Understanding resource investments

The Millennium Boom of 2003–2011 made the resources industry highly profitable and led to a surge in new projects around the world. This had major implications for the Australian economy: Resource investment accounted for almost half of all business investment at the peak and the buoyancy of the sector helped Australia to avoid the worst of the global financial crisis. Using the event-study approach, this article examines the wealth-creating effects of new resource projects at the individual company level. The results indicate substantial increases in shareholder returns occur around the time of announcements of government approval for projects, the finalization of feasibility studies and changes in the status of projects such as when a company decides to finally commit to invest in a project. Government approval is the most important milestone in the life cycle of a project, where abnormal returns around 4% are realized on announcement day.     

大数据背景下基于ABC-SVM的建筑工程造价预测

建筑工程项目决策阶段信息量少,精准高效的造价预测是科学决策的关键.为了提高项目前期工程造价预测的精度,探讨如何利用历史项目大数据及机器学习进行新建建筑工程项目的造价预测至关重要.本文首先通过文献研究确定了建筑工程决策阶段造价的主要影响因素,然后利用人工蜂群算法(ABC)对支持向量机(SVM)参数即惩罚因子C和核函数参数g进行优化计算,最终构建了基于ABC-SVM的建筑工程造价预测模型.最后以某工程造价数据平台上的84个建筑工程项目为数据源进行模型验证,结果显示,与GRID-SVM模型和BP神经网络模型相比,本文所提的ABC-SVM模型的预测精度更高,具有更好的适用性.     

Inefficient Investment,Information Asymmetry,and Competition for Managers

We investigate the possible inefficiency of investment when the manager has better information than the principal. We assume that projects can be grouped into two categories based on their information characteristics of soft and hard information. We consider a case in which the manager faces competition for appointment at the end of term. We consider several cases in which the competitor's ability is known, or proxied by the performance of other managers, or is uncertain. We find that hard information projects are preferred to soft information projects and that the efficiency in project selection critically depends on the competitor's ability. Interestingly, information asymmetry may be socially beneficial, because it can provide the manager with incentives to select high‐quality hard‐information projects. Welfare improvement can be made by a budget change that is in the opposite direction to the optimum. Several empirical implications of the theory are discussed.     

基于实物期权的企业信息化多项目投资决策研究

企业投资信息化项目不同于一般的项目,信息化项目具有高度的不确定性、收益的无形性和延迟性等特点,传统的投资决策评价方法面对不确定性很高的信息化项目无法作出科学的判断,无法赋予投资者更多的灵活性。由于企业信息化项目投资及其产生的效益的不确定性具有许多实物期权的特点,因此,将运用实物期权方法来解决企业信息化多项目投资决策风险控制问题。     

SHARECROPPING,LAND EXPLOITATION AND LAND‐IMPROVING INVESTMENTS*

This paper analyses the tenancy problem in a dynamic setup and addresses two long‐standing issues: inefficiency and lack of investment. It considers the problems that the tenant, with a shorter‐term interest in the farm than the landlord, might overexploit the land to maximize immediate returns even at the cost of future damages, and under‐supply long‐run productivity improving investments in land. I show that the efficient (first‐best) levels of input use and investment can be achieved (both in the steady state and in transition) by a suitable share contract which, by dampening incentives to maximize current returns, addresses the land exploitation problem, and by an appropriate cost allocation rule which can address the investment problem.     

对设计阶段工程造价管理的探析

设计阶段工程造价管理是建设工程在设计阶段按照经济规律的要求,根据市场经济发展,利用科学管理方法和先进的管理手段合理地确定工程造价和有效的控制投资,保证有限的建设资金和物质资源得到合理的充分利用。     

Evaluation of investment subsidies: when is deadweight zero?

In the evaluation of investment subsidies one of the critical issues concerns the assessment of deadweight, that is, the degree to which projects would have been carried out without grant assistance. With the increasing restrictions on and cuts in subsidies for investment projects in the EU countries maximisation of the impact of the public resources that remain can be achieved through their allocation for projects with minimum deadweight. This paper studies the profile of subsidised zero deadweight investment projects – projects that would be abandoned without public subsidies – in Finland. The empirical analysis is conducted using micro level data on investment projects by private sector firms. The data set comprises 3,423 projects that were granted public investment subsidies between 2001 and 2003. Our results show that the likelihood of zero deadweight is significantly dependent on the characteristics of the subsidised firm, the characteristics of the investment project and the location of the subsidised firm.     

The cost of capital,finance and high‐tech investment

Investment is the most volatile component of aggregate demand and it is often considered central to business cycles fluctuations. The responsiveness of business investment to changes in its price is thus crucial to our understanding of economic activity. In spite of the key role played by the user cost of capital in economic analysis, there is little empirical support for the existence of substantial user cost elasticity. However, most of the evidence to date is based on aggregate user cost data, which may have introduced downward biases in the estimated user cost. This paper contributes to the literature by constructing a disaggregated, industry‐specific micro user cost variable and focusing on a special class of firms – the high‐tech firms. To provide a benchmark for the results, the user cost estimates for the high‐tech sector are compared with those for the rest of the manufacturing sector. The results suggest that there is little response of investment to variations in its user cost. The findings also suggest that high‐tech firms’ investment behavior is not, after all, that different from the rest of the manufacturing sector.     

农村公共工程的扶贫效益——基于联立方程的分析

个人和家庭特征对贫困的影响相对较小是中国农村贫困的一个显著特点。因此针对公共利益的公共投资对消除贫困和缩小地区差距具有重要意义。公共投资也需要讲究效益,本文在分析贫困者参与农村公共工程的成本收益和农村公共工程扶贫效益影响因素的基础上,总结出农村公共工程扶贫效益的总方程式。农村公共工程的效益从成本收益上看,是由贫困者参与农村公共工程的收益和成本来决定的;从影响因素上看。农村公共工程扶贫效益是农村公共工程的目标选择、位置效应、时间效应、覆盖面、漏出效应、挤出效应、资金使用效率及其他因素共同起作用的结果。可以通过提高公共投资资源的使用效率、增强贫困人口的脱贫意识等途径提高农村公共工程的效益。     

Do resource dependent regions grow slower than they should?

A large literature documents a negative correlation between income growth and resource dependence. This correlation has been named the resource curse. We present evidence that suggests that the resource curse can be explained by a slow growing resource sector.     

过度投资、公司业绩与债务融资——基于信息对称视角下的持续时间模型研究

基于信息对称的视角,通过建立持续时间模型,并用杠杆比率表示为投资项目进行融资的总成本中债务融资所占的比重来研究债务融资对过度投资和公司业绩的影响.结果发现:当信息是对称的情况下,公司如果发生过度投资便不会出现投资不足,并且债务融资占投资项目总成本的比重越高公司过度投资程度越大.     

投资项目评审的粗集和灰色理论决策模型

一项项目投资能否成功,作为整个投资过程起点的投资决策起着至关重要的作用,因此需要在项目决策阶段对该项目进行严格的评审.为了解决投资项目评审中的不确定性、信息不对称等问题,提出一种基于粗集和灰理论的投资项目评审决策模型,将决策者先验知识给定的权重同粗集确定的属性重要度结合起来确定指标最终权重,再使用模糊评判和灰色系统理论,以灰色关联度为基础,对数据进行分析,为定量评价投资项目的风险提供了有效的方法.借助计算机编程,使用一个实例验证了该模型的实用性和可行性.     

Real option analysis for effects of emission permit banking on investment under abatement cost uncertainty

The present paper analyzes the investment effects of emission trading scheme (ETS) when emission permits are bankable and there is technological uncertainty with regard to the abatement cost. A real option model is employed to accommodate irreversibility of investment and cost uncertainty. In the absence of abatement cost uncertainty, a bankable ETS reduces a firm's incentive for environmental investment, because the firm can utilize the banked permits for future compliance which act as substitutes for abatement investment. However, when cost uncertainty is prevalent, investment may reduce the opportunity cost of irreversible investment under the banking system, thereby increasing a firm's investment incentive. The condition is derived under which a bankable ETS provides higher investment incentives than a non-bankable ETS does.     

A Tax Paradox for Investment Decisions under Uncertainty

In this paper we use a real option model for assessing uncertain investment projects and we show that—due to a flexibility premium—taxes asymmetrically affect the option value of projects that differ in their riskiness. Hence, this may generate distortions. We analytically identify a set of neutral tax rates (a tax regime) that preserve the post‐tax investment threshold if taxes change, and determine normal and paradoxical settings for investments. Unlike other tax paradoxes neither depreciation rules nor loss offset restrictions cause these paradoxical reactions. Taxes affect each project individually, depending on the project risks involved. This implies that, for a variety of uncertain projects, taxes cannot be neutral on aggregate.     

Public Monopoly,Mixed Oligopoly and Productive Efficiency

In general, the introduction of competition into the public sector seems to lead to higher cost‐efficiency in service production. However, there are examples of substantial cost increases in some areas. In this paper, using a mixed oligopoly model, we investigate the effects of deregulation on the cost‐reducing incentives of a public firm. Our results show that a firm that is a public monopoly has greater incentive to conduct cost‐reducing investment than a public firm within mixed oligopoly market.     

提高政府投资效益的对策研究

二十多年经济的快速发展使我国逐渐成为世界上最大的项目市场，目前我国由政府投资的项目占全部项目总投资额的70％-80％。但是，根据近年来国家审计署公布的对有关部委和部分重点工程的审计报告来看，部分政府投资的重点工程存在着资金挪用、工期拖延、质量低劣、甚至腐败问题十分严重的情况。这些问题引发了人们对如何提高政府投资效益的思考。本文通过对我国现行的政府投资项目管理的现状的分析，提出了提高政府投资效益的一些对策。     

PROJECT EVALUATION AND RESOURCE SUSTAINABILITY

This paper outlines a procedure for embodying the principle of resource sustainability in evaluating projects that use significant amounts of natural resources. In this analysis, sustainability requires maintaining the productivity of the resource used over time, either by renewing the resource or by investing its depletion in other capital assets. The basis of a project's evaluation is its net present social value (NPSV), including resource depletion as a social cost. The social cost of depletion is the amount that must be saved and reinvested annually to accumulate a fund that will yield a perpetual annual income equal to the net output lost by resource depletion. By treating resource depletion as a social cost in calculating NPSV, projects causing a high rate of resource depletion receive a relatively low valuation compared with projects causing less resource depletion. Resource depletion includes environmental damage caused by constructing and operating a project, as well as the direct consumption of natural resources.
Several problems arise in reinvesting depletion to preserve the value of a resource base. One major problem relates to the substitutability of man-made capital for natural resources. The conclusion of the analysis here is that society must invest a substantial amount of resource depletion in: (i) replenishing renewable resources, (ii) increasing product output per unit of resource used, or (Hi) increasing the end-use efficiency of resource-intensive products.     

PPP模式下轨道交通项目干系人动态管控

公私合营PPP模式作为基础设施项目融资建设的新方式,在城市轨道交通项目中的应用已成为新的研究热点。PPP项目结构复杂、参与方众多,决策和设计阶段的干系人管理对项目顺利实施有较大影响。根据利益相关者理论,在识别徐州城市轨道交通项目干系人,并对其进一步细分的基础上,详细分析了徐州城市轨道交通项目各干系人的期望与要求,提出了基于全寿命周期的项目干系人动态管控,可从主体识别、参与动力、参与过程以及绩效评价机制4个方面提高管理效率,为PPP模式下项目干系人管理策略决策提供一种新思路,对于同类项目管理实践具有一定指导意义。     

On the Growth Implications of Foreign Aid for Public Investment Co-Financing

In this paper we present an endogenous growth model with foreign transfers for public capital formation in order to analyze the implications for growth maximization when the public sector in recipient countries co‐finances investment projects. Our main innovation is to show that, first, there is a unique growth‐maximizing absorption rate of funds that decreases with the co‐financing ratio and, second, that high amounts of assistance may be an impediment to growth due to the excess domestic taxation required to co‐finance investment projects. We then derive a policy rule for designing the growth‐maximizing co‐financing share under a given level of assistance. Finally, we also highlight some implications for EU regional policies, which aim at fostering growth in poorer EU countries by co‐financing public capital formation.     

The Efficient and Fair Approval of "Multiple-Cost-Single-Benefit" Projects under Unilateral Information

This paper focuses on indivisible " multiple-cost-single-benefit " projects that must be approved by the government. A simple mechanism is proposed that ensures an efficient and fair implementation of such projects. The proposed mechanism is appropriate for a unilateral information structure: the single beneficiary has complete information on the cost and benefit of the project while the government official has no such information and the cost bearers have information only on each other's costs.