中国民办高等教育转型发展研究综述

目前,民办高等教育转型发展是符合国家发展战略和社会发展需求的必然选择.为科学研究、梳理我国民办高等教育转型发展问题,本文选择了民办高等教育为什么转型发展、转型发展的困境,如何转型发展三个问题进行综述.随着我国高等教育结构性调整的持续推进,民办高等教育将呈现内涵式发展的新特点,创新创业教育是民办高等教育发展的新突破点,将会出现一批国内一流、世界知名的应用技术大学.     

我国民办高等教育竞争力提高途径探析

由政府出资提供的高等教育相对稀缺是困扰我国教育产业发展重要问题。近年来政府通过推行各种政策,努力发展民办高等教育以期填补这一缺口。但作为一个新生事物,民办高等教育在其发展过程中,遇到了诸如发展模式、发展路径等问题,这些问题成为了制约民办高等教育的健康发展的桎梏。基于此,本文试图从高等教育产品的性质方面入手,分析民办高等教育产品的特殊性,找出民办高等教育的市场竞争优势所在,为民办高等教育的发展模式及发展路径提出建议。     

教育生态学视域下的民办高职教育发展

民办高职教育是我国高等教育的重要组成部分,但近年来民办高职教育发展的生态因子出现了一定的问题,文章在分析了各生态因素问题的基础上,提出了教育生态视域下民办高教育发展的途径.     

试析广西民办高等教育政策

广西民办高等教育还处于政策主导型发展模式，其发展相对落后主要是由政策因素造成的，政府提供的政策对民办高等教育的发展具有决定性的意义，故试图通过对教育政策的研究，找出广西民办高等教育发展中的政策问题并提出相关对策，以期为广西民办高等教育发展提供参考与借鉴。     

扶持民办高等教育发展的财政政策研究

伴随着高校的进一步发展，在我国社会主义的教育事业中，民办高校已经成为了其中比较重要的一个组成部分并发挥着较大的作用，满足了受教育者接受教育的需求并缓解了我国教育资金投入不足的问题。但是由于不少人对民办高等教育服务性质的认识存在偏差，民办教育的发展面临着众多的问题，例如经费的来源比较单一，政策缺失，相关制度不健全等。本文就从财政支持民办教育的方面进行了相关的研究，就目前存在的问题进行了分析，阐述了扶持民办高等教育发展的财政政策。     

民办高等学校教育投资来源的分析

民办高等学校在我国高等教育大众化的进程中起着十分重要的作用 ,然而其生存和发展受到投资来源的严重制约。文章针对民办高等学校的这一现状 ,对其教育投资的来源进行了分析 ,以期对民办高等学校的发展有所贡献     

浅谈我国民办高等教育的财政扶持政策

高等教育民营化是当今世界高等教育的发展趋势之一,但由于政府政策的缺失,经费来源的单一等问题,在很大程度上限制了民办高等教育事业的进一步发展。政府的财政政策扶持是我国民办高等教育发展的一个重要问题。文章将从财政支持民办高等教育的理论依据、国内现状和对策研究等方面着手,提出在公共财政体制下进一步促进和完善民办高等教育发展的财政政策的几点建议,以推动民办高等教育的持续发展。     

浅析我国民办高等教育政策的起步及发展

一部民办高等教育的发展历史,既是一部政策发展史,又是民办高等教育发展的"缩影"。我国对民办高等教育进行规范的相关政策表明,民办高等教育政策发展分为四个阶段:真空阶段、起步阶段、快速发展阶段、法治化阶段。     

公共财政支持民办高等教育的政策分析——评《我国民办高等教育财政支持制度研究》

高等教育的财政投入问题不仅关系到我国高等教育质量与水平的提升,还关系到我国区域经济与文化产业的长效发展.近年来,随着新形势下教育改革的持续深化,高等教育的财政支持制度研究日益成为人们高度关注的重点课题,引发了众多专家与学者的浓厚兴趣,相关的专业研究成果也给民办高等教育财政投入提供了许多有益的思考与建议.方芳、钟秉林合著的《我国民办高等教育财政支持制度研究》(北京师范大学出版社,2016年版)一书是我国民办高等教育财政调查与研究的重要成果,该书以探讨民办高等教育财政支持的重要性、必要性和可行性为基础,以规范民办高等教育财政机制、统筹规划高等教育财政支持体系为目标,系统地探究了我国民办高等教育财政支持制度的理论问题与实践路径.纵览全书,该书具有以下几个特点.     

民办高等教育实践调研报告

文章分析了我国民办高等教育的成功之处,以及民办高校办学存在的问题与各种疾症,探讨了民办高等教育的未来发展方向。     

Endogenous private information structures

We formally incorporate the option to gather information into a game and thus endogenize the information structure. We ask whether models with exogenous information structures are robust with respect to this endogenization. Any Nash equilibrium of the game with information acquisition induces a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding game with an exogenous structure. We provide sufficient conditions on the structure of the game for which this remains true when ‘Nash’ is replaced by ‘sequential’. We characterize the (sequential) Nash equilibria of games with exogenous information structures that can arise as a (sequential) Nash equilibrium of games with endogenous information acquisition.     

Multidimensional private value auctions

We consider parametric examples of symmetric two-bidder private value auctions in which each bidder observes her own private valuation as well as noisy signals about her opponent's private valuation. We show that, in such environments, the revenue equivalence between the first and second price auctions (SPAs) breaks down and there is no definite revenue ranking; while the SPA is always efficient allocatively, the first price auction (FPA) may be inefficient; equilibria may fail to exist for the FPA. We also show that auction mechanisms provide different incentives for bidders to acquire costly information about opponents’ valuation.     

Reputation and exogenous private learning

Short-run competitors in the chain store game receive noisy signals of the long-run incumbent firm's type. The history of signals, which in the limit is fully revealing, is observable to the competitors but possibly not to the incumbent. As long as there is sufficient noise in the signals, then in any equilibrium a patient weak incumbent obtains a payoff strictly higher than her minmax payoff.     

Public versus private risk sharing

Can public income insurance through progressive income taxation improve the allocation of risk in an economy where private risk sharing is incomplete? The answer depends crucially on the fundamental friction that limits private risk sharing in the first place. If risk sharing is limited because insurance markets are missing for model-exogenous reasons (as in Bewley (1986) [8]) publicly provided risk sharing improves on the allocation of risk. If instead private insurance markets exist but their use is limited by limited enforcement (as in Kehoe and Levine (1993) [23]) then the provision of public insurance interacts with equilibrium private insurance, as, by providing risk sharing, the government affects the value of exclusion from private insurance markets and thus the enforcement mechanism of these contracts. We characterize consumption allocations in an economy with limited enforcement and a continuum of agents facing plausible income risk and tax systems with various degrees of progressivity (public risk sharing). We provide conditions under which more publicly provided insurance actually reduces total insurance for agents (excess crowding-out), or under which more public insurance increases total insurance (partial crowding-out).     

Spillover from private energy research

Technological progress is generally considered a key element in the move towards a less carbon-intensive energy use, and therefore public energy research expenditure has increased in many countries. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether relatively high subsidies to private energy research can be justified by higher external knowledge spillovers from private energy research compared to knowledge spillovers from other private research. Estimation of spillover effects is carried out using an unbalanced panel of more than a thousand Danish private companies observed over the period 2000–2007. We reject that there are higher spillovers from private energy research compared to other types of private research. Instead the results suggest that the external knowledge spillovers from energy research may be lower than for other types of private research. This implies that high subsidies earmarked for private energy research should not be an element in a first best policy to reduce CO₂ emissions.     

Continuity properties of the private core

Let be a sequence of differential information economies, converging to a limit differential information economy (written as ). Denote by the set of all ε-private core allocations, ε ≥ 0 (for ε=0 we get the private core of Yannelis (1991), denoted by ). Under appropriate conditions, we prove the following stability results

Nash implementation with a private good

Summary. I construct a general model of social planning problems, including mixed production economies and regulatory problems with negative externalities as special cases, and I give simple mechanisms for Nash implementation under three increasingly general sets of assumptions. I first construct a continuous mechanism to implement the (constrained) Lindahl allocations of an economy, and I then extend this to arbitrary social choice rules based on prices. I end with a mechani sm to implement any monotonic social choice rule, assuming only the existence of a private (not necessarily transferable) good. In that general case, each agent simply reports an upper contour set, an outcome, and I need two agents to make binary numerical announcements. I do not require the usual no-veto-power condition. Received: February 19, 1998; revised version: January 30, 2002