Cross‐border Mergers and Greenfield Foreign Direct Investment

This paper presents a model of international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), where FDI is comprised of greenfield FDI and mergers and acquisitions (M&A). In a monopolistically competitive environment merging firms do not reduce competition. Mergers are motivated by efficiency gains and transfer of technology. Following empirical evidence, greenfield investors are modeled as more productive than M&A firms, which are in turn more productive than exporters. The model has two symmetric countries and generates two‐way flows of both M&A and greenfield FDI. Trade liberalization makes more firms choose greenfield FDI over M&A and leads to lower productivity and welfare.     

Mixed oligopoly, optimal privatization, and foreign penetration

This paper examines the impact of foreign penetration on privatization in a mixed oligopolistic market. In contrast to the simple framework of single domestic market with foreign entry by entry mode of foreign direct investment (FDI) or exports, our result shows that government should increase the degree of privatization along with increasing proportion of domestic ownership of multinational firms. Furthermore, we show that an increase in domestic ownership of multinational firms raises all domestic private firms' profit and social welfare, while it may either increase or decrease public firm's profit. With the aid of numerical example, intensive competition from private firms in general will enhance the degree of privatization gradually; in particular, the degree of privatization is lower in the presence of multinational firms.     

Foreign direct investment,international trade,and firm heterogeneity

We present an asymmetric model with firm heterogeneity and foreign direct investment (FDI) from a developed country to a developing country. We found that the successful entry firms could be sorted from highest to lowest according to productivity as reimport firms, FDI firms, export firms, and domestic firms. We also found that FDI decreases (increases) the gross national income of the developed (developing) country, but it can either increase or decrease the world income according to the level of the relative propensity to spend. In addition, we demonstrated that FDI influences welfare through variations in average price, national income, and the number of types of goods.     

Restrictions on Foreign Investments and the Relocation of Firms

We analyse why the Chinese government sets restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI). We focus our analysis on the percentage of shares in relocated firms that the government allows to be foreign‐owned. The government's decision on this percentage depends on the entry cost, the number of firms that relocate and the weight of the consumer surplus in the objective function of the government. We show that by its choice of this percentage, the Chinese government may restrict or encourage FDI to its country. We also find that if the government may subsidise the fixed entry cost, it provides a subsidy only when the producer surplus has a greater weight than the consumer surplus in weighted welfare. In that case, the subsidy encourages relocation by both firms and permits the government to allow a lower percentage of shares to be foreign‐owned in relocated firms.     

FDI Flows and Domestic Investment: Overview

The paper surveys theories of FDI and supporting evidence. Anew theory flashes out a unique feature of FDI: hands on managementstyle that enables investors to react in real time to changingeconomic environments. Equipped with superior intangible knowhow in screening firms, foreign direct investors can out bidportfolio equity investors for the top productivity firms. Theimplications of the theory are that investment is both moreefficient (namely, made dependent on the firm-specific productivity)and, in plausible cases, also larger. The theory can explainboth two way flows of FDI among developed economies, and oneway flows between developed and developing economies. Thesepredictions of the theory are consistent with panel data: largerFDI coefficients in domestic investment and output growth regressions,than those of the debt and portfolio equity coefficients. Theyare also consistent with gravity equations which explain FDIinflows by informational variables and degree of corporate transparencyin the host country.(JEL F2)     

THE IMPACT OF TRADE AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT POLICIES ON TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION AND SOURCING OF CHINESE FIRMS

How do trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) policies impact the decisions of firms in technology adoption (process vs. product innovations) and sourcing (internal vs. external and foreign vs. domestic)? We use a sample of Chinese firms to address this question. China's trade and FDI policies lead to different forms of internationalization: ordinary exports, processing exports, majority FDI, and minority FDI. We find that both exporting and FDI stimulate process innovation; ordinary exports, processing exports, and FDI have strong, weak, and no effects on stimulating product innovation, respectively. Exporting firms source technologies both internally through R&D and externally from foreign and domestic sources. FDI firms have a lower tendency of internal technology development and domestic technology sourcing, but a much higher tendency of foreign technology sourcing than exporting firms. (JEL F13, F23, O32)     

Profit taxation and the mode of foreign market entry

Abstract This paper studies the role of profit taxation for an international firm's decision upon how to penetrate a foreign market – through exports or through foreign direct investment (FDI) and local supply. We show that with harmonized taxes the international firm may choose FDI even though this has welfare costs from a global point of view. With tax competition, the host country can enforce exporting instead of FDI. This leads to a Nash equilibrium associated with higher world welfare than harmonized taxes. Thus, because of the effect on entry mode, tax competition provides heretofore unexplored benefits as compared to tax harmonization.     

Dimensions of international expansions by US firms to China: Wealth effects,mode selection,and firm-specific factors

China's recent efforts to attract foreign investment have been viewed favorably by US firms, who have explored a variety of strategies for expanding to China. This paper provides evidence related to a comprehensive set of strategies used by US firms to expand to China. For the 302 announcements of expansion by US firms into the Chinese market, several firm-specific factors are found to affect both the choice of mode entry and the reaction of investors to the announcement of the expansion. The results suggest that firms with a high investment in proprietary assets prefer foreign direct investment (FDI) modes to non-FDI modes, as do firms with high levels of geographic diversification. Firms entering the Chinese market utilize non-FDI modes, while those who have established a presence in China prefer FDI modes. The reaction of the stock market to expansions to China is positive; average excess returns of 0.75% are observed for the two days surrounding the announcement. Both FDI and non-FDI categories of expansion have statistically significant excess returns. Analysis by mode of expansion shows that expansions through joint ventures (JVs) and contracts are the most desirable alternatives. Other modes of expansion do not result in significant excess returns. Finally, a firm's prior financial performance has a significant influence on its ability to profitably expand to China.     

Export,FDI and the welfare gains from trade liberalization

This paper extends Melitz and Redding (2015) to analyze the welfare gains from trade liberalization by adding foreign direct investment(FDI). Our model predicts that with FDI activities, welfare gains from trade liberalization will be strictly lower than those in a model without FDI, but only takes exports into account. In addition, the calibrated model indicates that with FDI activities, aggregate welfare reaches its maximum when the fixed export costs are positive rather than 0. Furthermore, we decompose the welfare gains induced by trade liberalization from continuing exporters, and switchers. The results show that in any case, with or without FDI, continuing exporters contribute a larger share to welfare gains than status switching firms.     

Multinational Corporations, Stackelberg Leadership, and Tariff-jumping

In this paper we consider the traditional entry mode choice of an incumbent monopolist facing entry by a single foreign firm. By allowing entry to be either via exporting or foreign direct investment and for the possibility of Stackelberg equilibria where firms can set quantities in one of two time periods, namely “early” or “late,” we find conditions where both Cournot and Stackelberg equilibria emerge endogenously. Furthermore, by introducing a simple linear tariff, we see that it not only affects the choice of exporting and FDI in a nonlinear way, but that it can also affect the type of equilibrium that emerges.     

INTERNATIONALIZATION STRATEGIES IN OLIGOPOLY WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS

This paper examines the foreign direct investment (FDI) versus exports decision of foreign oligopolistic firms under cost heterogeneity. An additional motivation for firms to invest abroad is the technological sourcing via spillovers, which flow from the host more efficient firm to foreign less advantaged firms. For intermediate values of the set‐up costs associated with FDI entry, it is shown that foreign firms choose opposite entry strategies. An equilibrium where the less efficient foreign firm exports whereas the more efficient invests is more likely to happen when foreign firms become more heterogeneous, the larger the trade costs and not too big oligopolistic profitability. Interestingly, the opposite may also be an equilibrium thus finding that the more efficient firm does not choose to invest, a result that emphasizes the relevance of the strategic setting under consideration. The latter result identifies a market failure since welfare in the host market is higher when both firms undertake FDI; a finding that calls attention to how appropriate are host government policies towards internationalization strategies.     

Strategic tariffs, tariff jumping, and heterogeneous firms

The majority of research to date investigating strategic tariffs in the presence of multinationals finds a knife-edge result where, in equilibrium, all foreign firms are either multinationals or exporters. Utilizing a model of heterogeneous firms, we find equilibria in which both pure exporters and multinationals coexist. We utilize this model to study the case of endogenously chosen tariffs. As is standard, Nash equilibrium tariffs are higher than the socially optimal tariffs. Unlike existing models with homogeneous firms, we find that non-cooperative tariffs promote the existence of low-productivity firms relative to the socially optimal tariffs. This highlights a new source of inefficiency from tariff competition not found in models of homogeneous firms. In addition, we find that in many cases the Nash equilibrium tariff when FDI is a potential firm structure is lower than when it is not. As a result, FDI improves welfare by mitigating tariff competition.     

Auctions of licences and market structure

Summary. This paper studies sequential auctions of licences to participate in a symmetric market game. Assuming that the rate at which industry profits decrease with repeated entry is not too large, at the unique solution either a single firm preempts entry altogether or entry occurs in every stage, depending on the net benefit of complete preemption to an incumbent. If we relax the assumption, a third outcome can occur: two firms may coordinate their choices to avoid further entry. The analysis employs a new refinement of Nash equilibrium, the concept of recursively undominated equilibrium. Received: February 25, 2000; revised version: September 12, 2000     

Location choice,competition, and welfare in non-tradable service FDI

We investigate whether non-tradable service FDI is efficient from a welfare point of view. A fixed number of firms strategically decide which markets to locate in and then compete in quasi-Cournot fashion. Considering firm location in two symmetric markets, non-tradable service FDI may or may not be efficient for the source country, depending on the total number of firms, competition in markets and the curvature of the demand function. In contrast, non-tradable service FDI is always efficient for the host country and the overall economy. This implies that any policy that affects firm location between two symmetric markets will not be beneficial from a welfare viewpoint.     

The welfare effects of FDI: A quantitative analysis

Foreign direct investment (FDI) can increase productivity and wages. However, it is also often accompanied by primary income deficits as foreign-owned firms repatriate their profits. The welfare effects of FDI are thus ambiguous. A particularly illustrative example of this phenomenon are the Visegrád 4 (V4) countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia). This paper investigates whether FDI can be beneficial in the presence of profit repatriation using a general equilibrium model calibrated to the V4 economies. Counterfactual simulations suggest that the benefits of FDI outweigh the costs for these countries. On average, a 1% increase in the share of foreign firms is associated with a 0.17% increase in welfare. However, incentivising foreign firms to reinvest more of their profits domestically is, ceteris paribus, welfare-improving. A 10-percentage-point increase in the profit repatriation rate is associated with a 1.06% welfare gain on average.     

The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on Home and Host Countries with Endogenous R&D

The paper analyzes the impact of FDI on home and host countries, when firms compete both in the choice of international strategy and in R&D. A two-country, two-firm model is used. The problem is structured as a three-stage game in which firms must decide: the mode of foreign expansion; how much to invest in R&D; how much to sell in each market. It is shown that in high-technology sectors a policy of attracting inward FDI may increase welfare in both the home and host countries. The effect on host-country welfare is found to be more beneficial if technological spillovers are national, instead of international, in scope.     

Characterising Japanese Direct Investment in Central and Eastern Europe: A Firm Level Investigation of Stylised Facts and Investment Characteristics

This article analyses the activities of Japanese investors in Central and Eastern Europe since the beginning of the region's transition. The use of firm level data on Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region allows us to focus on the industry, location and timing of affiliate establishment at a level of detail previously unexamined. This enables us to compare Japanese investment with overall regional inward investment as well as investigate country specialisation patterns within the region. We also characterise the type of investing parent, and determine how investments in CEE fit into the European-wide investment patterns for these firms. Finally, we investigate the entry mode choices of investing firms, finding a shift from minority-owned joint ventures and limited participation in the region in favour of wholly-owned subsidiaries and larger involvement in the region.     

Market access and technology adoption in the presence of FDI

This paper theoretically investigates whether improved access to the domestic market speeds up new technology adoption by foreign firms. Foreign firms choose between exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI) to serve the domestic market. If two firms compete in the domestic market, multilateral liberalization of FDI or the realization of multilateral free trade may deter or delay technology adoption, while they always promote and accelerate technology adoption if only a single firm serves the domestic market. Technology adoption can be quickest and consumer welfare greatest when the fixed cost of FDI and the trade costs are neither very high nor very low. Preferential liberalization of FDI promotes the technology adoption of the targeted firm but may not benefit consumers because it discourages technology adoption of the non-targeted firm.     

FREE VERSUS SECOND‐BEST ENTRY IN COURNOT OLIGOPOLIES WITH FIRM‐SPECIFIC NETWORKS

This paper endogenizes the number of firms in an industry with positive network effects, complete incompatibility, and firms that compete in quantity. To this end, we compare two possibilities: free entry and second‐best number of firms (the one that maximizes social welfare). We show that with business‐stealing competition, free entry yields, in general, more firms than the socially optimal solution. In addition, we find that by the nature of the industry with firm‐specific networks, total production may be greater or lower under free entry than with a regulator; moreover, some industries attain their maximum social welfare with a monopoly.     

PRIVATISATION AND TIMING IN A MIXED OLIGOPOLY WITH BOTH FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC FIRMS*

This paper models a mixed oligopoly with both a domestic and a foreign private firm and examines the resulting timing in the quantity setting game. We demonstrate that with a single simultaneous pre‐game delay stage, the resulting endogenous timing has either the public firm leading or the two private firms leading. An alternative characterisation of the pre‐game stage results in the single timing in which the two private firms lead and the public firm follows. For all timings that emerge endogenously, we show that privatisation will always lower domestic welfare but its influence on global welfare is ambiguous.