Islamist terrorism and the status of women

We investigate the effect of Islamist terrorist activity on women's legal position in society, using data for 171 countries between 1970 and 2016. To identify causal effects, we exploit the prevalence of Islamist terrorism in neighboring countries as an exogenous source of variation, arguing that regional terrorism affects local terrorism through contagion effects. We show that increased activity by Islamist terrorist groups is linked to lower legal status of women. By contrast, we find that neither Islam per se nor other types of terrorism have comparable effects. This reinforces the notion that Islamist terrorism is singularly interested and effective in weakening women's rights. Our results are consistent with a rational-economic model of terrorism, where Islamist terrorists purposefully use violence to maximize political utility, while governments make concessions that constrain the role of women because the costs of compliance are lower than the harm from continued Islamist terrorism.     

Applying Intermediate Microeconomics to Terrorism

The authors show how microeconomic concepts and principles are applicable to the study of terrorism. The utility maximization model provides insights into both terrorist resource allocation choices and government counterterrorism efforts, and basic game theory helps characterize the strategic interdependencies among terrorists and governments.     

Defining and exploring the terrorism field: Toward an intertheoretic, agent-based approach

Drawing upon organizational design, contingency, and field theory, we outline a conceptual model for studying terrorism at the field level and argue that existing computational organizational theory could be extended to enable such inquiry. We introduce the terrorism field as the system of dynamic interaction between the terrorism, counterterrorism and political governance industries, defining the overarching functions of each. We then argue that intertheoretic, field-level inquiry could lead to explicit conceptual and computational models with significant benefits for researchers and policy makers, to include enhancing understanding of the proximate environmental conditions that are deleterious to the use of terrorism by political challengers. Using POW-ER, an illustrative field-level case of a basic terrorist attack is then modeled based on two archetypes of terrorist organizational forms emerging from the new terrorism debate: 1) hierarchy and 2) network, and two treatments: 1) applying counterterrorism techniques and 2) reducing knowledge within the terrorist organization. Preliminary findings compared to the baseline case are discussed, as well as implications for future research.     

NUCLEAR TERRORISM: REACTOR SABOTAGE AND WEAPONS PROLIFERATION RISKS

Nuclear power plants and research reactors are vulnerable to acts of terrorism that could render safety systems inoperable and result in catastrophic releases of radioactivity. In addition, expanding civil commerce in weapon-usable forms of plutonium and uranium and deploying tactical nuclear weapons in areas where terrorists are active increase the risk of terrorists' building or stealing nuclear weapons or, even more likely, carrying out a credible hoax.
The United States and other advanced industrialized nations should be concerned about nuclear terrorism, the threat of which now is perceived as low. However, if terrorist groups become more determined, violent, and technologically advanced, as some experts anticipate, then the possibility of nuclear terrorism will likely increase with little warning. Nuclear terrorism, regardless of where it occurs, could have far-reaching consequences for economic stability and world peace. Western Europe is a region of continuing concern due to its high level of "nuclearization" – that is, civil and military nuclear development – and the presence of sophisticated terrorist organizations operating across national boundaries.
This paper reviews potential dangers and available remedies based on the report of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, on policy and technical studies prepared for the Task Force, and on follow-up research conducted by the Nuclear Control Institute, the Task Force's sponsoring organization.     

Small investment and large returns: Terrorism, media and the economy

The study investigates the role of the media in the impact of terrorism on the economy. A unique data set of the newspaper articles that reported terrorist attacks during 2002 is used to evaluate their impact on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. An econometric analysis is performed in order to understand how a newspaper decides to cover a terrorist attack, i.e. the number of articles, positioning of articles, whether to include photos and the size of headlines. It was found that media coverage is an important channel through which terrorism produces economic damage. The findings also showed that the economic damage caused by terrorist attacks increases monotonically with the amount of media coverage. It was also found that the economic impact of the media coverage diminishes over time.     

Perceptions and attitudes following a terrorist shock: Evidence from the UK

Transnational terrorism in Western countries has raised questions about security measures that constrain civil liberties. This is the first paper that uses a terrorist attack, that in the London 7/7/2005, as an exogenous source of variation to study the dynamics of risk perception and the effect on the readiness to trade off civil liberties for enhanced security. In this framework we show that willingness to trade off security for liberties is dramatically affected by changes in individual risk assessments due to a terrorist attack. We document the extent of persistence of changed attitudes.     

Non-convexities and the gains from concealing defenses from committed terrorists

How should countries defend against committed terrorists who attack until defeated? We identify a fundamental non-convexity—one only needs to defeat the terrorist once. Consequently, provided a country values targets similarly, it should conceal defenses and allocate defense resources randomly.     

Terrorism and the world economy

It has been argued that terrorism should not have a large effect on economic activity, because terrorist attacks destroy only a small fraction of the stock of capital of a country (see, e.g., Becker, G., Murphy, K., 2001. Prosperity will rise out of the ashes. Wall Street Journal October 29, 2001). In contrast, empirical estimates of the consequences of terrorism typically suggest large effects on economic outcomes (see, e.g., Abadie, A., Gardeazabal, J., 2003. The economic cost of conflict: A case study of the Basque country. American Economic Review 93, 113-132). The main theme of this article is that mobility of productive capital in an open economy may account for much of the difference between the direct and the equilibrium impact of terrorism. We use a simple economic model to show that terrorism may have a large impact on the allocation of productive capital across countries, even if it represents a small fraction of the overall economic risk. The model emphasizes that, in addition to increasing uncertainty, terrorism reduces the expected return to investment. As a result, changes in the intensity of terrorism may cause large movements of capital across countries if the world economy is sufficiently open, so international investors are able to diversify other types of country risks. Using a unique data set on terrorism and other country risks, we find that, in accordance with the predictions of the model, higher levels of terrorist risks are associated with lower levels of net foreign direct investment positions, even after controlling for other types of country risks. On average, a standard deviation increase in the terrorist risk is associated with a fall in the net foreign direct investment position of about 5% of GDP. The magnitude of the estimated effect is large, which suggests that the “open-economy channel” impact of terrorism may be substantial.     

The short- and long-run relationship between the illicit drug business and terrorism

We study the effect of the illicit drug business on terrorism for a sample of 58 countries for the 1984–2007 period. Consistent with the notion of a crime-terror nexus, we find that in the long run, higher drug prices are associated with more terrorism. In the short run, however, increases in drug prices lead to less terrorism, potentially because terrorist groups respond to higher drug business attractiveness by prioritizing criminal over terrorist activity.     

Terrorist backlash, terrorism mitigation, and policy delegation

This paper presents a three-stage proactive game involving terrorists, elected policymakers, and voters. In each of two targeted countries, a representative voter chooses an elected policymaker, charged with deciding proactive countermeasures to ameliorate a transnational terrorist threat. Two primary considerations drive the voters' strategic choice: free riding on the other countries' countermeasures and limiting a reprisal terrorist attack. The resulting low proactive countermeasures benefit the terrorists, whose attacks successfully exploit voters' strategic actions. This finding stems from a delegation problem where leadership by voters has a detrimental consequence on the well-being of targeted countries. Domestic politics add another layer of concern when addressing a common terrorist threat.     

Why concessions should not be made to terrorist kidnappers

This paper examines the dynamic implications of making concessions to terrorist kidnappers. We apply a Bayesian Poisson changepoint model to kidnapping incidents associated with three cohorts of countries that differ in their frequency of granting concessions. Depending on the cohort of countries during 2001–2013, terrorist negotiation successes encouraged 64% to 87% more kidnappings. Our findings also hold for 1978–2013, during which these negotiation successes encouraged 26% to 57% more kidnappings. Deterrent aspects of terrorist casualties are also quantified; the dominance of religious fundamentalist terrorists meant that such casualties generally did not curb kidnappings.     

When is Foreign Aid Effective in Fighting Terrorism? Threshold Evidence

Building on the previous literature, we assess when foreign aid is effective in fighting terrorism using quantile regressions on a panel of 78 developing countries for the period 1984–2008. Bilateral, multilateral and total aid indicators are used whereas terrorism includes: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics. We consistently establish that foreign aid (bilateral, multilateral and total) is effective at fighting terrorism exclusively in countries where existing levels of transnational terrorism are highest. This finding is consistent with our theoretical underpinnings because donors have been documented to allocate more aid towards fighting transnational terrorist activities in recipient countries because they are more likely to target their interests. Moreover, the propensity of donor interest at stake is likely to increase with initial levels of transnational terrorism, such that the effect of foreign aid is most significant in recipient countries with the highest levels of transnational terrorism. Policy implications and future research directions are discussed.     

TRADE‐OFFS BETWEEN CIVIL LIBERTIES AND NATIONAL SECURITY: A DISCRETE CHOICE EXPERIMENT

We explore differences in perception of national security policies between self‐identified liberals, moderates, and conservatives from a national sample of U.S. adults. Using a discrete choice experiment, we also quantify each group's willingness to trade off select policies in exchange for reduced risk of a 9/11‐style terrorist attack. Relative to other groups, liberals are more likely to view such policies as ineffective and susceptible to government abuse. They also perceive a lower threat of terrorism. All groups are willing to make trade‐offs between civil liberties and risk of a terrorist attack. However, loss of civil liberties affects liberals more than conservatives. (JEL D61, H41, H56)     

Public opinion and terrorist acts

The paper examines support for terrorism in public opinion and the relationship with terrorist attacks. We link the 2007 PEW survey data on justification for suicide terror and opinions in 16 countries of the Middle East, Africa and Asia on nine regional powers, to the NCTC data on international terrorist acts between 2004 and 2008. We find that justification in public opinion for suicide terrorism increases terror attacks on people in countries that are unfavorably regarded. There is a robust positive relationship between the share of the population in a country that at the same time justifies suicide bombings and has an unfavorable opinion of another country, and terrorism originating from the former country.     

Fighting Terrorism: Empirics on Policy Harmonisation

This paper models the feasibility of common policy initiatives against global terrorism, as well as timelines for their enforcement. The empirical evidence is based on 78 developing countries for the period 1984–2008. Domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism variables are used. Absolute (or unconditional) and conditional catch‐ups are estimated using Generalised Method of Moments. We establish consistently that, the rate of catch‐up is higher in domestic terrorism relative to transnational terrorism. The time to full catch‐up required for the implementation of common policies without distinction of nationality is found to be in a horizon of 13–20 years for domestic terrorism and 24–28 years for transnational terrorism. Hence, from a projection date of 2009, in spite of decreasing cross‐country differences in terrorists’ attacks, there is still a long way to go before feasible common policy initiatives can be fully implemented without distinction of nationality. The paper is original by its contribution to the empirics of conflict resolution through decreasing cross‐country differences in terrorism tendencies. Policy implications are discussed.     

Fighting terrorism in Africa: evidence from bundling and unbundling institutions

Empirical Economics - This study assesses government mechanisms in the fight against terrorism with particular emphasis on the bundling and unbundling of ten governance dynamics. The empirical...     

Stock markets and terrorist attacks: Comparative evidence from a large and a small capitalization market

An expanding body of literature has investigated the economic impact of terrorist attacks. A part of this literature has focused on financial markets. We examine three research questions: whether markets' reactions to terrorism have changed through time; whether market size and maturity determine reactions, and whether reactions depends upon either the type of targets or the perpetrators of the attack. To this effect, a large – the London stock exchange – and a small – the Athens stock exchange – capitalization markets are used as the vehicles for the empirical investigation. Results from an event study methodology as well as from conditional volatility models suggest that size and maturity as well as specific attributes of terrorist incidents are possible determinants of markets' reactions.     

Dismantling terrorist networks: Evaluating strategic options using agent-based modeling

Dismantling dark networks remains a critical goal for the peace and security of our society. Terrorist networks are the most prominent instantiation of dark networks, and they are alive and well. Attempts to preemptively disrupt these networks and their activities have met with both success and failure. In this paper, we examine the impacts of four common strategies for dismantling terrorist networks. The four strategies are: leader-focused, grassroots, geographic, and random. Each of these strategies has associated pros and cons, and each has different impacts on the structure and capabilities of a terrorist network. Employing a computational experimentation methodology, we simulate a terrorist network and test the effects of each strategy on the resiliency of that network. In addition, we test scenarios in which the terrorist network has (or does not have) information about an impending attack. Our work takes a structural perspective to the challenge of addressing terrorist networks. Specifically, we show how various strategies impact the structure of the network in terms of its resiliency and capacity to carry out future attacks. This paper also provides a valuable overview of how to use agent-based modeling for the study of complex problems in the terrorism, conflict studies, and security study domains.     

The socio-economic determinants of terrorism and political violence in Western Europe (1994–2007)

The main objective of this paper is to empirically investigate the socio-economic causes of terrorism and political violence in a sample of 12 countries in Western Europe. First, we show that in western European countries the classical economic argument of opportunity cost is confirmed. That is, the larger is the set of current economic opportunities for individuals the lower is the likelihood or the willingness for them to be involved in a terrorist activity. Second, expected future economic growth seems to be associated with an increase in current terrorist activities. Eventually, our results also show that terrorist brutality (measured in people killed) is positively associated with real GDP per capita.     

THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM AND CONFLICTS ON GROWTH IN ASIA

This paper quantifies the impact of terrorism and conflicts on income per capita growth in Asia for 1970–2004. Our panel estimations show that transnational terrorist attacks had a significant growth-limiting effect. An additional terrorist incident per million persons reduces gross domestic product per capita growth by about 1.5%. In populous countries, many additional attacks are needed to achieve such a large impact. Transnational terrorism reduces growth by crowding-in government expenditures. Unlike developing countries, developed countries are able to absorb terrorism without displaying adverse economic consequences. An internal conflict has the greatest growth concern, more than twice that of transnational terrorism. Conflict variables are associated with smaller investment shares and increased government spending, with the crowding-in of government spending being the dominant influence.