Unemployment compensation and episodes of nonemployment

This paper examines the influence of unemployment insurance (UI) on the length of nonemployment spells experienced by young workers. The analysis introduces a flexible duration model to estimate the effects of the weekly benefit amount and weeks of eligibility on the amount of time spent between jobs by men, distinguishing between the experiences of UI and non-UI recipients. The empirical findings suggest three conclusions: (1) UI recipients experience longer spells of nonemployment than their non-UI recipient counterparts, at least up to the point of exhaustion of UI benefits; (2) the level of the weekly benefit amount does not significantly affect the length of nonemployment spells; and (3) increasing the number of weeks of eligibility offered by a UI program leads to longer episodes of nonemployment.     

Unemployment insurance, moral hazard, and economic growth

It is important but difficult to distinguish between desirable and undesirable effects of unemployment insurance (UI) that are observationally equivalent when designing optimal UI schemes. For example, a UI-induced rise in the wage rate caused by workers taking more time to match their skills with job vacancies is desirable. However, another view of the same observation is that UI causes permanently higher involuntary unemployment by raising the reservation wage. This paper avoids this problem by regarding the trade-off between the UI replacement rates and unemployment as an intermediate relationship that matters only as far as it impacts economic growth. An empirical analysis of UI replacement rates, unemployment rates, and growth rates using annual panel data finds UI replacement rates are associated with higher unemployment. However, no significant relationship is found between UI-related unemployment and the real growth rate of gross domestic product.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Fiftieth International Atlantic Economic Conference, October 15–18, 2000, Charleston, South Carolina. Financial support from the Scottish Economic Society and the University of Stirling is gratefully acknowledged. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development generously provided access to their database on benefit entitlements and gross replacement rates. The authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for constructive comments.     

Sick of Being Unemployed? Interactions between Unemployment and Sickness Insurance

This paper examines the incentive effects of interactions between unemployment insurance (UI) and sickness insurance (SI), two important components of Sweden's social insurance system. The main topic is how the sickness‐report rate among the unemployed is affected by (i) the limit of 300 workdays for UI benefits, and (ii) the difference in maximum compensation between UI and SI benefits. Results obtained by duration analysis suggest that sick reports increase as the UI benefit expiration date approaches. There is also evidence of an incentive effect on the sick‐report rate because SI offers higher compensation than UI.     

Does the sophistication of use of unemployment insurance evolve with experience?

Abstract The subject of this paper is the repeat use of UI/EI benefits in Canada. The first objective is to investigate empirically the pattern of adjustment that UI users exhibit over a multiple claim horizon. Our secondary objective is to investigate a behavioural channel that might potentially underlie observed adjustment effects, namely, individual learning effects. We estimate an econometric model of how certain features of their claims change as they file subsequent claims. We find strong empirical patterns suggesting that there does appear to be some sort of an adjustment process; beneficiaries tend to approach a desired value for these particular facets of their UI claims. There appears to be some process of growing sophistication of UI use – which some might label ‘gaming the system’– reflecting the adjustment of claims and the concomitant employment patterns to the provisions and rules of the regime. We also uncover evidence in favour of the existence of individual learning effects.     

Constructing Social Citizenship: The Exclusion of African American Women from Unemployment Insurance in the US

Theories of dual social citizenship in the US welfare state postulate that two tiers of citizenship rights are defined by the state, with first-class citizenship status offered to some individuals (historically, white male industrial workers) and second-class rights to others. Unemployment insurance (UI), as an employment-based right, is often characterized as a first-tier right. However, this examination of the original UI law shows that many levels of stratification were incorporated within this one program. Workers of color were excluded from UI benefits under the agricultural exemption, and the exclusion of private domestic workers barred an additional three-fifths of African American women from receiving UI benefits. The UI system built on existing stratification in the labor market to restrict this new right of social citizenship, as policy-makers re-examined and reified overlapping hierarchies of race, gender, and class advantage.     

Unemployment insurance and the business cycle*

An equilibrium model is developed to study the interaction of the business cycle, unemployment insurance (UI), and the labor market for young men in Canada. The model combines optimal job offer, layoff, and recall decisions within a numerically solved and restricted Bayesian–Nash equilibrium. We consider the long‐run implications of changes made to unemployment insurance in Canada during the 1990s. The changes lead to equilibrium increases in average rates of unemployment, layoffs, and recalls. Eliminating UI lowers the equilibrium unemployment rate and average observed earnings. UI policy affects the timing of cycles of endogenous outcomes relative to the productivity cycle.     

Unemployment insurance,recalls, and experience rating

In the United States, almost half of the workers who separated from their jobs ended their unemployment spell by returning to work for their last employer. In this study, we explore the impact of the experience rating (ER) system on recalls. In states using reserve ratio ER, and for a firm that is not at the minimum or the maximum tax rate, each layoff of a worker receiving unemployment benefits increases the future tax rate while each recall reduces it. This provides a natural incentive for firms to recall former workers receiving unemployment benefits. We use the Quarterly Workforce Indicators dataset, which provides information on recalls at the county level, and exploit the differences in tax schedule across states to estimate the impact of ER on recalls. We show that the recall share from hires increases with the degree of ER. We then develop a search and matching model with different unemployment insurance (UI) status, endogenous UI take-up, endogenous separations, recalls, and new hires. We illustrate that this model reproduces the effects of ER on recalls admirably. We show that an increase in the intensity of ER translates into a higher recall share at the steady state, especially for unemployed workers collecting unemployment benefits. We then use this model to analyze the labor market dynamics under alternative financing schemes. We show that ER has stabilization virtues—the higher the degree of ER, the less volatile the unemployment rate.     

Fixing the Leak: Unemployment Incidence before and after a Major Reform of Unemployment Benefits in Germany

We present first empirical results on the effects of a large scale reduction in unemployment benefit entitlement lengths on unemployment inflows in Germany. We show that this highly disputed element of the Hartz‐Reforms in 2006 induced a rush of workers and firms to take advantage of the previous legislation in its last days. Furthermore, we find a considerable decline in transitions to unemployment and an increase in employment rates among older workers after the reform. Our results provide new evidence for the importance of changes in unemployment inflows for the analysis of changes in unemployment outflows.     

Optimal Workfare with Voluntary and Involuntary Unemployment*

This paper addresses the welfare implications of introducing workfare into unemployment benefit policy. We consider a population composed of employed and unemployed workers and of individuals who do not seek employment. Job search behavior is unobservable, which means that voluntarily unemployed individuals can claim unemployment insurance (UI) benefits intended for unemployed workers. As a consequence, pecuniary benefit schemes underinsure workers against unemployment. We show that requiring unproductive activities (workfare) in exchange for UI benefits may generate a Pareto improvement by facilitating better unemployment insurance for workers, and we characterize the situations where this is the case.     

Labor market cycles, unemployment insurance eligibility, and moral hazard

If entitlement to UI benefits must be earned with employment, generous UI is an additional benefit to working, so, by itself, it promotes job creation. If individuals are risk neutral, then there is a UI contribution scheme that eliminates any effect of UI on employment decisions. As with Ricardian Equivalence, this result should be useful to pinpoint the effects of UI to violations of its premises. Our baseline simulation shows that if the neutral contribution scheme derived in this paper were to be implemented, the average unemployment rate in the United States would fall from 5.7 to 4.7 percent. Also, the results show that with endogenous UI eligibility, one can simultaneously generate realistic productivity driven cycles and realistic responses of unemployment to changes in UI benefits.     

The Impact of Unemployment Insurance on the Job Match Quality: A Quantile Regression Approach

This paper investigates the impact of unemployment insurance (UI) generosity on the distribution of the match starting wage and tenure. We show evidence of a positive shift in the location (mean) and scale (variance) of both variables: more generous UI increases expected starting wage and tenure, and this impact is greater at the highest quantiles. In this sense, more generous UI reduces the thickness of the lower tail of match quality (shorter and lower paid jobs), and, at the same time, increases the quality of matches available to all workers (the location effect on match duration and wages). These results can be seen as favorable evidence of match quality gains from UI generosity.The authors would like to thank Pedro Portugal, José A. F. Machado, Francisco Lima and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and discussions, as well as participants at the following conferences: ESPE – Paris, EEA – Amsterdam, LACEA – Paris and IV Brucchi Luchino – Milan. We are also grateful to Marianne Bertrand for providing a file used to construct the simulated unemployment insurance benefits. Opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the Banco de Portugal.     

Unemployment and consumption patterns

In this paper we obtain empirical evidence about the effect of female and male unemployment on household demand of a selection of goods and services. We analyse the percentage of the family income expenditure on a particular group of goods concerning education, domestic services, leisure goods, hotels etc. The impact of several determinants on each group of commodities is estimated using a Tobit specification. The data used for estimation have been taken from The Household Expenditure Survey (1990–91). Our main result is that male and female unemployment has a different impact on the household consumption.     

Unemployment compensation and aggregate fluctuations

This paper focuses on a theoretical and empirical analysis of the effects of discretionary changes of unemployment compensation payments on aggregate fluctuations. By means of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, it is shown that unemployment compensation can stabilize consumption on the one hand; however, on the other one, it has adverse effects on unemployment and output. These theoretical results are confirmed by the empirical structural vector autoregressive model. Moreover, the results highlight the importance of real wages in transmitting unemployment benefit shocks on to the macroeconomy. In particular, discretionary changes lead to an increase in real wages, unemployment and consumption while inducing a small decline in output.     

Severance Payments and Unemployment Insurance: A Commitment Issue

In the event of a job termination, many workers receive severance payments from their employer, in addition to publicly provided unemployment insurance (UI). In the absence of a third party enforcer, contracts featuring severance payments must be supported by an implicit self‐enforcing contract. Workers believe employers will make severance payments only if it is in their best interest ex post. If firms discount the future deeply, they will reduce the severance payment they offer, in order to relax their incentive constraint. Workers are forced to bear risk, and too many workers are laid off. We show that a well‐designed public UI system can correct these distortions.     

Unemployment duration and economic incentives—a quasi random-assignment approach

We investigate how economic incentives and spell duration affect hazard rates out of insured unemployment. We take into account that insured unemployment not always ends in employment, but also in disability, training programs, or benefit sanctions. Our empirical basis is Norwegian register data containing variation in economic incentives and spell duration similar to that of random-assignment experiments. We find that the employment and benefit-sanction hazards are negatively affected by the unemployment insurance replacement ratio, but that the effects vary considerably among individuals. There is negative duration dependence in the employment hazard and positive duration dependence in the disability hazard.     

Unemployment,institutions, and interdependencies: identifying successful reforms

Labor market reforms, which reduce institutional rigidities, are assumed to be a well-suited approach to lower unemployment. However, it is still not perfectly clear which reforms actually lead to a fall in unemployment. One crucial issue is that reforms do not work in isolation, but have labor market effects which depend on other institutional factors. Such institutional interactions have rarely been considered in empirical macroeconomic studies in a systematic way, mainly due to model uncertainty. As a solution to this problem, a Bayesian model averaging approach is adopted in this paper to identify robust and significant institutional interactions for unemployment. Using a panel data-set for 17 OECD countries from 1982 to 2005, five robust and significant interaction terms are identified, and country-specific reform effects for the institutional indicators are derived.     

Unemployment Durations in West Germany Before and After the Reform of the Unemployment Compensation System during the 1980s

Abstract. This paper analyzes empirically the distribution of unemployment durations in West Germany during the 1980s and 1990s. It therefore covers periods before and after the changes during the mid‐1980s in the maximum entitlement periods for unemployment benefits for older unemployed. The analysis is based on the IAB employment subsample containing administrative data for about 500,000 individuals. Since these data only partly reveal the unemployment duration in an economic sense, we use a narrow and a wide proxy for unemployment. Our empirical analysis finds significant changes in the distribution of non‐employment durations for older unemployed. At the same time, the distribution of unemployment durations between jobs remained unchanged after the reforms. Our findings clearly show that many firms and workers used the more beneficial laws as a part of early retirement packages. Surprisingly, for those workers who found and accepted a new job, we do not observe a prolongation of their search periods to a sizeable extent.     

Does University-Industry collaboration improve innovation efficiency? Evidence from Chinese Firms⋄

This paper investigates the impact of university-industry (UI) collaboration on firms' innovation efficiency using a balanced panel of 443 innovative firms in China from 2008 to 2011. An evaluation of firms' innovation efficiency shows that innovative firms do not show consistent performance across the two stages of the innovation process, namely, the R&D stage and the commercialisation stage. The empirical results demonstrate that UI collaboration can be detrimental to a firm's innovation efficiency initially but that the firm can benefit from UI collaboration as engagement deepens. In addition, UI collaboration affects innovation efficiency differently across the two stages once regional institutional factors are taken into consideration. Thus, pertinent policies may be required in order to facilitate UI collaboration and its role in improving innovation efficiency at different stages.     

Unemployment accounts and employment incentives

We explore the far-reaching implications of replacing current unemployment benefit (UB) systems by an unemployment accounts (UAs) system. Under the UAs system, employed people are required to make ongoing contributions to their UAs and the balances in these accounts are available to them during periods of unemployment. The government is able to undertake balanced-budget interpersonal redistributions among the UAs. At the end of their working lives, people could transfer the remaining balances on their UAs into their pensions.We present an analytical framework to analyse the incentive effects of UAs and calibrate our model for the high high-unemployment countries of Europe. Our results suggest that this policy reform would significantly change people's employment incentives and could achieve reductions in unemployment without reducing the level of support to the unemployed.     

我国产业结构升级对经济波动的熨平效应分析

本文基于时变参数模型的经验研究表明,改革开放以来我国产业结构升级对经济波动平稳化趋势有着显著的熨平效应,并且随着产业结构升级的不断推进,这种熨平作用亦趋明显。TGARCH模型的深入分析发现三大产业对我国经济波动幅度的影响是非对称性的:第一产业波动对经济总量波动几乎没有影响;第二产业波动对经济总量波动存在杠杆效应,而这种杠杆效应主要是由重工业带来的;但第三产业波动对经济总量波动存在明显的熨平作用,交通运输仓储和邮政业、住宿餐饮业及除五大类之外的其他服务业对经济波动的熨平效应最为显著,而批发零售业、金融业和房地产业因其自身的波动较大,对经济总量波动的熨平效应较小。本文结论的政策性启示是,为保持我国国民经济的平稳化增长势头,必须进一步优化三大产业之间的关系,深入推进产业结构升级,特别是要加快第三产业发展。