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Using data from a large panel of countries over the period 1995–2015, this article empirically investigates the effect of corruption on public debt. Overall, the estimates reveal that corruption increases public debt. The effect, however, appears to be heterogeneous across income-related sample splits: it is stronger for advanced economies, but weaker and less statistically robust for less-developed countries, where external factors such as foreign aid may also affect public debt. The analysis suggests the inadequacy of conventional wisdom assuming that more detrimental fiscal effects of corruption arise in low-income countries. 相似文献
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A government that cannot commit to future policy choices faces a trade-off that explains the level of debt. On the one hand, there is an incentive to increase debt and delay taxation, so as to reduce current distortions. On the other hand, inflating current prices lowers the real value of nominal debt and so there is a motive to reduce it now. The size of long-run debt will depend on the interaction of these two opposing incentives. The critical determinant is the willingness of households to substitute away from goods being taxed by inflation. Numerical simulations show that the model matches some qualitative and quantitative properties of U.S. policy variables, including the fact that wars are frequently financed with a mix of instruments. The theory interprets the unusual post-World War II inflation and fast liquidation of accumulated debt as being due to higher long-run debt and expenditure in the period leading up to the war. 相似文献
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This study aims to investigate the dynamics of public debts over more than four decades for two of the main developed countries: the USA and the UK. To do this, we apply nonlinearity tests and threshold models. While the first tests enable us to check for further changes in the data, threshold models are required to assess the switching-regime hypothesis and to apprehend the main changes in public debts through different regimes. Our results provide several interesting findings. First, for both countries, we noted several structural breaks associated with well-known economic downturns, oil shocks, debt crises and financial crashes. Second, public debt dynamics seem to be characterized by various threshold effects that can improve the modeling and forecasting of public debt evolution. It is important to note that public debts vary significantly according to the regime and that a regime can be induced by specific macroeconomic factors. Keeping a close eye on such factors may help economists and policymakers to better control future public debt evolutions. 相似文献
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Lefteris Tsoulfidis 《International Review of Economics》2007,54(1):1-12
Classical economists had developed advanced theories of public debt. These theories, however, have received less attention
compared with those of value and distribution. Classical theories of national debt at best receive cursory consideration and
are only used to offer further justification to modern theories. Smith’s discussion of the unproductive role of the state
and the Ricardian equivalence theorem are examples that are found routinely in the books of public finance or macroeconomics.
As for the ideas of classical economists per se these are considered inappropriate for modern economies and are ignored even
in books of history of economic thought. This paper takes issue with this view and argues that the ideas of classical economists
on public debt might be more relevant nowadays than is commonly thought. (JEL: B12, B22) 相似文献
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In this work we examine how economic growth affects public debt when interacted with reelection prospects. Reelection considerations shorten political time horizons and give rise to political myopia that exacerbates debt accumulation. That laxer institutional reelection restrictions (e.g., no term limits) mitigate this effect due to electoral accountability is well known. Incorporating growth, we find that this mitigation can be reversed because less myopic, and more accountable, incumbents put more emphasis on smoothing the effects of growth across generations. We test these predictions using an annual-based panel of U.S. states over the period 1963–2010. Our identification strategy rests on constitutionally-entrenched differences in gubernatorial term limits that provide plausibly exogenous variation in reelection prospects, and aggregate national TFP shocks that are exogenous to individual states. Our estimates indicate that when reelection is possible a one standard deviation positive income shock induces, within the same year, a relative increase of approximately $40 in real per capita public debt. 相似文献
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We show that to account for the cross-sectional divergence in debt-to-income ratios in US data a DSGE model must assume a tax reallocation across the top- and bottom-income quantile of the population, rather than differential productivity growth, and low cost of access to financial intermediation. 相似文献
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We study whether fiscal policies, especially public debt, can help to curb the macroeconomic and health consequences of epidemics. Our approach is based on three main features: we introduce the dynamics of epidemics in an overlapping generations model to take into account that old people are more vulnerable; people are more easily infected when pollution is high; public spending in health care and public debt can be used to tackle the effects of epidemics. We show that fiscal policies can promote convergence to a stable disease-free steady state. When public policies are not able to permanently eradicate the epidemic, public debt, and income transfers could reduce the number of infected people and increase capital and GDP per capita. As a prerequisite, pollution intensity should not be too high. Finally, we define a household subsidy policy that eliminates income and welfare inequalities between healthy and infected individuals. 相似文献
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Timothy P. Sharpe 《International Review of Applied Economics》2013,27(6):707-728
Inter-governmental Organisations, such as the IMF and OECD, advocate a medium-term reduction in deficit spending and public debt accumulation among advanced economies to satisfy conditions of fiscal sustainability. Buttressing the need for fiscal austerity, Reinhart and Rogoff claim to have identified a so-called tipping point, beyond which public debt accumulation negatively affects economic growth. While recent data seem to indicate that some Eurozone (non-sovereign) economies have reached a tipping point, for other advanced (sovereign) economies, such as the US, UK and Japan, this is not clear. The mainstream tipping point literature however does not recognise the importance of institutional arrangements for the conduct of fiscal and monetary policy. Furthermore, the literature sheds little light on the transmission mechanism between high public debt and low economic growth. This article draws on the principles of Modern Monetary Theory to discuss institutional arrangements and to justify the theoretical and empirical focus on Eurozone economies. The empirical analysis unpacks the transmission mechanism(s) to reveal that Eurozone economies have reached a public debt threshold limit with respect to long-term interest rates. 相似文献
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Geoffrey Brennan 《Constitutional Political Economy》2012,23(3):182-198
Public debt (as opposed to current taxation) alters the inter-temporal pattern of tax rates??it reduces current rates and increases future rates. Accordingly, whether the share of the cost of a given public expenditure is reduced or increased by debt for a given individual depends on the time profile of that individual??s income (tax base) vis-à-vis others?? incomes. Therefore, given the age-profile of income in virtually all Western countries, individuals will tend to be better off under current taxes the younger they are. If (as most standard models of political economy assume) individuals vote according to their economic interests, and if they are tolerably well-informed, then the pattern of support for public debt will track age. And increases in the median age of the population will lead to larger public debt. In other words, public debt policy collapses to a kind of demographic politics. This explanation may, however, be sensitive to assumptions about motives for bequest. Specifically, if bequestors seek to leave positive bequests and are motivated exclusively by the lifetime consumption of their heirs (as well as themselves) then the aged may, under plausible assumptions about the age of their heirs, prefer current taxes over debt. 相似文献
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By issuing tax-exempt bonds, the government can incur debt and never pay back any principal or interest, even if the economy without public debt evolves on a dynamically efficient growth path. The welfare effects of such a Ponzi type borrowing scheme are mixed. The current young will unambiguously benefit. Depending on preferences and the aggregate technology, a finite number of subsequent generations may also benefit. However, the welfare of all generations thereafter will be lower than in the economy without public debt. 相似文献
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Akira Kamiguchi 《Applied economics letters》2019,26(15):1289-1293
This study explores the mechanism that causes an inverted U-shaped relationship between the public debt to GDP ratio and the economic growth rate which is observed in empirical studies. We show that this relationship is caused even when the government does not introduce the golden rule of public finance, and government health care expenditure has important role in generating this relationship. 相似文献
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Ichiro Fukunaga Takuji Komatsuzaki Hideaki Matsuoka 《Contemporary economic policy》2022,40(1):124-137
This paper quantitatively assesses the effects of inflation shocks on the public debt-to-GDP ratio in 19 advanced economies using simulation and estimation approaches. The simulations suggest that 1 percentage point shock to the inflation rate can reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio by about 0.7 percentage points on average across countries, while the estimated impulse responses are a little larger and more persistent. Additional assumptions taking into account financial repression do not necessarily make these effects substantially larger. These results imply that modestly higher inflation, even if accompanied by some financial repression, could reduce the public debt burden only marginally. 相似文献
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Recent data on the accumulation patterns of public debt across OECD countries suggests a synthesis is possible between the theoretical and empirical approaches to public debt and also between the traditional and more recent political economy explanations of public debt accumulation. The inductive approach of recent political economy explanations is combined with the intertemporal constraints highlighted in the Ricardian–Barro theory to present a reinterpretation of cross-country debt accumulations patterns. Like the elephant in the blind men and the elephant fable, the conclusion is glaringly obvious. Formal and informal budgetary constraints matter.
相似文献
John ConsidineEmail: Phone: +353-21-490-2850Fax: +353-21-427-3920 |
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Sustainability of Austrian public debt is investigated in the context of political objectives such as stabilizing the business cycle, increasing chances for being re-elected and implementing the ideologies of political parties. Several tests indicate that Austrian fiscal policies were sustainable in the period 1960–1974, while from 1975 on, public debt grew much more rapidly. The development of public debt in Austria seems to be driven not primarily by ideology, but by structural causes and a shift in the budgetary policy paradigm. We find some empirical evidence that governments in Austria dominated by one party run higher deficits than coalition governments. There are no indications of a political business cycle. 相似文献
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Public debt and fertility are two issues of major concern in the current economic policy debate, especially in countries with below-replacement-fertility and large debt (which appears further enlarged as a consequence of the recent world financial distress 2008–2009). In this paper we show that, at the steady state, public debt is in general harmful for fertility, in that debt issuing almost ever crowds fertility. The relationship is however reversed if debt is sufficiently low and the share of capital (labor) in the economy is sufficiently low (high). Hence, our analysis would recommend that developed, capital intensive economies (such as OECD countries) aiming at a fertility recovery should reduce national debt, while developing, labor intensive economies, aiming at reducing fertility, should increase (reduce) national debt only if they are debt virtuous (vicious). 相似文献
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This paper addresses the basic tradeoff between the stabilisation properties of budgets and the sustainability of long run fiscal positions. The modeling framework consists of a simple non-monetary endowment economy with overlapping generations, extended to account for stochastic endowments and borrowing constrained households. A benign government chooses the optimal degree of responsiveness of net taxes to individual incomes and an optimal measure of long-run public debt in order to smooth households' consumption across states of nature. In the presence of a deficit constraint for the government, the results point to the desire for lower debt levels than those currently prevailing in European Union countries in order to enable a more effective hedging of personal income uncertainty by means of more active automatic fiscal stabilisers. The optimal degree of automatic stabilisation and debt reduction is conditional on the characteristics of economic cycles. 相似文献
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Udo Ebert 《Journal of Economics》1998,67(1):17-38
The paper considers relative standards which limit the level of emissions per unit of output. The representative firm is characterized by a cost function describing the actual production process, a separate abatement technology, and the fact that (gross) emissions are proportional to output. At first, the implications of a relative standard and of its marginal change for a single firm are examined. It is shown that the standard cannot be replaced by a corresponding tax. Afterwards a positive analysis is performed for an industry consisting of identical firms under perfect competition. Comparative statics are used to analyze the impacts of changes in the relative standard in a short-run and long-run equilibrium. It turns out that the standard always possesses a price effect. Moreover the relevant factors which govern price, quantity, and profit changes are revealed. Then the paper characterizes the optimal standard for the same framework. A main result is that the first-best allocation can never be obtained by means of a relative standard, even if firms are identical. The influence of the demand and supply side on an optimal standard can be demonstrated since the underlying model is simple and transparent. The resulting market price is compared to social marginal costs. Finally the investigation is extended to monopoly and symmetric oligopoly. 相似文献