The Greek Public Sector Wage Premium before the Crisis: Size,Selection and Relative Valuation of Characteristics

We examine the Greek public–private wage differential before the debt crisis to evaluate the prospective impact of the recent public sector pay cuts. We find a large public premium which persists after controlling for individual and job characteristics. For men, much of this is accounted for by self‐selection into the sector that rewards better their characteristics, while for women it is largely driven by sectoral differences in returns. We attribute these effects to more egalitarian pay structures in the public sector and to demand problems in the private sector. The recent policy measures only partially change this situation, as wage deflation extends to the private sector, preserving public premia for the low paid.     

Sharp Teeth or Empty Mouths? European Institutional Diversity and the Sector‐Level Minimum Wage Bite

The article explores the link between different institutional features of minimum wage systems and the minimum wage bite. We notably address the striking absence of studies on sectoral‐level minima and exploit unique data covering 17 European countries and information from more than 1,100 collective bargaining agreements. Results provide evidence for a neglected trade‐off: systems with bargained sectoral‐level minima are associated with higher Kaitz indices than systems with statutory floors, but also with more individuals actually paid below prevailing minima. Higher collective bargaining coverage can, to some extent, reduce this trade‐off between sharp teeth (high wage floors) and empty mouths (non‐compliance/non‐coverage).     

The Structure of the Wage Gap for Temporary Workers: Evidence from Australian Panel Data

This study uses panel data for Australia to estimate the wage differential between workers in temporary jobs and workers in permanent jobs. It is the first study to use unconditional quantile regression methods in combination with fixed effects to examine how this gap varies over the entire wage distribution. While the wages of fixed‐term contract workers are found to be similar to those of permanent workers, low‐paid casual workers experience a wage penalty and high‐paid casual workers a wage premium compared to their permanent counterparts. Temporary agency workers also usually receive a wage premium, which is particularly large for the most well paid.     

Wage Cyclicality Under Different Regimes of Industrial Relations

We analyze the effect of collective wage agreements and of works councils on the cyclicality of real wages. Using employer–employee data for western Germany (1995–2004), we find that wage adjustments to positive and negative shocks are generally not symmetric. Wage growth increases in all industrial relations regimes when unemployment is falling, but this inverse relationship is weaker when unemployment is rising. Moreover, in plants with individual‐level bargaining, wages do not adjust at all to rising unemployment. Works councils increase wage growth only in firms covered by sectoral agreements, but they do not affect the cyclicality of wages.     

The Effect of Minimum Wages on Labour Market Outcomes: County‐Level Estimates from the Restaurant‐and‐Bar Sector

We use US county‐level data on employment and earnings in the restaurant‐and‐bar sector to evaluate the impact of minimum‐wage changes in low‐wage labour markets. Our estimated models are consistent with a simple competitive model in which supply‐and‐demand factors affect both the equilibrium outcome and the probability of the minimum wage being binding. Our evidence does not suggest that minimum wages reduce employment once controls for trends in county‐level sectoral employment are incorporated. Rather, employment appears to exhibit an independent downward trend in states that have increased their minimum wages relative to states that have not, thereby predisposing estimates towards reporting negative outcomes.     

Public- and Private-Sector Occupational Pay Structures

Data from a representative sample of wage and salary workers are used to estimate wage equations that provide for direct estimates of the differences between public and private occupational pay structures. The results show that at the state and local levels of government in particular, the public/private wage differential tends to decline as occupational skill requirements increase. Public employees who work on jobs unique to the public sector are paid a wage premium. There is little support for the idea that degree of union coverage in the private sector affects public wages for an occupation.     

The Institutional Context of an ‘Empirical Law’: The Wage Curve under Different Regimes of Collective Bargaining

The wage curve postulates that the wage level is a decreasing function of the regional unemployment rate. In testing this hypothesis, most studies have not taken into account that differences in the institutional framework may have an impact on the existence (or the slope) of a wage curve. Using a large‐scale linked employer–employee dataset for Western Germany, this article provides a first direct test of the relevance of different bargaining regimes (and of works councils) for the existence of a wage curve. In pooled regressions for the period 1998 to 2006, as well as in worker‐level or plant‐level fixed‐effects estimations, we obtain evidence for a wage curve for plants with a collective bargaining agreement at firm level. The point estimates for this group of plants are close to the ?0.1 elasticity of wages with respect to unemployment postulated by Blanchflower and Oswald. In this regime, we also find that works councils dampen the adjustment of wages to the regional unemployment situation. In the other regimes of plants that either do not make use of collective contracts or apply sectoral agreements, we do not find a wage curve.     

The Productivity-Enhancing Impacts of the Minimum Wage: Lessons from Denmark and New Zealand

This article adds an international comparative perspective to the reflection on 100 years of minimum wage legislation in Britain by exploring the impact of minimum wage regulations and institutions in Denmark and New Zealand. In particular, it looks at the question of whether minimum wages can raise productivity through the 'shock effect'. It argues that while they will play a role, a supportive institutional framework is more important in providing coordinated solutions to issues of market failure, such as inadequate levels of training. The article suggests that sectoral bargaining institutions in low-paid sectors may have the potential to facilitate such coordination and enable the high-productivity model to emerge.     

Competition Policy under Laissez-Faireism: Market Power and its Treatment in Hong Kong

The paper describes the current competition policy framework in Hong Kong: how it came into existence, what business practices are prohibited, and how the enforcement system works. Recent cases in the telecommunications industry are used to illustrate the sectoral approach, a unique feature of Hong Kong's competition policy. We argue that a sectoral approach faces two fundamental drawbacks. First, due to having different ``rules of the game' for different sectors, the allocation of resources may be distorted in the long run. Second, since the relevant regulatory agencies perform dual roles both as competition policy enforcer and as traditional regulator of natural monopolies, the impartiality of their competition decisions may not be credibly conveyed to the public. We also address other specific problems associated with the sectoral approach, such as the exclusion of structural issues, narrow coverage of sectors, and the lack of public enforcement. We conclude that an overall competition law can better promote competition and economic efficiency in Hong Kong.     

Does Individualizing the Labor Contract Hurt Women?

The twenty‐first century has been marked by a retreat of the collective bargaining rights of public employees throughout the United States. This study exploits the variation in legal environments resulting from these reforms to estimate the causal impact of different collective bargaining policies on public employee compensation. Using data from the American Community Survey, results show a modest wage penalty at the aggregate level for employees covered by constraints on collective bargaining. However, this wage penalty is differential and is concentrated on women in all but one case—a legal environment in which collective bargaining over wages has either been prohibited or directly constricted, allowing governments to periodically institute wage freezes and caps on raises for public employees. In this case, a pre‐existing wage gap in which men earned more than women is disappearing as male and female earnings converge at a lower wage. The paper suggests that the long‐term effects of restricting collective bargaining occur through the individualization of the labor contract and should be examined along individual‐level characteristics, such as gender.     

Trade Union Decline and Union Wage Effects in Australia

Union density in Australia fell precipitously in the 1990s. This study investigates how union wage effects may have changed as a result. The findings from 1993 data suggest that union/nonunion wage differentials were very small, especially among workers in high-density industries. By 2001 the overall union wage effect had increased significantly; however, the union/nonunion wage differential was no longer correlated with union density at the industry level.     

Canadian Public-Private Sector Earnings Differentials, 1970–1980

This paper examines changes in the public-private sector wage gap in Canada between 1970 and 1980. The results show that the gross earnings advantage of both male and female government employees rose over the decade. For men, the increase was largely attributable to improved wage-determining characteristics, especially education, experience, and occupational distribution. For women, the increase occurred mainly because of a rise in economic rents in the form of a constant wage premium.     

Unions,Wage Gaps,and Wage Dispersion: New Evidence from the Americas

Using a common methodology, the effects of unions on wage levels and wage dispersion are estimated for two neighboring countries, Bolivia and Chile, and for the United States. The analysis shows that unions have broadly similar effects on the wage distribution within these three economies. The findings suggest that the political economy of unions, coupled with market constraints on labor costs, produce commonality in union wage effects that transcend other economic and institutional differences.     

Sectoral Productivity and the Distribution of Wages

Policy reports suggesting that productivity growth will raise the earnings of low-wage workers are based on the concept that gains from productivity will trickle down to raise the wages of workers at the lower end of the wage distribution. The compensation and employment systems of American industry do strongly link gains in industry productivity to wage increases for most workers. However, this analysis finds that the linkage of productivity change to wage change for the workers at the lower end of the distribution is virtually nonexistent. The empirical results of this study suggest that productivity increases have no effect on the wage change of workers at the lowest 10th percentile of the distribution and widen the dispersion in industry wages.     

Prevailing Wage Regulations and School Construction Costs: Cumulative Evidence from British Columbia

The effect of prevailing wage laws on the cost of public construction has been the subject of an ongoing public policy debate. We measure this effect by comparing the public/private construction cost differential for schools built before and after British Columbia's Skills Development and Fair Wage Policy. Regression results indicate that public schools were 40.5 percent more expensive to build prior to the policy. This differential was 40.1 percent after the policy's enforcement. However, this change is not statistically significant. Regression results also indicate a stable construction cost function over the policy period. These results indicate that the effect of fair wage requirements was not different from zero in terms of magnitude or statistical significance. Combining these results with the findings of our previous research provides a comprehensive view regarding the effect of the British Columbian prevailing wage policy on school construction. This body of research, utilizing a variety of statistical methods, provides consistent evidence indicating that a relatively strong prevailing wage policy was not associated with changes in the efficiency or productivity of construction that contributes to increased building costs.     

Compensating Wage Differentials versus Efficiency Wages: An Empirical Study of Job Autonomy and Wages

Efficiency wage theory as incorporated in the shirking model predicts that firms may substitute wage premiums for costly monitoring. This means that wage premiums should be expected for loosely monitored workers. By regarding extensive monitoring as a lack of job autonomy, efficiency wage theory predicts a positive relation between autonomy and wages. The theory of compensating wage differentials, however, predicts a negative relation between autonomy and wages. When workers prefer autonomous jobs, employers have to offer higher wages for less autonomous jobs in order to recruit labor.
Swedish micro data are analyzed in order to examine the predictions of these theories. A proxy for the monitoring problem of the firm measures workers' possibilities of effort variation. Since this proxy is autonomy, it enables us to test the two rival hypotheses on the relation between job autonomy and wages. We find a positive relation in the private sector as predicted by the efficiency wage hypotheses and a negative relation in the case of the public sector, which accords with the theory of compensating wage differentials.     

Unions and Wages in Australia: Does Employer Size Matter?

Industrial relations reforms starting in the late 1980s decentralized wage determination in Australia. Using data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ Survey of Education and Training gathered in 1993, before the full effects of decentralization had been realized, and in 2001, after which the impacts of structural changes had become manifested, the study shows the emergence of an inverse relationship between the employer size–wage effect and union/nonunion wage differential among male workers. The relationship is similar to those found in the United States and the UK, other economies with decentralized wage‐setting regimes.     

Australian Experiments in Wage Policy

Industrial conciliation and arbitration have been pivotal in pay determination in Australia throughout the twentieth century. This paper examines how these institutions influence macroeconomic performance, paying special reference to their impact on cost inflation. It goes on to evaluate the contribution of the Accord (incomes policy) in the last decade. Consensus and participation within the institutional framework are shown to be essential for effective wage policy.     

Firm‐Level Collective Bargaining and Wages in Greece: A Quantile Decomposition Analysis

This article analyzes the effect of firm‐level contracting on the wage structure in the Greek private sector. Using a matched employer–employee dataset for 2006, unconditional quantile regressions and relevant decomposition methods, we identify a wage premium associated with firm‐level contracting, which follows a hump‐shaped profile across the wage distribution. Further, the wage differential between workers under firm‐level and broader‐level collective agreements can be primarily attributed to the differences in the regime‐specific wage setting structure, for those below the median of the unconditional wage distribution, and to differences in worker and firm‐specific characteristics for those in the upper tail.     

Public- and Private-Sector Wage Differentials in Canada Revisited

Using a variety of techniques, we estimate the wage premium for federal, provincial, and municipal public-sector employees in Canada. We find that females in the public sector are paid a wage premium, with federal government workers enjoying the highest rents, followed by local and provincial public-sector employees. Estimates for males suggest that rent payments are comparably less, but results are inconclusive.