影子银行与金融危机

本文认为,此次全球金融危机的根源在于回购市场挤提引起的银行恐慌。机构投资者是回购市场的需求者,他们向影子银行“存款”,影子银行则以资产抵押支持证券保证“存款”的安全。当证券化资产的折价率大幅提高时,就出现了回购市场挤提,引起银行恐慌,从而导致了此次全球金融危机。     

影子银行:“带着枷锁起舞”

能量巨大的市场"游商"什么是影子银行?可能在此次危机之前鲜有人知。但是,一场全球金融危机,影子银行终于从隐身幕后的"影子"走到台前,其"知名度"空前远播。到底什么是影子银行?其实"影子银行"这一说法并不正统,并没有什么规范的定义,只是一种形象的比     

国际上关于影子银行监测和监管的探索

金融危机后,全球就加强对影子银行的监测、监管进行了广泛探讨。金融稳定理事会以欧美国家的影子银行体系为蓝本,研究提出了系列建设性建议,如将“广覆盖”、“窄聚焦”和“深评估”作为监测框架建设的要点,削弱银行同影子银行实体的关联,加强对货币市场基金和资产证券化业务的监管等。我国的金融结构和市场发展阶段决定了我国影子银行体系的独特性,应立足本国实际,加强监管,防范风险。     

国际金融危机后欧盟对影子银行体系的监管及启示

21世纪以来,随着监管的放松以及金融创新的不断出现,影子银行体系迅速壮大,成为金融体系的重要参与主体。有研究表明,此次金融危机并非源自于传统的商业银行体系,而是肇始于"影子银行体系"(Shadow Banking System)的坍塌。金融危机爆发后,国际社会相继推出一系列完善影子银行体系监管的改革方案,欧盟作为全球主要经济体,推出了一系列对影子银行监管措施。尽管当前我国影子银行体系发展仍相对滞后,但是欧盟的改革对于构建我国监管框架具有启示作用。     

影子银行的发展及其监管

自上个世纪末以来,影子银行快速发展,资产规模已接近传统银行体系。影子银行的风险被认为是造成2008年全球金融危机的重要原因,各国和国际金融机构近年纷纷出台加强影子银行监管的措施,试图改变过去监管缺失的状态。和国外影子银行以资产证券化为核心不同,我国影子银行的主要功能是作为融资渠道。因此,我国要借鉴国外影子发展和监管的经验,正确看待影子银行的作用,引导其规范发展并将其作为银行体系的有益补充。     

论影子银行的作用机制及对我国的启示

全球金融危机爆发以来,影子银行的快速发展及其作用影响引起了广泛关注。文章从影子银行的基本概念着手,通过从理论上分析影子银行的作用机制,结合中国影子银行发展背景及现状,提出规范我国影子银行发展的五点建议。     

论影子银行的作用机制及对我国的启示

全球金融危机爆发以来,影子银行的快速发展及其作用影响引起了广泛关注。文章从影子银行的基本概念着手,通过从理论上分析影子银行的作用机制,结合中国影子银行发展背景及现状,提出规范我国影子银行发展的五点建议。     

影子银行：“带着枷锁起舞”

能量巨大的市场”游商什么是影子银行7可能在此次危机之前鲜有人知。但是,一场全球金融危机,影子银行终于从隐身幕后的“影子”走到台前,其“知名度”空前远播。到底什么是影子银行7其实“影子银行“这一说法并不正统,并没有什么规范的定义,只是一种形象的比喻。它指的是没有挂银行之名却具有银行之实的信用中介体系。显然,既然为“影子”,其若有若无的特征很容易为人忽视。打个比方,在一个集中的“市场”里．金融监管者是市场管理员,正规的金融机构就是市场“摊贩“,管理员对“摊贩”的管理相对集中和主动,而影子银行．     

对存款保险的功能、国际经验与制度设计的思考

存款保险制度作为公共金融稳定网的重要环节,在保护小额存款人利益、防止银行挤提与恐慌等方面具有重要作用.存款保险制度的实施会产生道德风险与逆向选择等问题,但可以通过对存款保险制度的合理设计来减少或避免.分析世界各国实施存款保险制度的基本情况,总结国际上存款保险制度成功实施的经验,在此基础上,结合国情提出设计中国存款保险制度的一些看法.     

为金融体系铺设一张安全网——基于台湾存款保险制度经验

建立存款保险制度的目的是为金融体系提供一张安全网,防止存款者因个别金融机构倒闭而对其它金融机构失去信心,由此导致挤兑,引发银行恐慌和金融危机。真正意义上的存款保险制度产生于20世纪30年代。我国台湾地区于1982年颁布了《存款保险条例》,由台湾"财政部"     

Shadow Banking,Risk Transfer,and Financial Stability

Shadow banking is the process by which banks raise funds from and transfer risks to entities outside the traditional commercial banking system. Many observers blamed the sudden expansion in 2007 of U.S. sub‐prime mortgage market disruptions into a global financial crisis on a “liquidity run” that originated in the shadow banking system and spread to commercial banks. In response, national and international regulators have called for tighter and new regulations on shadow banking products and participants. Preferring the term “market‐based finance” to the term “shadow banking,” the authors explore the primary financial instruments and participants that comprise the shadow banking system. The authors review the 2007–2009 period and explain how runs on shadow banks resulted in a liquidity crisis that spilled over to commercial banks, but also emphasize that the economic purpose of shadow banking is to enable commercial banks to raise funds from and transfer risks to non‐bank institutions. In that sense, the shadow banking system is a shock absorber for risks that arise within the commercial banking system and are transferred to a more diverse pool of non‐bank capital instead of remaining concentrated among commercial banks. The article also reviews post‐crisis regulatory initiatives aimed at shadow banking and concludes that most such regulations could result in a less stable financial system to the extent that higher regulatory costs on shadow banks like insurance companies and asset managers could discourage them from participating in shadow banking. And the net effect of this regulation, by limiting the amount of market‐based capital available for non‐bank risk transfer, may well be to increase the concentrations of risk in the banking and overall financial system.     

国际影子银行体系的风险监管改革与启示

影子银行体系的超常规发展和信用扩张,是全球金融危机爆发的重要原因之一。本文从影子银行体系的内涵、运作机制展开研究,分析危机后西方主要国家有关的金融监管改革举措,并结合中国影子银行体系的现状提出有关建议。     

影子银行对货币政策的影响

随着2007年全球金融危机爆发,学界和社会公众再度提高对金融监管与宏观货币政策的重视。影子银行是金融创新的产物,在给资本市场和产品市场带来活力的同时也使得人们更加关注影子银行对货币市场和货币政策的影响。本文基于信用与宏观经济学理论并利用中国化宏观数据进行论证,将市场利率划分为商业银行体系利率与影子银行体系利率并以贷款基准利率作为商业银行的总体利率,以一年期国债到期收益率作为影子银行利率,以市盈利率作为整个经济体系的实际利率,并利用线性回归给出三者间的关系。结果表明我国的影子银行在一定程度上可以起到降低社会总体融资成本、促进经济增长的作用,但也给物价和金融稳定施加一定的压力,在短期内会加快我国的货币流通速度,降低我国货币政策有效性。     

Did the financial crisis affect the market valuation of large systemic U.S. banks?

We examine the impact of the financial crisis on the stock market valuation of large and systemic U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs). Using the Bertsatos and Sakellaris (2016) model of fundamental valuation of bank equity, we provide evidence that the financial crisis has not altered investors’ attitudes towards bank characteristics. In particular, before, during, and after the crisis, investors in large and systemic U.S. BHCs seemed to penalize leverage, albeit temporarily. Both before and after the crisis, they reward size in the short run. This pattern is appearing only briefly during the crisis. We also show that bank opacity plays no role in market valuation either in the short run or in the long run. Last but not least, we find evidence that stress testing has been informative to the market and that those BHCs that failed at the post-crisis stress tests were not subsequently valued differently by the market.     

Money Market Reform in Korea and Its Effects on the Overnight Call–Repurchase Agreement Rate

The Korean government implemented money market reform after the global financial crisis, aiming to develop the repurchase agreement (RP, repo) market. In this article, I analyze the reform and its effects on money markets. Results show that the reform strengthened the functionality of the RP market and the monetary policy transmission channel to it. The error correction model indicates that although the adjustments to the equilibrium occurred through the call rate during the global financial crisis, they were processed through the RP rate in later periods. The ability of the RP rate to inform market liquidity conditions has improved.     

中国式影子银行监管的新思维

"影子银行系统"是一个新鲜的概念,由2007年美国次贷危机诱发的全球金融危机引发了国际社会对影子银行系统的广泛关注。当前关于影子银行系统的认识仍然处于基础阶段,大部分文献探讨的是欧美发达国家的影子银行体系以及如何对其进行监测或监管。本文对欧美发达国家的影子银行体系与中国影子银行体系的不同进行深入地对比分析,认为中国的影子银行体系有其独有的环境和特点,提出对我国影子银行体系的监管应当采取规范引导为主和分类化监管的新思维。     

Shadow Banks and Macroeconomic Instability

We develop a macroeconomic model in which commercial banks can offload risky loans to a “shadow” banking sector, and financial intermediaries trade in securitized assets. The model can account both for the business cycle comovement between output, traditional bank, and shadow bank credit, and for the behavior of macroeconomic variables in a liquidity crisis centered on shadow banks. We find that following a liquidity shock, stabilization policy aimed solely at the market in securitized assets is relatively ineffective.     

The market reaction to debt announcements: UK evidence surrounding the global financial crisis

We examine the stock market response to announcements of public, bank and privately placed debt issuance by large UK firms surrounding the global financial crisis of 2008. Prior to the crisis, we find that stock prices respond positively to announcements of bank debt issuance only. This is restricted to the sub-sample of syndicated bank loans and this is suggestive of the certification from multiple lenders conveying a signal of creditworthiness. We find that abnormal returns on the announcement of bank loans have declined since the financial crisis, both in absolute terms and in comparison to alternative borrowing sources. Overall, our results suggest that surrounding the global financial crisis of 2008, bank loans have become less informative as a signal of the creditworthiness of borrowing firms.     

Securitized banking and the run on repo

The panic of 2007–2008 was a run on the sale and repurchase market (the repo market), which is a very large, short-term market that provides financing for a wide range of securitization activities and financial institutions. Repo transactions are collateralized, frequently with securitized bonds. We refer to the combination of securitization plus repo finance as “securitized banking” and argue that these activities were at the nexus of the crisis. We use a novel data set that includes credit spreads for hundreds of securitized bonds to trace the path of the crisis from subprime-housing related assets into markets that had no connection to housing. We find that changes in the LIB-OIS spread, a proxy for counterparty risk, were strongly correlated with changes in credit spreads and repo rates for securitized bonds. These changes implied higher uncertainty about bank solvency and lower values for repo collateral. Concerns about the liquidity of markets for the bonds used as collateral led to increases in repo haircuts, that is the amount of collateral required for any given transaction. With declining asset values and increasing haircuts, the US banking system was effectively insolvent for the first time since the Great Depression.