A TREATMENT OF ABSOLUTE INDICES OF POLARIZATION*

Absolute polarization indices remain unchanged under equal absolute augmentation in all incomes. This paper identifies the class of absolute polarization indices whose orderings of alternative income distributions agree with the rankings generated by nonintersecting absolute polarization curves. We explore the possibility of using the Kolm (1976) – Blackorby‐Donaldson (1980) ethical absolute inequality index in polarization measurement. We establish that although inequality and polarization are dissimilar concepts, different absolute inequality indices can be employed to design alternative absolute polarization indices. A numerical illustration is provided using Indian data and it is shown that inequality and polarization are different issues in income distribution analysis.     

The Changing Shape of Global Inequality 1820–2000; Exploring a New Dataset

A new dataset for charting the development of global inequality between 1820 and 2000 is presented, based on a large variety of sources and methods for estimating (gross household) income inequality. On this basis we estimate the evolution of global income inequality over the past two centuries. Two sets of benchmarks about between‐country inequality (the Maddison 1990 benchmark and the recent 2005 ICP round) are taken into account. We find that between 1820 and 1950, increasing per capita income is combined with increasing global inequality. After 1950, global inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient or the Theil index remains more or less constant. It also appears that the global income distribution was uni‐modal in the nineteenth century, became increasingly bi‐modal between 1910 and 1970 with two world wars, a depression and de‐globalization, and was suddenly transformed back into a uni‐modal distribution between 1980 and 2000.     

Inequality of Income and Consumption in the U.S.: Measuring the Trends in Inequality from 1984 to 2011 for the Same Individuals

This paper examines the distribution of income and consumption in the U.S. using one dataset that obtains measures of both income and consumption from the same set of individuals. We develop a set of inequality measures that show the increase in inequality during the past 27 years using the 1984–2011 Consumer Expenditure Survey. We find that the trends in income and consumption inequality are similar between 1984 and 2006, and diverge during and after the Great Recession. For the entire 27‐year period we find that consumption inequality increases almost as much as does income inequality.     

Income inequality, consumption, and social-status seeking

Using the Chinese Urban Household Survey data between 1997 and 2006, we find that income inequality has a negative (positive) effect on household consumption net of education expenditures (savings) even after we control for household income. We argue that people save to improve their social status when social status is associated with pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits. Rising income inequality can strengthen the incentives of status-seeking savings by increasing the benefit of improving status, and by enlarging the wealth level required for status upgrading. We also find that the negative effect of income inequality on consumption is stronger for poorer and younger people and that income inequality stimulates more education investment, which are consistent with the status-seeking hypothesis.     

The effect of income inequality on political polarization: Evidence from European regions, 2002–2014

This article investigates whether income inequality leads to political polarization and provides new evidence that an increase in the Gini coefficient at the local level increases the probability of supporting a political party at the extreme left and right of the ideological distribution. Using individual data for 25 European countries from 2002 to 2014, I find that increasing inequality leads on average to more support for left‐wing parties. I also find that increasing inequality leads to more support for far‐right parties among older individuals. Support for far‐right parties seems to be driven by rising anti‐immigrant sentiments. The results are robust to different specifications, including an instrumental variable that addresses the endogeneity of income inequality.     

INCOME INEQUALITY,MEDIA FRAGMENTATION,AND INCREASED POLITICAL POLARIZATION

The increasing polarization of congressional voting has been linked to legislators' inability to reach consensus on many pressing economic issues. We examine two potential factors driving polarization: greater income inequality and the increasingly fragmented state of American media. Using cointegration techniques, we find evidence indicating that media fragmentation has played a more important role than inequality. Periods of rising media fragmentation are followed by increased polarization. If recent patterns of media structure and income inequality persist, a polarized policymaking environment will likely continue to impede efforts to address major challenges, such as the long‐run fiscal imbalances facing the United States. (JEL D72, D31)     

How Does Fiscal Consolidation Impact on Income Inequality?

In this paper, we assess the impact of fiscal consolidation on income inequality. Using a panel of 18 industrialized countries from 1978 to 2009, we find that income inequality significantly rises during periods of fiscal consolidation. In addition, while fiscal policy that is driven by spending cuts seems to be detrimental for income distribution, tax hikes seem to have an equalizing effect. We also show that the size of the fiscal consolidation program (in percentage of GDP) has an impact on income inequality. In particular, when consolidation plans represent a small share of GDP, the income gap widens, suggesting that the burden associated with the effort affects disproportionately households at the bottom of the income distribution. Considering the linkages between banking crises and fiscal consolidation, we find that the effect on the income gap is amplified when fiscal adjustments take place after the resolution of such financial turmoil. Similarly, fiscal consolidation programs combined with inflation are likely to increase inequality and the effects of fiscal adjustments on inequality are amplified during periods of relatively low growth. Our results also provide support for a non‐linear relationship between inequality and income and corroborate the idea that trade can promote a more equal distribution of income.     

Income comparison and happiness: The role of fair income distribution

Relative income gap is one of the most popular approaches for explaining the income–happiness relationship. We argue in this article that when people compare their incomes, they care about distributional fairness more than relative income disparity. It is difficult for us to explain China's income–happiness paradox if we simply compare the income gap and do not explore the income‐generation process leading to income inequality. We therefore employ an approach based on a responsibility‐sensitive theory of justice that decomposes individual income into fair and unfair components. As a proxy for distributional unfairness, unfair income is considered the main source of unhappiness. Using data from the Chinese Household Income Project survey, we find strong support for the negative relationship between income unfairness and happiness. We also find a significantly positive relationship between the relative income gap and income unfairness, which leads us to consider the income comparison hypothesis as the explanation for the income–happiness paradox in a new light. Sensitivity analyses confirm the robustness of our results.     

The tale of the tails: Canadian income inequality in the 1980s and 1990s

Abstract.  We present new evidence on levels and trends in after-tax income inequality in Canada between 1980 and 2000. We argue that existing data sources may miss changes in the tails of the income distribution, and that many of the changes in the income distribution have been in the tails. For this reason, we turn to an alternative source. In particular, we construct data on after-tax and transfer income using Census files augmented with predicted taxes based on information available from administrative tax data. Using these data, we find that Canadian after-tax inequality levels are substantially higher than has been previously recognized, primarily because income levels are lower at the bottom of the distribution than in commonly used survey data. We also find larger long-term increases in after-tax income inequality and far more variability over the economic cycle. This raises interesting questions about the role of the tax and transfer system in mitigating both trends and fluctuations in market income inequality.     

A Class of Social Welfare Functions That Depend on Mean Income and Income Polarization

A well‐established strategy for evaluating alternative income distributions is based on the use of an abbreviated social welfare function that depends only on mean income and an inequality index. In keeping with this literature, we study the existence of social welfare functions that can be written as a trade‐off between efficiency and income polarization. This paper proposes a class of social welfare functions consistent with the Esteban and Ray, and Duclos, Esteban and Ray income polarization indices. For this result, we expand the domain for personal preferences to incorporate not only own income but also the well‐being of others. In addition, we link our proposal to the literature on relative satisfaction. The approach is illustrated by an empirical application using the CPS database for the United States in the period 1991–2010.     

Consumption and Income Inequality in Australia

Consumption may be a more appropriate measure of household well-being than income or earnings. Using four ABS Household Expenditures Surveys collected between 1975 and 1993, we compare trends in consumption and income inequality among Australian households. We find that consumption is much more equal than income. While there were significant increases in both income and consumption inequality, consumption inequality rose by much less. One interpretation of the results is that some income inequality in Australia reflects transitory fluctuations which households can smooth,'and that part of the growth in income inequality reflects an increase in these transitory fluctuations.     

Offshoring,computerization, labor market polarization and top income inequality

This paper proposes a model of occupational choice with heterogeneous agents in terms of human capital to quantify the role of offshoring and computerization in labor market polarization and increased top income inequality. We find that both offshoring and computerization played a major role regarding labor market polarization in the US over the period 1975–2008. We further show that the last decades can be decomposed into two subperiods. Computerization is the main driver of labor market polarization from 1975 to the mid 1990s, after which globalization (through decreased costs of offshoring) explains more than 70% of job and wage polarization. Our model can also explain around 40% of the observed increase in top income inequality since 1975.     

CAN HOUSEHOLDS AND WELFARE STATES MITIGATE RISING EARNINGS INSTABILITY?

We compare the evolution of earnings instability in Germany and the United Kingdom, two countries which stand for different types of welfare states. Deploying data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel (SOEP) and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), we estimate permanent and transitory variances of male income over the period 1984–2009 and 1991–2006, respectively. Studies in this literature generally use individual labor earnings. To uncover the role of welfare state and households in smoothening earnings shocks, we compute different income concepts ranging from gross earnings to net equivalent household income. We find evidence that the overall inequality of earnings in Germany and the United Kingdom has been rising throughout the period due to both higher permanent earnings inequality and higher earnings volatility. However, taking institutions of the welfare state and risk‐sharing households into account, we find that the volatility of net household income has remained fairly stable. Furthermore, redistribution and risk insurance provided by the welfare state is more pronounced in Germany than in the United Kingdom.     

Redistributive innovation policy,inequality, and efficiency

We examine the efficiency and distributional effects of regressive and progressive public R&D policies that target high‐tech and low‐tech sectors using a heterogenous‐agent growth model with in‐house R&D and incomplete capital markets. We find that such policies have important implications for efficiency and inequality. A regressive public R&D investment financed by income tax could boost growth and welfare via a positive effect on individual savings and effort. It could, however, also lower growth and welfare via its effect on the efficiency–inequality trade‐off. Thus, the relationship between public R&D spending and welfare is hump‐shaped, admitting an optimal degree of regressivity in public R&D spending. Using our baseline model, and the US state‐level GDP data, we derive the degree of regressiveness of public R&D investment in US states. We find that US states are more regressive in their R&D investment than the optimal regressiveness implied by our growth model.     

Household inequality, social welfare, and trade

Working with Sen social welfare functions (meaning explicit separability between mean income and income dispersion), we develop a generalized dual approach to tracking household inequality aspects of social welfare in general equilibrium. We highlight how household equity can be examined analytically alongside production efficiency in duality-based models, using our dual framework to explore potential trade-offs between efficiency and equity effects of trade policy. Our results complement the set of standard inequality results in trade theory focused on functional rather than household inequality. We also find that the relative distributional impact of tariffs on welfare is conditional on the initial level of inequality.     

我国收入不平等、金融发展和消费需求波动的实证研究:1978～2001

本文考察了收入不平等与总消费需求变动之间的联系,在高收入地区,不平等程度越大似乎消费需求波动越大,而在低收入地区,收入不平等越大,消费需求波动反而较小。本文找到证据表明金融发展水平能有助于解释为什么收入分配在高收入和低收入地区中影响消费需求的短期波动是不同的,本文的政策含义是,加快低收入地区如中西部的经济和金融发展步伐,加大金融发展相机调整的力度。     

Why Do the Rich Save More? A Theory and Australian Evidence*

We provide a theory to explain the existence of inequality in an economy where agents have identical preferences and have access to the same production technology. Agents consume a ‘health’ good which determines their subjective discount factor. Depending on initial distribution of capital the economy gets separated into different permanent‐income groups. This leads to a testable hypothesis: ‘The rich save a larger proportion of their permanent‐income’. We test this implication for savings behaviour in Australia. We find that even after controlling for lifecycle and health characteristics, higher permanent income is positively related with higher savings rates and better saving habits.     

Sources of Inequality: Measuring the Contributions of Income Sources to Rising Family Income Inequality

We develop a simulation method for measuring the impact of changes in the distributions of the main income sources on growth in family income inequality. We simulate the entire distribution of family income under the counterfactual, “What if the distribution of each source had not changed?” The simulation method allows us to evaluate the impact of changes at any point in the distribution as well as with multiple measures of inequality. We incorporate married‐couple and single‐person families, appropriately accounting for changes in the proportion married. We apply the simulation method to investigate the impact of changes in male earnings, female earnings, and capital income on the distribution of family income in the United States between 1969 and 1999. We find that changes in the distribution of male earnings account for more of the growth in family income inequality than do changes in any other source of income. Changes in the distribution of female earnings have reduced family income inequality.     

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND CONSUMPTION INEQUALITY IN AUSTRALIA BETWEEN 1975 AND 1993

We examine trends in consumption inequality among Australian households using the Australian Bureau of Statistics Household Expenditure Surveys collected over the period 1975 to 1993. We find that the distribution of consumption is much more equal than that of income and that both income and consumption inequality rose by significant amounts over the period. However, consumption inequality rose by much less (the Gini coefficient for income inequality rose by 17 percent while that for nondurable consumption rose by 9 percent). We then examine the effects of demographic trends, specifically population aging and changing family structures, and find they account for only a minor fraction in the overall growth in economic inequality.     

Redistributive choices and increasing income inequality: experimental evidence for income as a signal of deservingness

We explore the relation between redistribution choices, source of income, and pre-redistribution inequality. Previous studies find that when income is earned through work there is less support for redistribution than when income is determined by luck. Using a lab experiment, we vary both the income-generating process (luck vs. performance) and the level of inequality (low vs. high). We find that an increase in inequality has less impact on redistribution choices when income is earned through performance than when income results from luck. This result is likely explained by individuals using income differences as a heuristic to infer relative deservingness. If people believe income inequality increases as a result of performance rather than luck, then they are likely to believe the poor deserve to stay poor and the rich deserve to stay rich.