CAT Bonds and Other Risk-Linked Securities: State of the Market and Recent Developments

This article reviews the current status of the market for catastrophic risk (CAT) bonds and other risk-linked securities. CAT bonds and other risk-linked securities are innovative financial vehicles that have an important role to play in financing mega-catastrophes and other types of losses. The vehicles are especially important because they access capital markets directly, exponentially expanding risk-bearing capacity beyond the limited capital held by insurers and reinsurers. The CAT bond market has been growing steadily, with record amounts of risk capital raised in 2005, 2006, and 2007. CAT bond premia relative to expected losses covered by the bonds have declined by more than one-third since 2001. CAT bonds now appear to be priced competitively with conventional catastrophe reinsurance and comparably rated corporate bonds. CAT bonds have grown to the extent that they now play a major role in completing the market for catastrophic-risk finance and are spreading to other lines such as automobile insurance, life insurance, and annuities. CAT bonds are not expected to replace reinsurance but to complement the reinsurance market by providing additional risk-bearing capacity. Other innovative financing mechanisms such as risk swaps, industry loss warranties, and sidecars also are expected to continue to play an important role in financing catastrophic risk.     

Catastrophe Bonds and Reinsurance: The Competitive Effect of Information-Insensitive Triggers

We identify a new benefit of index or parametric triggers. Asymmetric information between reinsurers on an insurer's risk affects competition in the reinsurance market: reinsurers are subject to adverse selection, since only high-risk insurers may find it optimal to change reinsurers. The result is high reinsurance premiums and cross-subsidization of high-risk insurers by low-risk insurers. A contract with a parametric or index trigger (such as a catastrophe bond) is insensitive to information asymmetry and therefore alters the equilibrium in the reinsurance market. Provided that basis risk is not too high, the introduction of contracts with parametric or index triggers provides low-risk insurers with an alternative to reinsurance contracts, and therefore leads to less cross-subsidization in the reinsurance market.     

Catastrophe Bonds,Reinsurance, and the Optimal Collateralization of Risk Transfer

Catastrophe bonds feature full collateralization of the underlying risk transfer and thus abandon the reinsurance principle of economizing on collateral through diversification of risk transfer. Our analysis demonstrates that this feature places limits on catastrophe bond penetration, even if the structure possesses frictional cost advantages over reinsurance. However, we also show that catastrophe bonds have important uses when buyers and reinsurers cannot contract over the division of assets in the event of insolvency and, more generally, cannot write contracts with a full menu of state‐contingent payments. In this environment, segregation of collateral—in the form of multiple reinsurance companies, as well as catastrophe bond vehicles—can ameliorate inefficiencies due to reinsurance contracting constraints by improving welfare for those exposed to default risk. Numerical simulation illustrates how catastrophe bonds improve efficiency in market niches with correlated risks, or with uneven exposure of buyers to reinsurer default.     

Hard markets,hard times: On the inefficiency of the CAT bond market

This study explores the existence of inefficiencies in catastrophe (CAT) bond secondary markets by investigating the impact of sponsor characteristics on the CAT bond premium. We show that the CAT bond market does not satisfy the demand for catastrophe risk transfer efficiently by revealing a significant effect of sponsor-related factors on the CAT bond premium. This inefficiency is particularly surprising given that a CAT bond isolates the insured risk from other sponsor-related risks through a special purpose vehicle. Remarkably, this inefficiency is even present among non-indemnity CAT bonds, which determine the payout through a mechanism that is exogenous to the sponsor. Our findings also reveal that sponsor-related pricing inefficiencies vary over time and are more relevant during hard and neutral phases compared to soft market phases. Among the sponsor-related determinants of the CAT bond premium are the sponsor's tenure, market coverage, rating, credit default swap spread, and his ability to issue innovative “on the run” CAT bonds.     

The market for catastrophe risk: a clinical examination

This paper examines the market for catastrophe event risk – i.e., financial claims that are linked to losses associated with natural hazards, such as hurricanes and earthquakes. Risk management theory suggests protection by insurers and other corporations against the largest cat events is most valuable. However, most insurers purchase relatively little cat reinsurance against large events, and premiums are high relative to expected losses. To understand why the theory fails, we examine transactions that look to capital markets, rather than traditional reinsurance markets, for risk-bearing capacity. We develop eight theoretical explanations and find the most compelling to be supply restrictions associated with capital market imperfections and market power exerted by traditional reinsurers.     

Risk Management, Capital Budgeting, and Capital Structure Policy for Insurers and Reinsurers

This article builds on Froot and Stein in developing a framework for analyzing the risk allocation, capital budgeting, and capital structure decisions facing insurers and reinsurers. The model incorporates three key features: (i) value‐maximizing insurers and reinsurers face product‐market as well as capital‐market imperfections that give rise to well‐founded concerns with risk management and capital allocation; (ii) some, but not all, of the risks they face can be frictionlessly hedged in the capital market; and (iii) the distribution of their cash flows may be asymmetric, which alters the demand for underwriting and hedging. We show these features result in a three‐factor model that determines the optimal pricing and allocation of risk and capital structure of the firm. This approach allows us to integrate these features into: (i) the pricing of risky investment, underwriting, reinsurance, and hedging; and (ii) the allocation of risk across all of these opportunities, and the optimal amount of surplus capital held by the firm.     

Organizational structure,risk-based capital requirements,and the sales of downgraded bonds

Using bond downgrades as external shocks to life insurers’ asset risk, we document several findings of the impact of organizational structure and risk factors on investment risk taking. First, we find that mutual insurers and widely-held stock insurers are more likely to sell downgraded bonds than are closely-held stock insurers. Second, we find evidence that insurers are less likely to sell downgraded bonds that remain in the same rating class than bonds downgraded to a lower rating class. The result implies that insurers sell downgraded bonds mainly because of additional capital charge is imposed, not because of downgrade itself. In other words, risk factors in risk-based capital regulation do matter on life insurers’ investment risk taking. Finally, we find that life insurers might be reluctant to sell downgraded bonds at fire-sale prices during the 2008–2009 financial crisis.     

Keeping Some Skin in the Game: How to Start a Capital Market in Longevity Risk Transfers

The recent activity in pension buyouts and bespoke longevity swaps suggests that a significant process of aggregation of longevity exposures is under way, led by major insurers, investment banks, and buyout firms with the support of leading reinsurers. As regulatory capital charges and limited reinsurance capacity constrain the scope for market growth, there is now an opportunity for institutions that are pooling longevity exposures to issue securities that appeal to capital market investors, thereby broadening the sharing of longevity risk and increasing market capacity. For this to happen, longevity exposures need to be suitably pooled and tranched to maximize diversification benefits offered to investors and to address asymmetric information issues. We argue that a natural way for longevity risk to be transferred is through suitably designed principal-at-risk bonds.     

洪水巨灾债券及其定价的实证研究——基于Wang两因素模型对我国洪水债券定价的分析

近年来,巨灾频发,巨灾债券已成为国际公认而又行之有效的巨灾风险转移工具。我国自然灾害多发,全国有2／3的国土面积遭受洪水威胁。因此,在我国发行巨灾债券特别是洪水巨灾债券意义重大。而发行巨灾债券的难点便在于债券的合理定价。本文收集了1961年至2009年我国洪水灾害数据,运用Wang两因素模型对其经验估计分布进行了调整,得出了中国市场上一年期洪水巨灾债券的价格。以期对我国臣灾债券的合理定价有所借鉴。最后,文章针对中国发行洪水巨灾债券的细节方面提出了建议。     

Does Reinsurance Need Reinsurers?

The reinsurance market is the secondary market for insurance risks. It has a very specific organization. Direct insurers rarely trade risks with each other. Rather, they cede part of their primary risks to specialized professional reinsurers who have no primary business. This article offers a model of equilibrium in reinsurance and capital markets in which professional reinsurers arise endogenously. Their role is to monitor primary insurers credibly, so that insurers can raise capital more easily. In equilibrium, the financial structure of primary insurers consists of a mix of reinsurance and outside capital. The comparative statics yield empirical predictions which are broadly in line with a number of stylized facts from the reinsurance market.     

The Optimal Write-Down Coefficients in a Percentage for a Catastrophe Bond

Catastrophe bonds, also known as CAT bonds, are insurance-linked securities that help to transfer catastrophe risks from insurance industry to bond holders. When the aggregate catastrophe loss exceeds a specified amount by the maturity, the CAT bond is triggered and the future bond payments are reduced. This article first presents a general pricing formula for a CAT bond with coupon payments, which can be adapted to various assumptions for a catastrophe loss process. Next, it gives formulas for the optimal write-down coefficients in a percentage, implemented by Monte Carlo simulations, which maximize two measurements of risk reduction, hedge effectiveness rate (HER) and hedge effectiveness (HE), respectively, and examines how the optimal write-down coefficients in a percentage help reinsurance or insurance companies to mitigate extreme catastrophe losses. Last, it demonstrates how the number of coupon payments, loss share, retention level, strike price, maturity, frequency, and severity parameters of the catastrophe loss process and different interest rate models affect the optimal write-down coefficients in a percentage with numerical examples for illustrations.     

The Design of Private Reinsurance Contracts

This article examines the effect of asymmetric information on the trading of underwriting risk between insurers and reinsurers and how it is mitigated in a context of long-term relationships. It begins by explaining how information problems affect the efficiency of the allocation of risk between insurers and reinsurers and how long-term implicit contracts allow the inclusion of new information in the pricing of reinsurance coverage. A key feature of these relationships is the reliance on loss-contingent rebates and commissions in the pricing of reinsurance coverage. We argue that when information is revealed only over time, long-term implicit contracts between insurers and reinsurers allow the inclusion of new information into reinsurance pricing. Because of this feature, the allocation of risk between insurers and reinsurers is more efficient. Specifically, such arrangements lead to more reinsurance coverage, higher insurer profits, and lower expected distress in the industry. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G22, G13, L15, D81.     

Financial Innovation in the Management of Catastrophe Risk

Like the preceding article, this article argues that the high costs of reinsurance present the opportunity for hedging instruments to be offered to primary insurers that are both competitive with current reinsurance and that offer investors high rates of return. But the combination of high reinsurance premiums and the vast capacity of the capital market for diversification is not sufficient to ensure the success of these new instruments. If new instruments such as catastrophe options and catastrophelinked bonds are to compete successfully with reinsurance, they must provide a cost-effective means of resolving incentive conflicts between the primary insurer and the ultimate risk bearer that are known as "moral hazard." Without an effective solution of this moral hazard problem, the use of past insurance loss data to estimate the potential returns for purchasers of catastrophe bonds and other such instruments will be misleading and unreliable.
As the author demonstrates, both traditional reinsurance and each of the new catastrophe hedging instruments presents insurance companies and other hedgers with the challenge of managing a different combination of moral hazard, credit risk, and basis risk. For example, traditional catastrophe reinsurance is subject to significant credit risk and moral hazard, but little if any basis risk. By contrast, both catastrophe options and bonds can be designed in ways that reduce moral hazard and credit risk, but at the cost of taking on some basis risk. The risk manager's task in such circumstances is to design an instrument that embodies the optimal, or cost-minimizing, trade-off among these three sources of risk.     

RELATIVE EFFICIENCIES OF NON-LIFE REINSURANCE MARKETING METHODS

Abstract: This paper extends the study of the relative cost efficiency of insurance delivery systems from the primary market to the market for non-life reinsurance services. As in the primary market for insurance services there are two predominant methods of marketing reinsurance services: reinsurers who rely on employees, termed direct writers, and those who rely on brokers.
An extensive literature relating to the primary market for non-life insurance consistently indicates that independent agency insurers have a cost disadvantage relative to exclusive agency insurers. This literature also suggests that independent agency insurers may supply superior service but a continuing erosion of the market share of independent agency insurers suggests that the perceived service differential is not valued sufficiently to offset the perceived cost differential.
The authors find evidence that, cet. par., broker supplied reinsurers operate with lower costs than direct reinsurers but we find less convincing evidence of a service differential favoring direct reinsurers. More significantly, we observe that the largest component of the traditional measure of the reinsurer's cost is the commission paid back to the primary insurer: the seemingly lower cost brokers provide a higher net cost product. Yet brokers thrive in the marketplace suggesting the existence of a product differentiated by service or quality. With the important caveat that measures of service are imperfect and data is limited, we find no evidence of a service differential.     

On the economics of the longevity risk transfer market

We present a model of a longevity risk transfer market with different market players (primary insurers, reinsurers, and capital market investors) and investigate how market dynamics and the market players' roles evolve with progressing market saturation. We find that reinsurers' appetite for longevity risk is the key driver in the early stage of market development. Since diversification benefits with other businesses decrease with every transaction, the reinsurance market is intrinsically antimonopolistic. With the increasing saturation of the reinsurance sector as a whole, its competitiveness shrinks leading to rising expected risk-adjusted returns for capital market investors. We show that in a saturated market, reinsurers should assume the entire longevity risk from primary insurers, diversify it within their business mix, and subsequently pass on only specific (nondiversifiable) components of the longevity risk to the capital markets. Our findings provide valuable suggestions on how to make the best use of the market's limited risk absorption capacity.     

Regulatory capital and asset risk transfer

We explore whether life insurers use a unique reinsurance arrangement to manage assets tied to their regulatory capital. Typical reinsurance allows insurers to reduce their regulatory capital by transferring liabilities (reserves), and the associated assets, to reinsurers. With modified coinsurance (ModCo), insurers maintain control of their liabilities and assets while transferring regulatory capital requirements to the reinsurer. Holding fixed an insurer's reported capital, we find that ModCo allows insurers to report higher risk-based capital ratios. Insurers with ModCo are less likely to fire sale downgraded bonds. We also find suggestive evidence of regulatory arbitrage, as most ModCo is purchased from reinsurers in countries with low capital requirements or within the same insurance group.     

The risk implications of insurance securitization: The case of catastrophe bonds

Catastrophe (Cat) bonds are insurance securitization vehicles which are supposed to transfer catastrophe-related underwriting risk from issuers to capital markets. This paper addresses key, unanswered questions concerning Cat bonds and offers the following results. First, our findings show firms that issue Cat bonds exhibit less risky underwriting portfolios with less exposure to catastrophe risks and overall less need to hedge catastrophe risk. These results show that the access to the market for insurance securitization is easiest for firms with less risky portfolios. Second, firms that issue Cat bonds are found to experience a reduction in their default risk relative to non-issuing firms and our results, therefore, demonstrate that Cat bonds provide effective catastrophe hedging for issuing firms. Third, firms with less catastrophe exposure, increase their catastrophe exposure following an issue. Therefore, our paper cautions that the ability to hedge catastrophe risk causes some firms to seek additional catastrophe risk.     

Accuracy of Premium Calculation Models for CAT Bonds—An Empirical Analysis

CAT bonds are of significant importance in the field of alternative risk transfer. Because the market of CAT bonds is not complete, the application of an appropriate pricing model is of high relevance. We apply different premium calculation models to compare them with regard to their predictive power. Without taking the financial crisis into account, a version of the Wang transformation model and the linear model are the most accurate ones. In contrast, under consideration of the financial crisis, all analyzed models are approximately equivalent. Furthermore, we find that CAT bond specific information does not improve out‐of‐sample results.     

The Evolving Market for Catastrophic Event Risk

ABSTRACT: In the last two years, the market for catastrophic event risk has witnessed important change. The first large and truly successful catastrophe ("CAT") bonds have been issued. New exchanges have opened, traded contracts have been created, and indexes of CAT losses have been introduced. The array of products confronting issuers and investors has widened substantially.
This article provides a brief overview of these changes. It also takes a functional approach to diagnosing the problems in the market for CAT event risk in order to understand how future change is likely to occur. Finally, it provides information to companies looking to assess whether these new markets are useful for solving their problems.     

A Comparative Analysis of U.S. Property and Casualty Reinsurers and Insurers

In empirical research related to the property-casualty insurance industry, studies commonly focus on either insurers or reinsurers. However, in many cases, the definition used to make the distinction between the two groups is often not clearly defined and/or the definition varies across studies. This variation could result in a substantially different group of firms being included or excluded from the study, thereby affecting the empirical results obtained. This study builds upon Chen and Hamwi , who compare the performance of U.S. insurers and reinsurers. The objective of the study is fourfold: (1) to compare the definitions of insurer and reinsurer commonly used in prior research to identify differences, (2) to expand upon the traditional methods of classifying insurers and reinsurers, (3) to compare the individual firm-level characteristics of insurers and reinsurers to detect potential variation across categories and across definitions, and (4) to analyze the impact of different definitions on the results of multivariate analyses exploring common research questions. The univariate results indicate that there are some variations in the characteristics of the firms based on the categorization of insurers and reinsurers arising from different definitions. In addition, we find that there are significant differences in the regression results when comparing models based on various definitions of reinsurers utilized in prior research and when professional reinsurers and incidental reinsurers are grouped together. As such, it is possible that the definition used to include or exclude reinsurers from the sample can impact the results.