Strategic control systems and relative r&d investment in large multiproduct firms

This paper hypothesizes that tight financial controls associated with large diversified M-form firms lead to a short-term, low-risk orientation and thereby lower relative investment in R&D. Further, it is hypothesized that increasing levels of diversification require different control systems which have significant implications for investing in R&D. Results of the study of 124 major U.S. firms suggest that less diversified U-form firms invest more heavily in R&D than more diversified M-form firms after controlling for size and industry effects. Additionally, dominant business firms invested more in R&D than either related or unrelated business firms. Finally, the relationship between R&D intensity and market performance was negative for related and unrelated firms. The findings suggest that the market evaluates R&D investment more positively for firms that are organized to seek synergy than for those that are organized to pursue a hedging (or diversification) strategy.     

Institutional framework,corporate ownership structure,and R&D investment: an international analysis

We combine agency theory with the law and finance approach to analyze how the legal protection of investors and the corporate ownership structure affect corporate investment in research and development (R&D). We use information from 956 firms from the five most R&D-intensive industries in 19 developed countries. Our results show that better protection of investors’ rights by the institutional environment has a positive influence on corporate R&D. We also find that corporate ownership concentration works as a substitute for legal protection. This finding means that R&D investment of the firms in the countries with poor legal protection increases as ownership becomes more concentrated. Our results also show that the identity of shareholders has a relevant effect: Whereas banks and nonfinancial institutions as shareholders result in lower R&D, institutional investors as shareholders increase corporate investment in R&D.     

Effect of agglomeration on firms’ research and development investment: a U-shaped relationship

Extant research on how agglomeration affects firms’ R&D investment reveals conflicting views. Some studies suggest that, owing to free riding arising from knowledge spillovers, agglomeration reduces firms’ R&D investment, whereas others find that it creates additional incentives for innovation through intensifying local competition, thereby increasing firms’ R&D investment. Thus, this study attempts to reconcile these two conflicting views. We propose a U-shaped relationship between agglomeration and firms’ R&D investment; that is, when the extent of agglomeration is low, knowledge spillover effects are important, while local competition is negligible. The free riding effects dominate local competition effects. Therefore, firms’ R&D investment decreases with the extent of agglomeration at a decreasing rate. By contrast, when the extent of agglomeration is high, local competition becomes the dominant force. Consequently, firms’ R&D investment increases with the extent of agglomeration at an increasing rate. Using data from 299,256 manufacturing firms in China, we find that firms’ R&D investment first decreases with the extent of agglomeration to reach a minimum, then increases as the extent of agglomeration continues to rise. These results indicate that there is a robust U-shaped relationship between agglomeration and firms’ R&D investment.     

MARKET COMPETITION,R&D AND FIRM PROFITS IN ASYMMETRIC OLIGOPOLY*

We investigate a Cournot model with strategic R&D investments wherein efficient low‐cost firms compete against less efficient high‐cost firms. We find that an increase in the number of high‐cost firms can stimulate R&D by the low‐cost firms, while it always reduces R&D by the high‐cost firms. More importantly, this force can be strong enough to compensate for the loss that arises from more intense market competition: the low‐cost firms' profits may indeed increase with the number of high‐cost firms. An implication of this result is far‐reaching, as it gives low‐cost firms an incentive to help, rather than harm, high‐cost competitors. We relate this implication to a practice known as open knowledge disclosure, especially Ford's strategy of disclosing its know‐how publicly and extensively at the beginning of the 20th century.     

Business R&;D and the Interplay of R&;D Subsidies and Product Market Uncertainty

This paper examines the effect of product market uncertainty and government research and development (R&D) subsidies on firm-level R&D investment. Using a sample of German manufacturing firms, we find that product market uncertainty reduces R&D investment and government R&D subsidies increase R&D investment. Moreover, our results indicate that R&D subsidies mitigate the effect of product market uncertainty on R&D investment. These findings suggest that public policies aimed at increasing business R&D investment can achieve this objective by reducing the degree of uncertainty in the product market.      

研发与市场结构:基于成本视角的分析

本文从成本入手，探讨了研发与市场结构的关系。通过对平均成本、固定成本及知识特性的综合分析，认为由于技术复杂度的不断提高及研发带来的规模经济，在多数产业研发会导致市场集中度逐渐提高。通过对研发沉没成本的分析表明，在专利保护与许可证制度下，当研发导致的沉没成本比较小时，厂商数量较多的竞争性市场的福利好于寡占或垄断市场，因为其研发速度更快；反之，寡占或垄断市场的福利更好，因为研发的沉没成本得到了节约。在理论分析的基础上，本文就如何通过优化市场结构，提升我国企业研发能力，应对经济全球化的挑战，提出了三点对策。     

PROJECT CHOICE AND RISK IN R&D*

We introduce stochastic R&D in the Hotelling model and show that if the technical risk is sufficiently high, all firms focus on the most valuable market segment. We then endogenize technical risk by allowing firms to choose between a safe and a risky R&D technology. Firms either both target the most attractive market with at least one firm using the risky technology or they choose different niche projects and both apply the safe technology. R&D spillovers lead to more differentiated R&D projects and patent protection to less. Project coordination within an RJV implies more differentiation, and may be welfare‐improving.     

Innovation in the Shadow of Patent Litigation

We analyze non-cooperative R&D investment by two firms that already hold patents that they can assert against each other with probabilistic success. The market structure results from stochastic innovation and patent litigation. Depending on the level of infringement fees, we highlight positive and negative effects of litigation threats on innovation. We define an appropriate regulatory structure of infringement fees that will implement socially efficient R&D investments in the case of symmetric and asymmetric patent portfolios.     

Appropriability,preemption, and firm performance

The impact of strategies used to appropriate innovation rents on firm performance is analyzed using a sample of U.S. public manufacturing firms. Stronger appropriability at the firm level, achieved through patent protection or the ownership of specialized complementary assets, leads to superior economic performance, as measured by the stock market valuation of a firm's R& D assets. Among commonly used ‘nonconventional’ patent strategies, preemptive patenting allows incumbents to strengthen their market power. Consistent with theory, such effect is higher for incumbents with higher ex ante market power and facing a higher threat of entry, and lower when R& D competition is characterized by the discovery of drastic innovations. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Declared essential patents and average total R&D expenditures per patent family

The sharp increase in SEP declarations and declaring firms emphasizes the necessity for understanding firms’ innovation investment behavior in standardization. This paper empirically investigates whether declared standard-essential patents (SEPs) and the declaring firm’s business model (operationalized as a firm’s location in the value chain) are associated with a firm’s innovation investment behavior. To this end, we measure firms’ innovation investment behavior through average total research and development (R&D) expenditures per filed patent family for publicly listed firms from 1999 to 2018. Our sample mainly includes major SEP family declarants. We rely on a binary business model taxonomy differentiating upstream and downstream firms. Within that setting, total R&D expenditures rise with increasing fragmentation of declared SEP families, suggesting that firms adjust their R&D investments to declaration developments in standard-setting organizations (SSOs). We also show that upstream firms have significantly lower total R&D expenditures than downstream firms, which could indicate structural differences in their intellectual property (IP) and R&D management processes. Our results can help SSOs and regulators better understand firms’ innovation investment behavior.     

Patent office in innovation policy: Nobody's perfect

The number of patent applications and “bad” patents issued has been rising rapidly in recent years. Based on this trend, we study the overload problem within the Patent Office and its consequences on the firms' R&D incentives. We assume that the examination process of patent applications is imperfect, and that its quality is poorer under congestion. Depending on policy instruments such as submission fees and the toughness of the non-obviousness requirement, the system may result in a high-R&D equilibrium, in which firms self-select in their patent applications, or in an equilibrium with low R&D, opportunistic patent applications and the issuance of bad patents. Multiple equilibria often co-exist, which deeply undermines the effectiveness of policy instruments. We investigate the robustness of our conclusions as to how the value of patent protection is formalized, taking into consideration the introduction of a penalty system for rejected patent applications, as well as the role of commitment to a given patent protection policy.     

The influence of market structure on technological performance in the food-manufacturing industries

This paper tests the effect of firm and market structure variables on the rate of R&D investment by food processing firms. While the estimated relationship is consistent with the hypotheses of Schumpeter and Galbraith at small firm sizes and small-to-moderale concentration levels, above these critical values expected firm R&D increases at a decreasing rate with firm size and decreases with market concentration. The second part of this paper examines the origins of process patents closely related to six food industries. On average U.S. firms outside the industry, foreign firms, and individuals were each assigned more food-industry patents than were U.S. food processing firm. These findings place the public policy interpretation of observed relationships between market power and firm technological performance into a broader perspective. Even if a reduction in market concentrationn reduced R&D originating within a food industry, this decrease might bede minimus relative to technological changes, originating outside the industry.     

Does international research and development increase patent output? An analysis of Japanese pharmaceutical firms

Internationalizing research and development is often advocated as a strategy for fostering the development of technological capabilities. Although firms conduct international R&D to tap into knowledge bases that reside in foreign countries, we argue that in order to benefit from international R&D investments firms must already possess research capabilities in underlying or complementary technologies. We examine the international R&D expansion activities, research capabilities, and patent output of 65 Japanese pharmaceutical firms from 1980 to 1991. We find that firms benefit from international R&D only when they possess existing research capabilities in the underlying technologies. In addition to refining our understanding of when international R&D enhances firm innovation, our results integrate asset‐seeking and asset‐based theories of foreign direct investment. Internationalizing R&D to tap into foreign knowledge bases is consistent with asset‐seeking theories of foreign direct investment, while the contingent nature by which firms benefit from international R&D is consistent with asset‐based theories of foreign direct investment and the notion of absorptive capacity. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVE PRESSURE*

I analyze the effects of competition on process innovation and product introduction and obtain robust results that hold for a range of market structures and competition modes. It is found that increasing the number of firms tends to decrease cost reduction expenditure per firm, whereas increasing the degree of product substitutability, with or without free entry, increases it—provided that the average demand for product varieties does not shrink. Increasing market size increases cost reduction expenditure per firm and has ambiguous effects on the number of varieties offered, while decreasing the cost of entry increases the number of entrants and varieties but reduces cost reduction expenditure per variety. The results are extended to other measures of competitive pressure and to investment in product quality. The framework and results shed light on empirical strategies to assess the impact of competition on innovation.     

The Impact of Market Structure and Learning on the Tradeoff between R&D Competition and Cooperation

This paper compares R&D competition and cooperation when firms can devote resources to a ‘safe’ investment or a risky R&D investment. When the discovery of a new product creates positive externalities on non‐discovering firms, equilibrium investment flow, ex ante investment, and welfare under R&D competition are less than or equal to what they are under research cooperation. With negative externalities, R&D cooperation results in the same or lower ex ante investment than under R&D competition, and social welfare may also be less. Our results have relevance for empirical studies of the impact of R&D cooperation on R&D outcomes.     

Private and social incentives to form R & D joint ventures

R & D patent pools induce individual firms to reduce investment in R & D, but are socially beneficial because they ensure greater competition in the post-innovation market. It is not usually optimal for all firms to combine in a single cooperative R & D venture. If R & D combinations are formed voluntarily by firms that seek to maximize their expected value, they will not, in general, adopt the socially optimal structure of R & D joint ventures.     

An economic analysis of deferred examination system: Evidence from a policy reform in Japan

We investigate how a deferred patent examination system promotes ex-ante screening of patent applications, which reduces both the number of granted patents and the use of economic resources for examinations, without reducing the return from R&D. Based on a real option theory, we develop a model of examination request behaviors. Exploiting the responses of Japanese firms to recent policy reform, we find that the shortening of the allowable period for an examination request significantly increases both eventual and early requests, controlling for the blocking use of a pending patent application. This effect is stronger in technology areas with higher uncertainty. These results support the importance of uncertainty for an applicant and of ex-ante screening.     

COLLUSION AND RESEARCH JOINT VENTURES*

I examine the question whether cooperation in R&D among firms producing similar products leads to product market collusion. Suppose that firms engage in a stochastic R&D race while maintaining the collusive equilibrium in a repeated‐game framework. Innovation under non‐cooperative R&D leads to an inter‐firm asymmetry, destabilizing collusion in pre‐discovery and post‐discovery periods. Innovation sharing under cooperative R&D preserves the symmetry and also increases total profit, thereby facilitating collusion. However, welfare may increase with cooperative R&D. I also examine the condition for collusion under licensing and compare the results.     

R&D Partnerships and Innovation Performance: Can There Be too Much of a Good Thing?

R&D collaboration facilitates the pooling of complementary skills, learning from the partner as well as the sharing of risks and costs. Research therefore stresses the positive relationship between collaborative R&D and innovation performance. Fewer studies address the potential drawbacks of collaborative R&D. Collaborative R&D comes at the cost of coordination and monitoring, requires knowledge disclosure, and involves the risk of opportunistic behavior by the partners. Thus, while for lower collaboration intensities the net gains can be high, costs may start to outweigh benefits if firms perform a higher share of their innovation projects collaboratively. For a sample of 2735 firms located in Germany and active in a broad range of manufacturing and service sectors, this study finds that increasing the share of collaborative R&D projects in total R&D projects is associated with a higher probability of product innovation and with a higher market success of new products. While this confirms previous findings on the gains for innovation performance, the results also show that collaboration has decreasing and even negative returns on product innovation if its intensity increases above a certain threshold. Thus, the relationship between collaboration intensity and innovation follows an inverted‐U shape and, on average, costs start to outweigh benefits if a firm pursues more than about two‐thirds of its R&D projects in collaboration. This result is robust to conditioning market success to the introduction of new products and to accounting for the selection into collaborating. This threshold is, however, contingent on firm characteristics. Smaller and younger as well as resource‐constrained firms benefit from relatively higher collaboration intensities. For firms with higher collaboration complexities in terms of different partners and different stages of the R&D process at which collaboration takes place, returns start to decrease already at lower collaboration intensities.     

The effects of funding source and management ownership on the productivity of R&D

This study investigates the influence of the source of R&D funds and management ownership on R&D productivity. The lagged effect of the source of R&D funds on R&D output is investigated for a sample of US manufacturing firms in five industries over the 1996–99 period. Estimates based on 779 firm-years show that R&D productivity increases with the proportion of stock held by managers and directors of firms primarily in the Other Electronics industry. The estimates also show that recipients of government-sponsored R&D funds in the Chemicals industry have lower levels of output (sales) for each dollar committed to R&D. In addition, output for firms in the Chemicals industry worsens as management stockholding increases, implying an agency cost rationale for the observed difference in output. The implication is that firms with high manager-owner content are less productive with government-sponsored R&D than with company-financed R&D. The reported results suggest that potential agency costs should be incorporated in government-sponsored R&D contracts. It also suggests that the source of R&D funds should be disclosed and incorporated into the valuation of intangible assets attributable to research and development.