Market Power and Incentives to Form Research Consortia

It is well known that instability is a limit to the formation of cartels, and that some synergies are required to give cartel members an advantage over outsiders. In this paper, we explore theoretically the linkage between cost-reduction alliances (like research joint ventures) and the formation of cartels. The former have negative external impacts on outsiders, while the latter have positive external effects on outside (independent) competitors. We find that when the decisions to join both are made simultaneously the cartel can be profitable and stable for a smaller number of members than previously found for cartel formation alone by Salant et al. (1983, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, 185–199). This result follows both for open membership and exclusive membership rules, and suggests a possible anticompetitive impact of research joint ventures.     

The discontent cartel member and cartel collapse: The case of the German cement cartel

We hypothesize a particular source of cartel instability and explore its relevance to understanding cartel dynamics. The cartel instability is rooted in the observation that, upon cartel formation, the relative positions of firms are often fixed which may lead some growth-conscious members to be discontent. This incongruity between a cartel member's allocated market share and its desired market share may result in systematic deviations and the eventual collapse of the cartel. This hypothesis is then taken to the German cement cartel of 1991–2002. We argue that Readymix was such a discontent cartel member and, using a rich pricing data set, are able to characterize how Readymix deviated, how other firms responded, and how it led to the collapse of the cartel.     

Are emerging economies less efficient? Performance persistence and the impact of business group affiliation

By drawing a theoretical distinction between the persistence of superior and poor performance, we reconcile the conflicting predictions of the ‘revisionist’ and accepted views on the persistence of firm performance in emerging economies. Using a sample of manufacturing firms in the United States and India, we show that superior firm performance in emerging economies persists only as much as developed economies in line with the revisionist argument. We also provide evidence consistent with the accepted view that poor firm performance persists longer in emerging economies compared to developed economies. Further exploration of the latter shows that, contrary to predictions of extant theories, firms in emerging economies that are affiliated with an MNC or a business group have a greater persistence of poor performance than firms that are unaffiliated with these intermediate governance structures, and hence would be better off operating at arm's length. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cartel sustainability in retail markets: Evidence from a health service sector

This paper studies the role of cost asymmetries and product differentiation on cartel sustainability by drawing data from a failed retail cartel. Unlike the extensive theoretical literature, little empirical evidence exists on these relationships. First, we analyze cartel compliance and find that players are more likely to comply when cost is symmetric and own cost is high. Next, based on a structural model and counterfactual experiments, we show that a cartel price that satisfies all cartel members does not exist. This result indicates an inherent difficulty of sustaining collusion in retail markets with heterogeneous players. We also show that firm heterogeneities, especially product differentiation rather than cost asymmetries, hinder collusion more. Finally, we derive the level of patience (or the discount factor) required for cartel sustainability when firms split profits based on the Shapley value.     

Consumer Welfare Under the Adjustable-Rate Mortgage: Some Empirical Evidence

The theoretical literature on the economics of mortgage choice holds that consumer-borrower preference for the ARM depends largely on the FRM-ARM rate differential. However, there is no empirical evidence as to whether consumers are better off, worse off, or left indifferent with the choice of the ARM relative to the alternative FRM. This paper estimates the windfall gain or loss induced by the FRM-ARM rate differential in a multiperiod setting. The major results are as follows: (1) on the average consumer-borrowers reap windfall gain from the use of ARM, (2) but some individual consumers had windfall loss, (3) consumers with ARMs that have periodic interest-rate caps have significantly higher windfall gain than consumers whose ARMs have no periodic rate caps, and (4) the level of the windfall gain (loss) appears to be correlated with the slope of the yield curve and the level of interest rate.     

Anti‐Competitive Interconnection: the effects of the elasticity of consumers' expectations and the shape of the network effects function

I find that interconnection might cause the market to be less competitive, and might lead to an increase in the price firms charge for their product. Absent interconnection, firms compete for a consumer for two reasons. The first reason is to obtain revenue from selling the product to a consumer (as in the case without network effects). The second reason is that by expanding the network by one more consumer, the product becomes more attractive to all other consumers. Interconnection eliminates the second reason—when firms interconnect, they are no longer concerned with consumers' following the crowd. I show that consumers and society might be worse off from interconnection. I focus on two factors that make the (post‐interconnection) price increase larger: consumer expectations that are highly sensitive to prices and consumers putting a high value on small increases in network size at the equilibrium market shares. Both of these factors make firms highly competitive, but only if the firms' products' networks are not interconnected.     

Will It Spread or Not? The Effects of Social Influences and Network Topology on Innovation Diffusion

Innovation diffusion theory suggests that consumers differ concerning the number of contacts they have and the degree and the direction to which social influences determine their choice to adopt. To test the impacts of these factors on innovation diffusion, in particular the occurrence of hits and flops, a new agent‐based model for innovation diffusion is introduced. This model departs from existing percolation models by using more realistic agents (both individual preferences and social influence) and more realistic networks (scale free with cost constraints). Furthermore, it allows consumers to weight the links they have, and it allows links to be directional. In this way this agent‐based model tests the effect of VIPs who can have a relatively large impact on many consumers. Results indicate that markets with high social influence are more uncertain concerning the final success of the innovation and that it is more difficult for the innovation to take off. As consumers affect each other to adopt or not at the beginning of the diffusion, the new product has more difficulties to reach the critical mass that is necessary for the product to take off. In addition, results of the simulation experiments show under which conditions highly connected agents (VIPs) determine the final diffusion of the innovation. Although hubs are present in almost any network of consumers, their roles and their effects in different markets can be very different. Using a scale‐free network with a cut‐off parameter for the maximum number of connections a hub can have, the simulation results show that when hubs have limits to the maximum number of connections the innovation diffusion is severely hampered, and it becomes much more uncertain. However, it is found that the effect of VIPs on the diffusion curve is often overestimated. In fact when the influence of VIPs on the decision making of the consumers is strengthened compared with the influence of normal friends, the diffusion of the innovation is not substantially facilitated. It can be concluded that the importance of VIPs resides in their capacity to inform many consumers and not in a stronger persuasive power.     

Referrals in search markets

This paper compares the equilibrium outcomes in search markets with and without referrals. Although it seems clear that consumers would benefit from referrals, it is not at all clear whether firms would unilaterally provide information about competing offers since such information could encourage consumers to purchase the product elsewhere. In a model of a horizontally differentiated product market with sequential consumer search, we show that valuable referrals can arise in the equilibrium: a firm will give referrals to consumers whose ideal product is sufficiently far away from the firm's offering. We allow firms to price-discriminate among consumers, and consumers to misrepresent their tastes. We found that the equilibrium profits tend to be higher in markets with referrals than in markets without. Consumers tend to be better off in the presence of referrals when search costs are not too low, and under a certain parameter range, referrals lead to a Pareto improvement.     

Prosecution and Leniency Programs: The Role of Bluffing in Opening Investigations

This paper characterizes the optimal investigation and leniency policies when the Competition Authority is privately informed about the strength of a cartel case. I show that the Competition Authority can then exploit firms’ uncertainty about the risk of conviction to obtain confessions even when the case is weak. More generally, I show that offering full leniency allows the Competition Authority to open more successful investigations (what I refer to as the ‘activism effect’ of leniency), which overall raises both cartel desistance and cartel deterrence. Finally, I discuss the policy implications of the model.     

Multi-Market Collusion with Demand Linkages and Antitrust Enforcement

This paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand-related markets. We show that cartel prosecution can have a knock-on effect: bringing down a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel stability and leads to the break-up of the cartel in the adjacent market. Cartel prosecution can also have a waterbed effect: disrupting a cartel increases cartel stability in the adjacent market and induces cartel formation in previously competitive markets. We discuss the impact of dynamic cartel formation on consumer surplus, explore antitrust spillovers, the optimal scope of antitrust interventions and cartel formation with local firms.     

What types of switching costs to create under behavior-based price discrimination?

We study firms' incentives to create switching costs using a four-period model consisting of two consecutive price-competing stages intervened by options to create switching costs early (before price competition) and late (during price competition). Acknowledging that many real/social switching costs need to be created early while many contractual/pecuniary switching costs are set up late during the competition, we show that firms are better off minimizing real/social switching costs while maximizing contractual/pecuniary switching costs. The results highlight the importance of timing of creation that is embedded in different types of switching costs. We also show that switching costs can actually benefit consumers when firms practice behavior-based price discrimination because consumers can enjoy benefits of deep price discounts without the hassle of actually switching. Therefore, an observed lack of consumer switching should not be immediately interpreted as lack of competition in markets where both switching costs and behavior-based pricing exist.     

Interfirm Bundled Discounts as a Collusive Device

This paper investigates whether and how firms competing in price with homogeneous goods (i.e., Bertrand competitors) can achieve supernormal profits using interfirm bundled discounts. By committing to offering price discounts conditional on the purchase of a specific brand of other differentiated good, the homogeneous good suppliers can separate consumers into distinct groups. Such brand‐specific discounts help the firms relax competition and attain a collusive outcome. Consumers become worse off due to higher effective prices. Our result shows that in oligopolies it is feasible to leverage other's market power without excluding rivals.     

Product Choice and the Importance of Aesthetic Design Given the Emotion‐laden Trade‐off between Sustainability and Functional Performance

This paper investigates the trade‐off decision that consumers face when choosing between a product that is perceived to be more sustainable (i.e., more socially and environmentally responsible) and another product that instead is perceived to offer superior functional performance. Prior research has demonstrated that consumers often believe that there is a trade‐off between sustainability and performance, and in some cases, this trade‐off may be real and not just perceived. The objectives of the current research are to understand the mediators and moderators of this trade‐off choice and to illustrate one specific way in which to use this understanding to promote the consumption of relatively more sustainable products despite a perceived performance trade‐off. Two separate studies were conducted. The first employed a student‐based sample, whereas the second employed a nationally representative online sample. In both studies, participants were presented with a choice between two consumer products. One product was depicted as having superior sustainability characteristics (and average functional performance), and the other product was depicted as having superior functional performance (and average sustainability characteristics). Participants were asked to imagine that they were leaning toward choosing one product over the other, and then rated the degree to which they were feeling a set of possible emotions. Following these ratings, participants chose one of the products. The results suggest that consumers presented with such a trade‐off will tend to choose the product with superior functional performance over the product with superior sustainability characteristics, due to feelings of distress, until a minimum threshold of functional performance is achieved. The current research also shows that choice given this trade‐off depends upon the degree to which consumers value sustainability that, in turn, is mediated by consumers’ feelings of confidence and guilt. Further, based on an understanding of the emotions mediating choice in this context, the authors demonstrate how the effective use of product aesthetic design can improve the relative choice likelihood of sustainable products. Specifically, the authors demonstrate that superior aesthetic design has a disproportionately positive effect on the choice likelihood of sustainability‐advantaged (versus performance‐advantaged) products due to the effect that superior aesthetic design has on overcoming the potential lack of confidence in sustainable products. These findings highlight the specific value of aesthetic product design in the context of marketing sustainable products and suggest that it is especially important for firms interested in marketing sustainable products to also develop market‐leading product aesthetic design capabilities.     

PAYING FOR LOYALTY: PRODUCT BUNDLING IN OLIGOPOLY*

In recent times, pairs of retailers such as supermarket and retail gasoline chains have offered bundled discounts to customers who buy their respective product brands. These discounts are a fixed amount off the headline prices that allied brands continue to set independently. We show that a pair of firms can profit from offering a bundled discount to the detriment of other firms and consumers whose preferences are farther removed from the bundled brands. Indeed, when both pairs of firms negotiate bundling arrangements, there are no beneficiaries and consumers simply find themselves consuming a sub‐optimal brand mix.     

Post-cartel tacit collusion: Determinants,consequences, and prevention

We experimentally investigate the determinants of post-cartel tacit collusion (PCTC), the effects of PCTC on market outcomes, and potential policy measures aimed at its prevention. PCTC occurs robustly with or without fines or leniency and is determined both by collusive price hysteresis and learning about cartel partners’ characteristics and strategies. As a result, it is also strongly related to the preceding cartel success. PCTC generates a downward bias in the estimated cartel overcharges. This threatens the effectiveness of deterrence induced by private damage litigation and fines imposed on colluding firms based on the overcharge. This bias further increases with preceding cartel stability such that especially more stable sets of colluding firms may be deterred less when PCTC is present. Rematching colluding subjects with strangers within a session prevents PCTC. This indicates that barring colluding managers from their posts could help impede PCTC in the field.     

Bill-and-Keep peering

Peering arrangements between Internet Service Providers (ISPs), in which providers agree to carry traffic originating from a peer, are common in the Internet. A common contractual peering agreement between smaller ISPs is “Bill-and-Keep”, where no money changes hands between the peers. This paper first investigates a situation when ISPs who have access to a transit ISP capable of handling their traffic for a fee, decide to peer incurring some fixed peering cost. Using a simple model it is shown that Bill-and-Keep peering is the fair and efficient outcome if the transit ISP charges for both inbound and outbound traffic and transit charges as well as costs of peering are symmetric. Next, complementarity between providers at the operational level, as measured by improvement in quality of service (QoS), is analyzed using an idealized model. Assuming that each provider incurs costs, or degradation in QoS, from its traffic traversing its own as well as the peer's links and chooses the amount of traffic to send on its peers’ links in its self-interest, the Nash equilibria of the resulting one shot game and then of an infinitely repeated game are analyzed. For the one-shot game, it is established that, while it is not possible for all the providers to be worse off, it is certainly possible for all of them to be better off. An intuitive sufficient condition for each of the providers to be better off in Nash equilibrium is then derived. Further, it is shown that providers that are better off in the one-shot game can cooperate using threat strategies in an infinitely repeated game and can each be even better off. Coalition formation between peers as a dynamic process is also investigated and some examples and conjectures on some preliminary findings are provided. Finally, the policy implications of the findings are discussed.     

The bakers of Washington cartel: Twenty-five years later

Craig M. Newmark challenges the findings of a 1965 Federal Trade Commission decision and Economic Report that a price fixing cartel increased bread prices in the state of Washington from the mid-1950s to 1964. Newmark believes prices were higher during the cartel's existence because retailers in the west had higher margins and that bakers in the west had higher wages and higher normal profits than elsewhere in the country. Newmark ignores evidence that the cartel had set the higher retailer margins in Washington and that the labor costs and profits of Washington bakers were not higher than elsewhere. The Washington bakers had inflated distribution costs and excess capacity prior to the cartel's breakup. This result is commonplace when a cartel stimulates costly nonprice competition, so that the higher prices of the cartel members end up primarily in higher unit cost. Finally, Newmark claims that the reason prices fell in 1965 was the entry of a significant size price cutter, not the demise of the cartel. What Newmark characterized as a principal entrant was actually a tiny, two-man operation, with less than a 1.0 percent market share. The record shows that this entrant did not trigger the precipitous price decline occuring when the cartel was destroyed.     

Collusion in a price-quantity oligopoly

In the context of an infinitely repeated oligopoly game, we study collusion among firms that simultaneously choose prices and quantities. We compare a price cartel with a price-quota cartel and analyze when and why firms prefer the latter to the former. Output quota may be required to solve coordination and incentive problems when market demand is sufficiently elastic. If market demand is sufficiently inelastic, then the cartel faces a trade-off between increasing prices and the amount of costly overproduction. We find that a price cartel prices consistently below the monopoly price to mitigate excessive production. In this case, a quota arrangement allows firms to avoid overproduction and to sustain the monopoly price. From a policy perspective, our findings suggest that an overall price increase in conjunction with more stable prices and market shares is indicative of collusion in industries where production precedes sales and outputs are imperfectly observable.     

Optimal antitrust policy under different regimes of fines

This paper shows how antitrust laws against price-fixing can be enforced efficiently in the presence of asymmetric information between the authorities and the industry, and under different regimes of pecuniary punishment. We consider two regimes of fines that are often used in practice. The first involves a fine based on revenues of the industry while the second is related to the damage caused to consumers. The analysis shows that since investigation is costly, it is optimal from a welfare point of view to tolerate some degree of collusion in both cases. Comparing the deterrence levels, we show that no regime is a priori better than the other. In addition, we show that for industries where the possibilities of collusion are small, the first system dominates the second in terms of efficiency. Conversely, for high possibilities of collusion, the second system is better.     

Life expectancy of international cartels: An empirical analysis

This paper quantifies the importance of the various determinants of life expectancy for international cartels active throughout this century. I explain cartels' optimal duration as a function of market structure and demand growth and estimate the associated parameters recognizing that durability cannot be negative. According to the results, increases in either market shares or cartel concentration prolong life expectancy. Faster demand growth shortens cartel durability but this effect is not reliable. I also find that growth effects are sensitive to both the period of activity and the country coverage.The calculations in this paper use LIMDEP version 5.0. I am grateful to participants in seminars at the Federal Reserve Board and the U.S. International Trade Commission; to Alexander David, Jon Faust, Michael Gibson, William Greene, James Griffin, William Helkie, Dale Henderson, John Irons, Doug Irwin, Michael Leahy, Matthew Pritsker, Stephen Salant, and Janice Shack-Marquez for several suggestions. I also received very useful comments from two anonymous referees. The views expressed in this paper are solely the responsibility of the author and should not be interpreted as reflecting those of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or other members of its staff.