Coordination failure in an industrial society

Summary Different macroeconomic theories of coordination failure are dealt with. Using simple models it is shown that externalities may lead to multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria or, under suitable assumptions, to a continuum of equilibria. It is argued that in industrial societies imperfect competition is predominant. Therefore, demand externalities may be the main cause of low level equilibria. Trading externalities and searching externalities may play a supplementary role. The theory of coordination failure is based on complete markets and price flexibility. Despite its strong appeal, it has certain shortcomings which are also discussed in the paper.I would like to thank S.K. Kuipers and A. van Schaik for their useful comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

THE ARGENTINEAN CURRENCY CRISIS: A MARKOV‐SWITCHING MODEL ESTIMATION

In 2002, the Argentinean currency board came to a sudden and dramatic end. Although the country had been suffering from weak economic fundamentals for years, the timing and severity of the currency crisis surprised most observers. The present study analyzes the role of fundamentals and self‐fulfilling speculation in the Argentinean crisis. Arguing within a theoretical model of a fixed exchange rate system that allows for multiple equilibria, we show that the crisis, although associated with weak fundamentals, cannot be explained by these macroeconomic factors alone. Estimating a univariate Markov‐switching model, the current study shows that shifts in agents’ beliefs did indeed also play a crucial role.     

Asymmetric wage indexation

Models of wage indexation uniformly have been based on the simplifying assumption that nominal wages adjust upward or downwrd symmetrically with unexpected price increases or decreases. Indexation typically is asymmetric in actual contracts, however. Wages are indexed to price increases but not to price reductions. This paper analyzes a macroeconomic model with asymmetric indexation. On the one hand, this paper finds that when stable equilibria supporting use of such asymmetrically indexed contracts exist, the result is an unambiguous downward bias in the base contract wage, because workers must pay a premium for insurance against real wage reductions that unexpected inflation otherwise would induce. On the other hand, the paper concludes that the likelihood of existence of stable equilibria supporting positive wage indexation generally declines as aggregate demand variability rises relative to the variability of aggregate supply. This may help explain why relatively low levels of wage indexation actually are observed in nations with relatively contained aggregate demand volatility.     

The macrodynamics of business cycles: A comparative evaluation Mohammed H.I. Dore Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993, 242 pp.

In his latest book, Mohammed Dore has provided a much needed exposition of macroeconomic and business cycle theory since the advent of Keynes' General Theory. The book provides under one cover extended derivations of the main models that must be mastered if one is to be proficient in macroeconomic theory. It is, however, much more than just an expository volume; it is also a work of highly structured evaluation and criticism. The theories considered fall into the broad classifications of New Classical, New Keynesian, and endogenous cycle theories. The theories are rated on how well they account for ten stylized facts describing business cycles. The winner of the Dore sweepstakes is Richard M. Goodwin's endogenous cycle theory. While heartily endorsing Dore's criticism of representative agent models, this review expresses reservations about abandoning micro foundations.     

农民专业合作社主导因素与规范找寻

农民是农民专业合作社的产品供应者和理论受益者,对专业合作社的发展起决定作用。我国农民专业合作社的变迁路径是按照市场化取向由农民主导和选择的。我国农民专业合作社的发展正处于规范与发展并重的时期,是制度变迁的深化阶段。发展农民专业合作社符合农民的利益,应尊重农民的主体地位,正确处理政府推动与尊重农民意愿的关系,从而为进一步推动农民专业合作社健康、持续发展提供理论依据。     

我国前瞻性货币供给规则与宏观经济的稳定我国前瞻性货币供给规则与宏观经济的稳定性——拓展的MIU模型与中国经验

国内研究货币规则的文献大多依据＂损失函数最小化＂标准获得货币政策工具的决策准则,而鲜有从一般均衡模型不动点性质的角度评析我国货币政策规则的文章。本文将一个适用于我国转型时期的货币量规则引入一般均衡的MIU模型,拓展了传统的固定货币增长率的货币经济学模型。文章发现：消费者微观偏好和央行货币政策参数会对宏观经济系统的稳定性产生影响。数据分析显示：我国经济系统获致的不动点为鞍点,即存在一条稳定的轨迹使经济系统收敛于均衡状态。文章建议,货币政策部门密切关注居民微观行为演进和央行货币规则微调对经济系统动态特性产生的影响。

Abstract：

Most domestic literatures on monetary rules are based upon the standard of ＂loss function minimization＂ to get access to the decision-making guidelines regarding monetary policy tools.While,little article looks the problem concerning the assessment of China＇s monetary policy rule from the angle of fixed point nature in the general equilibrium model.This paper introduces a monetary policy rule compatible with our transitional reform period into a general equilibrium MIU model,which is extended from the traditional fixed-money-growth-rate model.This article argues that：micro-parameters of Consumer preferences and the central bank＇s monetary policy have great impact on macroeconomic stability.Further-more,we put forward three testable propositions.According to macro-level data from China,we find that：Our economic system has a saddle-point equilibria,that is to say,there exists a stable trajectory that the economy will converge to this equilibria.The paper suggests that our monetary policy-makers should pay close attention to the micro—behavior evolution of our residents and the monetary regime changes,which will have significant impact on the dynamic characteristics of our economy.     

Reversal of fortune: Macroeconomic policy, International Finance, and Banking in Japan

This essay provides an introduction and overview for a symposium on macroeconomic policy, international finance and banking in Japan. The symposium consists of thirteen papers. Nine of the papers including most of those on macroeconomic policy and international finance appear in this issue. The remaining papers including one on macroeconomic relations within the Asia-Pacific region and three on Japan's banking system will appear in a special section of the next issue of this journal.

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An Equilibrium Selection Theory of Monopolization

We develop a duopoly model in which firms compete for the market (e.g., investing in process innovation or product development) as well as in the market (e.g., setting quantities or prices). Competition for the market generates multiple equilibria that differ in the firms’ investment levels, relative size, and profitability. We show that monopolization that affects competition in the market can act as an equilibrium selection device in competition for the market. In particular, it eliminates equilibria that are undesirable for the monopolizing firm, while not generating new equilibria. This result complicates the task of determining whether a firm's dominance in a given market is the result of fair competition or unlawful monopolization. We discuss a number of implications for antitrust policy and litigation, and illustrate these by means of two well‐known antitrust cases.     

宏观经济因素、信用风险与压力测试

通过文献综述发现宏观经济因素波动是导致银行产生信用风险的重要原因之一。美国金融危机以来,我国经济面临的最主要问题是进出口大幅下降,我国商业银行在这样的宏观经济发生重大变动的情况下面临怎样的信用风险?本文在评介现有的宏观压力测试方法的基础上,提出并用实证证明利用投入产出模型建立宏观压力测试方法可以对出口大幅下降展开有效的行业内生影响分析并分解到每一个企业身上,从而为银行分析贷款不良率,管控信用风险提供直接的参考依据。     

Balanced‐budget rule,distortionary taxes and aggregate stability

It has been established under perfect competition and constant returns‐to‐scale that a one‐sector growth model may exhibit multiple stationary equilibria and local indeterminacy when income tax rates are endogenously determined by a balanced‐budget rule while government expenditures are fixed. The present paper shows that determinacy of the equilibrium trajectory is, however, generically preserved for a non‐empty range of initial values of the capital stock.     

Macroeconomic uncertainty,high-level innovation,and urban green development performance in China

This study incorporates macroeconomic uncertainty and high-level innovation into the framework of urban green development performance analysis. The positive impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on high-level innovation is related to the economic level and geographical location of cities. In developed cities and coastal cities, positive incentives for high-level innovation depicted by invention patents and green technology patents are generated, but the impacts are not significant in less developed cities. The negative impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on green development performance of developed and coastal cities is not significant, but it has a more obvious inhibition effect in less developed cities; raising the proportion of high-level innovation helps to weaken this negative impact.     

Bank Capital Regulation,Economic Stability,and Monetary Policy: What Does the Academic Literature Tell Us?

This paper surveys academic research exploring the macroeconomic and monetary policy implications of the Basel I and Basel II systems of risk-based capital requirements. This research indicates that regulatory tightening of capital ratios can generate aggregate shocks, that capital regulation can enhance the procyclicality already inherent in banking, and that capital requirements can influence macroeconomic outcomes and alter the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The paper offers suggestions for future avenues of research on the interplay between bank capital regulation, the economy, and monetary policymaking. Although any errors are my own, I received very helpful comments on earlier versions from Kenneth Kopecky, John Pattison, and Jack Tatom. I am grateful for research support from Networks Financial Institute.     

Coordination

Many economic games have multiple equilibria, some of which are better than others for everyone involved. Such coordination games are of special interest to economists because they raise the possibility that a group of individuals or even a whole economy might become mired in an unfavorable situation. This paper explains how to use playing cards in the classroom to implement an economic game with multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria. Discussion can focus on policies and institutions that promote coordination on better outcomes. Use: This experiment can be used in introductory economics to teach concepts of team production and coordination and in intermediate microeconomics to teach game-theoretic concepts of Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality. Time required: Five minutes for reading instructions, 20 minutes for decision making, and about 15 minutes for discussion. Materials: You will need one or more decks of playing cards, each deck accommodating 26 people. One copy of the instructions should be made for each person. Payment to a randomly selected individual is optional and will require about a dollar or two.     

ECONOMIC GROWTH, CONVERGENCE CLUBS, AND THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT

This paper aims to show and test the existence of a povertytrap linked to the development of the banking sector. Our theoreticalmodel exhibits multiple steady state equilibria due to a reciprocalexternality between the banking sector and the real sector.Growth in the real sector causes the financial market to expand,thereby increasing banking competition and efficiency. In return,the development of the banking sector raises the net yield onsavings and enhances capital accumulation and growth. The aimof our econometric tests is to check the existence of multiplesteady states associated with financial and educational development.     

Monetary and Fiscal Theories of the Price Level: The Irreconcilable Differences

The fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) has attracted muchattention but disagreement remains concerning its defining characteristics.Some writers have emphasized implications regarding interest-ratepegging and determinacy of rational expectations solutions,whereas others have stressed its capacity to generate equilibriain which price-level trajectories mimic those of bonds and differdrastically from those of money supplies. We argue that theFTPL attained prominence precisely because it appeared to providea theory whose implications differ greatly from conventionalmonetary analysis; accordingly we review monetarist writingsto identify the primary distinctions. In addition, we reviewrecent findings concerning learnability—and thereforeplausibility—of competing rational expectations equilibria.These indicate that when FTPL and monetarist equilibria differ,the latter are more plausible in the vast majority of cases.Under Ricardian assumptions, necessary for clear distinctions,theoretical analysis indicates that fiscal and monetary coordinationis not necessary for macroeconomic stability. Footnotes ¹ E-mail addresses: bmccallum{at}cmu.edu; edward.nelson{at}stls.frb.org     

Agricultural productivity, trade, and industrialisation

Traditional development economics states that industrialisationmust be positively correlated with agricultural developmentas in the American and many European cases. However, some recentindustrialisation experiences suggests a negative link whichcan be supported by a simple Ricardian argument Yet this argumentis not consistent with the agricultural ‘leap forward’that often occurred before industrialisation took place. Here,we develop a model in which, for a closed economy, industrialisationfollows rising agricultural productivity. For a small open economy,multiple equilibria are possible and industrialisation tendsto be associated with low agricultural productivity, but istriggered by sudden changes in it.     

Big push or big grab? Railways,government activism,and export growth in Latin America, 1865–1913

Railways were one of the main engines of the Latin American trade boom before 1914. Railway construction often required financial support from local governments, which depended on their fiscal capacity. However, since the main government revenues were trade‐related, this generated a two‐way feedback between government revenues and railways, with a potential for multiple equilibria. The empirical tests in this article support the hypothesis of such a positive two‐way relationship. The main implication of our analysis is that the build‐up of state capacity was a necessary condition for railway expansion and also, to a large extent, for export expansion in Latin America during the first globalization.     

Corruption as an Occupational Choice: Endogenous Corruption and Tax Policy

Corruption is endemic in many countries, and empirical studies have demonstrated how it impacts on macroeconomic indicators. Theoretical studies have generally assumed an exogenously given proportion of the population are corrupt or that the public sector is fixed in size; far fewer explore how corruption emerges endogenously. We endogenize corruption as an occupational choice. Workers choose private or public employment; public employees can be honest or corrupt. Corruption is subject to a social sanction that results in a loss of self-esteem. Those who care little about the social sanction choose to be corrupt. When a firm meets a corrupt public employee it pays a bribe to secure a reduction in the tax rate. The economy has two self-sustaining equilibria with different levels of corruption. Corruption reduces tax revenue and the tax rate that maximizes revenue. An increase in the social sanction reduces corruption but also reduces tax revenues if the economy is in a high-corruption equilibrium. Paying a wage premium to public sector workers can result in all public sector workers being corrupt. Public sector audits to detect corrupt workers always reduce corruption but can only increase welfare when they are cheap to conduct and the economy is in a low-corruption equilibrium.     

Indeterminacy in a forward-looking regime switching model

This paper considers the properties of Markov switching rational expectations (MSRE) models. We discuss possible solution concepts for MSRE models, distinguishing between stationary and bounded equilibria. For the case of models with one variable we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness of a bounded equilibrium and we relate this condition to an alternative, the "generalized Taylor principle," suggested by Davig and Leeper. We provide examples of models with multiple bounded and multiple stationary equilibria which suggest that it might be more difficult to rule out non-fundamental equilibria in MSRE models than in the single regime case where the Taylor principle is known to guarantee local uniqueness.     

宏观经济不确定性、融资约束与企业现金持有行为——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文建立一个简化的存货缓冲模型来形式化管理者的现金持有决策,并基于中国非金融类上市公司2001-2009年间的面板数据,考察不同融资约束条件下宏观经济不确定性对企业现金持有行为的影响。研究发现,宏观经济不确定性对企业的现金持有水平具有显著的正向影响;相比于低融资约束的公司,高融资约束公司的现金持有水平对宏观经济不确定性变化具有更高的敏感性。研究结果有助于增进对中国制度情境下企业流动性需求行为的理解。