浅析天使投资与风险投资的区别与发展

近年来,我国创业浪潮不断掀起,建立天使投资与风险投资管理体系和充分调动天使投资资本和风险投资资本,是解决越来越大的创业资本需求缺口的重要途径。本文通过天使投资和风险投资的案例分析,了解天使投资和风险投资的区别与联系,提出建立天使投资和风险投资的促进发展机制,从而促进企业的融资。     

我国体育产业资本市场环境的理论研究

运用献资料、专家访谈和综合分析等方法,对我国体育产业资本市场环境进行了理论研究。研究表明,我国体育产业资本市场的发展与环境有着密切的关系,而这种关系的核心是体育产业资本市场环境资源的需求和创业体育企业资源的供给所具有的有机联系。体育产业资本市场作为一种创新性的金融活动,离不开其赖以生存和发展的环境支持。体育产业资本市场环境在一定程度上决定着体育产业资本市场战略目标的实施。     

风险资本对创业企业发展的作用及规范建议

不同于一般股权资本形态,风险资本不仅投资实力雄厚,且投资具有投资阶段早、投资地域和行业集中等特征。这些特征也使其对创业企业融资具有重要价值。结合我国市场发展实情,本文提出了提高风险资本投资效率、促进创业企业成长规范性建议。     

公司财务筹资理论方法在创新创业企业中应用

"十三五"时期是全面建成小康社会和进入创新型国家行列的决胜阶段,是深入实施创新驱动发展战略、全面深化科技体制改革的关键时期,创新创业企业的健康发展十分必要,然而创新创业企业在经营过程中常面临资金困难,本文通过财务管理筹资理论和方法应用,帮助创新创业企业预测资金需求量,根据综合资本成本比较法和资本结构风险分析方法并结合创新创业企业自身特点选择筹资方式,以助力企业发展,获取更多利润。     

浅议融资方式对创业企业绩效的影响

近年来,根据相关资料数据显示,我国的创业活动呈现出十分活跃的状态。蓬勃的创业活动创造了新的产业,提高了生产率,解决了部分的就业,推动了经济的发展,然而创业存在着较高的失败率,究其原因主要是财务资本的缺乏。融资是创业成功与否的决定性因素之一,获得适宜的资本是创业企业取得绩效的保证,在资本约束下,创业企业合理安排融资方式是获得绩效的关键。本文从理论角度对创业企业的融资方式和绩效进行分析,从而得出创业企业的融资方式对其绩效是有影响的,以期为创业企业融资研究提供参考。     

论社会资本在我国微型企业创业中的作用

随着企业市场环境的变化和现代技术的发展,企业规模经济的重要性开始减弱,高度专业化的微型企业获得了更多的生存、发展机会。结合社会资本理论,分析了社会资本在企业中的功效;并结合我国微型企业发展现状,剖析了社会资本在我国微型企业创业中的作用。     

创业资本在我国的发展——基于创业板上市公司的面板数据分析

2009年以来,随着创业板市场的开市,众多高新技术企业在创业板上市．无疑带动了创业资本市场的发展。该文基于2010-2012年间在创业板IPO的319家企业为研究对象,通过查找这些企业的招股说明书,找出有创业资本介入的企业,通过比例分析得出：70％以上的企业都有创业资本的投资,这说明我国创业板上市公司在IPO时,创业投资是一个新兴的而且广泛的融资渠道。通过研究同时发现,在这些创业企业中,40％以上的企业中,单个上市公司的创业投资比例都集中在10～30％之间,这也说明创业资本在我国的发展,更有待于规范化和扩大化。     

关于发展创业资本的思考

近年来,如何借鉴国外经验,发展我国的创业资本已成为各界关注的热点问题之一。有关部门通过对建立创业资本的必要性和可行性的分析,认为发展创业资本对改变我国的现状,走出某些困境,实现一些企业的第二次创业的目标,具有十分重大的意义。     

创业板信息技术业资本结构与融资需求研究——基于与主板和中小板的比较

随着中国经济的持续健康发展,创业板将推动高新技术业的发展,并有利于创业企业的自主创新。作为创业板市场的代表行业,信息技术业的长足发展有赖于合理的资本结构和充足的资金来源。通过分析比较创业板与主板、中小板信息技术业上市公司2009年的资本结构情况,探讨创业板信息技术业上市公司资本结构和融资需求的特点,进而寻求适合我国创业板市场发展的途径,以期推动创业板上市公司的长远发展。     

我国企业资本结构存在的缺陷以及建议

我国的资本市场经过十余年的发展探索,取得了举世瞩目的成就,为促进经济发展,社会进步做出了突出贡献。但在发展的同时也存在很多问题。本文重点在于对公司的资本结构问题的研究,着重对我国企业资本结构存在的缺陷做出探讨,并对存在的问题并提出合理的解决办法和建议,使得企业能够更好的对内部资本结构进行合理调整,及时有效的规避经济风险,促进企业长远稳定的发展。     

风险投资组织形式与治理结构的有效性分析

风险投资组织形式和治理结构直接决定和影响风险投资效率。一种有效的风险投资组织形式其治理结构应解决的两个基本问题:激励约束机制问题和选择、监督的成本与效率问题。用三种不同组织形式治理结构效率的比较和有限合伙制为什么成为美国风险投资主流的分析,为我国各地兴起的风险投资及其组织形式提供借鉴。     

我国风险投资存在的问题与对策研究

风险投资在我国还是一个新兴的产业。在我国风险投资的发展历程中,政府起了主要的推动作用。与发达国家相比,我国的风险投资业还处于刚起步的阶段。我国风险投资业的发展面临的最主要问题是缺少优秀的具有远见卓识的风险投资人才、风险投资公司自身的问题以及风险投资面对的市场环境问题。在探讨分析我国风险投资业的现状和问题的基础上,提出适合我国风险投资业发展的政策和建议,对我国风险投资业的健康发展具有极其重要的现实意义。     

风险投资有限合伙制激励约束机制研究

有限合伙制对发展风险投资有着重要的金融经济价值,是我国风险投资事业发展的一个前进方向。对有限合伙制中基金与管理人、项目遴选、项目经理人、投资对象和有关专家聘用等五个方面的激励与约束机制进行分析,结果表明,有限合伙制的利益激励与风险约束相对称,构成了风险投资系统的两个方面,二者共同作用保证了风险投资收益的可靠性。现阶段,我国发展有限合伙制,就激励与约束机制而言,应尽快完善有限合伙制的相关法律体系。     

基于BP神经网络的风险投资退出模式研究

风险投资的退出方式受多种因素的影响,选用何种退出方式退出成了难点.IPO对于风险企业来说,可以保持风险企业的独立性还可获得在证券市场上持续融资的渠道.对于风险投资家而言可获得高额的投资回报,因此,IPO被认为是最佳的退出方式.虽然并购收益比不上IPO,但资金能很快从风险企业中退出进行新的投资.因此,并购也是风险投资退出的重要方式.通过建立风险投资退出方式的指标评价体系,并应用BP神经网络求解模型,对风险投资退出方式的综合评价结果说明,分值越高,评价指标上综合表现越佳,应优先选用IPO退出.分值越低,指标上综合表现欠缺,应优先选用清算退出.     

Deal Structuring in Philanthropic Venture Capital Investments: Financing Instrument,Valuation and Covenants

Philanthropic venture capital (PhVC) is a financing option available for social enterprises that, like traditional venture capital, provides capital and value-added services to portfolio organizations. Differently from venture capital, PhVC has an ethical dimension as it aims at maximizing the social return on the investment. This article examines the deal structuring phase of PhVC investments in terms of instrument used (from equity to grant), valuation, and covenants included in the contractual agreement. By content analyzing a set of semi-structured interviews and thereafter surveying the entire population of PhVC funds that are active in Europe and in the United States, findings indicate that the non-distribution constraint holding for non-profit social enterprises is an effective tool to align the interests of both investor and investee. This makes the investor behaving as a steward rather than as a principal. Conversely, while backing non-profit social ventures, philanthropic venture capitalists structure their deal similarly as traditional venture capital, as the absence of the non-distribution constraint makes such investments subject to moral hazard risk both in terms of perks and stealing and social impact focus.     

风险投资是新三板市场"积极的投资者"吗

定向增发在新三板创业企业的股权融资中发挥着中坚作用,而风险投资正是其中重要的参与者.本文选择2013 —2016年新三板企业定向增发为研究样本,实证检验了风险投资介入的动因及经济后果.研究发现,整体而言,风险投资参与新三板定向增发会选择财务绩效较好、创新能力较强的企业介入,结论支持了风险投资的事前筛选职能.大股东参与定向增发在一定程度上会减弱风险投资介入与企业财务绩效和创新能力之间的敏感性.当面对优质企业标的时,风险投资将选择联合投资的方式"抱团"进入,体现了其在新三板市场更为谨慎的投资风格.但风险投资进入所投企业后,受制于本身能力和投资意愿,并未显著提升被投企业财务绩效和创新能力,没有发挥事后监督职能.考虑新三板独特的做市商制度和分层制度,本文再次验证了风险投资事前筛选职能的履行和事后监督职能的缺失.本文不仅揭示了风险投资参与新三板企业定向增发的动因及经济后果,同时也为国家利用新三板市场推进创新战略、构建和完善多层次资本市场提供了经验证据.     

风险投资 政府如何定位

我国是一个从计划经济体制向市场经济体制转型的发展中大国,政府在风险投资中的角色定位与行为选择是否妥当,对我国风险投资的发展关系极大。风险投资离不开政府的支持,在发展初期尤其应该强化政府的作用。但在市场经济条件下,政府对风险投资只能引导,不能作为主要投资主体,政府主办风险投资不符合市场经济以及风险投资的发展规律。现阶段我国政府主要应当加大对风险投资的扶持力度,全面加强促进风险投资业发展的制度供给,为风险投资创造一个适宜的环境。     

The CEO,venture capitalists,and the board

An element in the never-ending debate about the process of funding highpotential businesses is the extent to which venture capitalists add value besides money to their portfolio companies. At one end of the spectrum, venture capitalists incubate start-ups and nurture hatchlings, while at the other extreme, so-called “vulture” capitalists feed on fledgling companies. A very important way in which venture capitalists add value other than money to their portfolio companies is by serving on boards of directors. Hence, by studying the role of outside directors, especially those representing venture capital firms, we were able to shed light on the issue of value-added.In the first phase of the research, we studied 162 venture-capital-backed high-tech firms located in California, Massachusetts, and Texas. In the second phase (with data from 98 of the 162 firms), the lead venture capitalists on the boards were classified according to whether or not they were a “top-20” firm.Board Size The average board size was 5.6 members, which was somewhat less than half the size of the board of a typical large company. Board size increased from 3 to 4.8 members with the first investment of venture capital.Board Composition and Control The typical board comprised 1.7 inside members, 2.3 venture capital principals, .3 venture capital staff, and 1.3 other outsiders. Insiders constituted 40% or less of the members of 82% of the boards, while venture capitalists made up over 40% of members of 55% of the boards. When a top-20 venture capital firm was the lead investor, then 55% of the board members were venture capitalists; in contrast, when the lead was not a top-20 firm, only 23% of board were venture capitalists.Value-Added Overall, our sample of CEOs did not rate the value of the advice of venture capitalists any higher than that of other board members. However, those CEOs with a top20 venture capital firm as the lead investor, on average, did rate the value of the advice from their venture capital board members significantly higher—but not outstandingly higher—than the advice from other outside board members. On the other hand, CEOs with no top-20 as the lead investor found no significant difference between the value of the advice from venture capitalists and other outside board members. Hence, in our sample, we could not say that there was a noticeable difference in the value of valueadded by top-20 boards and non-top-20 boards.The areas where CEOs rated outside board members (both venture capitalists and others) most helpful were as a sounding board, interfacing with the investor group, monitoring operating performance, monitoring financial performance, recruiting/replacing the CEO, and assistance with short term crisis. That help was rated higher for early-stage than later-stage companies.Our findings have the following implications for venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, and researchers.Venture Capitalist The main product of a venture capital firm is money, which is a commodity. It's impossible to differentiate a commodity in a martetplace where the customers have perfect information. As venture capitalists learned since the mid-1980s, their customers (entrepreneurs) now have an abundance of information that, while it may not be perfect, is certainly good enough to make a well-informed decision when selecting a venture capital firm. Hence, value-added may be the most important distinctive competence with which a venture capital firm—especially one specializing in early-stage investments—can differentiate itself from its competitors. If that is the case, then venture capital firms need to pay more attention to their value-added, because CEOs, overall, do not perceive that it has a great deal of value to their companies. The top-20 appear to be doing a somewhat better job in that area than other venture capital firms.Entrepreneurs If an entrepreneur wants outside board members who bring valueadded other than money, it appears that they can do as well with non-venture capitalists as with venture capitalists. The entrepreneurs we talked to in our survey gave the impression that board members with significant operating experience are more valued than “pure” financial types with no operating experience. If venture capital is an entrepreneur's only source offunding, then the entrepreneur should seek out firms that put venture capitalists with operating experience on boards. It also appears that an entrepreneur, will, on average, get more value-added when the lead investor is a top-20 firm, but there is a drawback: when a top-20 is the lead investor, it is more likely that venture capitalists will control the board. No entrepreneur should seek venture capital solely to get value-added from a venture capitalist on the board, because outside board members who are not venture capitalists give advice that is every bit as good as that given by venture capitalists.Researchers Value-added is a fruitful avenue of research. From a practical perspective, if valueadded exists it should be measurable. So far the jury has not decided that issue. Some finance studies of the performance of venture-capital-backed initial public offerings (IPOs) claim to have found valueadded, some claim to have found none, and at least one study claims to have found negative value- added. From a theoretical perspective, value-added is relevant to agency theory, transaction cost economics, and the capital asset pricing model. It also is relevant to strategic analysis from the viewpoint of distinctive competencies.     

Venture capital or private equity? The Asian experience

Venture capital in Asia has exhibited remarkable growth over the last two decades. Researchers and practitioners have, however, expressed doubts as to whether what is being reported as venture capital in Asia can really be classified as such. Authors of scholarly studies often avoid this debate and, consequently, fail to caution readers about the applicability of their research findings. Through an exploration of the history, development, and composition of venture capital in Asia, this article not only confirms significant differences between Asian and traditional venture capital, but also finds that venture capital in Asia differs little from what is commonly called private equity. As such, a need exists within the venture capital literature to recognize this peculiarity of the Asian venture capital market. Moreover, venture capitalists considering expansion into Asia must comprehend the nature of the Asian market in order to avoid disillusionment and frustrations which may result from inadequate understanding.     

政府引导基金下基金经理人薪酬激励机制研究

在风险企业家、创业基金经理人、投资者的三方动态博弈中,信息不对称可能导致基金经理人的道德风险问题。以委托代理理论为基础,研究政府引导基金下如何有效地设计基金经理人的薪酬激励机制;并通过委托代理模型的推导,探讨影响基金经理人激励强度的各种因素,从而为政府引导基金顺利、高效的运作提供承上启下的保障。