Choice of Mortgage Contracts: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances

This study revisits the empirical question of the determinants of the choice between fixed‐ and adjustable‐rate mortgages using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances that overcome some of the data limitations in previous studies. The results from a logit model of mortgage choice indicate that pricing variables and affordability are important considerations. We also find that factors, such as mobility expectations, income volatility and attitudes toward financial risk largely influence mortgage choice, with more risk‐averse borrowers preferring fixed‐rate mortgages. For households that are less risk averse, the mortgage type choice decision is less sensitive to pricing variables and income volatility, and affordability factors are not significant. These findings provide empirical support that underscores the importance of attitudes toward risks in mortgage choice.     

Evaluating the Costs of Increased Lending in Low and Negative Growth Local Housing Markets

The literatures on default and the evaluation of low downpayment mortgage programs are extended by showing within an options pricing framework how differences in expected price appreciation trends across housing markets can influence default and, thereby, the cost of programs designed to increase mortgage liquidity. An equilibrium mortgage rate reflecting the risk premium required to compensate for expected default-related losses is endogenously determined within the model. Evaluating the entire process by which program losses arise strictly within a rigorous asset pricing framework has potentially important implications for policy evaluation, as the estimated present value of program losses in declining markets where expected default is high is quite sensitive to the choice of the discount rate. The implications of increased lending in low and negative price appreciation local markets are also investigated.     

Credit History and the FHA–Conventional Choice

Models explaining whether households choose conventional or FHA mortgage financing typically use differential insurance premiums, loan-to-value (LTV) and payment-to-income underwriting standards, and local economic conditions to explain household behavior. Using a large and geographically diverse sample, we expand the standard choice model by including measures of borrower credit history. We find that the ability of a homebuyer to avoid credit problems is an important part of the FHA–conventional choice. In addition, credit scores of FHA borrowers are worse on average than those of conventional borrowers, but as LTV increases credit scores of conventional borrowers deteriorate.     

Unobservable Risks in Mortgage Contract Choice

This study proposes a lifetime utility maximization model where borrowers choose optimal mortgage bundles including mortgage type, loan‐to‐value and loan size to maximize their allocation of limited budgets between housing and nonhousing consumptions. The model predicts that the mortgage bundle choices by borrowers of different income and risk attributes explain significant variations in the ex post default risks of the borrowers. The empirical tests using sampled mortgages pooled in nonagency residential mortgage backed securities support the hypothesis that the optimal choice of mortgage bundles reveals hidden risk factors of borrowers, which, if ignored, could lead to misjudgment of ex post default of borrowers.     

Mortgage Pass-Through Securities: Progress and Prospects

This paper discusses the Housing Commission's perspective and recommendations on mortgage pass-through securities markets, reviews federal policy toward such securities in the wake of the Housing Commission Report , and considers prospects for mortgage securities in the housing finance system of the future. Concerning the outlook, it is concluded that massive "securitization" of housing finance may not be inevitable–contrary to the developing conventional wisdom on this topic–partly because the underlying need for secondary market transactions may not be as strong as commonly expected. Furthermore, the relative importance of pass-through securities as secondary market vehicles may erode if federally related programs are phased down in line with Housing Commission recommendations, even if policies currently being developed within the Administration to improve the functioning of fully private securities markets are implemented.     

Mortgage Choice†

Mortgage choice refers to a set of problems faced by a homeowner that includes the choice of a loan-to-value ratio, the refinancing and default decisions, and the choice of mortgage instrument. This paper reviews much of the literature that has been written on the topic. It begins with a listing of the major stylized facts the literature seeks to explain. Models used to explain mortgage choice are categorized and discussed. It is argued that the relatively simple certainty model that incorporates liquidity constraints seems capable of explaining some of the stylized facts, but is unable to explain some others. The paper concludes with a discussion of three policy questions that require a better understanding of mortgage choice before they can be answered. The paper is based upon the author's Presidential Address to the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, which was delivered in Atlanta, Georgia on December 29, 1989.     

The Commission's Recommendations on Housing Finance

The Commission proposes radical changes in the structure of institutions supplying residential mortgage funds. By massive broadening of their asset and liability powers, the thrifts are to become quasi-banks. The resulting housing credit gap is to be filled by multipurpose lenders, notably pension funds, and by greater use of mortgage securities backed by conventional as well as FHA and VA loans. For these changes, the Commission relies on the magic of deregulation, initiated partly in the Depository Institutions Act of 1982. A mortgage investment tax credit is proposed to cushion adverse effects on housing, but its adoption is highly unlikely. The Commission's expectations of structural reform through deregulation are overdrawn. Hence, its approach would probably reduce resource allocation to housing. The assertion that the new system would be more efficient is not supported by the meager analysis offered in the Report . Likewise, the claim of greater cyclical stability of mortgage lending remains unsubstantiated. The Commission also recommends curtailment of federal programs supporting the private housing sector: restricting FHA to high-risk loans and phasing down the GNMA guaranty of mortgage securities. But the proposals for FNMA and FHLMC stop short of cutting their umbilical cords of government.     

Optimal Sharing of Interest‐Rate Risk in Mortgage Contracts: The Effects of Potential Prepayment and Default

Much of the literature on the economics of mortgage markets has studied the fixed vs. adjustable‐rate mortgage choice made by individual borrowers. However, to decide if the outcome of such a choice is efficient or approximately so, it is necessary to explore the question of optimal risk‐sharing in mortgage contracts. But because only a small literature has studied this question, more research is clearly warranted. The present article helps fill this gap by developing a simplified version of Arvan and Brueckner's model, using it to characterize optimal contracts in the absence of mortgage termination, and then exploring how termination via prepayment or default affects optimal risk‐sharing. The broad conclusion of the analysis is that potential mortgage termination makes higher risk exposure for borrowers optimal.     

The Subprime Virus

We examine the correlation between prime mortgage default risk and the introduction of subprime mortgages in a local area. We motivate our analysis with a model of a default contagion effect that spreads the effect of a mortgage foreclosure from one property to surrounding properties. Through numerical analysis, we demonstrate the effect of subprime mortgage originations to the risk of prime mortgages. Finally, we offer empirical support for our model by examining the spatial variation in MSA prime mortgage default rates and the level of subprime mortgage activity.     

Household Interest Rate Risk Management

I investigate household interest rate risk management by solving a life‐cycle asset allocation model that includes mortgage and bond portfolio choice. I find that most investors prefer an adjustable‐rate mortgage and thereby save on the bond risk premium that is contained in fixed‐rate mortgage payments. Only older, risk‐averse investors hold some fixed‐rate mortgage debt. Together with a position in short‐term bonds this enables them to hedge against changes in the real interest rate, while the inflation exposure of the debt and bond positions cancel out. Hedging house price changes with bonds only occurs at the end of the life cycle. Early in the life cycle short‐sale constraints prevent an effective hedge.     

Preliminary Evaluation of the HECM Reverse Mortgage Program

This paper describes and evaluates the Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) insurance demonstration, designed to encourage the development of private reverse mortgage programs by insuring lenders against the risks associated with new mortgage lending programs and with reverse mortgages in particular. The paper evaluates demand for the program by analyzing the attributes of participating borrowers, their properties and the types of payment options chosen. It also presents several observations regarding participation by the financial community in the HECM demonstration, required counseling and legal and regulatory issues that may hamper the growth and development of reverse mortgage programs in general.
The findings suggest strong demand for reverse mortgages among "house-rich, cash-poor" elderly homeowners, either to supplement inadequate current incomes or to provide a reserve against unexpected lump-sum expenses. The flexible design of the HECM program addresses a wide variety of borrower financial needs, even though it imposes higher costs on lenders and servicers. The continued growth of the program, however, is hindered by a shortage of qualified housing counselors in some areas, as well as by a variety of legal and regulatory barriers.     

The Mortgage Acquisition Process: A Comparison of VRM and FRM Borrowers*

In recent years a number of alternative types of residential mortgage plans (i.e., alternative to the fixed-rate level-payment mortgage) have been proposed, and some of these have been available in various parts of the country. The most often proposed innovation has been the variable rate mortgage (VRM). The most widespread use of the VRM has been in the State of California, starting in early 1975. This paper discusses some of the results of a survey of over 1,700 homeowners in California that examined consumer reaction to the VRM. Specifically, this paper looks at the impact of the VRM on the mortgage acquisition process and the features of mortgages demanded by consumers. The data seem to indicate that the process of acquiring a mortgage has not been affected significantly by the availability of the VRM. However, the existence of alternative mortgage plans means that consumer choice can be broadened to include type of mortgage as well as lending institution.     

Potential Beneficiaries from Reverse Mortgage Products for Elderly Homeowners: An Analysis of American Housing Survey Data

A variety of reverse mortgage loan programs have been available to elderly households for over a decade. The number of unrestricted reverse mortgage loans issued by the private sector has been quite small. About 12,000 loans have been issued through mid-1992. Some researchers take this to mean that the size of the potential market for reverse mortgages is also quite small. Other researchers claim that current low levels of activity reflect supply and demand problems, but that the potential market is in fact quite large. This paper uses American Housing Survey (AHS) data to estimate the potential size of the market for unrestricted reverse mortgages. The 1989 national AHS shows that there are over twelve million elderly homeowners (age 62 and over) who own their homes free and clear. Depending on their income, age and the level of home equity, the group of households most likely to benefit from reverse annuity mortgages is considerably smaller. As one approach to defining a lower bound of the estimate of potential beneficiaries from reverse mortgages, we count the number of homeowners in a prime group consisting of the older elderly, aged 70 or above, with an annual income of $30,000 or less, with home equity between $100,000 and $200,000, who have lived in their homes for over ten years. We estimate that there are about 800,000 elderly households in this prime group. For such households, reverse mortgage payments could represent a substantial percentage increase in income; other definitions of target groups can also be explored using the tables provided. The paper uses the 1985 through 1988 AHS Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) surveys to identify areas that have a large number of elderly homeowners in the prime target group, and in which these homeowners represent a large fraction of the elderly homeowner population. These locations are likely targets for introduction of reverse mortgage products because any campaign can be targeted towards a high concentration of likely eligible beneficiaries.     

Regressive Interest Rate Expectations and Mortgage Instrument Choice in the United Kingdom Housing Market

The paper considers the choice of mortgage instrument when the rate of interest is fixed for a short duration, with reversion to a variable (bullet) rate mortgage contract. The research is the first direct test for regressive interest rate expectations using United Kingdom data while testing for wealth and portfolio effects. The econometric modeling uses a variety of nonparametric and parametric techniques to control for classification error in the dependent variable. There is evidence that households adopt regressive interest rate expectations. The lack of statistical significance of wealth and portfolio effects confirms the short run cash flow perspective of United Kingdom mortgage choices.     

Lenders’ pricing strategy: Do neighborhood risks matter?

This article explores the different pricing strategies of lenders who originate both government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) and non-GSE loans. We find that conditional on loan and borrower characteristics and some observable local economic factors, mortgage rates on GSE loans vary significantly across regions. However, we observe no sizable regional variation in loan amounts or default risk. By contrast, the mortgage rates on non-GSE loans depend almost entirely on borrowers and loan characteristics. In addition, we find that spatial variations in GSE mortgage rates are highly responsive to regional prepayment risk. Our results are robust to various controls for neighborhood characteristics, including regional-level bank competition, borrower accessibility to mortgages, and household income levels. Overall, the findings offer a novel insight into how lenders adjust pricing strategies in response to a changing lending environment. The results provide implications relating to the present and imminent dangers of housing bubbles and the intensified refinancing wave following the COVID-19 pandemic.     

The Borrower's Perceived Risk in Mortgage Choice

We investigate how borrowers perceive the risk in the adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) versus fixed rate mortgage (FRM) choice. We develop a mortgage choice model where the coefficient on the long‐term bond risk premium is conditional on the borrower's perceived risk. We show that the perceived risk fluctuates over time according to the short‐term interest rate level and housing market conditions. We find that when the short‐term rate level is high (low), the borrowers perceive low (high) risk of a short‐term rate rise, thus opting for ARMs (FRMs). Also, during a down housing market they become more risk‐averse perceiving higher risk in choosing ARMs. The perceived risk level alters the borrowers’ sensitivity to the long‐term bond risk premium.     

Self-Selection in the Fixed-Rate Mortgage Market

This paper analyzes the effect of information asymmetry between the lender and the borrower (i.e., the borrower knows how long he will reside in his home, whereas the lender does not) on the borrower's choice among the interest rate-discount points combinations available in the fixed-rate mortgage market. The analysis shows that if the rate-points trade-off of the mortgage menu is either too steep or too flat, then all types of borrowers will choose the same loan contract from the menu. In addition, if the rate-points trade-off is not convex to the origin, then only the contracts with extreme rate-points combinations will be chosen by borrowers; all contracts with intermediate rate-points combinations are redundant and will not be chosen by any borrowers. Intermediate rate-points combination mortgage contracts would be chosen by some borrowers only if the mortgage menu were to provide a self-selection function. Several necessary conditions of a self-selection mortgage menu are depicted.     

A Simple Model of Mortgage Insurance

This paper uses a two-period model to analyze the borrower's choice of an optimal time pattern of mortgage payments in a world where future house values are uncertain. Since a decline in values can make the borrower's equity negative, leading to default on the mortgage, lenders in the model will require the purchase of mortgage insurance. The premium on the insurance policy will depend on the riskiness of the mortgage, which in turn depends on the magnitude of the initial mortgage payment. Mortgages with large (small) first payments will carry low (high) insurance premiums. Taking this fact into account, the borrower decides on the optimal riskiness of his mortgage. Borrowers who discount the future heavily choose risky mortgages carrying high insurance premiums, while those who place a higher value on future consumption opt for less risky contracts carrying low (or zero) premiums.     

Housing Tenure in a Model of Consumer Choice: A Simple Diagrammatic Analysis

The paper begins with a general model of demand for housing in an intertemporal utility maximization framework. Under standard assumptions the consumer is indifferent between owning and renting. Relaxation of various assumptions would explain tenure choice, but this is mathematically complex. As an alternative, a diagrammatic model of consumer choice over one period is presented which shows the effects of income, savings, housing and other prices, mortgage interest rates, rates of return on alternative investments, and tastes. Again under standard assumptions the consumer is indifferent about housing tenure. The effects on tenure choice of a change in the assumption about the availability of mortgage credit, rates of return on alternative investments and income taxes are demonstrated.     

What drives screening incentives in nonbank mortgage originators?

Nonbank mortgage originators, which operate through the originate-to-distribute (OTD) model, account for more than half of all the mortgage origination in the United States. However, less is known about which factors drive the quality of mortgage originations through nonbanks. I show that an exogenous shock that reduced collateral risk for funding intermediaries of nonbank mortgage originators led to a greater issuance of riskier mortgages that culminated in 10–30% higher ex post defaults. These results show how the quality of mortgage origination in the OTD model of nonbanks is affected by the collateral risk borne by their funding intermediaries. Overall, the results highlight funding intermediaries' monitoring incentives as one of the factors that drive the quality of mortgage originations through nonbanks.