雷曼事件中审计问题剖析及启示

2008年9月15日,美国第四大投行雷曼兄弟宣告破产,进而引发了一场席卷全球的金融风暴。雷曼事件中的审计问题引人深思,本文总结了雷曼事件中的审计问题,从雷曼自身及安永两个方面剖析雷曼事件中审计问题,最后得出启示:不能盲目相信"四大"、加强职业谨慎的重视以及审计行业的自我保护。     

从雷曼公司破产事件看信用衍生品模型缺陷

长期以来,信用衍生品的风险分析和定价高度依赖于模型分析,但在本次雷曼兄弟倒闭事件中,数量分析模型却没有预测到信用衍生品的巨大损失。本文对雷曼兄弟公司等投行信用衍生品风险模型存在的缺陷进行了初步探讨,提出了关于信用模型运用的一些思考和建议。     

雷曼兄弟再度赔偿105亿美元

北京时间9月26日消息,破产投行雷曼兄弟对外表示,10月起再度向债权人赔偿约105亿美元资金。据了解,按照既定的方案,雷曼兄弟将最终赔偿逾     

美国金融危机到底咋回事(上)

2008年9月8日，美国政府宣布接管房地美和房利美公司；9月15日，美国第4大投行雷曼兄弟公司申请破产保护，第3大投行美林证券公司被美国银行收购。受美国次贷危机冲击，华尔街叱咤风云的3大投行—贝尔斯登、雷曼以及美林都已黯然退出历史舞台。转眼间，华尔街5大投行仅剩两家。     

从雷曼兄弟破产看黄金价格走势

9月15日,当国内金融市场处于中秋假期休市时,作为美国第四大投行的雷曼兄弟公司宣布申请破产保护.雷曼兄弟公司的破产消息不仅震动了华尔街,也震惊了全球金融市场,拉开了全球金融动荡的序幕.     

从雷曼破产报告看会计造假手法——"回购105"

本文通过解析安东·沃卢克斯对雷曼破产的调查报告,探究了雷曼破产前所使用的会计造假方法--"回购105"的造假手段和目的.     

从雷曼破产报告看会计造假手法——“回购105”

本文通过解析安东·沃卢克斯对雷曼破产的调查报告，探究了雷曼破产前所使用的会计造假方法——“回购105”的造假手段和目的。     

雷曼破产审计责任案例分析

2010年3月,美国司法部任命的前联邦审查官安东·沃卢克斯(Anton Valukas)发布了一份关于美国历史上最大的破产案——雷曼兄弟控股公司(Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.,以下简称"雷曼")破产调查报告。它揭示出雷曼在2007年至2008年上半年间,利用"回购105"的融资手段,隐瞒资产负债表上多达500亿美元的债务,误导投资者和评级机构,并有足够的证据证明其审计师安永(E&Y)存在"疏忽过失"。那么,"回购105"在雷曼破产案中扮演了什么角色?审计师安永是否应对雷曼破产负责?雷曼破产案可以带给我们哪些启示呢?     

雷曼兄弟公司破产对中国QDII的影响

2008年9月14日,在美国政府接管"两房" (房地美和房利美)仅过一周,美国五大投行之一的雷曼兄弟控股集团公司(简称"雷曼兄弟")因陷入财务危机而无奈地宣布申请破产.受此利空消息的打击,当天全球主要股市出现普遍重跌,法兰克福、伦敦、纽约、巴黎等地股指跌幅一度超过4%,引发投资者对美国金融业的担忧和恐慌.     

雷曼破产审计责任案例分析

2010年3月，美国司法部任命的前联邦审查官安东·沃卢克斯（Anton Valukas）发布了一份关于美国历史上最大的破产案——雷曼兄弟控股公司（Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc．．以下简称“雷曼”）破产调查报告。它揭示出雷曼在2007年至2008年上半年间，利用“回购105”的融资手段，隐瞒资产负债表上多达500亿美元的债务，误导投资者和评级机构。并有足够的证据证明其审计师安永（E＆Y）存在“疏忽过失”。那么，“回购105”在雷曼破产案中扮演了什么角色？审计师安永是否应对雷曼破产负责？雷曼破产案可以带给我们哪些启示呢？     

Bank Failure,Mark‐to‐market and the Financial Crisis

This paper is concerned with the allegation that fair value accounting rules have contributed significantly to the recent financial crisis. It focuses on one particular channel for that contribution: the impact of fair value on the actual or potential failure of banks. The paper compares four criteria for failure: one economic, two legal and one regulatory. It is clear from this comparison that balance sheet valuations of assets are, in two cases, crucial in these definitions, and so the choice between ‘fair value’ or other valuations can be decisive in whether a bank fails; but in two cases fair value is irrelevant. Bank failures might arise despite capital adequacy and balance sheet solvency due to sudden shocks to liquidity positions. Two of the most prominent bank failures cannot, at first sight, be attributed to fair value accounting: we show that Northern Rock was balance sheet solvent, even on a fair value basis, as was Lehman Brothers. The case study evidence is augmented by econometric tests that suggest that mark‐to‐market accounting has had only a very limited influence on the perceived failure risk of banks.     

Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008

This paper shows that new loans to large borrowers fell by 47% during the peak period of the financial crisis (fourth quarter of 2008) relative to the prior quarter and by 79% relative to the peak of the credit boom (second quarter of 2007). New lending for real investment (such as working capital and capital expenditures) fell by only 14% in the last quarter of 2008, but contracted nearly as much as new lending for restructuring (LBOs, M&As, share repurchases) relative to the peak of the credit boom. After the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, there was a run by short-term bank creditors, making it difficult for banks to roll over their short term debt. We find that there was a simultaneous run by borrowers who drew down their credit lines, leading to a spike in commercial and industrial loans reported on bank balance sheets. We examine whether these two stresses on bank liquidity led them to cut lending. In particular, we show that banks cut their lending less if they had better access to deposit financing and thus, they were not as reliant on short-term debt. We also show that banks that were more vulnerable to credit-line drawdowns because they co-syndicated more of their credit lines with Lehman Brothers reduced their lending to a greater extent.     

The effects of loan portfolio concentration on Brazilian banks’ return and risk

This paper tests whether diversification of the credit portfolio at the bank level leads to better performance and lower risk. We employ a new high frequency (monthly) panel data for the Brazilian banking system with information at the bank level for loans by economic sector. We find that loan portfolio concentration increases returns and also reduces default risk; the impact of concentration on bank’s return is decreasing on bank’s risk; there are significant size effects; foreign and state-owned banks seem to be less affected by the degree of diversification. An important additional finding is that there is an increasing concentration trend after the breakout of the recent international financial crisis, specially after the failure of Lehman Brothers.     

What happened to profitability? Shocks,challenges and perspectives for euro area banks

This paper analyses the evolution of bank profitability from 2005 to 2016, with a focus on the period covering both the global financial crisis and the euro area crisis. To accomplish this, we constructed a dataset that includes financial statement information from 310 euro area banks. Using a dual approach – a ‘bottom-up’ approach as applied by bank analysts and macroeconomists' ‘top-down’ approach, we find that the profitability of euro area banks was hit by two shocks of different nature. The Lehman Brothers collapse affected mostly big banks with diversified portfolios via losses in their securities investment. The subsequent euro area debt crisis and economic recession hit more traditional banks specialising in retail lending activities, mainly through increasing impairment costs. If the first shock had a one-off impact on bank profitability, the second shock is far more long-lasting and is still depressing the profitability of banks in peripheral Europe.     

The Effect of Federal Reserve Accounting Rules on the Equilibrium Level of Overnight Repo Rates

This paper addresses whether Federal Reserve Board accounting requirements are sufficiently pervasive to create regularities in government overnight repurchase agreement (repo) rates. US bank settlement regulations allow overnight government repos as substitutes for Federal (Fed) funds. We find that overnight government repos exhibit rate changes and variance regularities consistent with regularities identified in the Fed funds market, which have been shown to result directly from the Federal Reserve regulations and accounting policies governing the US bank settlement process. Thus, we conclude that the overnight government repo rates are influenced in a similar manner by regulatory rules. However, since the rate changes are not large economically, the influence of regulatory accounting practices does not violate the premise of an efficient market.     

Are lending relationships beneficial or harmful for public credit guarantees? Evidence from Japan's Emergency Credit Guarantee Program

This paper examines the effectiveness of Japan's Emergency Credit Guarantee (ECG) Program set up during the financial turmoil following the failure of Lehman Brothers, in increasing credit availability and improving the ex-post performance of small businesses. In particular, using a unique firm–bank matched dataset, the paper examines whether lending relationships enhanced or dampened the effects of the ECG program. It is found that the ECG program significantly improved credit availability for firms using the program. However, when it was a relationship lender (main bank) that extended an ECG loan, the increased availability was partially, if not completely, offset by a decrease in non-ECG loans by the same bank. Further, propensity score matching estimations show that the ex-post performance of firms that received ECG loans from the main bank deteriorated more than that of firms that received non-ECG loans. We do not find such loan “substitution” or performance “deterioration” effects when a non-main bank extended ECG loans. Our findings suggest that close firm–bank relationships may have perverse effects on the efficacy of public credit guarantees.     

Are outside directors with greater board tenure valuable? Evidence from the last credit crisis

Analyses of bank performance around the 2007–2008 financial crisis indicate that outside directors with financial experience acquired through longer board service at their own banks are more effective than those with financial experience acquired elsewhere. Institutions with more long-tenured independent directors (i) earn higher Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around the collapse of both Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, (ii) limit their risk exposure before the crisis, (iii) exhibit better stock return and accounting performance during the crisis, (iv) are less likely to be bailed out by the U.S. government’s Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), and (v) receive proportionally less financial assistance from TARP.     

Are Investment Banks Special Too? Evidence on Relationship‐Specific Capital in Investment Bank Services

The question of whether optimal provision of these services comes mainly from established relationships between banks and client firms or can result from arms'‐length market transactions has been the topic of considerable recent debate. This discussion has paralleled the debate in the commercial banking literature on the “specialness” of banks and whether lending can and should be relational or purely transactional. Whether the provision of investment bank services is relationship‐based or transactional is especially relevant now thanks to recent trends that have blurred the distinction between commercial and investment banks, and changed the competitive landscape for investment bank services. In their study summarized in this article, the authors examine whether investment bank‐client relationships create valuable relationship‐specific capital using stock market evidence from the period surrounding the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Specifically, they studied the effect of the Lehman collapse on companies that used Lehman for (1) underwriting equity offerings, (2) underwriting debt offerings, (3) advice on mergers and acquisitions, (4) analyst research services, and (5) market‐making services. The study addressed two specific questions. First, which investment bank services, if any, are associated with the creation of relationship‐specific capital; and second, what are the value drivers of this relationship capital? The authors report finding that companies that used Lehman as lead underwriter for public equity offerings experienced significantly negative abnormal stock returns in the days surrounding Lehman's bankruptcy announcement. By contrast, they find no significant reaction to the announcement for Lehman's debt underwriting clients or any of the other client categories they examine. While most of these investment bank services have at least the potential to create relationship‐specific capital, the authors' findings suggest that except for equity underwriting, all the other investment bank services appear to be transactional rather than relationship‐based, at least in the average case. Moreover, the authors report significant differences even among different groups of Lehman's equity underwriting clients. An equity underwriting relationship with Lehman appears to have been especially valuable for smaller, younger, and more financially constrained firms—those firms which presumably had a high degree of dependence on Lehman to access the capital market.     

The interbank network across the global financial crisis: Evidence from Italy

This study examines the effects of the global financial crisis (GFC) on interbank market connectivity using network analysis. More specifically, using data on Italian banks’ bilateral interbank positions between 1998 and 2013, we analyze the impact of the following events on each bank's network centrality: the liquidity crisis in August 2007, the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, Eurosystem's long term refinancing operations (LTROs) between 2009 and 2012, the sovereign debt crisis in July 2011, and the announcement of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) in 2012. The results show that the 2007 liquidity crisis and especially the collapse of Lehman Brothers are associated with a marked reduction of the relative interconnectedness of the Italian banking sector (i.e., a shift in the distribution of banks’ centrality to the left, away from the most connected bank). In the following years, the system progressively recovered its initial patterns of integration among banks, which coincided with the main Eurosystem's monetary policy interventions. However, the average outcome conceals different results across banks, depending on their characteristics and initial positions within the system.     

Can SRI funds better resist global financial crisis? Evidence from Japan

This paper compared Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) funds and conventional funds in the Japanese market with respect to the impact of the global financial crisis in 2008. Taking the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers as a particular event, we estimated the average cumulative abnormal returns of both funds by event study methodology using a Fama–French three-factor model and EGARCH model. Our results suggest that SRI funds better resisted the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers than conventional funds. We also found that this result can be attributed to the existence of international funds, possibly because investors might evaluate the CSR activities of international firms more than those of domestic firms. Alternatively, it can be interpreted that the universe of domestic SRI funds is too limited to enjoy risk diversification.