Flexible policies and IS-LM dynamics

A dynamic IS-LM model with a Phillips curve is used to analyze the consequences of familiar flexible government policies. The dynamic behavior of the model depends critically upon the monetary and fiscal policies followed by the government. If a passive stance is taken in which real government spending and the nominal money supply do not adapt to the course of economic events, then the model is unstable. The government can, however, follow simple policy rules which stabilize the economy. The most clearly stable policies involve the joint employment of monetary and fiscal policies.     

Endogenous uncertainty and the non-neutrality of money

Summary. We study some implications of the Theory of Rational Beliefs to monetary policy. We show that monetary policy in a Rational Beliefs environment can have an important effect on the characteristics of economic fluctuations. In Rational Beliefs Equilibria money is generically non-neutral unlike Rational Expectations Equilibria in which money is neutral and monetary policy is ineffective. Under Rational Beliefs Equilibria nominal prices and real output change not only in response to changes in the exogenous growth rate of money but also in response to changes in the state of beliefs. In Rational Beliefs Equilibria monetary shocks have real effects even when they are observed but are not fully anticipated. Furthermore, the non-neutrality of money results in a short run Phillips curve. When money “flutters, real output sputters” [8]. We show that Endogenous Uncertainty and the distribution of market beliefs are the major explanatory variables of such fluctuations. Under Rational Expectations monetary policy is ineffective because agents neutralize it by predicting correctly the effect of the policy. Under Rational Beliefs it is shown instead that inflation and recessions can be substantially aggravated by the distribution of market beliefs. Received: January 14, 2002; revised version: April 5, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I would like to thank Mordecai Kurz for his constant help and support. Most of the ideas developed hereby have been inspired by innumerable and fruitful discussions with him. I have also greatly benefited from helpful comments by Stanley Black, Luigi Campiglio, Carsten Nielsen and Ho-Mou Wu. I also received valuable remarks from participants at the V meeting of “The Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory” held in Ischia, Italy, on July 2-8, 2001, where an initial draft of the present work was presented.     

Financial market imperfections and monetary policy strategy

In a model with imperfect money, credit and reserve markets, we examine if an inflation-targeting central bank applying the funds rate operating procedure to indirectly control market interest rates also needs a monetary aggregate as policy instrument. We show that if private agents use information extracted from money and financial markets to form inflation expectations and if interest rate pass-through is incomplete, the central bank can use a narrow monetary aggregate and the discount interest rate as independent and complementary policy instruments to reinforce the credibility of its announcements and the role of inflation target as a nominal anchor for inflation expectations. This study shows how a monetary policy strategy combining inflation targeting and monetary targeting can be conceived to guarantee macroeconomic stability and the credibility of monetary policy. Friedman's k-percent money growth rule, which can generate dynamic instability, and two alternative stabilizing feedback monetary targeting rules are examined.     

A note on nominal government expenditure targets

In IS-LM models, government expenditure is usually fixed in real terms. In this short note, we examine some of the implications of nominal government expenditure targets for both model stability and comparative statics. When a fixed money supply policy is in operation, nominal government expenditure targets may stabilize an otherwise unstable system. If this is the case, an increase in the nominal stock of money will reduce the price level in the long run.     

How justified is abandoning money in the conduct of monetary policy in Australia on the grounds of instability in the money‐demand function?

The role of money in the design and conduct of monetary policy has reemerged as an important issue in both advanced and developing economies, especially since the 2007 global financial crisis. A growing body of recent literature suggests that the causal relationship between money supply growth and inflation remains intact across countries and over time and that this relation is not conditional on the stability of the money‐demand function or whether money is endogenous or exogenous. Moreover, critical for a rule‐based monetary policy is the presence of a long‐run stable money‐demand function, rather than a short‐run money‐demand model that may exhibit instability for many reasons, including problems with estimating a money‐demand model with high‐frequency data. Provided that a stable money‐demand function exists, it could be useful to establish long‐run equilibrium relations among money, output, prices, and exchange rates, as the classical monetary theory suggests. Within this analytical framework, this paper addresses the question of whether money has any role in the conduct of monetary policy in Australia. The conventional wisdom is that the money‐demand function in Australia has been unstable since the mid‐1980s due to financial deregulation and reforms; this led to a change in the strategy of monetary policy for price stability in the form of inflation targeting that ignores money insofar as inflation and its control are concerned. This paper reports empirical findings for Australia, obtained from a longer quarterly data series over the period 1960Q1–2015Q1, which suggest that instability in the narrow‐money‐demand function in Australia was primarily due to the exclusion of variables which have become important in the deregulated environment since the 1980s. These findings are confirmed by an expanded form of the narrow‐money‐demand function that was found stable over the past two decades, although it experienced multiple structural breaks over the study period. The paper draws the conclusion that abandoning the monetary aggregate as an instrument of monetary policy in Australia, under a rule‐based monetary policy such as inflation targeting, cannot be justified by instability in the money‐demand function or even by lack of a causal link between money supply growth and inflation.     

Optimal fiscal and monetary policy with sticky wages and sticky prices

We determine the optimal degree of price inflation volatility when nominal wages are sticky and the government uses state-contingent inflation to finance government spending. We address this question in a well-understood Ramsey model of fiscal and monetary policy, in which the benevolent planner has access to labor income taxes, nominally risk-free debt, and money creation. Our main result is that sticky wages alone make price stability optimal in the face of shocks to the government budget, to a degree quantitatively similar as sticky prices alone. Key for our results is an equilibrium restriction between nominal price inflation and nominal wage inflation that holds trivially in a Ramsey model featuring only sticky prices. Our results thus show that when nominal wages are sticky, setting real wages as close as possible to their efficient path is a more important goal of optimal monetary policy than is financing innovations in the government budget via state-contingent inflation. A second important result is that the nominal interest rate can be used to indirectly tax the rents of monopolistic labor suppliers. Taken together, our results uncover features of Ramsey fiscal and monetary policy in the presence of a type of labor market imperfection that is widely-believed to be important.     

NOMINAL BONDS AND INTEREST RATES*

In this article, I integrate the microfoundation of monetary theory with the model of limited participation to analyze the competition between nominal bonds and money. The market for government nominal bonds is centralized and Walrasian, whereas the goods market is modeled as random matches. The government imposes a legal restriction that requires all government goods to be purchased with money but not with bonds. By contrast, private agents can exchange between themselves with both money and bonds. I show that an arbitrarily small legal restriction is sufficient to prevent matured bonds from being a medium of exchange. I also analyze the effects of monetary policy with and without the legal restriction. Some of those effects differ significantly from traditional monetary models.     

WEALTH,ASSET PORTFOLIO,MONEY DEMAND AND POLICY RULE

I look at the linkages between monetary policy and asset wealth using quarterly data for the USA. I show that a positive interest rate shock leads to a fall in aggregate wealth and an important change in portfolio composition: housing wealth gradually decreases, but the effects are very persistent; and financial wealth quickly shrinks, but the impact is short‐lived. I also find that the money market can be characterized as follows: (i) the money demand has a large interest elasticity and a small output elasticity; and (ii) the estimated monetary policy reaction function highlights the special focus given by the central bank to developments in monetary aggregates. These features call for an approach whereby monetary authorities put more emphasis on tracking wealth developments, in particular, given the asset portfolio rebalancing between money holdings and financial and/or housing assets.     

Nominal uniqueness and money non-neutrality in the limit-price exchange process

We define continuous-time dynamics for exchange economies with fiat money. Traders have locally rational expectations, face a cash-in-advance constraint, and continuously adjust their short-run dominant strategy in a monetary strategic market game involving a double-auction with limit-price orders. Money has a positive value except on optimal rest-points where it becomes a ??veil?? and trade vanishes. Typically, there is a piecewise globally unique trade-and-price curve both in real and in nominal variables. Money is not neutral, either in the short-run or long-run and a localized version of the quantity theory of money holds in the short-run. An optimal money growth rate is derived, which enables monetary trade curves to converge towards Pareto optimal rest-points. Below this growth rate, the economy enters a (sub- optimal) liquidity trap where monetary policy is ineffective; above this threshold inflation rises. Finally, market liquidity, measured through the speed of real trades, can be linked to gains-to-trade, households?? expectations, and the quantity of circulating money.     

Direct effects of money on aggregate demand: another look at the evidence

Now that a number of central banks are faced with short-term nominal interest rates close to or at the zero lower bound, there is a renewed interest in the long-running debate about whether or not changes in the stock of money have direct effects. In particular, do changes in money have additional effects on aggregate demand outside of those induced by changes in short-term nominal interest rates? This article revisits and reinterprets the empirical evidence based on single equation regressions which is quite mixed, with some results supporting and other results denying the existence of direct effects. We use a structural model with no direct effects of money to show that the finding of positive and statistically significant coefficients on real money growth can be misleading. The model generates data that, when used to estimate analogues of the empirical regressions, produce positive and statistically significant coefficients on real money growth, similar to those often found when using actual data. The problem is that single equation regressions leave out a set of variables, which in turn, give rise to an omitted variables bias in the estimated coefficients on real money growth. Hence, they are an unreliable guide to calibrate monetary policies, in general, including at the zero lower bound.     

Disinflation costs in China and monetary policy regimes

This paper investigates the real effects of a disinflationary policy in China, in which we conduct a disinflation experiment in a medium-scale New Keynesian model. We highlight two key features of China's economy: the relevance of money to monetary policy rules and household inequality. For the former, we consider two monetary policy regimes: an expanded Taylor rule with money and a money supply rule. For the latter, we take into account a share of the population that is limited in its ability to participate in assets markets. Our analysis suggests that a disinflation policy is more costly when the central bank controls the money supply than the case in which the nominal interest rate is the policy instrument. Our results are driven by the different impacts of disinflation on nominal and real interest rates under the two regimes.     

Indivisibilities, Lotteries, and Monetary Exchange

We introduce lotteries (randomized trading) into search-theoretic models of money. In a model with indivisible goods and fiat money, we show goods trade with probability 1 and money trades with probability τ, where τ<1 iff buyers have sufficient bargaining power. With divisible goods, a nonrandom quantity q trades with probability 1 and, again, money trades with probability τ where τ<1 iff buyers have sufficient bargaining power. Moreover, q never exceeds the efficient quantity (not true without lotteries). We consider several extensions designed to get commodities as well as money to trade with probability less than 1, and to illuminate the efficiency role of lotteries. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E40, D83.     

Economy as Instituted Process: Change,Transformation, and Progress

During the past two decades, chronic fiscal deficits have led to elevated and rising ratios of government debt to nominal GDP in Japan. Nevertheless, long-term Japanese government bonds' (JGBs) nominal yields initially declined, and have since stayed remarkably low and stable. This is contrary to the received wisdom which holds that higher government deficits and indebtedness will exert upward pressures on nominal yields. This paper examines the relationship between JGBs' nominal yields and short-term interest rates, as well as other factors, such as low inflation, persistent deflationary pressures, and tepid growth. We also argue that Japan has monetary sovereignty, which gives the Japanese government the ability to service its debt, and enables the Bank of Japan (BOJ) to keep JGBs' nominal yields low by ensuring that short-term interest rates are low, and by using various other tools of monetary policy. The argument that short-term interest rates and monetary policy are the primarily drivers of long-term interest rates follows John Maynard Keynes's (1930) insights.     

The nature and role of monetary policy when money is endogenous

This paper considers the nature and role of monetary policywhen money is modelled as credit money endogenously createdwithin the private sector. There are currently two schools ofthought that view money as endogenous: one has been labelledthe ‘new consensus’ in macroeconomics, and the otheris the Keynesian endogenous (bank) money approach. The paperfirst explores the analysis of monetary policy in the ‘newconsensus’ macroeconomic model, followed by an examinationof the effectiveness of monetary policy in that analysis. TheKeynesian view of endogenous money is discussed, and the rolefor monetary policy in a Keynesian endogenous monetary policyanalysis is considered, including discussion of the objectivesand instruments of monetary policy.     

不稳定的货币流通速度必然导致货币量中介目标无效吗?

大量的文献研究表明,货币流通速度的稳定性是货币量作为货币政策中介目标的先决条件。近年来随着金融创新的发展,各个国家的货币流通速度都出现了较大的波动,因此,无论是理论界还是货币政策当局对货币量作为货币政策中介目标可能性的否定,在一定程度上都依据了货币流通速度的不稳定性。然而,基于伯杜和乔纳格的研究,本文研究表明:货币流通速度的不稳定并不必然意味着货币量作为货币政策中介目标是无效的,影响货币量作为货币政策中介目标的最主要因素是流通速度的可预测性以及货币当局对货币流通速度的预测能力;只要货币当局能够准确预测货币流通速度变化的方向和幅度,货币供给量就仍然可以作为货币政策的中介目标。本文的结论是,近期中国广义货币M 2的可预测性较好,因此,基于货币流通速度的不稳定性而否定货币量作为中介目标的可能性是不正确的。     

Inflation and Unemployment in General Equilibrium*

When labor is indivisible, there exist efficient outcomes with some agents randomly unemployed, as in Rogerson (1988) . We integrate this idea into the modern theory of monetary exchange, where some trade occurs in centralized markets and some in decentralized markets, as in Lagos and Wright (2005) . This delivers a general equilibrium model of unemployment and money, with explicit microeconomic foundations. We show that the implied relation between inflation and unemployment can be positive or negative, depending on simple preference conditions. Our Phillips curve provides a long‐run, exploitable, trade‐off for monetary policy; it turns out, however, that the optimal policy is the Friedman rule.     

Money non-neutrality in a Rational Belief Equilibrium with financial assets

Summary. In Rational Beliefs Equilibria money is generically non-neutral. Given the expectational perspective proposed by the Theory of Rational Belief Equilibrium, we show that one of the most important factors in the emergence of money non-neutrality is played by Endogenous Uncertainty. This, in contrast to the Rational Expectations results of money neutrality and policy ineffectiveness, leads to a scenario in which monetary policy has an impact on the real economy and price volatility. The heterogeneity of beliefs together with the distribution and intensity of agents' states of optimism/pessimism can amplify the real effect of monetary policy and/or generate endogenous fluctuations in the economy which are not explained by any exogenous shock. We claim that money non-neutrality is mostly an expectations driven phenomenon. Indeed, additional assumptions of asymmetry of information and/or unanticipated monetary policy are not needed to explain the real effect of monetary policy as it is customary in the New Classical Theory. Received: May 30, 2000; revised version: December 28, 2000     

A simple model for study of the determination of the price level and the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy

Summary A representative-agent model with money holdings motivated by transactions costs, a fiscal authority that taxes and issues debt, no production, and a convenient functional form for agents' utility is presented. The model can be solved analytically, and illustrates the dependence of price determination on fiscal policy, the possibility of indeterminacy, even stochastic explosion, of the price level in the face of a monetary policy that holdsM fixed, and the possibility of a unique, stable price level in the face of a monetary policy that simply pegs the nominal interest rate at an arbitrary level.In a rational expectations, market-clearing equilibrium model with a costlessly-produced fiat money that is useful in transactions, the following things are true under broad assumptions.- A monetary policy that fixes the money stock may (depending on the transactions technology) be consistent with indeterminacy of the price level—indeed with stochastically fluctuating, explosive inflation.- A monetary policy that fixes the nominal interest rate, even if it holds the interest rate constant regardless of the observed rate of inflation or money growth rate, may deliver a uniquely determined price level.- The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium price level cannot be determined from knowledge of monetary policy alone; fiscal policy plays an equally important role. Special case models with interest-bearing debt and no money are possible, just as are special cases with money and no interest-bearing debt. In each the price level may be uniquely determined.Determinacy of the price level under any policy depends on the public's beliefs about what the policy authority would do under conditions that are never observed in equilibrium.These points are not new. Eric Leeper [1991] has made most of them within a single coherent model. Woodford [1993], in a representative agent cash-in-advance model, has displayed the possibility of indeterminacy with a fixed quantity of money and the possibility of uniqueness with an interest-rate pegging policy. Aiyagari and Gertler [1985] use an overlapping generations model to make many of the points made in this paper, without discussing the possibility of stochastic sunspot equilibria. Sargent and Wallace [1981] and Obstfeld [1983] have also discussed related issues.This paper improves on Leeper by moving beyond his analysis of local linear approximations to the full model solution, as is essential if explosive sunspot equilibria are to be distinguished from explosive solutions to the Euler equations that can be ruled out as equilibria. It improves on the other cited work by pulling together into the context of one fairly transparent model discussion of phenomena previously discussed in isolation in very different models.We study a representative agent model in which there is no production or real savings, but transactions costs generate a demand for money. The government costlessly provides fiat money balances, imposes lump-sum taxes, and issues debt, but has no other role in the economy. We make restrictive assumptions about the form of the utility function and the form of a transactions cost term in the budget constraint.The model could be extended to include production, capital accumulation, non-neutral taxation, productive government expenditure, and a more general utility function without affecting the conclusions discussed in this paper. Indeed the model I informally matched to data in an earlier paper [1988] makes some such extensions. While such an extended model is more realistic, it is harder to solve. The version in my earlier paper [1988] was solved numerically and simulated. The bare-bones model of this paper allows an explicit analytic solution that may make its results easier to understand.This paper improved following comments from participants at seminars at Yale and the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank. Eric Leeper and James Robinson were particularly helpful. Comments from Michael Woodford led to important corrections and clarifications.     

The Optimal Inflation Tax

We determine the second best rule for the inflation tax in monetary general equilibrium models where money is dominated in rate of return. The results in the literature are ambiguous and inconsistent across different monetary environments. We derive and compare the optimal inflation tax solutions across the different environments and find that Friedman's policy recommendation of a zero nominal interest rate is the right one.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: E31, E41, E58, E62.     

“CONVENTIONAL” MONETARY POLICY IN OLG MODELS: REVISITING THE ASSET-SUBSTITUTION CHANNEL

Conventional monetary policy involves actions by the monetary and fiscal authorities: the former sets a nominal interest rate and the latter sets lump-sum taxes to finance the implied flow of interest payments on government debt. We model such policy within an overlapping generations framework and show that absent any other frictions the magnitude of the nominal interest rate gives rise to asset substitution between government debt and either private debt or capital—substitution that has both real and nominal effects. Such substitution is not in standard New Keynesian models because their dynastic specification implies that government debt is not net wealth.