WELFARE‐MAXIMISING PRICING IN A MACROECONOMIC MODEL WITH IMPERFECT COMPETITION AND CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITIES

This paper develops a simple macroeconomic model with imperfect competition and consumption externalities, and uses it to examine whether the marginal cost pricing rule in the partial equilibrium framework can apply to the general equilibrium framework. It is shown that, for welfare to be maximised, average revenue should be set equal to marginal cost if consumption externalities are either absent or positive. However, for welfare to be maximised, average revenue should be set higher than marginal cost in the presence of negative consumption externalities.     

Ramsey,Pigou, Heterogeneous Agents,and Nonatmospheric Consumption Externalities

This paper analyzes the effects of nonatmospheric consumption externalities on optimal commodity taxation and on the social cost and optimal levels of public good provision. A negative consumption externality, by lowering the social cost of public good provision, may require the second‐best level of public good provision to exceed the first‐best level. If those households who are most important for building up the consumption reference level respond the least to commodity taxation, the second‐best commodity tax rate may fall short of the first‐best rate. Moreover, in this case, heterogeneity may imply an equity‐efficiency tradeoff. This tradeoff is present only if the consumption externality is of the nonatmospheric type.     

PROTECTION,INVOLUNTARY SELF‐EMPLOYMENT AND WELFARE

A small open economy operates with a unionized import‐competing sector and an informal “self‐employed” sector. Productivity varies across people in the informal sector. The full‐employment structure accommodates “underemployment or involuntary self‐employment” in the flexible‐wage informal sector. Protection increases the cost of capital and may increase the set of people who are involuntarily employed in the informal sector. Even if one ignores the consumption distortion effect of a tariff, the tariff may fail to be second‐best because it may raise underemployment. Our results on tariff‐reform are consistent with some recent empirical evidence.     

SHARECROPPING,LAND EXPLOITATION AND LAND‐IMPROVING INVESTMENTS*

This paper analyses the tenancy problem in a dynamic setup and addresses two long‐standing issues: inefficiency and lack of investment. It considers the problems that the tenant, with a shorter‐term interest in the farm than the landlord, might overexploit the land to maximize immediate returns even at the cost of future damages, and under‐supply long‐run productivity improving investments in land. I show that the efficient (first‐best) levels of input use and investment can be achieved (both in the steady state and in transition) by a suitable share contract which, by dampening incentives to maximize current returns, addresses the land exploitation problem, and by an appropriate cost allocation rule which can address the investment problem.     

On the Market Failure in a Dixit-Stiglitz Setup with Two Trading Cities

This study discusses the reasons for market failure and its bias in an economy with two cities and two final goods: tradeable differentiated products and non‐tradeable housing. It is shown that inside the city, as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) , diversity (number of firms) is too small. With regard to the population partition between the cities, the paper distinguishes between a marginal and a global market bias against agglomeration or dispersion (in a second‐best context). The reasons for a marginal bias are twofold: a gap between marginal and average labor productivity and the (excessive) labor employed in housing production which vary between the large and the small cities. The source of the global bias is multiple stable equilibria. The marginal bias may be in an opposite direction to the global bias, such that more agglomeration may be marginally desirable, whereas full dispersion is (second‐best) optimal. Simulations demonstrate that the same market structure and potential source of market failure may imply bias in different directions, depending on the aggregate population size.     

TESTING MODELS OF DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS MARKETS: CONSOLIDATION IN THE CABLE TV INDUSTRY

Research on differentiated products markets often uses structural demand/supply models to identify firms' marginal costs as product‐level cost data are unavailable. Using unique demand and cost data from cable TV, I evaluate a differentiated products model's ability to identify marginal costs. I find firms systematically price below profit‐maximizing levels, leading to biases in the model's marginal cost estimates. I study the implications for merger simulations and find that these biases compromise estimates of merger‐related cost efficiencies, yet do not prevent these models from generating useful predictions of the price and nonprice effects of mergers.     

QUALITY DIFFERENTIATION,WELFARE, AND THE MODE OF COMPETITION IN A VERTICALLY DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCT MARKET: A NOTE*

We analyse the implications of quality differences in a vertically differentiated product market for social welfare by employing an endogenous quality choice model. We find that in of Bertrand and Cournot duopolies, the degree of quality differentiation at equilibrium in an unregulated market is larger or smaller, respectively, than that of the socially second‐best optimum. This implies that a reduction in quality difference, respectively, increases or decreases social welfare in the case of Bertrand or Cournot duopolies.     

Regulatory Policy Design in an Uncertain World

The paper examines principal–agent relationships in uncertain environments where beliefs of the contracting parties (the regulator and the firm) are represented by sets of probabilities. In addition to fully characterizing the first‐best and the second‐best solutions, we examine optimality of zero‐risk, fixed‐payment schemes and the relationship between the first‐best and the second‐best solutions. In the second‐best world, where the regulator can only contract on the quality of the good, a zero‐risk standard is optimal when the firm has beliefs that are so ambiguous that the firm’s marginal rate of transformation belongs to the set of the firm’s relative probabilities.     

PRICES,INEQUALITY, AND POVERTY: METHODOLOGY AND INDIAN EVIDENCE

This paper uses a methodology for evaluating the distributional implications of price movement for inequality and poverty measurement. The methodology is based on a distinction between inequalities in nominal and real expenditure. The conversion of nominal to real expenditure takes into account the varying household preferences. The empirical application to the Indian budget datasets from NSS rounds 50, 55, and 61 shows the usefulness of the proposed procedures. The relative price changes in India have tended to be inequality and poverty reducing as confirmed by formal statistical tests. The result is robust to expenditure dependent equivalence scales. The progressivity of the relative price changes weakened in the second half of our time period as Fuel and Light overtook the composite group called “Miscellaneous” in recording the largest price increase. While the poverty rates registered a decline, which was marginal in the urban areas, there was a sharp increase in inequality.     

COMPETITION, PARALLEL IMPORTS AND COST-REDUCING INNOVATION

Incorporating parallel imports (PI), we develop a two‐country two‐firm model which relates to the incentives for cost‐reducing innovation. We show that PI may facilitate or inhibit the manufacturers' incentives to innovate. In particular, PI could encourage both firms' innovations. The difference between the manufacturer's profits under successful innovation and failed innovation is either a U‐shaped curve or an inverted U‐shaped curve in terms of the cost of engaging in PI. As these differences reflect the manufacturers' incentive to innovate, the variations in R&D investment depend on transportation cost, and firms' marginal costs before and after successful innovations.     

COST‐SAVING PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGIES AND STRATEGIC DELEGATION*

This work analyses a managerial delegation model in which firms choose between two production technologies: a low marginal cost technology and a high marginal cost technology. For the former to be adopted more investment is needed than for the later. By giving managers of firms an incentive scheme based on a linear combination of profit and sales revenue, we find that Bertrand competition provides a stronger incentive to adopt the cost‐saving technology than the strict profit maximisation case. However, the results may be reversed under Cournot competition. If the degree of product substitutability is sufficiently low (high), the incentive to adopt the cost‐saving technology is larger under strict profit maximisation (strategic delegation).     

Optimal price regulation in a growth model with monopolistic suppliers of intermediate goods

Abstract. In this paper we investigate the trade‐off faced by regulators who must set a price for an intermediate good somewhere between the marginal cost and the monopoly price. We utilize a growth model with monopolistic suppliers of intermediate goods. Investment in innovation is required to produce a new intermediate good. Marginal cost pricing deters innovation, while monopoly pricing maximizes innovation and economic growth at the cost of some static inefficiency. We demonstrate the existence of a second‐best price above the marginal cost but below the monopoly price, which maximizes consumer welfare. Simulation results suggest that substantial reductions in consumption, production, growth, and welfare occur where regulators focus on static efficiency issues by setting prices at or near marginal cost. JEL Classification: D42, D61, D92, O38 Régulation du prix optimal dans un modèle de croissance où existent des fournisseurs monopolistes de biens intermédiaires. Dans ce mémoire, on enquête sur la relation d’équivalence à laquelle les régulateurs doivent faire face au moment de définir le prix quelque part entre le niveau du coût marginal et le niveau du prix de monopole. On utilise un modèle de croissance dans le cas où existent des fournisseurs monopolistes de biens intermédiaires. Des investissements dans l’innovation sont nécessaires pour produire un nouveau produit intermédiaire. La tarification au coût marginal décourage l’innovation alors que la tarification au niveau du prix de monopole maximise l’innovation et la croissance au prix d’une certaine inefficacité statique. On montre que l’existence d’un prix qui est un optimum de second ordre et se situe au‐dessus du coût marginal mais au dessous du prix de monopole maximise le niveau de bien‐être des consommateurs. Des résultats de simulation suggèrent que des réductions substantielles dans la consommation, la production, la croissance, et le niveau de bien‐être se produisent quand les régulateurs sont focalisés sur les problèmes d’efficacité statique et fixent les prix au niveau (ou près du niveau) du coût marginal.     

ECONOMIC RENT AND ESTIMATION OF SOVIET GNP GROWTH

The extraction of fuels and metals and production of agricultural goods in the USSR involve increasing marginal cost, which generates economic rent. In computing Soviet GNP accounts, though, the CIA excludes economic rent in measuring value added. The effect is to value output at average, as opposed to marginal, cost. The exclusion of rent understates the shares of fuels, metals, and agriculture in Soviet GNP, which adversely affects the CIA's calculations of Soviet growth. In this paper, the author estimates the economic rent generated by Soviet extraction of fuels and metals and agricultural production. He then uses the estimates to recompute the shares of these sectors in Soviet GNP, and GNP growth. The results suggest that inclusion of economic rent in value added (or alternatively, marginal cost valuation of output) more than doubles the share in GNP of mining (fuels and metals extraction), and increases agriculture's share during the 1980s from 20 percent to about 25 percent. The reestimates of Soviet GNP growth also differ from those of the CIA by 10–30 percent.     

The structure of production in urban housing: a multi-input cost function approach

This paper uses a two-stage cost function model to analyse substitution possibilities among inputs in the production of urban housing. Aggregate price indexes for groups of inputs are generated in the first stage, and then used in the estimation of the aggregate cost function in the second stage. The procedure is valid under the assumption of weak separability. The use of flexible functional forms at both stages allowed the analysis to be carried out by imposing fewer restrictions as a part of the maintained hypothesis than has been the case in the previous literature. The findings are consistent with the postulates of cost-minimising factor demand theory.     

Optimal Income Taxation and Job Choice

In this paper, we study optimal income taxation when different job types exist for workers of different skills. Each job type has some feasible range of incomes from which workers choose by varying labor supply. Workers are more productive than others in the jobs that suit them best. The model combines features of the classic optimal tax literature with labor variability along the intensive margin, with the extensive‐margin approach where workers make discrete job choices and/or participation decisions. We find that first‐best maximin utility can be achieved in the second‐best, and marginal tax rates below the top can be negative or zero.     

FISCAL POLICY, MACROECONOMIC STABILITY AND FINITE HORIZONS

In this paper we analyse the stabilisation properties of distortionary taxes in a new‐Keynesian model with overlapping generations of finitely lived consumers. In this framework, government debt is part of net wealth and this adds a number of interesting channels through which fiscal policy could affect output and inflation. Output volatility, in the presence of technology shocks, is not substantially affected by the operation of automatic stabilisers, but we find interesting composition effects. While the presence of finitely lived households strengthens the stabilisation performance of distortionary taxes through the reduction of the volatility of consumption, it does so at the cost of more volatile investment and real money balances.     

Cost-based Phillips Curve forecasts of inflation

It is a well-established idea that prices are a function of marginal cost, yet estimating a reliable measure of marginal cost is difficult to do. Stock and Watson (1999) use the Phillips Curve to forecast inflation for a variety of existing activity variables that researchers commonly use to proxy for marginal cost. This paper uses a similar type of approach to examine the performance of a new candidate for the activity variable, which is marginal cost measured following the theoretical methodology of Bils (1987), which we find to be simple yet powerful when implemented empirically. We then use the Phillips Curve to conduct pseudo out-of-sample inflation forecasts for the US using: output, unemployment, hours, the labor share, the capacity utilization rate, and the new measure of marginal cost. For almost all cases, forecast errors are lowest in the regressions with the new marginal cost variable, indicating that this new measure is an improvement over previous attempts to proxy for marginal cost.     

Tax Havens,Growth, and Welfare

This paper develops an endogenous growth model featuring tax havens, and uses it to examine how the existence of tax havens affects the economic growth rate and social welfare in high‐tax countries. We show that the presence of tax havens generates two conflicting channels in determining the growth effect. First, the public investment effect states that tax havens may erode tax revenues and in turn decrease the government's infrastructure expenditure, thereby reducing growth. Second, the tax planning effect of tax havens reduces marginal cost of capital and hence encourages capital accumulation so as to spur economic growth. The overall growth effect is ambiguous and is determined by the extent of these two effects. The welfare analysis shows that tax havens are more likely to be welfare‐enhancing if the government expenditure share in production is low, or the initial income tax rate is high. Moreover, the welfare‐maximizing income tax rate is lower than the growth‐maximizing income tax rate if tax havens are present.     

Market entry,privatization and bank performance in transition1

This paper examines how market entry and privatization have affected the margins and marginal costs of banks in the post‐communist transition. We estimate bank revenue and cost functions, allowing the estimated parameters to change over time. In the first sub‐period (1995–98), we find that privatized banks earned higher margins than other banks, while foreign start‐ups had lower marginal costs. In the third sub‐period (2002–2004), foreign banks remained low marginal cost service providers, while privatized domestic banks had the widest margins. Subtracting marginal costs from margins to calculate mark‐ups, an indication of demand for services, shows that initially privatized banks had the largest mark‐ups. However, by the third sub‐period, differences among private banks diminished. In comparison to private banks, state banks persistently under‐performed in controlling costs and attracting demand. Our evidence therefore indicates that foreign bank entry promoted lower costs and that privatization and market entry encouraged more demand for services.     

Consumer confusion,obfuscation and price regulation

This paper studies firms’ obfuscation choices in a duopoly setting where two firms differ in their marginal costs of production. We show that the high‐cost firm chooses maximum obfuscation while the low‐cost firm chooses minimal (maximal) obfuscation if the cost advantage is large (small). We argue that in this setting there is a new role for price regulation as it leads to more transparent pricing. Moreover, a price cap benefits social welfare as it shifts production to the more efficient low‐cost firm.