中国加入WTO内生与外生比较产业的选择分析

加入WTO后，产业选择将决定中国在国际贸易中的地位和竞争力，本通过内生比较利益与外生比较利益的比较，用超边际分析的方法分析了发展内生比较优势的产业是中国参与国际分工，提高国际竞争力的较好选择。     

第三次工业革命对国际产业分工和竞争格局的影响

当前正在发生的第三次工业革命,将对国际产业分工和全球竞争格局带来重大影响,并赋予国际产业分工和竞争以新的内涵。第三次工业革命将改变传统的国际产业分工体系,带来国际产业结构深刻调整,推动国际贸易结构和贸易方式的重大变化,产业竞争更趋广泛性、分散性和个性化,知识性生产要素的争夺将日趋激烈。     

企业间专业化分工与产业集群组织发展——基于交易费用的分析视角

从劳动的专业化分工入手,本文通过揭示产业集聚降低区域企业交易费用,指出发生在产业关联企业间而不是企业内的专业化分工是产业集群组织发展的基本动力。大量的产业关联企业在区域内聚集发展,不仅能够降低企业内生交易费用,而且能够降低外生交易费用,使人们劳动的专业化分工深化沿着大量地理接近的企业间而不是数量有限的企业内进行,从而为产业集群发展给出了一个具有新制度经济学含义的理论解释。     

新型农民合作经济组织:实现农业产业专业化分工的有效交易协调机制

专业化分工的程度与水平有赖于有效交易协调机制在解决因此而产生的交易费用中发挥重要作用。新型农民合作经济组织相较于传统体制下形成的社区型合作经济组织，非人格化的市场价格，“公司 农户”农业产业化经营组织，有利于降低农业产业专业化分工进程中的内生和外生交易费用，是一种有效的交易协调机制。在充分发挥其作用的同时，必须针对其发育初期中存在的问题。坚持有所创新。     

比较竞争优势与中国产业的国际定位

比较优势理论虽然强调要素优势在一国产业定位中的作用，却把要素优势等同于产业优势，忽略了其它的约束条件，致使践行比较优势理论的发展中国家长期陷入“贫困化增长”之中，竞争优势理论所强调的优势要素，因与发展中国家的资源禀赋结构相距甚远，对发展中国家产业定位的指导意义十分有限。鉴于发展中国家的经验教训和我国大国经济的特征，中国在参与国际分工，对本国产业进行国际定位时，要把比较优势和竞争优势结合起来，形成比较竞争优势，按照比较竞争优势原则定位我国的产业，既能解决长期困扰发展中国家的贫困化增长问题，又能推动我国产业结构的升级和就业的增加。     

论制度变迁的速率与选择

制度变迁速率与选择是由内生变量和外生变量共同决定.内生变量主要是制度变迁的性质、变迁规模、变迁强度和目标制度的类型.外生变量是由社会政治经济环境、非正式制度以及需求状况组成.两个方面共同决定制度变迁的速度及决策主体的选择.文章首先分析了制度变迁的内生因素和外生因素及速率的最佳范围和规模,其次用具体案例进行检验并得出结论.     

企业竞争优势来源初探

企业竞争优势来源的研究一直是众多学者关注的焦点。根据对企业竞争优势来源的研究成果,将其归类为企业竞争优势外生理论和企业竞争优势内生理论。从系统论的角度对基于企业竞争优势理论的来源解释进行评述,进而得出知识与企业家精神是竞争优势的真正来源。     

企业竞争优势理论演进评述

竞争优势理论经历了古典综合论、竞争优势外生论、竞争优势内生论和动态综合论四个发展阶段,它是一个从注重企业内外环境静态匹配到注重企业外部环境到注重企业内部环境再到注重企业内外环境动态匹配的研究历程.     

面对全球竞争的企业营销对策

随着高科技和信息技术的发展 ,世界各国经济的发展越来越超越国界的限制 ,而在全球范围内进行国际分工和协作 ,以谋求资源的最佳配置。国际间的交往日益增多 ,国际经济活动全球化的趋势已成为不可逆转的潮流。在这种形势下 ,企业面临着目标顾客、营销环境、营销管理等问题的巨大变化。任何企业要想独自垄断市场是不可能的 ,只能是相互共享市场。因此 ,我国企业必须树立全球营销观念 ,以合作竞争、强强联手的战略联盟等形态扩大自身的竞争优势。     

企业竞争优势根源的理论演进

研究企业竞争优势的根源不仅有助于企业的实践，而且也是检验各种理论流派能否解释和预期企业竞争优势的判断依据。本文拟对探讨企业竞争优势根源的各种理论观点进行较为系统的梳理，认为企业竞争优势并不是“梅森－贝恩范式”主张的由市场结构等因素所外生，也不完全是“以资源为基础的企业观点”、“企业能力理论”所倡导的由企业内的资源、能力所内生。通过逐层剥离笼罩在企业竞争优势根源的外围因素，本文认为，企业竞争优势源于企业的知识，试图为现实中企业构筑以知识为基础的竞争优势的实践提供理论支持和指导。     

Learning competitive market balance

Summary We exhibit a quite natural, adaptive process generated by price-taking, noncooperative firms, supplying the same market. Under rather mild conditions, that process, being driven by marginal profits, converges to a market clearing, Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Namely, it suffices for convergence that cost functions be strictly convex and that the law of demand holds. Randomness in revenues and costs is accommodated.Support from Ruhrgas is gratefully acknowledged.     

Non-computability of competitive equilibrium

Summary. We provide a “computable counterexample” to the Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium existence theorem [2]. In particular, we find an exchange economy in which all components are (Turing) computable, but in which no competitive equilibrium is computable. This result can be interpreted as an impossibility result in both computability-bounded rationality (cf. Binmore [5], Richter and Wong [35]) and computational economics (cf. Scarf [39]). To prove the theorem, we establish a “computable counterexample” to Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem (similar to Orevkov [32]) and a computable analogue of a characterization of excess demand functions (cf. Mas-Colell [26], Geanakoplos [16], Wong [50]). Received: September 9, 1997; revised version: December 17, 1997     

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The competitive advantage of honesty

We study competitive markets where firms may lie to their workers to reduce costs. Consumers may benefit from firms’ dishonesty through lower market prices. Does firms’ (dis-)honesty affect consumers’ purchasing decisions? Our experiment shows that when honesty is fully transparent, it can provide a competitive advantage: Honest firms sell more and – despite higher costs – achieve higher profits. This finding is in line with our equilibrium predictions when allowing for dishonesty-averse consumers. By identifying circumstances in which consumers – although not the addressee of dishonesty – “punish” firms for their within-firm dishonesty, we contribute both to behavioral ethics and behavioral industrial organization.     

Information revelation in competitive markets

This paper analyzes a market with multiple sellers and horizontally differentiated products. We investigate the sellers’ incentives to reveal product relevant information that affects the buyer’s private valuation. The main finding is that if the number of sellers is sufficiently large, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium with full information disclosure. Thus, unlike the results by Lewis and Sappington (Int Econ Rev 35:309–327, 1994) and Johnson and Myatt (Am Econ Rev 93:756–784, 2006) for monopoly, which state that the monopolist reveals either full information or no information, intense competition results in a single extreme with respect to information disclosure. We show that the market is always inefficient, but the magnitude of inefficiency converges to zero at a high rate as competition intensifies.     

A competitive idea-based growth model

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we present a model in which endogenous growth arises in competitive markets. Knowledge is described as a factor used directly in the final goods' production. Firms demand both basic nonrival knowledge contents, which are supplied jointly and inelastically with raw labor, and further contents supplied by patent holders. This fact, together with Lindahl prices for knowledge, allows competition to work, while it also implies that workers' income share declines overtime. In a first version of the model with constant cost of knowledge production, the first best is attained. In a further version of the model, in which the cost of knowledge production is allowed to change over time and thus intertemporal externalities arise, in a decentralized economy a second best equilibrium occurs in the transitional period, while in the long run there is convergence to efficiency.     

Freeware as a competitive deterrent

Using perfect foresight and adaptive models, this paper examines the effect of competitor asymmetry, consumer sensitivity to incentives and adaptive processes on freeware strategies and competitive outcomes. Four roles played by freeware in competitive markets are identified – it can be a mechanism to build or speed up the growth of a network without the need to lower prices on the commercial version, a deterrence mechanism, a hindrance to a rival’s network building efforts, and a coordination device in the presence of forward looking consumers. We determine the optimal prices of the commercial version, the decisions to introduce freeware and the freeware qualities for both competing firms.     

Price-making in a competitive market

An attempt is made to analyze the behavior of a price-maker in a purely competitive market. Assuming the price-maker maximizes expected profit subject to the constraint of satisfying periodic excess demand, we derive characteristics of his optimal prices as they depend on current state variables and then obtain properties of the expectation and variance of the long-run stationary probability distribution of price.