高管股权激励 、约束机制与对外直接投资速率

对外直接投资速率是企业国际化过程中面临的重要决策 ,但并未引起学术界的广泛重视.文章从公司治理的视角剖析了企业对外直接投资速率的决策驱动机制,并基于2004-2013年中国上市公司在全球范围内的对外直接投资数据 ,探讨了高管股权激励对于对外直接投资速率的影响以及高管所面临的内外部约束机制对两者关系的调节作用.实证结果显示:(1)股权激励总体上使得高管倾向于选择快速扩张的投资策略;(2)内部约束机制会强化高管股权激励与对外直接投资速率之间的正向关系;(3)外部约束机制会弱化高管股权激励与企业对外直接投资速率之间的正向关系.进一步研究发现:在民营企业内部 ,高管股权激励对于加快企业投资的激励效果以及外部约束机制的调节作用更加明显;而无论是民营企业还是国有企业 ,内部约束机制的调节作用均十分显著.文章为如何充分调动企业高管积极性和主动性去实施"走出去"战略以及抓住国际化机遇提供了借鉴.     

管理层薪酬、持股结构与企业成长——来自PE支持企业的数据

在传统的融资路径下,中小科技型企业很难获得资金支持。私募股权投资基金的兴起,有力地支持了中小科技型企业的发展,同时私募股权投资基金也获得了良好的回报。本文通过对69家中小板私募股权投资基金支持企业的实证研究发现,管理层获酬率、平均薪酬、持股率与平均持股对企业成长拉动性并不强,而管理层获酬方差和持股方差对企业成长具有正相关关系,符合锦标赛效应。     

高管人力资本、高管报酬和公司绩效关系的实证研究——以中部地区上市公司为例

高管人力资本、高管报酬和公司绩效三者之间体现何种关系特征，是企业配置高管人员有效实施高管报酬激励的重要依据，是提升公司绩效的有效保证。本文的研究结果表明，高管的任期与公司绩效存在正相关关系，与高管报酬存在负相关关系；高管年龄与公司绩效存在负相关关系，与高管报酬存在正相关关系；高管的教育背景与公司绩效存在负相关关系，与高管报酬存在正相关关系。公司治理因素尤其是股权因素对高管人力资本特征与公司绩效、高管报酬的相关性有很大的影响。     

Firm performance,corporate governance and executive compensation in Pakistan

This study examines the effects of firm performance and corporate governance on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in an emerging market, Pakistan. Using a more robust Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation approach for a sample of non-financial firms listed at Karachi Stock Exchange over the period 2005–2012, we find that both current- and previous-year accounting performances has positive influence on CEO compensation. However, stock market performance does not appear to have a positive impact on executive compensation. We further find that ownership concentration is positively related with CEO compensation, indicating some kind of collusion between management and largest shareholder to get personal benefits. Inconsistent with agency theory, CEO duality appears to have a negative influence, while board size and board independence have no convincing relationship with CEO compensation, indicating board ineffectiveness in reducing CEO entrenchment. The results of dynamic GMM model suggest that CEO pay is highly persistent and takes time to adjust to long-run equilibrium.     

Severe or gentle bankruptcy law: Which impact on investing and financing decisions?

This research investigates how legal sanctions prevailing under bankruptcy may impact on debt contracting and on investing decision. We model firms having the opportunity to engage (or not) faulty management. In case of default, the firms may escape costly bankruptcy by reaching a private agreement with the bank. We show that such renegotiation process may depend on the level of severity of bankruptcy law.Our approach helps in answering the following key questions: can bankruptcy costs always be internalized? Who benefits from accrued severity? Should the creditors accept a certain level of moral hazard from their debtors? Should bankruptcy law be extremely severe in order to ensure ex-ante efficiency? Does such severity depend on the financial environment?The model focuses on three equilibriums. The first equilibrium describes honest firms that choose the best investment project (ex-ante efficiency). Here, we show that bankruptcy costs can be avoided through private renegotiation (ex-post efficiency). Yet, the legislator cannot directly implement this equilibrium as it does not depend on the level of legal sanctions. A second equilibrium describes tricky firms turning to the less profitable and riskiest project. Here, default is still privately resolved: the occurrence of such equilibrium can be avoided owing to a minimal amount of legal sanctions that depend on the level of interest rate. Last, we consider firms that adopt mixed strategies regarding their investment policy. Here, two post-default bargains prevail (pooling or separating) and costly bankruptcy may occur.Simulations illustrate how the bank finally chooses between these equilibriums while the legal environment becomes more severe. For moderate levels of legal sanctions, banks may accept a certain level of faulty management, expecting to take advantage of bankruptcy punishment. An increase in sanctions, however, has a compelling effect on the companies towards honoring their commitments. Once the optimal equilibrium prevails, any additional increase in sanctions is ineffective as the players' strategies no longer depend on the legal environment. As a result, extreme severity is not required to ensure both ex-ante and ex-post efficiencies. Last, we find that a more severe bankruptcy law increases the protection of banks and may result in reduction of the contractual interest rate, which on the other hand benefits the debtors.     

Dynamic Moral Hazard and Executive Stock Options

This paper shows that the optimal executive compensation scheme in a dynamic moral hazard environment is convex in the firm value. This implies that the optimal contract should include stock options. This is because the private benefit of shirking is increasing in firm value and the manager's utility is concave. Therefore, in contrast to the previous literature that takes stock options in the incentive contract exogenously, we rationalize the optimality of their use endogenously. Moreover, we show that the optimal amount of stock options (restricted stocks) increases with agency cost and the executive's reservation utility, decreases with the degree of risk aversion of the manager, and increases (decreases) with the firm size.     

新医改背景下公立医院医患关系法律性质研究——以患者权益保护为视角

医患关系是由医疗法律法规在调整患者与各级医疗单位之间的关系过程中所形成的权利义务关系。医患关系的法律属性和法律适用直接决定了医疗纠纷的归责和赔偿原则,也决定了医疗纠纷的处理模式,因此医患关系的法律属性是一个重大问题。医患关系作为兼具公法与私法性质的特殊的法律关系,需要采用国家干预民事主体私法自治相结合的调整方式,单纯的用公法的方式或是单纯的用私法的方式来调整都难于达到最佳的效果。新医改方案明确指出,要构建健康和谐的医患关系,加强医德医风建设,重视医务人员人文素养培养和职业素质教育,大力弘扬救死扶伤精神,在全社会形成尊重医疗卫生工作者、尊重患者的良好风气。而这些必须是建立在明确医患关系法律性质位之上的,也就是说明确公立医院医患关系的法律性质问题对于新医改制度体系的建立和完善具有重要的作用和意义。     

高管薪酬与企业绩效的相关性——以信息技术行业上市公司为例

在对我国信息技术行业上市公司的高管薪酬和企业绩效进行描述性统计的基础上,采用多元线性回归模型,对样本公司的高管薪酬与其绩效的相关关系进行分析。研究结果表明:信息技术行业上市公司的高管薪酬与每股收益和净资产收益率两个财务指标显著正相关,与其他业绩指标不显著相关;在非财务指标中,高管薪酬与资产规模、高管持股、股权集中度、地区等非财务指标相关。这说明,虽然我国上市公司已建立起基于绩效评价的薪酬激励制度,但业绩评价指标过于单一,薪酬激励制度有待完善。     

论我国大气污染生态补偿法律机制的完善

大气污染生态补偿法律机制对于促进区域大气污染联合治理、实现大气污染治理法律正义、创新与完善生态补偿法律机制等具有重要意义。我国现有法律法规就大气污染生态补偿进行了原则性规定,特别是山东、陕西、湖北等地方性法规更是对大气污染生态补偿进行了探索性规范,为大气污染生态补偿法律机制完善提供了有益经验。但从总体来看,我国大气污染生态补偿法律机制尚存在缺乏专门法律支撑、生态补偿主体过窄、补偿方式单一、补偿标准不合理、法律责任不完善等问题。为促进生态文明战略与强化大气污染生态补偿的法律保障,我国应以科学理念为指导,采取有效措施推进大气污染生态补偿法律机制完善。     

高管薪酬管制分析——基于多任务委托代理视角

股东和高管之间存在利益冲突,多任务委托代理模型分析表明,高管薪酬决定机制存在激励过度的内在冲动,高管薪酬管制不仅存在合理性,实践中也非常必要,政府可以通过强化高管薪酬股东决策权、细化高管薪酬信患披露制度及建立奖金回追制度等措施来管制.     

中国上市公司高管薪酬影响因素分析——来自制造业上市公司的证据

随着中国经济的快速发展,上市公司高管薪酬一直是各方关注的焦点。对2006—2011年六年内中国制造业上市公司的高级管理人员的薪酬状况和影响因素进行分析,发现,中国制造业上市公司高管的薪酬与公司绩效、企业规模和公司所在地区的市场环境有关,具体的影响关系是:高管薪酬与公司绩效和公司规模存在正相关关系,与公司所在地区的市场环境存在负相关关系,与高管持股比例相关性不显著。     

Optimal executive compensation: Stock options or restricted stocks

This paper develops an agency model to analyze the optimality of executive stock option compensation in the presence of information manipulation. The analyses show that although information manipulation is positively related to the size of option compensation, the relative size of manipulation-to-effort does not depend on the size of option compensation. Furthermore, an optimal executive compensation package includes stock options instead of restricted stocks under most circumstances. Testable predictions on the relationship between optimal option exercise price and exogenous model parameters are derived.     

Worker Absenteeism in Search Equilibrium*

In this paper we introduce a general equilibrium model of search unemployment that incorporates absence from work as a distinct labor force state. Absenteeism is driven by random shocks to the value of leisure that are private information to the workers. Firms maximize profits while recognizing that the compensation package may affect the queue of job applicants and the absence rate. The analysis provides results concerning the effects of social insurance benefits and other determinants of workers' and firms' behavior. The normative analysis identifies externalities associated with firm‐provided sick pay and examines the welfare implications of alternative policies.     

高管激励研究的问题与改进

高管激励机制是现代公司治理重要机制之一。文章从高管薪酬总体描述研究、最优契约法研究、管理者权力法研究和隐性收益研究四个角度,总结评述了近年来国内外高管激励研究的状况。在此基础上,结合组织合谋理论,指出了高管激励研究中存在的问题,为下一步研究指出了方向。     

试论民营经济发展的刑事法制保障

目前,蓬勃发展的民营经济已成为社会主义市场经济的重要组成部分,但规范和保护民营经济发展的社会主义法制却比较滞后,其中刑事方面,立法和司法都存在着缺陷。为了保持民营经济持续、稳定、健康的发展,健全非公有制经济发展的法制环境,刑事法制的完善急需加强。     

国际化战略实施、公司治理与中小企业商业模式转型

中小企业国际化扩张会对企业商业模式转型产生何种影响？中小企业公司治理能否有效解决商业模式转型中的代理问题？基于资源依赖和公司治理视角,以深圳证券交易所中小上市公司为样本,采用多层线性回归方法研究发现：①从短期看,我国中小企业国际化战略对商业模式转型有显著抑制作用。随着国际化程度的加深,在国际化环境下获得的资源对商业模式转型存在积极作用,但影响效果不显著;②高管短期薪酬激励对企业商业模式转型有显著消极作用,高管持股激励对企业商业模式转型具有积极影响,但影响效果不显著;③公司治理中的监督机制能够有效解决由管理者自利行为引发的代理问题,公司监督能力越强,商业模式转型程度越大;④国际化战略实施和公司治理间的强化作用不显著。     

投资者保护、定向增发和财富转移

本文研究良好的投资保护环境能否抑制上市公司的财富转移行为,以2006-2010年进行定向增发的上市公司为研究样本,我们发现地区投资保护程度越高,大股东借助定向增发折价进行财富转移的程度越低。这一研究不仅为我国定向增发中所存在的财富转移提供了佐证,而且对理解宏观投资保护水平对企业微观行为的影响,构建完善的定向增发监管体系,具有重要的理论和现实意义。     

Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets

We present a multiperiod agency model of stock-based executive compensation in a speculative stock market, where investors have heterogeneous beliefs and stock prices may deviate from underlying fundamentals and include a speculative option component. This component arises from the option to sell the stock in the future to potentially overoptimistic investors. We show that optimal compensation contracts may emphasize short-term stock performance, at the expense of long-run fundamental value, as an incentive to induce managers to pursue actions which increase the speculative component in the stock price. Our model provides a different perspective on the recent corporate crisis than the "rent extraction view" of executive compensation.     

Influence of firm performance and gender on CEO compensation

In this article we continue the examination of top executive pay by comparing performance, total pay and the influence of CEO gender. We analyse compensation differences between male and female CEOs using nonparametric analysis. We calculate the potential compensation for each executive using two benchmarks. First, each executive's performance and compensation are evaluated relative to members of the same gender to produce a same-gender measure of under-compensation. Each executive's compensation is also benchmarked against the other gender's potential compensation, producing an other-gender measure of under-compensation. Together, both measures allow an analysis of the gender-specific potential salaries of each executive while controlling for performance. The approach is applied to a sample of male and female executives. The results indicate that women are under-compensated.     

企业特征、高管薪酬结构与企业绩效

利用2005—2010年我国沪深两市A股非金融保险行业1654家上市公司的高管年度薪酬数据,结合企业特征,对不同类型企业的高管薪酬结构与企业绩效的关系进行了实证研究,细化锦标赛理论和行为理论在不同类型企业中可能形成的差异化实施效应。结果显示:我国不同类型的企业都比较适宜采用锦标赛理论制定高管薪酬激励政策,竞争性的高管薪酬结构对于提升企业绩效具有正面作用,均等化高管薪酬结构不利于企业的价值创造;相对于民营企业、小规模企业、低成长企业而言,我国国有企业、大规模企业、高成长企业更宜采用锦标赛理论设计企业高管薪酬结构。因此我国不宜对非金融保险行业国有企业的高管薪酬进行过度均等化的管制,否则会负面影响企业绩效提升和企业价值创造。