零准备金制度下的货币政策操作框架研究

目前世界上越来越多的国家取消了对商业银行的法定准备金要求,不仅于此,英国、加拿大和澳大利亚等国家的中央银行还采用了通货膨胀目标制的货币政策框架,从而主要通过调控短期名义利率来实现既定的目标通货膨胀率,如此操作不但较好地实现了对宏观经济的调控,而且,相比较正法定准备金制度下的货币政策操作,在零准备金制度下,货币当局主要通过引导市场主体的预期来实现政策目标,从而在减少货币政策操作成本的同时,也使得中央银行有了更大的政策实施空间。     

期刊荟萃

银行国际化削弱了货币政策的自主性杨力在《世界经济研究》2004年第8期著文指出熏从广义的角度讲熏银行国际化至少包括三个方面的内容熏即银行机构和业务的国际化、银行业务市场的国际化和银行金融资产和收益的国际化。随着银行国际化进程的深入,中央银行对利率、汇率和通货膨胀等变量的控制能力逐步减少。首先,中央银行对利率难以控制了。一旦中央银行试图有意识地变动利率,银行在国际金融市场的运作就可能会部分抵消中央银行行为的实际效果。其次,中央银行难以控制通货膨胀率。随着银行的国际化,其货币创造过程也相应从国内扩展至国际范围…     

中国通货膨胀成本的非对称性与货币政策动态调控模式研究

本文对我国通货膨胀成本的非对称性以及货币政策的惰性特征进行了检验和识别,发现中央银行具有明显的规避通货紧缩偏好,但其货币政策调控不存在明显的惰性区域。本文采用理性预期框架下的TVP S VAR模型测度中央银行在不同宏观背景信息下的利率调控规则。结果发现,中央银行在通货紧缩时期的政策调控力度将显著增强,而就新常态时期内的货币政策调控而言,其更加注重货币政策的持续性,坚持“总量平衡、适度从紧、适时微调、定向着力”的货币政策调控方针,从而为经济增速托底,也给经济结构全面升级和改革留出必要的时间。     

新凯恩斯框架下中国通货膨胀动态变化及货币政策分析

以新凯恩斯菲利普斯曲线为分析框架,在考虑利率滞后项和预期项的情况下,通过最优化中央银行的目标损失,构建中国的通货膨胀方程,并采用1992年以来的季度数据对中国通货膨胀的形成因素进行实证分析,以研究我国货币政策对通货膨胀事后调节和事前引导的实际效果.实证结果显示,我国的通货膨胀水平主要受经济主体通货膨胀预期和产出缺口的影响;利率变化在短期内并不改变通货膨胀的变化方向,不过随着利率市场化改革的深入,利率对通货膨胀的影响逐步显现;预期实际利率对当期物价波动有着正向引导作用,并且在子样本的稳健性分析中证实这种关系有加强趋势.这些实证检验结果对我国调控物价水平及制定更加有效的货币政策提供理论支持.     

货币政策的数量型工具与价格型工具的调控绩效比较——来自动态随机一般均衡模型的证据

本文基于我国经济发展现实,构建了包含金融加速器、工资调整粘性以及消费惯性的新凯恩斯动态随机一般均衡模型,从货币政策的冲击效应、非政策冲击下宏观经济波动幅度以及中央银行损失函数等三个方面对比了不同货币工具的调控绩效,研究显示,价格型工具的调控绩效优于数量型工具,而稳健性分析也对此提供了进一步证明。因此,中央银行应积极地运用利率工具以更有效控制通货膨胀和实际产出波动,维护宏观经济稳定。     

危机后中央银行面临的挑战与对策

危机后,中央银行政策操作环境发生了新的变化。未来中央银行将面临经济、理论和制度三大挑战,如何面对这些挑战?本文提出了四大指导准则。文中一个基本结论是,目前宽松的货币政策均需要适时退出。政策利率及时回归常态将有助于抑制日益增加的通货膨胀压力,防止出现新的金融失衡积累。     

学习效应与资产价格

文章在一般均衡的框架下,分析实际利率被扭曲时资产价格的表现.主要贡献是为中央银行刻意压低实际利率的政策建模,并分析它对资产价格的含义.我们发现当中央银行调整货币政策目标,压低实际利率的时候,具有抵押价值的资产,其价格会上升,从而产生资产价格泡沫.如果社会公众对真实的货币政策目标缺乏完备信息,那么对政策目标的学习过程将导致资产价格在较长时期内呈现出上涨趋势.     

论我国商业银行应对利率市场化的对策

一、利率市场化的涵义 利率市场化是我国实现经济和金融市场化的关键,是我国经济金融体制改革深化的核心内容.具体来说,利率市场化包括以下两层含义:其一,利率决定方式的市场化.利率的品种结构、期限结构以及利率水平不再由中央银行直接决定,或受中央银行直接限制,而是逐渐由金融资产的供需双方根据金融市场的供求状况,按价值规律自发调节、自行决定.其二,利率管理方式的市场化.指中央银行对利率的管理不是通过硬性规定来实现,而是根据现实经济环境及经济政策等,通过运用拥有的金融资源,在市场机制下改变金融市场的供求状况,调节基准利率来调控整个市场利率水平,促进货币政策目标的实现与国民经济的发展.货币当局所能直接决定的,只有存款准备金利率、再贴现利率和再贷款利率.     

基于市场利率波动测度的货币政策操作风险研究

在货币政策操作过程中,中央银行对宏观经济形势的认识偏差,货币政策工具及政策调控时机的选择不当,以及政策信息的披露不及时等,都有可能误导公众预期,增加市场不确定性,从而引致货币政策操作风险。文章通过利用中国货币市场上同业拆借和债券回购的利率数据进行实证,结果表明,中央银行政策操作透明度不高以及对宏观经济形势进行判断的前瞻性不足,是引致我国货币政策操作风险的重要原因。     

我国货币政策中利率对消费、投资的影响

<正>一、我国的货币政策与利率(一)我国的货币政策工具一个国家的中央银行,作为经济的监管者和调控者,其调控经济主要靠经济政策,或者说是货币政策。而货币政策工具是中央银行为达到货币政策目标而采取的手段。     

Inflation targeting in Canada: Experience and lessons

In 1991, the Canadian government and the Bank of Canada agreed on targets for inflation reduction. The major lesson that we at the Bank of Canada draw from our experience with inflation control since then is related to the advantages of establishing a credible anchor for monetary policy by focusing on the predictability of inflation. Overall, it became increasingly evident through the last decade that the inflation target deals with expectational problems. It promotes a much greater degree of confidence and understanding than monetary targets or a vaguely expressed desire for price stability ever did.     

Monetary Policy; Questions of Adequacy, Design and Presentation

In this article John Flemming considers three possible modifications to the presentation and design of monetary policy. He argues first that it is odd to forecast the target variable – inflation – when it is policy to do what is necessary to deliver the target. What would be interesting would be a forecast of what interest rates might prove necessary. Secondly he considers the possibility that with monetary policy dedicated to price stability and fiscal policy to paying for public expenditure – and stabilising output – a third control might be appropriate to stabilise the financial system. Finally, and overlapping with the last, he explores ways in which asset price changes might be reflected in a broader measure of inflation – as recently suggested by Charles Goodhart and the IMF.     

The monetary policy strategy of the Bank of England in 2020–21: An assessment

Excessive money creation during the Covid pandemic has resulted in Britain's worst episode of inflation since 1990–91. The backdrop to this failure of monetary policy is the Bank of England's aggregate demand/aggregate supply framework together with the Monetary Policy Committee's neglect of broad money. An alternative way to operate monetary policy is urgently needed. A significantly improved monetary policy outcome could be achieved by shifting from trying to steer the economy using interest rates and quantitative easing or quantitative tightening to reliance on the relative stability of income velocity (the ratio of nominal GDP to broad money) as a means of managing aggregate demand.     

Briefing Paper: The Interdependence of Fiscal and Monetary Policy under Economic and Monetary Union

This article explores the implications of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) for the conduct of fiscal policy. Under EMU, where the European Central Bank is successful in controlling inflation, the loss of seigniorage revenues causes a potential problem for public sector deficits. To prevent the debt-income ratio from spiralling upwards, a primary budget surplus is ultimately required. EMU has usually been considered as a strong central monetary authority which forces fiscal discipline on lax national governments. But this is not the only possibility. Because the debt ratio can be reduced by surprise inflation, the price expectations of the private sector are important. Once these are taken into account, EMU can be examined in a 'game' framework in which the reputation of the authorities and the existence or otherwise of cooperation between the fiscal and monetary authorities becomes a critical factor.
The paper finds that where the authorities enjoy reputation and cooperate, a one-off reduction in public spending will lead to a permanent decline in the real interest rate and crowd in extra private spending (consumption and investment). Without reputation the cut in government spending has to be sustained. Where there is neither reputation nor cooperation, the outcome depends on the structure of the European economy and whether fiscal policy can effect the terms of trade between countries. If the terms of trade remain unchanged, the outturn is similar to the case of cooperation without reputation, but where the terms of trade can be improved in one country, there is no incentive to cut public spending. In this case the outturn is higher inflation with private spending crowded out.     

Reviewing Bank of England Independence: The Report of the Bank of England Commission

In this article, Geoffrey Williams outlines the main findings and recommendations of the independent Bank of England Commission set up by the Conservative Party to review the performance of the United Kingdom's monetary policy framework. Its final report published earlier this month, recommended that operational independence of the Bank of England should be retained but that important improvements can be made to how policy is conducted. These include even greater transparency in policy decisions, changing the inflation target and creating a new Parliamentary Committee and possibly a new Council of Economic Advisers to provide for the UK the clearest possible democratic and professional scrutiny of economic policy.     

Assessing the Powell policy review

To understand both how it controls inflation and how it trades off inflation with its goal of maximum employment, the Federal Reserve System uses a Keynesian framework in which monetary policy moves the unemployment rate relative to a presumed full employment value, termed the NAIRU (non‐accelerating inflation rate of unemployment). Because it does not know the value of the NAIRU, it pursues an expansionary monetary policy until inflation rises. This policy risks reviving the inflationary monetary policy of the 1970s.     

Unconventional government debt purchases as a supplement to conventional monetary policy

In response to the Great Financial Crisis, the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and many other central banks have adopted unconventional monetary policy instruments. We investigate if one of these, purchases of long-term government debt, could be a valuable addition to conventional short-term interest rate policy even if the main policy rate is not constrained by the zero lower bound. To do so, we add a stylised financial sector and central bank asset purchases to an otherwise standard New Keynesian DSGE model. Asset quantities matter for interest rates through a preferred habitat channel. If conventional and unconventional monetary policy instruments are coordinated appropriately then the central bank is better able to stabilise both output and inflation.     

Estimating the Bank of Mexico’s reaction function in the last three decades: A Bayesian DSGE approach with rolling-windows

This paper uses a small open economy Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model to investigate how Mexico’s central bank has conducted its monetary policy in the period 1995–2019. The main objective of the paper is to document the systematic changes in the Bank of Mexico’s reaction function by analyzing possible shifts in the parameters of the policy rule. The central bank’s policy is modeled using a Taylor rule that relates the nominal interest rate to output, inflation, and the exchange rate. I employ Bayesian computational techniques and conduct rolling-window estimations to explicitly show the transition of the policy coefficients over the sample period. Furthermore, the paper examines the macroeconomic implications of these changes through rolling-window impulse–response functions. The results suggest that the Bank of Mexico’s response to inflation has been steady since 1995, while the response to output and the exchange rate has decreased and stabilized after 2002.     

The First Unified Budget What Should Mr. Clarke Do?

Mr. Clarke has the distinction of presenting the first Unified Budget, an innovation introduced by his predecessor. He does so against a subdued inflation outlook and a recovery from recession that has been proceeding since the first half of last year. But he is also aware that there are risks to this favourable outlook: European recession may slow growth, and there is the worry that underlying inflation may breach the Government's 4 per cent ceiling. III this Viewpoint, we argue that the Chancellor should go further that his predecessor in curbing public borrowing, aiming for a reduction of sonic £4-5bn; this fiscal contraction could be accompanied by a further 0.5 per cent reduction in interest rates, or more if the recovery shows signs of faltering. A rebalancing of monetary and fiscal policy in this way reduces the risks associated with a high level of public borrowing, can help in reducing the excessive level of consumption (private and public) in the UK economy, and offers the best means of maintaining a competitive exchange rate without inflation. A curious feature of the first Unified Budget is that, having moved tax decisions to the autumn, the Chancellor appears to have ruled out further government spending cuts beyond those agreed by the Cabinet before the summer: with more favourable inflation arid the public sector pay limit, there would seem to be scope for a further reduction in the Control Total. On the revenue side, the Chancellor should seek to raise revenues in such a way that does not adversely affect incentives. Here he has several options: to extend the VAT net; to eliminate income tax allowances or reduce them to the 20p rate of tax; or to introduce new user charges. There is also the opportunity, one year on from the UK's exit from the ERM, to restate the basis for a sustainable macroeconomic framework. This should include a rebalancing of monetary and fiscal policy, and a move to enhance the powers of the Bank of England but with parliamentary accountability.