Pricing response to entry and agglomeration effects

In contrast to the traditional approach that typically views entry solely as a threat, we argue that our understanding of this important phenomenon will remain incomplete until we consider the possibility that entry may also provide opportunity for incumbent firms. Drawing from agglomeration theory, which describes the benefit from colocating with competitors, we explicitly examine the combined impact of the competitive and agglomeration effects of entry using a unique dataset of Texas hotels. We find that incumbent establishments price higher when facing entrants whose agglomeration benefits are more likely to outweigh their competitive effects. This association is stronger for incumbents that have greater experience with entry. Our results bring a new perspective to the entry response literature helping clarify inconsistent empirical results. Further, we apply agglomeration theory to a new question, incumbent behavior, and demonstrate that experience appears to play an important role in recognizing situations that generate agglomeration externalities. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Internal agglomeration and productivity: Evidence from microdata

Research Summary: We study how internal agglomeration—geographic clustering of business establishments owned by the same parent company—influences establishment productivity. Using Census microdata on the population of U.S. hotels from 1987-2007, we find that doubling the intensity of internal agglomeration is associated with a productivity increase of about 2% in pre-existing establishments. We consider several mechanisms that may be driving the productivity effect and find evidence consistent with the idea that an economically meaningful component of the productivity effect is due to knowledge transfer between internally agglomerated establishments. We replicate our main findings with Census microdata on the full population of U.S. restaurants from 1987-2007, suggesting that the internal agglomeration effects we document may generalize broadly to other industries with multi-unit firms. Managerial Summary: Internal agglomeration is the geographic clustering of business establishments owned by the same parent company. This paper uses detailed Census data on hotels and restaurants to show how internal agglomeration influences performance. Interestingly, knowledge sharing between owned establishments in the same metropolitan area appears to be a key driver of the internal agglomeration effect.     

NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES,COMPETITION AND CONSUMER CHOICE*

Consumers sometimes make choices that impose greater external costs on those who do not make the same choice. This paper examines how the selectivity of negative externalities in such situations affects the competitive equilibrium and the desirability of an externality‐reducing public policy. Selective negative externalities create network externalities, but outcomes may differ greatly from typical network effects. Price effects may cause the imposing product's sales to decline with the size of the negative externality. Consequently, a positive competitive effect may overwhelm the externality's negative direct effects on welfare, such that a policy that enlarges the externality may improve welfare.     

How firms respond to mandatory information disclosure

Mandatory information disclosure regulations seek to create institutional pressure to spur performance improvement. By examining how organizational characteristics moderate establishments' responses to a prominent environmental information disclosure program, we provide among the first empirical evidence characterizing heterogeneous responses by those mandated to disclose information. We find particularly rapid improvement among establishments located close to their headquarters and among establishments with proximate siblings, especially when the proximate siblings are in the same industry. Large establishments improve more slowly than small establishments in sparse regions, but both groups perform similarly in dense regions, suggesting that density mitigates the power of large establishments to resist institutional pressures. Finally, establishments owned by private firms outperform those owned by public firms. We highlight implications for institutional theory, managers, and policymakers. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Role of Resource Access, Market Considerations, and the Nature of Innovation in Pursuit of Standards in the New Product Development Process

Standards influence new product development (NPD) in high‐technology markets. However, existing work on standards has focused exclusively on one aspect of standards—compatibility standards. This article has the following goals. First, we delineate the concept of customer interface standards as distinct from compatibility standards. This distinction is important from a product development and technology adoption perspective. Second, we propose and show that antecedent factors may motivate a firm differently about the emphasis that the firm should put on a type of standard (compatibility or customer interface) that it follows. For example, we propose that appropriability regime affects pursuit of customer interface standards and compatibility standards differently. Finally, we illustrate how resource access and the nature of the innovation also influence a firm's decision to pursue a standard type. Finally, we propose that pursuit of different standards (customer interface or compatibility) affects the NPD process in terms of (1) sourcing and dissemination of technology and (2) the customer utility for the product, which influences adoption. We collected perceptual data from a sample of marketing and technology managers in high‐tech industries in the UK using both formative and reflective scales to measure the constructs. Analysis of the data using LISREL supports our contention that compatibility standards and customer interface standards are distinct constructs and that appropriability regime influences compatibility standards and customer interface standards differently. We also find that pursuit of compatibility standards helps a firm to create direct externalities pursuit of customer interface standards helps firms to develop indirect network externalities and technological advantage in the market. Our findings have the following implications. First, managers need to account explicitly for the difference between compatibility and customer interface standards, as resource allocation decisions during the NPD process will determine where a firm puts more focus. The choices made by the firm—as to whether it pursues compatibility standards or customer interface standards—will determine the type of advantage that it can gain in the market. Given a firm's situation at a point in time, a greater focus on one standard type rather than the other may be the right approach. Such choices will influence resource allocation in the product development process.     

Rent Sharing and the Compensation of Head Coaches in Power Five College Football

The monopoly and monopsony power of intercollegiate sports create significant rents, but previous studies of intercollegiate football coaches’ salaries implicitly assume that coaches are paid their marginal revenue products. In a two-stage estimation, we show that coaches share in these rents. The first stage shows that several common measures of coaches’ productivity do not affect an athletic department’s variable revenue. When we include these measures in the second-stage salary equation, their impact on pay reflects bargaining power, not productivity. We also find that several measures of fixed revenue, which are independent of the coach’s performance, increase the coach’s pay.     

Resource‐seeking agglomeration: a study of market entry in the lodging industry

We analyze whether firms prefer collocating with incumbent firms when choosing among markets to enter, highlighting the role of resource‐seeking as a motivation for collocation. We propose that entrants will locate near others possessing resources that can spill over, but will avoid locations where existing firms will exploit spillovers without contributing. To test these propositions, we analyze the location decisions of 570 new hotels in Texas between 1992 and 2000. We find that hotels are attracted to markets with branded upscale hotels. Further, we find that owners of upscale hotels avoid markets with hotels without similar resources. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do‐no‐harm versus do‐good social responsibility: Attributional thinking and the liability of foreignness

Research summary: The efforts of multinational corporations to be socially responsible do not always engender positive evaluations from overseas stakeholders. Drawing on attribution theory, we argue that two heuristics guide stakeholders in evaluating firms' social performance: foreignness and the valence of firms' social responsibility. We provide evidence from a field study of secondary stakeholders and an experimental study involving 129 non‐governmental organizations. Consistent with attribution theory, the liability of foreignness is minimized when firms engage in “do‐good” social responsibility (focused on proactive engagement creating positive externalities) but is substantial when firms engage in “do‐no‐harm” social responsibility (focused on attenuating negative externalities). In online supporting information, Appendix S1, we demonstrate that these evaluations have consequences for whether stakeholders subsequently cooperate, or sow conflict, with firms. Managerial summary: There is no guarantee that efforts to be socially responsible will improve multinational corporations' relations with overseas stakeholders, such as customers, governments, and activists. In a field study and an experiment, we unpack when foreign firms suffer from harsh stakeholder evaluations. Foreign firms especially suffer from harsh evaluations when they conduct “do‐no‐harm” CSR rather than “do‐good” CSR. Stakeholders attribute the motive for foreign firms' do‐no‐harm CSR to managerial interests and shareholder pressures, perceiving a wedge between managers and owners (who may be unmotivated to reduce the negative impacts of their business activities) and local stakeholders (who bear the social costs). A practical implication is that foreign firms gain more from highlighting do‐good rather than do‐(no)‐harm CSR initiatives. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Geographical cluster and performance: The case of Iberian ham

This research examined whether firms that concentrate geographically perform better or worse than their more dispersed counterparts. While belonging to a cluster may have positive externalities for proximate firms, there can also be congestion economies that counterbalance these advantages. Having identified existing ham-producing establishments in the Iberian ham cluster, a sample of 265 firms was selected and it was confirmed that as the number of neighbouring firms increases performance increases. Also, the proximity to larger firms in the same province benefit smaller firms. This positive effect that geographical concentration has on performance is explained by access to valuable natural resources, workers, higher demand, knowledge spillovers, and lower transaction costs, which may help managers and policy-makers in their investment decisions, as well as contributing to the dearth of existing research and its contradictory nature.     

Are aliens green? Assessing foreign establishments' environmental conduct in the United states

Previous research has found that foreign‐owned establishments often lack specific capabilities needed to respond to local business conditions and are held to a higher standard by local stakeholders. These establishments compensate, however, by possessing offsetting capabilities such as technological excellence. In this article, we investigate how these conflicting forces shape the environmental conduct of foreign‐owned facilities. Using data from the Environmental Protection Agency, we find that foreign‐owned establishments generate more waste yet manage more waste than U.S.‐owned establishments. We also find evidence that both domestic and foreign‐owned firms generate more waste if they operate multiple facilities across multiple jurisdictions in the United States. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Property Investment and Rental Rate under Housing Price Uncertainty: A Real Options Approach

The conventional wisdom that housing prices are the present value of future rents ignores the fact that unlike dividends on stocks, rent is not discretionary. Housing price uncertainty can affect household property investments, which in turn affect rent. By extending the theory of investment under uncertainty, we model the renter's decision to buy a house and the landlord's decision to sell as the exercising of real options of waiting and examine real options effects on rent. Using data from Hong Kong and mainland China, we find a significant effect of housing price on rent and draw important policy implications.     

Estimating the Effect of Crime Risk on Property Values and Time on Market: Evidence from Megan's Law in Virginia

We examine neighborhood externalities that arise from the perceived risk associated with the proximity of a registered sex offender's residence. We find large negative externality effects on a property's price and liquidity, employing empirical techniques that include a fixed‐effects OLS model, a correction for sample selection bias and censoring using a Heckman treatment, and a three‐stage least‐squares model to account for simultaneity bias in the joint determination of a home's sale price and liquidity. Additionally, we find amplified effects for homes with more bedrooms (a proxy for children) and if the nearby offender is designated by the state as “violent.”     

Welfare Analysis of Regulating Mobile Termination Rates in the U.K.

We develop a calibrated simulation model of the U.K. mobile telephony market and use it to analyze the effects of reducing mobile termination rates (MTR's) as recommended by the European Commission. We find that reducing MTR's is likely to increase both consumer surplus and networks' profits. Depending on the strength of call externalities (i.e., benefits to the recipient of a call), social welfare may increase by as much as £1 billion to £4.6 billion per year. We also use the model to estimate the welfare effects of the 2010 merger between Orange and T‐Mobile and find that the merger led to a substantial reduction in consumer surplus.     

Price effects of search advertising restrictions

Some suppliers prohibit their distributors from advertising on search engines if the consumer searches for the supplier's brand name. Such restrictions are referred to as “non-brand bidding agreements” (NBBAs). This paper investigates the effect of NBBAs on retail prices in the Dutch hotel sector, where some hotels impose NBBAs on online hotel booking platforms. An NBBA may protect the hotel's own website against competition from hotels on booking platforms because booking platforms cannot target consumers searching for the hotel with a search ad. This may lead to higher prices on the hotel website. However, an NBBA may also generate ad savings, which may lead to lower prices. We use hotel prices from a meta-search site and data on NBBAs from two hotel booking platforms. To correct for unobserved heterogeneity between hotels with and without NBBA, we apply a trajectory balancing approach within a synthetic difference-in-differences framework. Compared to non-NBBA-hotels, NBBA-hotels charge higher prices on their website relative to the price on booking platforms, suggesting a price increase. We identify cases where it is unlikely that consumers benefit from passed-on ad savings.     

Emerging Market Firms' Internationalization: How Do Firms' Inward Activities Affect Their Outward Activities?

Research summary : In this study we examine how an emerging market firm's inward international activities (“inward activities”) are related to its outward international activities (“outward activities”) by focusing on the role of the firm's gain from its inward activities. On the one hand, drawing upon the organizational learning perspective, we propose that a firm's gain from inward activities may facilitate its outward activities through improving its resource fungibility. On the other hand, we draw upon the prospect theory to propose that a firm's gain from inward activities may hinder its outward activities by discouraging the firm's top managers from taking risks that are inherent in outward activities. With detailed data from a sample of manufacturing firms in China, we find empirical support for both lines of arguments . Managerial summary : Are emerging market firms with higher inward gain more likely to engage in outward internationalization activities? We argue that it depends upon how a firm uses its gain from inward activities. If the firm can improve its resource fungibility (particularly organizational resource fungibility) from its inward gain, it is more likely to engage in outward activities. If the firm cannot improve its resource fungiblity, the answer is no. Our findings suggest that for emerging market firms, internationalization is not just a path toward new markets; instead, it reflects how these firms exploit and explore what they have learned from their interactions with foreign firms at home in foreign markets. Therefore, managers must think more strategically on developing (organizational) resource fungibility from their inward activities . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Innovating standards through informal consortia: The case of wireless telecommunications

We empirically examine the effects of industry consortia on the coordination of innovation strategies of the members. Our analyses utilize membership data from 32 consortia in wireless telecommunication technology subfields from 2000 to 2005 and prior art citations in standard-essential patents. We find that connections among firms in informal and technically-oriented consortia significantly increase the likelihood that firms cite each other's patents in subsequent patents essential for the UMTS wireless telecommunication standard. Inventions that are likely to become part of the UMTS system tend to build on inventions by firm peers who were members of the same consortia, controlling for patent or firm fixed effects, technology class, and other characteristics. Consortia may enhance productivity of invention and increase the incentives to invest in R&D by internalizing potential externalities. They may also enhance efficiency of standardization by facilitating the interaction of committee and market processes. Consortia thus structure and constrain the process of innovating standardized technologies. This is problematic if consortia are not truly accessible for all the relevant parties. Policymakers thus need to balance these effects. For managers, the results show that participation in a variety of technical consortia enables influencing peers' innovation strategies related to compatibility standards.     

The Estimation of a Cusp Model to Describe the Adoption of Word for Windows*

This article revisits earlier work in this journal by Paul Herbig (1991) that proposed a catastrophe model of industrial product adoption under certain conditions. Catastrophe models are useful for modeling situations where organizations can exhibit both smooth and abrupt adoption behavior. It extends Herbig's work by focusing on organizations' adoption of new products when network externalities are an important part of the decision process, and it presents an empirical estimation of the model. Network externalities occur when firms do not want to adopt a new innovation or product unless other firms do. The reason is that they do not want to end up with an innovation that ends up not being a standard of some sort. Mistakes of this nature can be costly as the firm must invest twice and loses time relative to competitors who have not made such a mistake. However, when such externalities exist, for example with regard to technological adoptions, then normal diffusion gives way to sudden discontinuous shifts as all firms seemingly act together an move to a new technology. Since, technology is an area where the authors expect network externalities to exist, that is the focus of this article. The specific application is developed from two sets of panel data on the organizational adoptions of Microsoft's (MS) Word for Windows software by organizations that previously were using either Word for DOS or Word for Macintosh (Mac). The theoretical framework for the analysis is based on work in the economics literature on network externalities. However, the organization and new product development catastrophe model comes primarily from Herbig (1991) . The article focuses on an area of organizational adoption where relatively little empirical research has been done, namely organizational adoption “for use.” Longitudinal data provided by Techtel Corporation is used to develop the estimations. Results of the empirical analysis are consistent with the theoretical framework suggested in Herbig's article and in those found in economics and catastrophe theory literatures. This lends clear support to the idea that organizations will adopt a bandwagon‐type behavior when network externalities are present. It further suggests that in such markets, the standard S‐shaped diffusion curve is not an appropriate model for examining organizational behavior. From a managerial perspective, it means that buyers and sellers may face nonstandard diffusion curves. Instead of S‐shaped curves, the actual curves have a break or rift where sales end, and there is a sudden shift to a new product that is relatively high very early on. Clearly, for new product development (NPD), it suggest that organizations' “for‐use” purchases may be similar to regular consumers and may change rapidly from one product to another almost instantly, as in the case of the switch from vinyl records to compact discs (CDs). From an old product seller's viewpoint, the market is here today and gone tomorrow, while for the new seller it is a sudden deluge of sales requests. To put it in more everyday terms, sudden changes in adoption behavior are a September 11‐type experience for the market. It is the day the world changes.     

Trading between agents for a better match

This paper studies externalities that arise when agents can trade outcomes ex post. I show that when agents can trade outcomes ex post, principals are incentivized to contract with agents ex ante to reduce ex post transfers to outside agents with whom the principals do not directly contract. This causes principals to offer agents piece-rates that are inefficiently low and lower than the piece-rates they would offer if trading was not allowed. Although trading reduces an agent's effort and could increase the agent's outside option of rejecting a principal's ex ante contract, principals ultimately gain from allowing ex post trading because such trading results in outcomes that better match their tastes.     

The Relationship between Delegation and Incentives Across Occupations: Evidence and Theory

A large literature suggests that incentive pay and delegation of worker authority are positively related. Using data from a large cross section of British establishments, we show that the positive relationship found in the empirical literature masks a stark difference across jobs. Classifying jobs into two categories (complex jobs, including professional, technical and scientific occupations, and simple jobs, consisting of all other non‐managerial occupations) we find a positive relationship for simple jobs and a negative relationship for complex jobs. To explain this negative relationship, we develop a model where stronger incentives distort a worker's decisions towards low risk‐return tasks.     

Exclusionary pricing in two-sided markets

This paper studies the incentives to engage in exclusionary pricing in the context of two-sided markets. Platforms are horizontally differentiated, and seek to attract users of two groups who single-home and enjoy indirect network externalities from the size of the opposite user group active on the same platform. The entrant incurs a fixed cost of entry, and the incumbent can commit to its prices before the entry decision is taken. The incumbent has thus the option to either accommodate entry, or to exclude entry and enjoy monopolistic profits, albeit under the constraint that its price must be low enough to not leave any room for an entrant to cover its fixed cost of entry. We find that, in the spirit of the literature on limit pricing, under certain circumstances even platforms find it profitable to exclude entrants if the fixed entry cost lies above a certain threshold. By studying the properties of the threshold, we show that the stronger the network externality, the lower the thresholds for which incumbent platforms find it profitable to exclude. We also find that entry deterrence is more likely to harm consumers the weaker are network externalities, and the more differentiated are the two platforms.