Demand for coffee in Sweden: The role of prices, preferences and market power

There is a widespread belief that consumer coffee prices are high relative to bean prices and that lower consumer prices would lead to substantial increases in bean exports from Third-World countries. This issue is evaluated by analysing how retail prices, preferences and market power influence coffee demand in Sweden. A demand function is estimated for the period 1968–2002 and used, together with information on import prices of coffee beans, to simulate an oligopoly model. This approach gives estimates of the maximum average degree of market power and shows how coffee demand would react to reductions in marginal cost to its minimum level. The maximum level of market power is found to be low, but it generates large spreads between consumer and bean prices because the price elasticity has low absolute values. Moreover, the impact of a price decrease would be small because long-run coffee demand is dominated by changes in the population structure in combination with different preferences across age groups. Hence, a change to perfect competition would only have a negligible effect on bean imports.     

Passing through the supply chain: Implications for market power

In this paper, we study the connection between pass-through and market power in the Brazilian Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) industry. We use a state tax shock and apply a difference-in-differences strategy to estimate pass-through – at different levels of the supply chain – and an instrumented difference-in-differences strategy to estimate demand, and then feed a theoretical model to make inferences about a conduct parameter – that measures market power. We find an incomplete pass-through at the distribution level and for the supply chain as a whole, and a more-than-complete one at the retail level. Furthermore, we estimate price-elasticity of demand to be greater than one. When we feed a theoretical model of pass-through under imperfect competition with these estimates, we obtain a high conduct parameter at the whole supply chain level and an even higher one at the retail level alone. These results show that considering only the whole supply chain pass-through may lead to hasty conclusions about market power. Besides contributing to the empirical literature that connects pass-through with market power, we contribute to on-going national discussions regarding competitiveness in the LPG industry.     

The Effect of Government Advertising Policies on the Market Power of Cigarette Firms

We estimate market power among cigarette manufacturers over 1952–1984, a period of uniform pricing. We apply the Bresnahan approach; adjust it to the firm level; employ a dynamic model with habit persistence; and add an advertising equation, which helps identify the parameters, increase degrees of freedom, and constrain parameters so we can interpret our results at the firm level, despite the fact that the equations conform to what we might see in a market model. We consider effects of government interventions upon demand and market power and find, for instance, that the 1971 broadcast advertising ban decreased market power.     

Measuring Market Power in the U.S. Aluminum Industry: A Residual Demand Approach

This paper applies a refined market power test to examine market power in the U.S. aluminum industry. The study conducts a two-step analysis in which the inverse residual demand facing the industry is first estimated to generate the associate elasticity to infer market power, and then the inverse partial residual demand facing the industry is estimated to produce the elasticity to measure the potential effect of inter-industry coordination. The results suggest that only the primary industry attains market power, and the market power can exert even without collusion between the primary and secondary industries.     

Market Power and Technology

It is well known that market power depends on the price elasticity of demand and the intensity of competition. It is also well known that technology can influence market power through its effect on market structure. However, there is limited research on the direct link between market power and technology. In this paper, we investigate this relationship. We find that the monopoly price can be constrained to be identical to marginal cost under certain technological conditions. We also show how market power depends directly upon technology, holding constant demand conditions, market structure, and the degree of competition.     

2005年电煤供需状况及2006年展望

对近年电煤供需形势作了分析,介绍了2005年煤炭市场的主要特点,煤炭需求增速下降,供需矛盾缓和,库存持续上升,但价格仍然高位运行.同时介绍了2006年电煤供需形势,总体将继续好转,但仍存在较大的不确定性.     

MARKET STRUCTURE AND PRICING STRATEGY OF CHINA'S AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY*

In this study, using market‐level data on quantities, prices' and automobile characteristics from 1995 to 2001, we conduct a market analysis of the Chinese automobile industry under imperfect competition. On the demand side, we apply a nested multinomial logit model to the national market share data in order to ascertain the demand features of China's automobile market. On the supply side, we assume Bertrand behavior to uncover the markups set by automobile manufacturers. Our empirical results suggest that some large automobile manufacturers set high markups, indicating their strong market power in China's automobile market. However, their declining markups in the late 1990's imply a reduction in market control by the major producers.     

价值规律在电力市场中的作用

通过对价值规律基本内容及表现形式的介绍,论述了电力市场运营机制中的供求机制、竞争机制和电价机制的实现,在此基础上分析了电力市场中供求机制与价格机制的相互关系,并对价值规律在国外电力市场中的研究和在国内电力市场化改革中的作用作了相应的阐述,目的是希望在我国电力市场化改革过程中,充分注意电力工业固有的特点来运用价值规律.     

电力市场中的市场势力及其治理

电力市场中市场势力受供给和需求刚性、市场竞争政策和制度安排，以及输电堵塞等因素影响表现出特殊性。电力市场势力不仅受到主导企业市场份额的影响，还更多地受企业之间战略相互作用或博弈效应、市场需求弹性、竞争性边缘企业供给弹性、边缘企业的市场份额等因素的影响。这些因素与电力生产经营过程中的技术性结合在一起，使规制很难有效进行，在电力市场中产生了明显的市场势力结果。限制电力市场中市场势力的根本途径是设计特别的市场竞争政策和交易制度。     

Power in the market for Medi-Cal services

The California Medicaid Reform Act of 1982 resulted in a shift in power from the supply to the demand side of the Medi-Cal market. We find some evidence that strategic behavior by hospitals in the subsequent period may have countered the erosion of supplier market power. This study conducts an empirical assessment of market power in markets for Medi-Cal services, in the year reforms were first implemented (1983) and six years later. Multihospital chain presence is found to have a positive and statistically significant impact on market power, and to vary by chain ownership type.     

Labor market power and the distorting effects of international trade

This article examines how final product trade with China shapes and interacts with labor market imperfections that create market power in labor markets and prevent an efficient market outcome. I develop a framework for measuring such labor market power distortions in monetary terms and document large degrees of these distortions in Germany's manufacturing sector. Import competition only exerts labor market disciplining effects if firms, rather than employees, possess labor market power. Otherwise, increasing export demand and import competition both fortify existing distortions, which decreases labor market efficiency. This widens the gap between potential and realized output and thus diminishes classical gains from trade.     

动力煤期货强势引领 煤价有望走出低迷

动力煤期货的上市将会对我国煤电行业、我国期货市场和国际期货市场等方面产生深远影响,其中最为核心与显著的影响是将会深刻改变我国煤炭行业的定价机制。分别从国内外经济环境、动力煤供求关系、库存水平、运输能力、行业政策、进口动力煤价格、生产成本等方面的变动论证了当前动力煤期货价格将会引领煤炭价格的回升。     

The reverse Cellophane fallacy in market delineation

In the landmark Cellophane case, the Supreme Court erroneously concluded that du Pont did not have significant market power because the Court evaluated the elasticity of demand for Cellophane at the monopoly equilibrium, at which the elasticity was far higher than at the competitive equilibrium. The Court's error is commonly referred to as the Cellophane fallacy. This paper contends that there also is a reverse Cellophane fallacy. Markets delineated on the basis of prevailing demand elasticities are likely to be too small and the potential for the exercise of market power is likely to be overstated.     

Bargaining over employment as a firm strategic choice

This paper develops a simple model as to why unionized Cournot firms acting non-cooperatively in the product market may find it optimal to commit to bargaining outcomes with their specific union, which are off the labor demand curve, hence restricting their behavior to non-profit maximizing practices in their product markets. The prediction that power over labor conceded strategically to the union by the firm is negatively linked to union wage power is not rejected on a panel of Belgian firms as well as the prediction that the union bargaining power can be affected by product market structure and other variables affecting union wages.     

How much trustworthy and salubrious an organic jam should be? The impact of organic logo on the Italian jam market

This paper studies the impact of organic logo in the Italian jam market. Using data on true sales in Italian supermarkets in the 2002–2004 period we estimate the structural demand model developed by Berry (1994). This approach allows us to solve potential endogeneity problem in the estimation of the price coefficient in the demand equation, as well as other aspects related to multiple sources of differentiation. In a market where 62 percent of organic jams are diet this approach allows us to identify separately the market power induced by the organic logo and by the low content of sugar. The estimation results from various specifications of GEV class of models show that the organic attribute guarantees a degree of market power greater than the diet attribute. However, the protection from competition entailed by the organic logo is not particularly strong, and the diet attribute does not guarantees additional protection to organic jams. Most importantly, our findings show that consumers trust more big organic producers thus suggesting important policy implications on the supply and marketing side of the jam market.     

Competition Among Middlemen When Buyers and Sellers Can Trade Directly

This paper examines competition among middlemen when sellers and buyers can trade directly. Direct trade alters the supply and demand facing the middlemen, making them interdependent, and reduces the market power of intermediaries. However, it does not alter the Stahl [1988] result that middlemen may have an incentive to “corner” the market if demand is inelastic. The model is applied to market making in financial markets, vertical integration in goods markets and to the question of bypass in utilities. This discussion suggests that cornering is most likely in markets for essential inputs and that it may enable seller collusion.     

The effect of coal combustion byproducts on price discrimination by upstream industries

Price discrimination is often difficult to disentangle from price dispersion due to a lack of transaction level data capable of tracking sales from individual companies to quantifiably heterogeneous groups of consumers. This paper uses mine-mouth prices and transportation prices paid by regulated coal-fired power plants in the U.S. coal market during the time period 2009–2010 to study how coal mines and transportation companies practice price discrimination against electricity plants. Power plants with heterogeneous demand for coal are perfectly identified based upon their ability to market flue-gas desulfurization (FGD) gypsum, which is a byproduct produced from scrubbing SO₂ emissions. Because sulfur is the raw material for FGD gypsum byproduct production, gypsum sellers are anticipated to have a more inelastic demand for high-sulfur coal. Results indicate that coal mines and transporters charge higher prices to gypsum sellers in comparison to non-sellers for transactions originating at the same mine during the same month of the same year. Coal-fired power plants capable of selling FGD gypsum byproducts are estimated to pay a 10.3–39.6 ¢/MMBtu price premium for coal. Coal mines and transportation companies each capture a relatively equal share of the associated rents.     

电煤市场中买方市场集中度对均衡价格的影响分析

几乎所有的文献都从"市场煤"与"计划电"的体制矛盾入手分析电煤价格持续上涨及发电企业经营困难的主要原因与相关对策。作者认为,在近年来电煤市场供求总量基本平衡的前提下,电煤市场价格持续大幅度上涨与发电企业买方市场集中度有关。本文运用讨价还价模型,分析了买方市场集中度变化即改单一发电企业购煤为发电集团公司统一购煤甚至多家发电集团公司统一购煤对电煤均衡价格的影响。结果表明:提高买方市场集中度能有效降低电煤市场均衡价格。     

福岛核泄漏事故后日本及世界LNG市场趋势

2011年3月日本福岛核泄露事故导致日本停机维护的已有核电机组迟迟无法重启,在建核电项目面临延期,规划核电项目被无限期搁置.本文从短期效应和长期效应两个角度深入剖析了福岛核泄漏事故对日本LNG需求的影响,日本将长期维持高LNG需求.未来短期内世界LNG市场供应形势不明朗,但需求将持续旺盛.     

Anforderungen an den konventionellen Kraftwerkspark – wieviel und welche Kraftwerkskapazit?t wird ben?tigt?

The electricity supply system will, particularly in Germany, significantly be determined by the use of renewable energy sources. A?decreasing energetic utilization along with an increasing flexibility demand lead to chancing requirements for the conventional plant fleet. The question arises to what extent conventional generation capacity is needed in the future and if??compared to today??additional technical requirements have to be fulfilled due to the increased flexibility demand. Furthermore it has to be discussed how a required capacity level can be achieved and if??and under which conditions??today??s market design is sufficient or if additional capacity mechanism are necessary. These questions are discussed in this article. The questions as to the required capacity level and the means to achieve it depend on the perspective, which is chosen with respect to security of supply. Choosing a European perspective, i.e. a common responsibility for an appropriate level of security of supply in Europe, additional capacity mechanism are not necessary. Choosing a national perspective, i.e. requiring that national demand can??theoretically??be covered by capacity available in the particular country, does not only significantly increase the necessary amount of generation capacity but also??due to the fact that the electricity market already today is organized on a European rather than a national basis??requires additional capacity mechanisms to cover capacity demand. With respect to the flexibility demand a concerted as well as coordinated acting of the different independent market players is necessary to cover a more volatile residual load. However, there is no additional demand for technical flexibility.