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本文利用192家上市公司3年的面板数据,对股权分置改革下我国上市公司股权结构与公司绩效的相关性进行了实证分析。首先通过因子分析确定公司绩效指标,接着分别从股权构成、股权集中度及股权制衡度3个方面考查股权结构与公司绩效的关系,结果表明,公司绩效与国有股比例、第一大股东持股比例呈显著的U型关系,与流通股比例负相关,与前五大股东持股比例、股权制衡度正相关。 相似文献
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本文围绕管理人员和大股东所产生的两类代理问题,分析了股权结构中的管理层持股、股权集中和股权制衡等方面影响公司绩效的机制,以我国民营上市公司为样本对上述方面与公司绩效之间的关系进行了实证研究,结果表明:民营上市公司管理层持股比例、股权集中度与公司绩效之间存在显著的正相关关系;当第一大股东持股比例介于20%和50%之间时,股权制衡度与企业绩效存在显著的正相关关系。 相似文献
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本文以IPO定价市场化为背景,以创业板创开市至2010年10月12日共131创业板IPO公司为样本,研究了第一大股东持股比例、股权制衡度以及实际控制人类型等股权结构对IPO定价的影响。结果表明,第一大股东持股比例与IPO定价存在非线性关系,持股比例较低时存在负相关关系,持股比例适当增加后关系并不明显,持股35%时则呈现较显著的正相关;多个自然人共同控制的公司对发行定价产生正向影响,而家族控制的公司则相反;总体来讲,股权制衡度与IPO定价成正向关系,这一关系在家族控制型企业中表现最为显著。 相似文献
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股权结构与公司治理绩效 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
一、股权结构决定公司治理结构 所谓股权结构,就是指公司股东的构成状况.它包括股东的类型及各类股东的持股比例、股权的集中与分散程度、股东的稳定性和经营者持股比例等.由于股东的种类及持股比例不同,导致不同的股权结构.一般说来,股权结构大体可以分为三个不同的类型:一是高度集中型股权结构,即少数股东拥有相对多数的股票,尤其是第一大股东持股数额很大,处于绝对控股地位,其他股东持股极少,大股东掌握着超过现金流权利更大的公司控制权,公司的重大问题由大股东说了算.二是过度分散型股权结构,即相当数量的股东持有数量相近的股票. 相似文献
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本文以2005~2009年支付现金股利的A股上市公司为研究对象,检验了大股东持股比例与现金股利支付水平的关系。结果表明:大股东持股比例与现金股利支付水平正相关,但股权分置改革后,现金股利支付水平与大股东持股比例正相关关系减弱,大股东利用现金股利侵占中小股东的隧道挖掘行为减弱。 相似文献
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本文基于房地产行业2010-2012三年的研究数据,分别从负债结构和股权结构考察二者对公司治理效应的影响。研究结果表明,负债总体水平可以提高公司的长期业绩,而有息负债率和长期负债率则不利于公司的长期业绩;股权集中度和股权制衡度与治理效应呈显著正相关关系,第一大股东持股比例与治理效应呈显著负相关关系,说明适度集权和形成股权制衡机制有利于公司长期业绩,而过度集权如第一大股东持股比例集中则起到反向的作用。 相似文献
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Jiatao Li 《Managerial and Decision Economics》1994,15(4):359-368
Patterns of corporate governance and control differ significantly across countries because of national differences in structures of ownership and composition of boards of directors. Based on agency theory, we examine the relationship between ownership structure and the composition of the board of directors of 390 large manufacturing firms based in Japan, Western Europe and the United States. In particular, we examine how ownership concentration, bank control and state ownership affect the percentage of outside directors on the corporate boards. The results show that, consistent with predictions of agency theory, ownership structure has significant effects on board composition. 相似文献
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资本结构与代理成本之间的关系始终是研究者关注的焦点。本文认为,资本结构中权益资本和债务资本会引发不同的代理成本,其产生的根源在于管理者与股东以及债权人与权益投资者之间存在不同的利益格局。在第一类和第二类代理冲突中,债务均具有重要的地位,但债务在第二类代理冲突中的作用与第一类冲突中显著不同。当企业股权集中时,大股东掌握着企业的实际控制权,企业的主要代理问题成为控股大股东与中、小股东之间的代理问题,这会导致其资本结构的代理成本与第一类和第二类代理成本显著不同。 相似文献
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资本结构与代理成本关系研究评述 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
资本结构与代理成本之间的关系始终是研究者关注的焦点。本文认为,资本结构中权益资本和债务资本会引发不同的代理成本,其产生的根源在于管理者与股东以及债权人与权益投资者之间存在不同的利益格局。在第一类和第二类代理冲突中,债务均具有重要的地位,但债务在第二类代理冲突中的作用与第一类冲突中显著不同。当企业股权集中时,大股东掌握着企业的实际控制权,企业的主要代理问题成为控股大股东与中、小股东之间的代理问题,这会导致其资本结构的代理成本与第一类和第二类代理成本显著不同。 相似文献
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传统的债务期限结构理论不能用来解释制度因素与债务期限结构的关系;从公司治理角度对债务期限结构的研究文献较少考虑多层级控股方式下,终极控制人与债权人之间的代理问题对债务融资期限的影响。债务期限结构的未来研究需要探讨多层级控股方式下企业债务期限结构影响因素问题,此外还需要完善现有的债务期限结构理论及其替代指标。 相似文献
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《Scandinavian Journal of Management》2022,38(2):101209
This study investigates whether employees’ psychological ownership results in stewardship behavior and whether this relationship is affected by an employee’s perception of the organization’s agency culture. A survey of the financial managers of 129 firms in Germany generally confirms these expectations. In addition, and surprisingly, our findings suggest a negligible effect of an agency culture on the relationship between psychological ownership and stewardship behavior when managers perceive high psychological ownership. Thereby, our study enriches the literature on the consequences of psychological ownership by providing insights into the boundary conditions of such outcomes at the manager level. 相似文献
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上市公司股权激励机制与政策思考 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
高级管理层股权激励是西方企业缓解代理冲突的重要的风险激励机制,但我国对管理层股权激励的作用还缺乏清晰的认识。本文对中外管理层股权激励的理论和经验进行比较分析后发现,我国上市公司管理层持股已从单纯的福利制度安排向激励制度安排过渡。基于此,公司应尊重内生性,以长效考核机制为基础推行适度的股权激励计划,但要注意降低股权激励过程中新的代理成本和防止股权激励后的“内部人交易“。 相似文献
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High Performance Work Systems for Service Quality: Boundary Conditions and Influence Processes 下载免费PDF全文
Drawing on agency theory and the resource‐based view, this study examines the moderating effect of hotel ownership structure on the relationship between high‐performance work systems for service quality (HPWS‐SQs) and service performance as well as the curvilinear relationship between hotel service performance and hotel profitability. Results from surveys and archival data of 126 hotels showed that when hotels were owned and operated by brands, HPWS‐SQs had a positive effect on service performance. Moderated mediation analyses showed that service performance as a mediator accounted for the moderating effect of ownership and management structure on the relationship between HPWS‐SQs and hotel profitability. In addition, service performance demonstrated an inverted U‐shaped relationship with hotel profitability. These findings advanced the understanding of the boundary conditions and influence processes of HPWS‐SQs on financial performance in service settings. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 相似文献
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We investigate the link between payouts and stock incentives among financial institutions. We hypothesize that the varying degree of regulation across depositories, insurers, and securities firms is likely to influence the observed relation to the extent that regulation substitutes for other monitoring mechanisms. We find that managerial stock ownership is inversely related to dividend payouts across the institutions, consistent with the notion that managerial stock ownership is an effective method of reducing agency problems. We do not find evidence that the relationship occurs because of regulation since all institutions, regardless of the degree of regulation, exhibit the same inverse relationship between dividend payouts and management stock ownership. Our results suggest that, among financial institutions, regulation complements managerial stock ownership in minimizing agency problems. 相似文献
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This study examines the interrelation between board composition and variables that capture various agency and financial dimensions of the firm. The agency literature suggests that outside directors on the board provide important monitoring functions in an attempt to resolve, or at least mitigate, agency conflicts between management and shareholders. The agency literature indicates that other mechanisms such as managerial equity ownership, dividend payments, and debt leverage also serve as important devices in reducing agency conflicts in firms. This study argues and documents that an inverse relationship exists between the proportion of external members on the board and managerial stock ownership, dividend payout, and debt leverage. This is consistent with the hypothesis that individual firms choose an optimal board composition depending upon alternative mechanisms employed by the firm to control agency conflicts. Board composition is also found to be systematically related to a number of other variables including institutional holdings, growth, volatility, and CEO tenure. 相似文献