织的一员,应该把中国的石油公司放在世界市场的大局上来看待垄断和竞争。本文针对我国现有石油垄断体制未能有效开发我国油气资源的现状,剖析了竞争格局与石油资源的有效利用关系后,得出垄断竞争格局是我国油气资源开发的最佳途径,并提出了相应的对策和建议,对今后如何高效开发我国的油气资源具有一定的借鉴意义。     

Analysis of the animal feed to poultry value chain in Zambia

ABSTRACT

Rapidly growing populations, urbanisation and income are together triggering increased demand for high-value agricultural commodities across Southern Africa with scope for gains from trade and regional integration. The poultry sector in Zambia, in particular, has witnessed a rapid growth triggering increased investments and competition, benefiting the consumers. Despite this growth, the sector still faces huge challenges hindering the development of the animal feed, feed input and poultry production sub-sectors. This has limited the extent of participation of the Zambian poultry industry in the regional market due to uncompetitive prices. This study analyses the animal feed to poultry value chain in Zambia, focusing on the industry capabilities with a view to enhancing its competitiveness and production for the regional market. Enhancing value chain capabilities will require improvements in productivity and production of key poultry inputs, and addressing transportation inefficiencies and coordination among governments.     

Entry deterrence when the potential entrant is your competitor in a different market

In this article, we present a two‐period model in which one firm operates in two markets: a monopoly and a duopoly. Assuming that this firm has private information on the cross‐price elasticity of demand between the products sold in both markets, it limits its quantity supplied in the monopoly market in order to make its rival in the other market believe that entry into the monopolized market is unprofitable. As a result of this strategy, the average prices observed in both markets increase. This result suggests that the detrimental effects of entry deterrence on consumers' welfare are stronger than those predicted by previous literature.     

Pricing, Sunk Costs, and Market Structure Online: Evidence from Book Retailing

While online consumers are less concerned than traditional consumersabout firm location, they may be more concerned about unobservablequality and, to signal this, online retailers rely more on advertisingthan traditional retailers. Imperfect price competition mayarise because of vertical product differentiation, incompleteconsumer awareness, and near-perfect information exchange betweenretailers. This paper evaluates alternative theories of competitionand market structure in online retailing. Advertising, productdevelopment, and revenue data for the online book market revealthat consumers respond to advertising and website spending ratherthan low prices. As the market size expanded, during 1997–2001,these endogenous sunk costs escalated and there was no majornew entry. Advertising-to-sales ratios and market-concentrationratios are much higher than for traditional bookselling. Usingprice and demand information for individual books over a numberof weeks, we find counter-cyclical and cross-sectional pricevariation inconsistent with perfect price competition.     

Trade Policy Versus Competition Policy: Substitutes or Complements?

This paper deals with the difference between trade policy and competition policy for domestic prices, wages, and employment when product and labour markets are imperfectly competitive. We show that in the presence of country-specific institutions like trade unions, trade policy and competition policy are no longer substitutes in disciplining product and labour market distortions. While both domestic entry and foreign imports affect domestic price-cost margins, they differ in their effectiveness and their impact on the domestic labour market. The results in this paper suggest that enforcement of competition policy without a sufficient degree of openness to imports is typically not a first-best outcome. While domestic entry increases union welfare, foreign imports reduce it. Competition policy in the presence of labour unions is insufficient to reduce labour market distortions, while international competition reduces both labour and product distortions.     

跨国公司与东道国产业集群竞争的博弈拓展分析

跨国公司投资产业集群的产量竞争优势,在于其较低的边际成本和东道国缺乏需求弹性的市场结构。东道国产业集群的对外开放度越高,其消费者所获得的福利也就越多。对跨国公司与东道国产业集群市场竞争进行博弈分析,提出促进我国产业和区域经济发展的若干建议。     

Ex-Post Evaluation of Competition Law Enforcement Effects in the German Packaging Waste Compliance Scheme Market

We provide an ex-post evaluation of the impact of competition law enforcement activities in the German packaging waste compliance scheme market. Until 2003, the non-profit compliance scheme DSD enjoyed a monopoly in the market. Numerous antitrust cases, however, paved the way for competitive market structures. We show that these enforcement activities resulted in a series of market entries since 2004, a corresponding drop in DSD’s market share, increased innovation and substantial efficiencies. Furthermore, we apply a difference-in-differences approach to show that prices decreased by 63% and to estimate the aggregated consumer welfare gains achieved by 2011 at a total of €13 billion. In the given case imposing a non-profit obligation on the monopolist did not substitute for the efficiency-enhancing effects of competition.     

Competition in the rail industry

The privatization of the railways in Britain is almost complete.The article describes the method of privatization, where a verticallyintegrated state-owned monopoly has been broken up into a monopolytrack company, three monopolistic owners of passenger rolling-stock,25 franchised passenger train operating companies, a freightoperating company, and large numbers of suppliers of services.The author explains the potential for competition within thiscomplex structure, in an industry which has been steadily losingits share of the transport market for some 70 years. Attentionis drawn to the absence of any clear criteria for continuedpublic subsidy and to the tensions which exist between the Regulatorand other players in the industry.     

Intermarket network externalities and competition: An application to the media industry

Intermarket network externalities occur when the utility of a good produced in a given industry varies with the size of the demand for a good produced in another. A particularly significant example of this phenomenon is provided by the interaction between the media and advertising industries. Media consumers vary according to their willingness to pay for a media good, which depends on the advertising volume. In the advertising market, advertisers vary according to their willingness to pay for an advertisement, which also depends positively on the audience reached. We model a situation of competition between two content providers who are rivals in both the media and advertising industries, choosing simultaneously the newspaper prices and the advertising rates. We characterize the equilibria of the game and explore how they depend on audience attitudes towards advertising. Our main finding is that two-sided interactions may induce exit by one of the media companies from either only the advertising market or both markets.     

Industry competition in China: an external governance mechanism or an external incentive

We focus on the impact of industry competition on earnings management in listed companies in China. Empirical analysis reveals the following: (1) When competition within an industry is relatively low, it lowers the extent of earnings management; (2) when competition is relatively high, earnings management is promoted.; (3) within an industry, the more intense the competition, the more companies manipulate earnings when in an inferior competitive position; and (4) state‐owned enterprises that are at a competitive disadvantage within an industry rely more on real earnings management strategies, whereas these effects are insignificant in private firms.     

THE ECONOMICS OF IMPORT PARITY PRICING: A PEDAGOGICAL NOTE

This paper demonstrates that pricing to import parity is not necessarily prima facie evidence of the exercise of market power. It is shown that in the presence of imports both market structures, perfect competition and monopoly, can price to import parity. If markets can be segmented enabling the firm to discriminate between the export and domestic market it is shown that the imperfectly competitive firm can differentially price. Furthermore, as the number of domestic firms is increased, and if these firms are able to segment the market, the differential between domestic and foreign prices is reduced. The import parity price may or may not be charged in the domestic market. A measure of the exercise of market power is therefore the differential between export parity and the domestic price.