Cogeneration and electric power industry restructuring

In 1978, Congress passed the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) in response to the energy crisis of the early 1970s. One of the unintended results of PURPA has been to show that electric generation was not a natural monopoly and could be opened to competition. Both the theoretical and empirical determinants of cogeneration and how they may be affected by future electric power industry restructuring are important for future industrial generation decisions. This paper explores these determinants and identifies differences between industrial cogenerators which sell power back into the electricity grid (commercial generators) and those which keep all of their electricity generation for internal purposes (self generators). The empirical results indicate that increases in industrial firm technical capabilities tends to increase their probabilities of both commercial and self generating. In addition, the models indicate that increases in retail electricity prices and industrial output increases industrial generation probabilities. The ability to switch fuels enhances industrial generation probabilities, as does a decrease in the price of natural gas. The results also imply that under electric restructuring a number of industrial generators may find that they face a stranded cost problem much like the one faced by their electric utility counterparts.     

A note on optimal capital stock and financing constraints

There is a robust literature on the relationship between financing constraints and real investment. Little has been said on the relationship between financing constraints and capital stock in the long run. This note focuses on this last issue. To keep the model tractable, we assume that the firm employs a single input, and this input is used as collateral. We get three main results. Firstly, we show that the optimal capital stock chosen by a firm is affected by financing constraints even when they are slack at the current time. Secondly, we show that the net present value of the potentially constrained firm is always smaller than the one of the never constrained firm. Finally, we find that in the presence of latent financing constraints the firm does not limit itself to reducing its investment when the upper limit is reached. What it actually does is to lower its long run optimal capital stock, amplifying the effects of constraints in the long run.     

Auctions for PURPA purchases: A simulation study

Competition was introduced into the electric utility industry with the passage of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) of 1978. Increasing interest has appeared in structuring the PURPA purchase market into an auction system. This paper addresses the design issues associated with setting up such markets and introduces a simulation model to study them. The simulation analysis is guided by theoretical issues such as the alleged inefficiency of first-price auctions. We find that efficiency concerns raised about first-price auctions turn out to be less important than simple theoretical concerns would suggest.     

Temporary Protection and Technology Choice under the Learning Curve*

This paper examines the effects of temporary protection in a model of Cournot competition under the learning curve. We show that when the protected firm can choose among multiple technologies subject to different scopes for learning, protection may hurt the long‐run competitiveness of the firm by inducing it to choose a technology with little scope for learning.     

Dynamic energy demand models with latent equipment

Our approach to energy demand modelling is based on a two-level dynamic analysis. In the short run we consider the stock of energy-using appliances as fixed. Only its intensity of use may change. However, in the long run this stock may vary. The short- and long-run demand equations are integrated into a single-equation dynamic model in which the equipment is ruled out. Our application to the demand for energy in Switzerland shows the power of this simple but flexible model which provides a thorough explanation of past behavior and a firm basis for the exploration of future demand evolution paths.     

A dynamic model of advertising by the regulated firm

A profit-maximizing firm subject to price regulation typically seeks alternative variables to control if the regulatory constraint is binding. Advertising may be one such variable. By shifting the demand curve inward or outward between rate hearings, the firm may increase its earnings above the allowed level. Here, a simple discrete-time optimal-control model is proposed to examine the dynamic implications of advertising by the regulated firm. Our results indicate that, in the long run, the combined effect of regulation and advertising leads to a steady-state equilibrium that is closer to the minimum point on the firm's long-run average-cost curve than the original output level. Thus, an invisible-hand property is established that pushes the regulated firm to shift its demand curve toward the minimum point on its long-run average-cost curve in the presence of regulation. As a result, the well-known allocative inefficiency created by rate-of-return regulation (PMC), on which so much has been written over the past 100 years, is reduced (and, under certain conditions, eliminated) if the regulated firm is allowed to advertise.     

The market response to corporate scandals involving CEOs

This article examines corporate scandals of both a financial and nonfinancial nature between 1993 and 2011 which is expressly linked to a firm’s CEO. Findings suggest that in the short run, investors react adversely to such events and that recalcitrant CEOs end up costing their shareholders dearly. Such scandals are more likely to occur among large firms, firms with insiders on the board and where the value of options granted to a firm’s managers is substantial. However, firms with more cash flows are less likely to be mired in such scandals, and their stock returns are less likely to be affected. There is an increase in stock price volatility of affected firms in the days following the announcement of the scandal. A point of respite for investors is the damage being confined to the short run. The stock price performance of the firms affected by the scandals matches the performance of control firms in the long run post-announcement. However, the operating performance of the sample firms is better than their matched counterparts in the years after the scandal. We contribute to the extant literature by considering corporate scandal events that are the doings of a firm’s CEO and not necessarily financially motivated.     

Market collusion and the politics of protection

This paper investigates the relationship between trade and competition policy within a model where market collusion and protectionist lobbying are themselves related. Collusion and lobbying are modeled as joint products of the same collective effort of firms. In equilibrium, firms cannot achieve greater cooperation in one dimension without reducing it in the other. A trade agreement that limits the effectiveness of lobbying may cause firms to increase market collusion, thereby increasing the domestic price. Thus, international trade agreements may run counter to the goals of competition policy. On the other side, a more restrictive competition policy is shown to either reduce the domestic price or reduce import protection. Thus, competition policy tends to promote trade policy goals. The reason is that restrictive competition policy undermines collusion at the source—it decreases the per-firm benefit to collusion relative to the gains from deviating—reducing firm cooperation in both dimensions.     

Partial Small Country Import Pass-through,Currency Composition,and Imported Inputs

Long run import pass-through is investigated in a partial equilibrium model in the context of a small domestic economy. Contrary to the standard view, it is shown that long run small country pass-through may be incomplete provided three sufficient conditions are met: (i) the foreign producer uses imported inputs, (ii) those inputs are paid for in a neutral currency, and (iii) three-way arbitrage is in operation. The theoretical predictions of.the partial equilibrium model are tested against the results of recent small country empirical studies. The sensitivity of pass through to productivity changes, monopsonistic behaviour, imperfect competition, the timeframe of the firm. and tariff protection are also examined. [F13]     

SHORT‐RUN AND LONG‐RUN IMPLICATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION ON FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE

Opposing theoretical arguments exist regarding the effect of environmental regulation on financial performance. Some studies argue that environmental regulation constrains firms' abilities to exploit revenue‐enhancing or cost‐reducing opportunities. Other studies, representing the Porter hypothesis, argue that environmental regulation motivates firms to innovate, which ultimately improves financial performance. Although much of the debate focuses on long‐run effects, there are also important short‐run effects. This study provides empirical evidence regarding the short‐run and long‐run effects of Clean Water Act regulation on financial performance. To generate this evidence, we examine the effect of permitted wastewater discharge limits, on the return on sales, using panel data on publicly owned firms in the chemical manufacturing industries. We find that Clean Water Act regulation improves financial performance in both the short run and the long run with a stronger effect in the long run. These results suggest that some net benefits may be realized during a short‐run transition to comply with a tighter permitted discharge limit, with additional benefits accruing to the firm in the long run because the firm has more time to innovate. (JEL K23, L25, L51, L65, Q52)     

Factor market structure and technology choice in the Colombian brick industry

This paper examines the relationship between factor markets and an industry structure such that capital-intensity is correlated with size, and firms of different sizes coexist in the long run. Empirical evidence shows that wages vary positively with firm size after correcting for education, experience, turnover and firm location. Secondary source evidence suggests that capital access differs across entrepreneurs, according to their positions in Colombian society. These assumptions are combined in a model which can generate the industry structure observed. The alternative hypothesis that capital access improves over a firm's lifetime, so that industry structure represents a growth path, is examined and rejected.     

The persistence of innovation: a panel data investigation on manufacturing firms

This paper represents a contribution to empirical debate on the persistence of innovation in the firm, by exploiting an innovative panel database that, for the first time, links three waves of the Italian Community Innovation Survey with an administrative data source providing economic and financial information for firms in the Italian manufacturing sector, 1996–2003. By using both a dynamic logistic model and a Granger causality approach, we show that in order to innovate successfully it is much more important to have an adequate flow of profits during an appropriate time span rather than high profits only during one period before innovation. Our causality tests prove the existence of a dynamic interaction between innovation and profitability: successful innovation can, in the short run, generate the profitability conditions that can then enhance the financial resources needed to reinvest in new technological opportunities, thus causing the firm to persist in its innovative behaviour. We have also shown that another important source of persistence is represented by past innovative experience. A firm with consolidated innovative behaviour would have a higher probability of future successful innovation with respect to a firm that occasionally (or accidentally) innovates. Persistence in innovation enables a firm to take advantage of substantial technological and organizational learning effects, which improve with time.     

Why do firms disclose knowledge and how does it matter?

In this paper we propose a simulation model aimed at describing the emergence and the dynamics of innovation networks, with particular emphasis on the role of open knowledge disclosure. It is argued that firms that widely disclose knowledge to other firms are more likely to enter innovation networks and to acquire a central position within these networks. By disclosing knowledge, firms increase their reputation, which indicates to other organizations that they are competent, and that it is worth starting a partnership with them. The higher a firm reputation, the higher its probability of entering new R&D partnerships with other firms. Our model provides, therefore, a rationale for behaviors of open knowledge disclosure by showing that such strategies, although risky in the short run, may pay in the long run by enabling firms to access external sources of knowledge more easily.     

Privatization and entries of foreign enterprises in a differentiated industry

We investigate whether or not privatization is beneficial from the viewpoint of social welfare in a monopolistic competition model. We discuss the relationship between the welfare effects of privatization and the degree of foreign direct investment in the private sector, which is an important problem in developing countries and in transition economies such as China and Central and Eastern European countries. We find that, in the long run, privatization of a public firm is more likely to improve welfare when the country depends on foreign capital in the private sector, whereas the opposite tendency exists in the short run.     

Firm Heterogeneity,Contract Enforcement,and the Industry Dynamics of Offshoring*

We develop an endogenous growth model with R&D spillovers to study the long‐run consequences of offshoring with firm heterogeneity and incomplete contracts. In so doing, we model offshoring as the geographical fragmentation of a firm's production chain between a home upstream division and a foreign downstream division. While there is always a positive correlation between upstream bargaining weight and offshoring activities, there is an inverted U‐shaped relationship between these and growth. Whether offshoring with incomplete contracts also increases consumption depends on firm heterogeneity. As for welfare, whereas with complete contracts an R&D subsidy is enough to solve the inefficiency due to R&D spillovers, with incomplete contracts a production subsidy is also needed.     

GENERALIZED OLIGOPOLY DERIVED DEMAND WITH AN APPLICATION TO TAX INDUCED ENTRY*

Equations are derived for the factor demand of an N firm oligopoly for fairly general market demand curves and production functions. Free-entry is then introduced and it is shown that this may either raise or lower derived demand elasticity. This result is then applied to show that a unit production tax may encourage entry and so cause larger changes in price and quantity in the short run than the long run.     

Power in the multinational corporation in industry equilibrium

Recent theories of the multinational corporation introduce the property rights model of the firm and examine whether to integrate or outsource firm activities locally or to a foreign country. This paper focuses instead on the internal organization of the multinational corporation by examining the power allocation between headquarters and subsidiaries. We provide a framework to analyse the interaction between the decision to serve the local market by exporting or FDI, market access and the optimal mode of organization of the multinational corporation. We find that subsidiary managers are given decision power to run the firm at intermediate levels of host country competition. We then provide comparative statics on the optimal organization of the multinational corporation for changes in fixed FDI entry costs, trade costs, as well as changes in information technology.      

Do incentive systems spur work motivation of inventors in high tech firms? A group-based perspective

In this paper, we explore with a model the potential tensions between the incentive system of groups of inventors and knowledge diversity in a high tech firm. We show that, when all groups are rewarded and able to interact freely with their peers, extrinsic and intrinsic motives are mutually self-reinforcing, leading to crowding in effects. As a result, the level of created knowledge increases in each group, reinforcing the diversity of the firm’s knowledge base. By contrast, competitive rewards and constrained autonomy are likely to produce motivating effects in a small number of groups, limiting knowledge creation to the firm’s core competencies. In this case, the firm can suffer from crowding out effects by the other groups, leading eventually to the extinction of creation in their fields and reduced diversity in the long run. The results are illustrated with empirical findings from a case study of a French high tech firm.     

ENVIRONMENTAL DYNAMICS AND THE LINKS BETWEEN GROWTH,VOLATILITY AND MORTALITY

I construct a model of a growing economy with pollution. The analysis of the model shows that the interactions between capital accumulation, endogenous lifetime and environmental quality determine both the long‐run growth rate and the pattern of convergence (i.e., monotonic or cyclical) towards the balanced growth path. I argue that such interactions can provide a possible explanatory factor behind the, empirically observed, negative correlation between growth and volatility. Furthermore, the model may capture the observed pattern whereby economic growth and mortality rates appear to be negatively related in the long run, but positively related in the short run.     

Eco-labels, Trade and Protectionism

Eco-labels are suspected to serve protectionist purposes. We analyze the choice between an environmental standard and a voluntary eco-label scheme in a partial trade model with one domestic firm and one foreign firm. The environmental standard will only apply to the domestic firm, while both firms can adopt the eco-label. Pollution is production related, and domestic consumers demand products that are produced in an “environmentally friendly” way. Our results show that it may be optimal for the domestic government to introduce an eco-label and get both firms to adopt the label, instead of setting an environmental standard. However, to what extent this policy serves protectionist purposes is ambiguous. In particular, if the willingness to pay for green products is sufficient to cover the pollution abatement costs of the foreign firm, foreign firm profit will increase while domestic firm profit will decrease compared to the outcome with a domestic environmental standard. On the other hand, if the willingness to pay for green products is insufficient, the foreign firm would be better off with a domestic environmental standard.